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SIX THEORIES OF MIND

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TO
JOHN DEWEY
AND
GEORGE H. MEAD

PREFACE

THE pages which follow were originally intended to form the first part of a larger work on the topic of mind. The pages, however, multiplied in an unseemly fashion, and came to assume somewhat the character of a separate work. The present study has deepened the initial conviction as to the fruitfulness of the identification of mind with the symbolic process, and it is planned to follow this historical and comparative treatment with the development of a general theory of symbolism and its application to the nature of mind.

Six dominant types of theory of mind are examined critically in successive chapters. No claim to completeness or finality in treatment can be made, but it is believed that these chapters do reveal the main articulation of this province of thought, and exhibit the cultural and philosophical dialectic which has resulted in the present dominance of functional theories of mind.

I am indebted to President Edgar Odell Lovett of the Rice Institute for permission to use portions of a study entitled "The Nature of Mind" which appeared in the *Rice Institute Pamphlet* of 1929, and to the editors of the *Journal of Philosophy* for permission to reprint, with some modifications, the pages on Mr. Whitehead. Professors Radoslav A. Tsanoff, Edwin A. Burtt, and G. Watts Cunningham have given me the benefit of their careful reading of the first two chapters, with the exception of the pages on Gentile and Leibniz. My deepest thanks must go to John Laird, Arthur O. Lovejoy, Charles A. Strong, Bertrand Russell, and John Dewey for valuable corrections and com-

ments, and for their often elaborate analyses of the pages and chapters centering around their views. It is due to them that some errors have been avoided, and some strata men left untouched. The changes demanded by Mr. Lovejoy's comments were so extensive that the present discussion of his views cannot be said to have passed under his eyes. The kindness and acumen of these men have been commensurate with their eminence. Some of their reactions have been embodied in the text, and some have been inserted as footnotes. Mr. John Dewey has allowed me to state his acceptance of the presentation and interpretation of his views given in chapter vi, "Mind as Function." Notes in this chapter denoted by letters of the alphabet instead of numerals are additions to the manuscript since Mr. Dewey's reading. Mr. Bertrand Russell's restatement of his analysis of mind has been inserted bodily in the chapter on "Mind as Relation."

Miss Vivian Vieweger has considerably lightened the more burdensome aspects of manuscript preparation.

Two young ladies of different ages, one sharing my name and the other my blood, have constantly kept before academic eyes the living reality of mind.

CHARLES W. MORRIS

March, 1932

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CHAPTER I

MIND AS SUBSTANCE

I. PRIMITIVE CONCEPTIONS OF MIND

IN THE manner of Hegel, it might be said that there have been three "moments" in the history of speculation concerning mind: a period in which mind and nature are only vaguely conceived and vaguely differentiated; a period in which mind and nature are regarded as different in kind and as sharply separated and opposed; and a period in which the effort is to restore, at a more complex level, the intimate connection of mind and nature with which thought began. While these periods overlap, and traces of the earliest speculations concerning mind continue to the present day, just as suggestions of the most recent theories can be found in very early stages of thought, it may in general be said that the history of thought concerning the nature of mind is indicated by a passage from the first, through the second, to the third of the foregoing "moments."

In tracing this historical passage, it will be evident that while all the typical approaches to the problem of mind appear in the historical development preceding the contemporary period (the functional view alone might plausibly claim to represent a distinctly novel point of view), these various approaches appear as defenses of or reactions to the conception of mind as substance which dominates the whole history of thought. The rise and development of this conception of mind as substance and the difficulties

which this view meets form the themes of the present chapter. While much of the material to be considered is the familiar subject matter of the history of philosophy, the basic importance of the substance view of mind for all later speculation makes it advisable to throw this historical material into the perspective of the present problem. No attempt will be made to use concepts of greater precision than those used at the stage of thought being considered, so that the scrutiny of certain of the concepts here used without analysis must be left for the discussions of later chapters.

Early man made no sharp separation between himself and his mind and the rest of the world in which he dwelled. Man only becomes vividly conscious of himself and of his reflective processes in the course of a long evolution, in which, as a result of a continual struggle demanded by the search for a more secure existence, he is forced to pay attention to himself and to the intellectual tools upon which so much of his fate depends. The attitude of primitive man makes no sharp distinction between mind and nature, between a private subjective life of consciousness and an outward world of corporeal events. There is no formulated problem as to how mind and nature can interact, or how mind can know a world that is not mind. Similarly, in the early stages of human thought, there is no sharp opposition within religious ideology or practice of an immaterial spiritual soul to the physical body. Indeed, the soul begins its career as the breath of life which distinguishes the living organism from the corpse. This breath continued on after death, retaining its longing for the body. It lived on in the grave, demanding food, and hovering about the body, so elaborately preserved and duplicated by the Egyptians as to provide a fit habitation for the breath of life. The "soul" continued as a bloodless shade, or when re-embodied lived

a glorified earth-life: strong, vigorous, blessed with male children, feasting, enjoying concubines, fighting the good fight. It is some such picture of the relation of soul (or souls) to the body which is reflected in the poems of Homer, in the Rig Veda, in the Pyramid Texts, in the literature of pre-prophetic Israel, and in the early Teutonic writings.¹

When attention is turned to the "lispings" (as Aristotle would say) of early philosophers, a similar situation is found. There is encountered no awareness of the problem of knowledge, no opposition of mind and the world. Mind is not regarded as a private isolated substance, but as the principle of motion and order of the world. The most distinctive feature of the earliest sayings about mind is precisely their lack of psychological orientation. The Logos or World-Reason is objective mind, and it is not at all unlikely that this notion was formed on the analogy of the concept of soul as the breath of life. Anaximenes specifically held that "just as our soul which is air holds us together, so it is breath and air that encompasses the whole world."² In Burnet's words, air was held to be "the life of the world, just as the breath was the life of the body."³ Heraclitus hints at a Reason which guides all things.⁴ Parmenides, in the often quoted but ambiguous statement that "it is

¹ See Rohde's *Psyche*; A. E. Crawley's *The Idea of the Soul*; the article on "Soul" in Hastings' *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*; P. Radin's *Primitive Man as Philosopher*. The last volume shows well the pluralistic character of early conceptions: the notion of a soul, like that of one God, is only gradually attained. It is interesting to remember that the Hebrew-Christian tradition has retained the doctrine of the resurrection of the body. The foregoing sketch should make clear the fact that the materialist's notion of the finality of death is a concept of late origin.

² Bakewell, *Source Book in Ancient Philosophy*, p. 7.

³ *The Socratic Doctrine of the Soul* (British Academy, 1916), p. 19. It will be noticed later that Plato continues to think of soul as the principle of motion both in the body and in the world at large.

⁴ Bakewell, *op. cit.*, p. 32, frag. 72.

the same thing that can be thought and that can be," vaguely suggests a doctrine that some have regarded as the prototype of the absolute idealisms. Empedocles¹ says of God: "He is only mind, sacred and ineffable mind, flashing through the universe with swift thoughts." Perhaps the most interesting of the early references is the famous statement of Anaxagoras,² which is of historical importance because of its influence upon Plato: "Mind is infinite and self-ruled and is mixed with nothing. . . . It is the thinnest of all things and the purest, and it possesses all knowledge and the greatest power. . . . Over all is mind the ruler. And over the whole revolving universe mind held sway, so that it caused it to revolve in the beginning." In this statement, which deserves to be read in full, there is evident the emotional glorification of mind, the absence of a sharp distinction between mind and nature, and the use of mind as the ultimate principle of motion.

In the fragments of the early period of Greek thought that may be called psychological, the problem of the relation of thought to the presented world is touched upon in the unsystematic way that is inevitable at a time when necessary distinctions are only beginning to appear. On the one hand, Aristotle writes that the atomists identified sense and reason,³ and the Sophists made a similar identification;⁴ on the other hand, in Parmenides and Democritus there is, for quite different reasons, a separation of thought and sense with a depreciation

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 46, frag. 134.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 51, 52, frag. 12. Plato's dissatisfaction in the *Phaedo* with Anaxagoras' failure to utilize mind consistently as an explanation of movement emphasizes the absence of a sharp separation between mind and natural processes in the thought of Anaxagoras: while mind is the "purest" of all things, it is also the "thinnest."

³ *De anima* i, 404.

⁴ Windelband, *A History of Philosophy*, p. 62.

of the latter. On the psychological side, the early Greek thinkers either failed to discriminate between mental processes and the data of sense or else radically opposed them.

In this way a double problem of mind arises: metaphysically, the relation of mind as a principle of movement to the processes of nature; psychologically, the relation of mind to the phenomena of the so-called world of sense. Neither of these problems is adequately met by even Plato or Aristotle, and both are passed on by Greek thinkers to those of later times. -

2. SUBSTANCE AND SUBSTANTIVE

There are many factors which led to the appearance of the second historical moment in which mind is conceived as a substance different in kind from physical nature.

It is very difficult to define adequately the term "substance" because of the diverse and complex connotations of the term. This very ambiguity is perhaps sufficient reason for the present widespread attempt to avoid the concept whenever possible. It is possible, however, to distinguish roughly an empirical and a metaphysical use of the term. No one doubts empirically that there are, in some sense of the word, things which have assignable attributes or characteristics. McTaggart defines a substance as that which exists and "has qualities and is related, without being a quality or a relation."¹ There are, no doubt, substances in this sense; the question is rather whether such a view does not admit too much into the class of substances. As McTaggart states, all data of perception, a party at whist, and the group of all red-haired archdeacons become instances of substances.² It is to be noted that on this view the capacity for persistence through time, and

¹ *The Nature of Existence*, I, 68.

² *Ibid.*, p. 73. Chap vi, Book II, Vol. I, deals with substance.

the character of independence or self-sufficiency, are not involved in the definition of substance.

These latter characteristics, however, are the ones singled out by Broad in his references to substance: "An existent is more of a substance the longer it lasts and the less dependent it is on anything else," that is, "endurance and capacity for independent existence" may be taken "as two tests for substantiality."¹ Whatever the final merits of McTaggart's position, Broad's observations seem to fit in better with common usage (consider the meaning of the adjective "substantial," and the reasons why breathing would not ordinarily be called a substance), and they are certainly essential in those historical usages of the term which are of significance in the present survey.

Höffding remarks that Descartes employed the term "substance" to stand for a self-sufficient and independent reality that is the bearer of attributes,² thus uniting the two main uses of the term. When substance is regarded as a substratum which upholds and unites qualities without being itself a quality or a combination of qualities, the passage has been made from an empirical to a metaphysical use of the term. Thus McTaggart is insistent that a set of qualities cannot be substituted for the substance. While there are no qualities without substances and no substances apart from their qualities, the substance is not thereby swallowed up by the qualities, since "it does not follow that A is nothing at all, because it could be nothing out of relation to B."³ Thus while ontologically no sub-

¹ *The Mind and Its Place in Nature*, pp. 31, 33.

² *A History of Modern Philosophy*, English trans., I, 236, 237.

³ *Op. cit.*, I, 70. According to McTaggart, the qualities cannot be substituted for the substance. "We predicate of Smith, for example, that he is happy. Let us take wisdom, goodness, consciousness, and happiness as constituting his whole nature. Now when we say that Smith is happy, we certainly cannot substitute for Smith any or all of those qualities. We do not mean that wisdom, or that

stance without qualities could exist, logically the substance must be distinguished from the attributes. While the empirical use of the term "substance" merely refers to the fact that there are "thats" which have qualities and relations, the metaphysical use of the term postulates a substratum which bears the attributes but which is not itself a part of or the whole of the class of attributes. This distinction may be indicated by the distinction between substantive and substance, as used by Arthur E. Murphy. On this view the substantive and its characters cannot exist apart or have any meaning apart from each other. "The relation of adjective to substance is a one-way affair; that to substantive is reciprocal."¹ A substance is "a bifurcated substantive." A substantive is what we have called an empirical substance; a substance, involving the passage to an unobserved substratum, we have called a metaphysical substance. An empirical substance or substantive has some degree of independence and duration but is not divisible into substratum and attributes as is a substance. With this terminology the two main uses of the term "substance" are clearly distinguished: "substance" involving a

goodness, or that consciousness is happy. . . . In the same way, we cannot mean that the aggregate of wisdom and goodness and consciousness is happy" (*ibid.*, p. 67). Perhaps not, but neither need we mean that over and above all the qualities there remains a substance Smith. If one is to talk in terms of an aggregate of qualities, it may simply be held that the aggregate of qualities *includes* happiness, instead of holding that the qualities singly or collectively *are* happy. It may, however, be admitted that a thing is not merely an *aggregate* of the qualities into which it can be analyzed, without holding that there is a substratum in addition to the discriminable qualities or attributes. Such an alternative will be discussed in a later chapter.

¹ "Substance and Substantive," *The Problem of Substance*, "University of California Publications in Philosophy," IX, 66. An able criticism of the concept of substance and defense of the concept of substantive is found in Roy W. Sellars' article, "Critical Realism and Substance," *Mind*, N.S., XXXVIII (1929), 473-88. An analysis of the nature of a substantive—though still called substance—that is acceptable to the present writer is found in Laird's *Problems of the Self*, chaps. xii and xiii.

substratum as well as independence and duration; "substantive" not implying the existence of a substratum in addition to the capacities of independence and continued existence.

The main historical uses of the term "substance" have certainly been of the metaphysical type. If it be added that kinds of substances have been distinguished, each substance possessing what Broad has called a differentiating attribute, and that of these kinds material and immaterial substances have played the most prominent part in philosophical discussion, the main historical use of the term "substance" when applied to mind can be characterized as follows: A mind is an immaterial "that," capable of continued and independent existence, and analyzable into qualities and a substratum which has relations and supports these qualities, without itself being a relation or quality or sum of qualities.

3. THE GENESIS OF THE CONCEPT OF SUBSTANCE

The idea of substance is empirically derived, by idealization, from the semipermanent things of common life, from the food that is eaten, the timbers that are fashioned for a multitude of uses, the persons who help and hinder our desires. A whole group of such "thats" gets to be set off as "material," partly because they can be grappled with and transported, and finally weighed and measured. About the common-sense status of such empirical substances or substantives, there is no question. Material substantives are to some degree independent of each other: one such object can be moved or destroyed without any easily noticeable effect on other such objects. And such objects clearly retain an identity through a period of time. It required no great order of imagination to conceive, as did the early

atomists, of material objects which would endure throughout time and which would persist unchanged even if the remainder of the universe were destroyed. Such an extension and idealization of empirically founded concepts characterizes the entire history of human thought in all its domains. ✓

Just why such things should have been thought of as substances rather than as substantives is a more difficult matter. Many considerations may have entered to account for the bifurcation of a thing into substratum and attributes: the opposition of one appearing quality to the other absent characters; the desire for the permanent, as one chapter in the quest for certainty; the misleading suggestion of language that a constant name implies a constant referent, and so on. But two considerations seem of greater moment. A substantive is describable as an identity in difference, and it is easy to transform a "sameness for certain purposes or under certain criteria" into an absolute sameness independent of purpose and criterion. This is particularly true when the purposes and criteria involved are determined by the normal use of the thing in question. One's house is the "same" house from day to day, since its use is relatively constant, but it is not the "same" house to a theoretical physicist whose purposes would specify different criteria to determine sameness. It is natural to take the character of an object which satisfies a dominant use or criterion as its "essence," and to contrast this as the core or substratum with the nonessential qualities, that is, with those qualities not relevant to the purpose at hand. In the second place, it is only aspects of objects which are given or which are attended to, so that the conception tends to arise that a thing is a set of qualities or characters. But this suggestion is in conflict with the obvious wholeness of the object, and this conflict is met by assuming that the

principle of cohesion among the attributes is to be found in an identical substratum which has the attributes but which is not reducible to them. Such reasoning forgets that an aspect or quality of a thing is an abstracted or discriminated feature of a determinate whole (to use a phrase of Sellars), so that a determinate whole is not an aggregate of events which must be held together, nevertheless, combined with the erection of the sameness-for-a-certain-dominant-purpose into an absolute identity, it helps to account for the passage from substantives as determinate wholes to the substratum-attribute mode of thought.

Once the concept of substance had become established, it was natural to conceive of existences which would have endurance and independence without having the differentiating attribute of materiality, and which could not therefore be weighed or handled. There are many considerations which throw light upon this extension of the category of substance (an extension noticed by Schopenhauer), and upon the widespread attempt to conceive of mind as such an immaterial substance. Such a tendency is especially congenial to Western thought, and reaches classic expression in Plato and Descartes. Its most fundamental and pervasive form is found in the world-view of Christianity. Some of the general reasons for this tendency to interpret mind as an immaterial substance suggest themselves immediately.

Western thought reveals a strong tendency either to identify mind and soul or to make mind the thinking aspect of the soul. There is in many languages a close connection between the words for mind and soul: *ψυχή*, *spiritus*, *esprit*, *spirito*, *Geist*. In thinkers nourished by the philosophical traditions of the West, it has been an almost constant assumption that the soul is the knower and thinker, the soul often being regarded as an alien visitor in the realm of

matter. In this way a characteristic pattern of Western culture has found its reflection in a theory of mind. •

However, this reference to the soul merely pushes back the problem. No adequate account of the origin of the concept of the soul is possible in this study, but it is clear that some of the causes for the treatment of soul as immaterial also account for the analogous theory of mind. Among the many considerations which could be noted, the following may be mentioned. There is, in the first place, an observable difference, however explained, between acts of thought and such bodily activities as walking and eating. Thought is swift and subtle and wondrous in its happenings. The mere experience of the difference between thinking and material objects provides a basis for recognizing other forms of reality than the material. This basis is extended, in the second place, by noting the complex phenomena of recognition, of memory, of self-consciousness, of dreams, of illusions, of emotions, and a host of other such experiences which are still, for the most part, without adequate explanation. Such experiences accentuate the felt difference between the thinking self and the surrounding world of known and encountered physical objects. Further, there arises within the self, because of its social and developmental nature, a felt distinction between the present self and the self that is coming into being, between the "lower" selfish desires and the socially approved "higher" desires. Couple such considerations with the experience of unity and personal identity, and with the earlier recognition of a breath of life which animated the body and which entered and left it, and the ground is laid for the conception of a substantial immaterial soul. It is true that the world that is given for observation is not exhausted by material objects, since such objects are a discriminated class of observed contents. Since thinkers had not hesitated to speak

of the material object as a substance, there was no barrier to thinking of another kind of substance, the soul, which had for its attributes the activities of knowing, thinking, feeling, willing, and the like. In this way the felt unity and organization of the non-material aspects of the experienced world were explained by an extension of the substance-attribute pattern of thought which had received its formulation in dealing with material things.¹ Thus, based upon an undeniable experiential foundation, there arose the conception of a soul substance, capable in its unity of independent continuous existence, and different in kind from the body it inhabits and the world of material things in which it dwells.

4. PLATO AND THE SUBSTANCE TRADITION

In the Greek world, this way of thinking about mind appears in the Socratic-Platonic-Aristotelian tradition, in which the problem of universals first arises vividly in the focus of attention. Men talk of "whiteness," of "man," of "justice," of "circles," and yet the objects of direct experience are, at the best, only white things, specific men, just acts, and things approximately circular. It is evident that thought and sense, things thought of and things sensed, are not identical, as the Sophists had argued. The superstructure that was raised upon this undeniable foundation only introduces new difficulties. Plato himself was first of all a moralist, and felt that if everything is in flux no knowledge is possible, and that without knowledge morality is lost. Intoxicated by the ethical relevancy of the So-

¹ One of the merits of Spaulding's work, *The New Rationalism*, is the exhibition of the place which the substance-attribute pattern of thought, based on the model of the material thing, has played in determining major philosophical conceptions, and the demonstration of how a new logic not dominated by this pattern leads into alternative modes of thought (such as the conception of neutral events relationally organized) which are free from enslavement to the material-mental dichotomy of substances.

cratic "discovery" of universals, and without entering into a detailed analytical discussion of how these universals are related to the things of sense and action, Plato, at one stage of his thinking at least (whatever the significance of the later and continual modification), passed to the conclusion that there must exist a realm of objects that are not transitory, and which make possible the existence of genuine knowledge. In the history of philosophy this class of objects has been designated the Platonic realm of Ideas. However these Ideas or Forms be interpreted, they were not for Plato mental states, but were rather the objects of mind in knowledge.¹

For Plato's treatment of mind, then, the search must be carried on elsewhere. As early as the sixth century B.C., Burnet writes, Greece had been subject to religious influences which had separated the soul from the body, and had set up rites for the soul's purification and release. To the Orphics, souls were divine gods confined to the mortal body in punishment for earlier sin. Socrates had turned the attention of his followers to the care of their souls, regarding the soul as "whatever it is in us that has knowledge or ignorance, goodness or badness."² The Socratic emphasis was not on the separableness of the soul from the body, but on its intellectual and moral purification. The Orphic opposition between soul and body, cleansed in the light of Socratic sanity, is found in Plato's *Phaedo*.

¹ The hand of the substance conception is present even in the distinction between the Forms or Ideas and things. The Forms are really immaterial substances, the essences of the things which participate in them. The individual exemplifications stand to Forms somewhat in the relation of attribute to substratum, and analogous difficulties appear in both cases.

² Burnet, *op. cit.*, p. 25. The entire thought of the paragraph is lifted from Burnet's lecture. It may be noticed that Socrates relates the soul to knowledge and moral excellence, a connection not found in the more primitive and pluralistic doctrine of the soul as breath. More and more phenomena are unified through the soul, until it finally stands alone and indivisible before the material world.

In this dialogue the body is described as a prison-house of the soul, which is, because of its incarnation, "only able to view existence through the bars of a prison, and not in her own nature."¹ The sense world is in some degree a hindrance to knowledge, and at best a stimulus to knowledge, so that the tendency to set off sense from the realm of thought is clearly in evidence: "Thought is best when the mind is gathered into herself, . . . when she has as little as possible to do with the body."² When the soul so reflects "she passes into the realm of purity, and eternity, and immortality, and unchangeableness," this realm of unchanging things being only perceptible by "the mind."³

Plato has thus, in this dialogue at least, aggravated the rupture between thought and sense, and it seems just to say that this rupture is not remedied elsewhere. The mind has become an activity of the soul, whose content is not exhausted by such mental activity.⁴ Thinking has become the conversation of the soul with herself: "The soul when thinking appears to me to be just talking—asking questions of herself and answering them, affirming and denying."⁵ It is the soul that knows and thinks, and this immaterial substantial immortal soul, when the soul of a human being inclosed in a finite body, is in an alien world from which it must liberate itself in order to know and to think truly.

Plato's arguments in favor of the existence of the soul took many forms. The better-known arguments are found in the *Phaedo*. In the interesting argument in the *Laws* it is insisted that since there is motion there must be a self-moved mover, for if everything required to be set in mo-

¹ *Phaedo* 82.

³ *Ibid.* 79.

² *Ibid.* 65.

⁴ *Laws* 961.

⁵ *Theaetetus* 189, 190; cf. *Sophist* 263, where the question is asked whether "thought is the unuttered conversation of the soul with herself."

tion from without there could be no way of starting motion. The soul is then defined as "the motion which can move itself."¹ In the individual the soul "holds and carries and gives life and motion to the entire nature of the body";² in the universe at large the soul is likewise the principle of movement and order. "The soul . . . is among the first of bodies and before them all, and is the chief author of their changes and transpositions."³ The soul, in brief, is "the nature which controls heaven and earth, and the whole circumference."⁴ So closely does Plato relate soul and mind that he may speak of the "mind that orders the universe,"⁵ may call it "the king of heaven and earth,"⁶ and designate it as "the ruling power."⁷ In the account of the creation of the world, God is the creator of order only and not of stuff,⁸ the world being ordered in accordance with the Ideas or Eternal Patterns, which thus remain to the end, even in the case of God, objects of mind rather than states of mind. Through God the world only becomes "a living soul and truly rational."⁹ Not as a spectator is mind conceived by early thinkers,¹⁰ but as a principle of action. Plato's thought, while accentuating the opposition of thought and thing, brings into bolder relief the earlier doctrine of mind as the source of motion. So deeply had the conception of the soul as the breath of life, the principle of motion in the individual and in the cosmos at large, sunk into the thought of mankind!

¹ *Laws* 896. Burnet suggests (*Greek Philosophy*, I, 335) that God was required to account for the circularity of the heavenly motions, i.e., a supreme soul being the correlate of the basic and perfect motions.

² *Cratylus* 400.

⁶ *Philebus* 28.

³ *Laws* 892.

⁷ *Timaeus* 48.

⁴ *Ibid.* 897.

⁸ *Ibid.* 32.

⁵ *Ibid.* 966.

⁹ *Ibid.* 30.

¹⁰ Epistemologically this statement needs serious qualification. Knowledge for Plato was a beholding of essence, a "Wesensschauung."

5. FUNCTION AND SUBSTANCE IN ARISTOTLE

Of all the great thinkers in the history of philosophy, Aristotle is the earliest opponent of the substance conception of mind. In his thought are to be found clear indications of relational and functional conceptions, indications which account for the intellectual kinship which many contemporary philosophers have felt with Aristotle. Aristotle's thought is of interest for the introduction into the speculation concerning mind of considerations which received their mature development only after a lapse of two thousand years. New realists and critical realists still find refreshment in the waters of Aristotelian thought. At the same time, it is not to be expected that a Greek and a student of Plato should completely free himself from modes of thought which dominated his age and his teacher. Even though Aristotle's tendency is to oppose a substance view of mind in his attempt to integrate mind and nature, the substance approach continually creeps into the account. The result is that mind continues to be invoked as a principle of movement and order (although a concession is made by the larger place that is given to material or efficient causation), and the valiant attempt to bridge the Platonic gap between thought and sense experience comes to naught. It is of interest to note where Aristotle avoids the substance conception of mind and where this conception enters into the course of his argument.

Even though the distinctive aspect of Aristotle's theory of mind is not couched in substantive terms, it is of course true that the concept of substance dominates his thought. The *Metaphysics*, indeed, is the first and greatest treatise on substance. Substance is there regarded as the primary category. A substance, according to Aristotle, is never present "in a subject," that is, is never an attribute but always a substratum of which attributes are predicated or

in which they inhere. It is true that Aristotle at times uses the term to stand for the whole individual thing, and at times for the essential nature of such a thing. Ross states that "this double meaning pervades Aristotle's whole treatment of substance."¹ There is a further vacillation in the use of the category to refer at times to the Form or essence,² and at times to the matter which takes on form.³ "Substance" then refers ambiguously to the determinate whole of Form and matter, to the Form, and to the matter. Neglecting this ambiguity, the important point in the present connection is that Aristotle does conceive of things as substances, as having a substratum or core in which attributes inhere. In general, Aristotle insists upon the necessity for a substratum in his philosophy of nature.

In the more naturalistic phases of his thought Aristotle regards Form and matter as correlative: Forms are always embodied in matter, and matter is always formed. The Form of living beings Aristotle calls "soul," defining it as "the first actuality of a natural body furnished with organs."⁴ The Form of a living organism is able to grasp or receive the Forms of other objects. In this analysis, Aristotle would seem to be making mind or thought merely one consummation of the processes of nature—in modern terminology, an emergent which is nothing before it emerges. He specifically notes that "what we call reason in the soul . . . is, prior to the exercise of thought, no reality at all."⁵ Mind becomes the Form of all Forms, the locus of Forms "in" the Form of a living organism.⁶ On this view there can be no "pure" thought, no thought without the content of nature present: "The soul . . . never thinks without

¹ *Aristotle*, pp. 165, 166.

⁴ *Ibid.* 1035b; Ross, *op. cit.*, p. 134.

² *Metaphysics* 1041b.

⁵ *De anima* 429a.

³ *Ibid.* 1042a.

⁶ *Ibid.* 429a, 432a.

the use of images."¹ Thinking, as the apprehension of Form, requires given content.

In this doctrine, whatever may be the difficulties in the conception of Form, there is no doubt but that mind, as characterizing a soul, is an emergent in the world-process, and not a substance differing in kind from that process. Because of its origin, mind has the closest possible relation to the body, to the objects of mind, to the social life of man, and to nature.² On this view things are not intrinsically mental, nor is there any mind apart from or before the apprehension of the Form of the thing. Hence the typically Aristotelian doctrine that the mind is the thing when it is thought, a doctrine which reappears in the writings of both new and critical realists. Mind would appear to have nothing of its own, drawing its entire content from nature. Mentality resides in the relation which the apprehended Form assumes in the presence of the Form of the apprehending organism. Just as a stone may be a paper weight in a certain situation, so it would seem that an aspect of nature gains the status of mentality by appearing as content for the Form of an apprehending organism. If the foregoing implications of Aristotle's sentences may be drawn, it is necessary to admit the presence of relational and functional elements in his conception of mind, although the failure to specify in detail the process by which Form apprehends Form makes it difficult to decide whether the relational or functional factor is dominant. In either case the position would seem to make nature open to mind, and to bridge the gap between thought and perception. But in the light of certain further aspects of the Aristotelian metaphysics, such a conclusion must be seriously qualified.

¹ *Ibid.* 431a; cf. 427b, 432a.

² The intimacy of these connections is emphasized in the treatment of Aristotle in Jascalevich's *Three Conceptions of Mind*.

The qualification is made necessary by the admission that there are some Forms that need not be embodied in matter, namely, God, the intelligences of the spheres, and a part of the human soul which Aristotle calls the "active reason." By this admission the soul in its capacity of mind is no longer regarded as one aspect of the mind-body substantive, but as an immaterial substance capable of continued and independent existence. This turn in the argument may be illustrated by a brief reference to the conceptions of God and active reason.

Aristotle's conception of God is of interest in the present connection for two reasons: God is conceived both as an unmoved mover (in place of Plato's self-moved mover) and as pure thought thinking itself. Here Form is not regarded as inseparable from the matter it forms, and thought seems to have been made an essential and not an emergent feature of the highest Form, God. In the conception of an unmoved mover, that is, of a principle which by its perfection directs the heavenly spheres, there appears again the use of soul or mind as an explanation of motion. In saying that "in all things the good is in the highest degree a principle,"¹ Aristotle approaches the Platonic principle of a single universal process determined and directed by mind. In conceiving God as thought thinking itself, Aristotle again has on his hands a metaphysically pure thought not thinking anything external to itself, not dependent upon or in indissoluble union with nature, and not requiring the slightest vestige of an image.

Even in Aristotle's psychology of the finite mind, the diremption of thought and experience is inevitable. Under the term "passive reason" Aristotle lumps together the phenomena of sensation, imagination, memory, and recol-

¹ *Metaphysics* 1075a.

lection.¹ The passive reason, which is treated quite empirically, is the matter upon which the active reason works.² The distinction between active and passive reason is somewhat akin to the usual (but loose) distinction between conception and perception. Instead of tracing empirically the process by which concepts arise and function, Aristotle deserts at this point the genuinely psychological point of view, apparently regarding the active reason as a pure form which enters into the biological process through the germ cells. This "principle of the soul," conveyed by the semen, is of two kinds: one not connected with matter and the other inseparable from it.³ In this respect the active reason is capable of separate existence, like a wax tablet as yet unwritten upon.⁴ The result is that mind, in its higher phases at least, has again been turned into a substance separable from nature, and the conceptual activity of thought has again been severed from the perceptual content. Like Plato in opposition to the Sophist, Aristotle in the last resort so emphasizes the uniqueness of thought that its relation to nature and to experience remains an enigma. In spite of the relational and functional suggestions, it is the conception of mind as substance which finally triumphs. And with this triumph Aristotle makes no more intelligible than Plato had done the relation of mind as the principle of order and motion to the ordered and moving world, or the relation of thought to the other constituents of reality. These two problems are handed down to the thinkers of later times.

¹ Hammond regards the sum of the content of the *sensus communis* as the passive reason (*Aristotle's Psychology*, p. lxxxiv).

² "Active reason stands to passive reason in the relation of form to matter" (*ibid.*, p. lxxviii).

³ *De generatione animalium* 737a.

⁴ *De anima* 430a.

6. THE BACKGROUND OF CARTESIANISM

The doctrine of mind as an immaterial substance appears in another form in Descartes, more, however, as a result of the growth of modern science than as the result of ethical or religious considerations. Nevertheless, the appearance of this position in Western speculation is a corollary of the religious development which gave a central metaphysical importance to the soul and its inner life. To mention an important consideration which has received sufficient emphasis in other hands,¹ with the breakdown of Greek culture the individual was increasingly thrown back upon his own resources, and became evermore aware of himself as a being struggling for an adjustment, a content of life, which the existing social groups could no longer supply. The reconstructed society which Plato and Aristotle built in theory was not realized in fact. While for Aristotle man had to rise to his fullest stature through participation in nature and society, by the time of Plotinus the salvation on and through the earth had given way to a salvation from the earth, "a flight of the soul isolated from all that exists to the isolation of God."

Even the Roman Stoics of the time of Christ, such as Seneca and Marcus Aurelius, frequently referred to the body as the prison-house of the soul. In spite of the empirical interests which continued in the later Peripatetics, in some of the Stoics and Epicureans, and in the Skeptics, philosophy became increasingly devoted to ethical and religious ends.

The net result of this tendency was that it favored a subjective interpretation of the categories of mind and consciousness, and brought these categories into the center of attention. Windelband has aptly characterized one aspect

¹ The importance of the process hinted at in this sentence for the history of theories of mind was brought to my attention by Professor G. H. Mead.

of the change: "The oldest science knew the soul only as one of Nature's products side by side with many others,—for Neo-Platonism the whole of nature is regarded as real only in so far as it is soul."¹

In the light of such a widespread movement, whose roots were nourished by ethical and religious needs, it is not surprising that the substance view of soul and mind increasingly dominated the course of philosophical reflection. The separation between mind and nature continues to grow during the Middle Ages, though to some degree opposed by such Aristotelian influences as found expression in Scholasticism. Augustine's reliance upon the "I doubt therefore I am" type of argument shows how natural it had become to feel that mental phenomena furnished the sole justifiable starting-point for speculation. The intellect is in itself infallible,² and truth, strictly speaking, is obtained only by the pure intellect, for the "real" world does not directly appear in experience.³ And even though Thomas Aquinas temporarily stems the tide of subjectivism by an analysis of mind and knowledge that is essentially Aristotelian in spirit, nominalism and subjectivism continually gain the ascendent, and in William of Occam there is encountered a situation strikingly prophetic of the position of Descartes in that mind is sharply separated from the domain of nature, its content never being the non-mental world itself. Mind is limited to the "signs" of things, and cannot deal with things directly.⁴ With the ontology of Christianity, and its emphasis on the world as a stage upon which was played the drama of soul-redemption, it had become ever easier to think of mind as a substance differing in essence from the world of things, and to regard the world

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 249.

² J. Martin, *Saint Augustin*, p. 36.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 265, 277.

⁴ Windelband, *op. cit.*, pp. 325, 326.

that is given for observation as "mental" and "in the mind."

Interestingly enough, this very tendency seemed at first to play into the hands of developing science. Professor Mead has insisted that the Christian soul was the contribution of religion to the embryonic movement of science. It is not difficult to see the justification of this position. Partly owing to Platonic influences, such as the geometrical aspects of the *Timaeus*, partly owing to great advances in mathematics itself, and partly owing to the lack of an adequate technique of investigation, the early science of Western Europe was given a predominantly mathematical and quantitative cast. The possession of a tool focuses the attention upon those objects upon which the tool can be used. To a young boy with a hammer those aspects of the world stand out which permit of being hammered; to the scientists in the youth of modern science the world is transformed into such objects as are susceptible to mathematical treatment. In the world as given, however, there are many contents which will not admit of such treatment. The presence of meaning, the aesthetic experience, the fact of self-consciousness, may be taken to represent such phenomena. It was natural for the richly developed Christian soul, the vehicle of mind, to become the harbor of refuge for those homeless aspects of reality which the mathematically conceived world could not accept. Mind so expanded included the entire range of immediate experience: all that is present, that is given, was labeled "mental," and assigned to mind for safekeeping; while under the influence of the view that mind and matter were substances different in kind, nature as a vast mechanico-material system became closed, or practically closed, to mind. In this way the subjectivistic tendency fostered by the religious tradition became complementary to the demands of a growing science, a re-

sult of extreme interest and of great significance for the comprehension of the course of Western thought.

7. THE CARTESIAN DUALISM

The situation sketched above is clearly reflected in Galileo's contrast of the realm of primary qualities to the realm of secondary qualities, the former being the object of knowledge, quantitative, objective, absolute, and mathematical; the latter being the realm of opinion, qualitative, subjective, relative, and sensible.¹

If it is true, as Descartes said, that he found nothing of significance in Galileo's works,² that in itself is but an additional confirmation of the fundamental significance of the view whose outline has been blocked out, for such world-views are the products of great cultural movements, and are not merely the personal idiosyncrasies of individual thinkers. Like the air that is breathed, the larger guiding assumptions of an individual thinker are least likely to operate in the focus of attention. It is only the thought of later times, equally unaware of its basic motives, that isolates the guiding doctrines of an earlier era.

Descartes in a famous sentence writes: "I was especially delighted with mathematics. . . . I was astonished that foundations, so strong and solid, should have had no loftier superstructure raised on them."³ With his conception of a "universal Mathematics"⁴ Descartes hoped to raise this superstructure. He felt that all things are mutually related in the same fashion as are the objects of geometry.⁵ In fact, the external world is conceived by Descartes as identi-

¹ E. A. Burtt, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science*, p. 73.

² Mahaffy, *Descartes*, p. 35.

³ *The Philosophical Works of Descartes*, ed. Haldane and Ross, I, 85.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 92.

cal with the object referred to and studied by geometry, and this is the significance of his otherwise incomprehensible reduction of the external world to pure extension.

It is to be noted that in this account nature has become mechanized. Were Descartes consistent, he would have to say, as both Locke and Leibniz recognize, that mind is no longer in any sense a cause of the motions in nature. The modern world, retaining for a long period the substance approach to mind, and the sharp separation of pure thought from the realm of sense, increasingly is forced to give up the Greek view of mind as the principle of order and motion in nature.¹ The traditional philosophy of the seventeenth century separates mind and nature much more sharply than any period of classic thought.

With the external world reduced to pure extension, it is evident that the world as perceived cannot be regarded as literally a part of the external world, which, if known at all, must be known by "mind" and not by "sense." Even those forms of "thought," as Descartes uses the term, which are most akin to the data of perception, such as imagination and the emotions, are called in question as vehicles of knowledge.² Paradoxical as it may seem, nature is only to be known by that which is intrinsically different from nature, by that pure thought which is the essence of mind.

The Cartesian treatment of mind is so well known that only a brief reference to it is necessary. From the occurrence of thinking, on the assumption that any attribute must belong to a substance,³ Descartes concludes that mind is the substance which thinks. Since mind and body can be thought as separate, they must be distinct, on the

¹ This is, of course, not true of the idealistic movement. In *Siris* Berkeley explicitly defends such a view. To some degree this is true of every idealist.

² *Meditations*, VI.

³ *Works*, II, 53.

assumption that things which can be thought apart are by nature separable.¹ Mind and matter are then two substances different in essence: the essence of mind is pure thought; the essence of matter is extension.²

It must be remembered that for Descartes, mind, although it is called a "thing which thinks,"³ is an activity or attribute of the soul. Briefly, it is "the whole of that soul which thinks,"⁴ "a thing which doubts, understands, affirms, denies, wills, refuses, which also imagines and feels."⁵ Although mind, as Descartes here says, does imagine and feel, these lower grades of "thought" are due, in a way never satisfactorily explained, to the fact that mind is inclosed in the material body, for its essence is simply pure thought. Not merely, then, is mind sharply separated from nature, but within mind itself there is an unreconciled dualism between the rational and the sensuous. The Cartesian dualism is a double dualism. In Descartes, no more than in the Greek world, is the relation between thought and sense plausibly described, while the gap between mind and nature became a problem whose implications Descartes had never dreamed of.

There is only one more aspect of Cartesian thought to be mentioned here. Descartes shrinks from the theoretical conclusion of his position, which would be a complete denial of any interaction between mind and nature. Instead, he affirms that the mind uses the body as an instrument, and even that mind can act independently of the brain.⁶ Although there are passages where Descartes states

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 32, 59, 100.

² Since, however, mind and matter were not entirely self-sufficient, but required the consent of God, they were less substantial than God. This situation facilitated the transition to Spinozism.

³ *Works*, I, 152, 153.

⁵ *Ibid.*, I, 153.

⁴ *Ibid.*, II, 210.

⁶ *Ibid.*, II, 212.

that mind is "coextensive with the body,"¹ his more usual position is that the soul or mind "does not perceive excepting in as far as it is in the brain."² The external world affects the body, the motion is transmitted to the brain, and then the mind somehow (Descartes admits we do not know how)³ has ideas. In some equally incomprehensible manner, the mind, acting through the pineal gland, can control the motion of the body.⁴ Descartes tries desperately to permit mind to act as a causal factor, but this is inconsistent with his mechanics, and his ambiguous treatment of imagination⁵ is convincing evidence that he never successfully accounts for the interaction of mind and body.

In this way Descartes leaves as his heritage an "ivory tower" view of mind, a conception of mind different in essence from the world which in some miraculous manner it is supposed to know. To the problem of the relation of pure thought to the rest of given reality has been added in an acute form a dualism between mind and nature. What is given for observation is merely a set of cues useful for the preservation of the organism, and not genuine aspects of the physical world.⁶

8. THE GALILEAN-CARTESIAN-NEWTONIAN WORLD-VIEW

When it is realized that the fundamental features of the Cartesian view also appear in Newton, it should be clear that in what Professor E. A. Burt has aptly called the Galilean-Cartesian-Newtonian world-view there had appeared a doctrine arising from the basic cultural soil of Western Europe, and destined to dominate the thought of

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 255.

² *Ibid.*, I, 293; see also p. 196.

³ N. K. Smith, *Studies in the Cartesian Philosophy*, pp. 82, 83.

⁴ *Works*, I, 289-91.

⁵ Smith, *op. cit.*, Appendix B to chap. iii.

⁶ *Works*, I, 194, 197.

this civilization for centuries after the period of its formulation. It is this view that has insinuated itself into the language of the day, and into the background and basic concepts of all but the most recent forms of natural science. It is no exaggeration to say that the main movements of philosophy since Descartes have centered around criticisms of the Galilean-Cartesian-Newtonian world-view, and in attempts to develop an alternative world-view which does justice to the close relation between the mental and the physical, while at the same time resting on bases more in harmony with the modern temper and the results of modern science. Speaking in terms of the problem of mind, it may be said that all succeeding theories of mind, based on the concepts of process, act, relation, substantive, and function, are at one in their opposition to an explanation of mind in terms of substance. Because of this central historical importance of the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century world-view, it may be well briefly to sketch the outline of this position.¹

The world of nature is here regarded as a vast machine, physical in nature, and susceptible of a mathematical quantitative treatment. Time is not taken with metaphysical seriousness, and there is nothing akin to the modern dominance of historical and evolutionary categories, made into a metaphysics in the notion of emergent evolution. The ideal of science is an all-embracing deductive presentation, the method being predominantly mathematical for Descartes and mathematico-empirical for Galileo and Newton. The dominance of absolutistic, universal, and static categories goes hand in hand with a reliance upon interpretations of the world in terms of substance and attributes.

¹ The previously referred to book of Burtt, and Randall's *Making of the Modern Mind*, may be used to fill in the sketch.

The world as experienced is regarded as a state of the experiencing subject, and, as a realm of secondary qualities that are mental in nature, is sharply opposed to the "real" world of primary material substances. Mind, while differing in essence from physical nature, which is closed to mind except for purposes of knowledge, is a substance among substances, but with an immaterial nature. Man is body *and* mind (or soul). Physically, man is simply one small part of the world-machine; mentally, he is a spectator of this machine, and the only relation of mind to the world-machine is one of knowledge. The basic intellectualism lies in the limitation of the mind to the activity of knowing. Mind as substance is, for the most part, conveniently located in the brain, and has ideas when the organism is stimulated by external bodies, though there is little attempt to explain in detail how this occurs. Nor is there any explanation of the common belief that God is the creator and mechanic of the world-machine, for if God is interpreted in terms of mind, the causal relation of God to nature is as difficult to conceive as the relation of the human mind to the human body. It is true that the assumption was certainly that God is more than a knower, just as the human soul was more than a knower, but this view was not critically developed or brought to bear on the problem of mind.

As later developments indicated, particularly in Hume, the separation of mind and nature prominent in this general view led to a skepticism in regard to the possibility of knowing external reality (a point capitalized by idealism). It is not surprising that later thought, taking seriously the notions of passage and development, should become skeptical of the whole framework of the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century world-view, and relinquish the substance approach to both mind and nature. It is as movements in

this reinterpretation that romanticism, modern idealism, the philosophy of organism, and the position of emergent evolution find their genuine significance. More than one prophet and creator of later modes of thought and feeling would have sympathized with the words of William Blake:

I turn my eyes to the Schools and Universities of Europe,
And there behold the Loom of Locke, whose woof rages dire,
Washed by the Water-wheels of Newton: black the cloth
In heavy wreaths fold over every Nation: cruel Works
Of many Wheels I view, wheel without wheel, with cogs tyrannic,
Moving by compulsion each other; not as those in Eden, which,
Wheel within wheel, in freedom revolve, in harmony and peace.¹

9. THE REACTIONS OF HOBBS AND SPINOZA

Before trying alternative approaches, it was natural for thinkers to see first what could be done to meet the inadequacies of the Cartesian mode of thought by a reinterpretation of the concept of substance, and a reconsideration of the relations in which substances might stand to each other. Three main directions could be taken: the attempt might be made to reduce mind to matter, or to assimilate matter by mind, or to regard mind and matter as metaphysically parallel. Historically these possibilities are represented by Hobbes, by Berkeley, and by Spinoza.

Hobbes rightly insists that from the fact of thinking, Descartes could not legitimately conclude that there is an immaterial spiritual substance which thinks. Still depending upon the category of substance, Hobbes holds that it is the animal body which thinks. For him all change is merely a change in the motion of bodies, and nothing can cause such motion but another moving body.² The experienced

¹ Quoted in the *International Journal of Ethics*, XXXIX (1929), 223, 224, in an article, "The Significance of William Blake in Modern Thought," by William F. Clarke.

² W. Molesworth, *The English Works of Thomas Hobbes*, I, 69, 70, 124.

world, the separate contents of which he calls "ideas" or "apparitions,"¹ and which with speech makes up all that is meant by mind,² exists only as a complex of motions in the sentient organism, and not as qualities of the objects in themselves.³ As Hobbes is aware, on such a view "mind will be nothing but the motions in certain parts of an organic body."⁴ In effect, Hobbes retains the matter side of the Galilean-Cartesian-Newtonian world-view, together with its doctrine of representative perception, his innovation lying in the insistence that the world of sense—or better, the world as given—is itself solely a complex of matter in motion. The fundamental question which such a metaphysics raises comes from the fact that "matter" seems to designate a class of objects that actually are observed or given, and to be a term applicable to only one aspect of the given world. Empirically, then, it would seem no more legitimate to reduce the observed world to matter than to mind, since in either case categories are applied beyond their legitimate domain. A critique of this type of metaphysics is not possible here, but before turning from Hobbes it is just to call attention to the fact that his suggestive experiential analysis of speech in terms of signs and marks is independent of the validity of the materialistic metaphysics, and must be regarded as one of the earliest analyses from what would now be called the "symbolic approach."⁵

Spinoza continues to think of the universe under the categories of mind and matter, but instead of these being regarded as two distinct substances, they are considered as two aspects of the single substance which can be called

¹ *Ibid.*, IV, 2, 3.

³ *Ibid.*, I, 389-91.

² *Ibid.*, III, 16.

⁴ Haldane and Ross (ed.), *op. cit.*, II, 65.

⁵ This material may be found in the first part of the treatise *Concerning Body*, the first part of the *Leviathan*, and in the essay on *Human Nature*.

nature, the universe, or, when the eternal creative factor is stressed, God. The world as a whole, and every part of the world, has an aspect which is mental and an aspect which is physical. As two sides of the same event or actuality, there is no meaning to the statement that mind and matter as distinct substances interact, nor ultimately to the statement that they are parallel as substances. But if this parallelism of substance be not implied, it may be said that the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things, since "thinking substance and extended substance are one and the same thing."¹

This general pattern of thought finds its representatives today, as in C. Lloyd Morgan, S. Alexander, and C. A. Strong, and the general issue cannot yet be entered upon, but one observation may be made in regard to its treatment in Spinoza. While the double-aspect view as held by Spinoza seems to avoid any general epistemological difficulty, in reality neither the problem of knowledge nor the problem of error is capable of an adequate statement. Metaphysically, it would seem as if every event or object knew itself and could know only itself. Considering only the cause of knowledge by a finite mind, Spinoza's position shows how deeply the Cartesian world-view, with its distinction between pure thought and the rest of the experienced world, was intrenched. According to Spinoza, the human mind knows the external world only through modifications of its own body,² and in knowing these modifications due to the external body, the external body is known,³ to be sure, but known only inadequately, and in a confused and mutilated manner.⁴ To obtain genuine knowledge, it then becomes necessary to distinguish the idea as

¹ *Ethics*, Part II, Prop. 7.

² *Ibid.*, Prop. 26.

³ *Ibid.*, Prop. 16.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Props. 28, 29, 31.

“pure thought” from other “modes of thinking,”¹ to say with Plato that the mind obtains truth only when “disposed from within,” and to regard error as due to the imagination, that is, as due ultimately to the influence of the body on the processes of mind.² If, however, the order of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things, it becomes difficult to see how any error is possible—how, in other words, the human body is any exception to the law which holds for all other bodies. It must be said, I believe, that aside from its failure to give any just account of the nature of mind and its relation to knowledge and error, Spinoza’s double-aspect theory does not solve the problems which Cartesian thought had raised: pure thought is still opposed to the rest of the world as given, and the human mind is still separated from the external world by the human body.

10. THE BERKELEIAN ALTERNATIVE

To the idealist philosophy must go the credit for the first and most complete opposition to the mechanico-mathematical aspect of the Galilean-Cartesian-Newtonian world-view, even though it is true that this movement only gradually emancipated itself from the substance treatment of mind. It is in this opposition that the key to idealism is to be found, for the historic task of idealism has been to vindicate after every great movement of science the status of human values, to resist the temptation to find reality at the simplest levels disclosed by the analytical intelligence, and to give to man a place of dignity in the cosmos. In parrying the materialistic treatment of mind, such as a Hobbes would give, the idealist is likely to reply with an equally extreme mentalizing of matter, for the philosophy

¹ *Ibid.*, Axiom III.

² Elwes, *The Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza*, II, 31-34.

of mind, so closely connected with certain phases of the realm of value, naturally becomes the keystone of the idealist arch. The temptation becomes great to say that mind alone is real, that nature is but an aspect of, and a stage in, the development of mind or spirit.¹

Berkeley, for instance, argues that matter cannot be conceived as a substratum of the experienced world, which thereby becomes the effect of this substratum on an immaterial mind. The mind cannot be put into the brain, for the brain as experienced is, like all "material things," a collection of "ideas" or givens, and is therefore, in conformity with the tradition that the domain of experience is part of the subject mind, mental.² Stated generally, there can be no necessary inference from the world as given to a quantitative world of matter intrinsically different in essence. With this result, and after a simultaneous attack on the dominance of the mathematical approach to the world, Berkeley takes the bold step of identifying the perceived world with the world of nature, and in so doing appears as a forerunner of the radical empiricists and the new realists, at least in the claim that the "real" world is directly given, and not merely a representative of it. Berkeley's idealism would of course prevent him from agreeing with the new realist that what is given is independent of all mind, but he does hold that the coherent and systematic features of the experienced world are independent of the particular human mind. Berkeley is keenly aware of the reconstruction in the philosophy of science which his position entails,³ and his rejection of the static infinitesimal, his advocacy of the relativity of time, space, and motion, and his denial of gravitation as a causal "force" are all "contemporary"

¹ Cf. the following chapter.

² A. C. Fraser, *Berkeley's Complete Works*, I, 420-22.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 285, 295.

doctrines, as Spengler would use the word, and worthy of careful scrutiny in the light of the recent phenomenological interpretations of science.

However plausible it is today to regard such aspects of Berkeley's thought as the positive and reconstructive ones, they appeared to Berkeley as weapons to be used for the establishment of a religious and spiritualistic metaphysics. The passage to an idealist position was made possible by his uncritical acceptance of the Galilean-Cartesian-Newtonian view of the mind, coupled with the Christian view of the soul, as an immaterial substance. In the sphere of mind Berkeley continues to think in terms of substance. Regarding all that is given or experienced as "in" a mind,¹ that is, as relative to and dependent upon a mind, mind or spirit being the unperceived perceiver which is distinct from the ideas which are dependent upon it,² and which is known by a "notion" and not by an "idea,"³ Berkeley is led to the conclusion that only minds and their ideas exist. The world becomes a system of minds, any existent thing not an object of a finite mind owing its existence to its being perceived by the infinite mind or God.⁴ As for the materiality of the things of daily life, Berkeley does not deny them the reality they are experienced to have, but only that these things exist in independence of mind. The underlying material substratum, the "philosophic" and not the "vulgar" matter, is the only matter that Berkeley denies.⁵ While insisting that material objects are substantives, empirically describable, he continues to hold that minds are not substantives on a par with material objects

¹ See *ibid.*, p. 470, for Berkeley's use of the phrase "in the mind."

² *Ibid.*, pp. 336, 444-51. "The Mind, Spirit, or Soul is that indivisible unextended thing which thinks, acts, and perceives" (*ibid.*, p. 448).

³ *Ibid.*, p. 272.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 260, 261.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 275-79.

but are metaphysical substances, not constituted by the attributes which they support.

It is doubtful if Berkeley is justified in maintaining that mind and matter are not logically in the same precarious position, the criticism which Hume pressed. Whether matter is reduced to mind or mind to matter, in each case the procedure seems equally illegitimate from the point of view which gives up an approach from the conception of substance, and equally legitimate within the framework of the concept of substance. The difficulty comes in making either mind or matter a substantive, while regarding the other as a substance.

Historically considered, it would seem as if neither Hobbes nor Spinoza nor Berkeley was able convincingly to justify the conception of substance. In each case, while certain problems of the Cartesian approach do not appear, other problems, equally as difficult, do appear. With Hobbes, the question is as to the legitimacy of reducing the world of experience to movements within a percipient organism; with Spinoza, the difficulty is as to the explanation of knowledge and error; with Berkeley, the problem is as to the legitimacy, on his own doctrine of meaning, of passing to the concept of mind as substance while holding to the substantive character of matter.

II. HUME AND KANT

Hume's significance for the problem of mind lies in his explicit rejection of the concept of substance.¹ The *Treatise of Human Nature* is the decisive answer to Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. Far from being the primary category, Hume denies any legitimacy to the idea of substance. The course of his argument is simple and clear: ideas are derived from

¹ His suggestion of a relational approach to mind will be considered in chap. iii.

impressions or immediate givens, and since the substratum necessary to the conception of substance is admittedly incapable of being given, it follows that there can be no idea of such a substratum. Hence "we have . . . no idea of a substance"; "nothing appears requisite to support the existence of a perception."¹

So tenacious, however, are old habits of thought that when the full-blooded figure of substance is reduced to a corpse, its ghost continues to appear under various guises and in unexpected places. The pages of Hume and Kant furnish striking examples of this "groaning of the bones." Hume escapes from the concept of substance itself, but not from the shadow it had cast across the centuries: he falls into the pattern of the world-view which had been dominated by this conception.²

These traces of the Galilean-Cartesian-Newtonian world-view lingering in the back of his thought make intelligible his "mitigated skepticism," which is the expression of a fundamental conflict between the traces of the foregoing view and an attitude of radical empiricism, a conflict which Hume never resolves, and which makes it possible to find both realistic and subjectivistic currents in his thought.

Hume begins his account with the typical (but fatal) doctrine that given or presented contents are "perceptions of the human mind."³ He continues to think of the experienced world as caused by material objects work-

¹ *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Book I, Part IV, sec. 5; Selby-Bigge's ed., p. 234. In a similar fashion Bertrand Russell insists that if the substance is *not* defined by its predicates, it cannot be defined at all, and so is without justification, while if the substance is so defined, then the substratum element, necessary to substance, drops out (*The Philosophy of Leibniz*, pp. 59, 60).

² Thus even Hume's sensory atomism is the result of removing the core of things, leaving only the set of attributes.

³ *Op. cit.*, Book I, Part I, sec. 1.

ing through the senses to produce impressions in the mind,¹ maintaining specifically that there is no reason why matter could not cause thought.² Nevertheless, Hume's analytical acumen forces him to realize that such material objects and such a mind cannot be justified on his starting-point. Strictly speaking, therefore, Hume is not even entitled to speak of extra-experiential physical or mental substantives, but nevertheless he continues to write as if such material objects were the cause of impressions, and this in spite of his analysis of causation in terms of a relation between impressions such that when one appears the other is expected by the mind.³ Even the thesis that matter may cause impressions cannot be justified on his own analysis of causation. The skepticism in regard to knowledge is itself meaningless except on the assumption of an external world which is believed in, but which cannot be reached by the mind.

Such observations as the foregoing justify the statement that beneath the surface of Hume's numerous inconsistencies lies the lack of an adequate theory of mind. In fact, the whole paradox of English empiricism, the paradox of a group of men with a decidedly "realistic" attitude becoming ensnared in the toils of a subjectivistic metaphysics, lies in the almost unconscious acceptance of the framework of the Galilean-Cartesian-Newtonian world-view, with its doctrine of the subjective and mental nature of experience. Positively put, the paradox results from the failure to de-

¹ *Ibid.*, Part II, sec. 4; Selby-Bigge's ed. p. 64.

² "We may certainly conclude that motion may be, and actually is, the cause of thought and perception" (*ibid.*, Pt. IV, sec. 5; Selby-Bigge's ed., p. 248). Locke had admitted the possibility of God creating matter capable of thought (*Essay concerning Human Understanding*, ed. A. C. Fraser, II, 192 ff., 313 ff.). The materialists passed from this entertained possibility to the position rejected by Locke, that matter alone could cause thought (see R. A. Tsanoff, *The Problem of Immortality*, p. 98).

³ Such a habit-forming mind seems rather "substantial."

velop a critical theory of mind on an empirical basis. Locke's refusal to concern himself with the ultimate nature of mind simply means that he is unconsciously talking in terms of the dominant substance view, as when he speaks of mind as a "closet wholly shut from light," with the senses as "little openings" to the outside world.¹ Locke, in fact, in spite of the empirical temper of his personality, represents the mature development of a Cartesian world-view, his empiricism merely serving to bridge the gap between thought and sense that is found in Descartes. While regarding himself as clearing the ground for the "incomparable Mr. Newton," Locke actually cleared the ground out from under Mr. Newton, in that for Locke, as for Hume, a science of nature becomes impossible.² Hume himself is not free from the influences of the substance view. Like Locke, he is too willing to leave the inquiry into the nature of mind to one side, and to say that the essence of mind is as equally unknown to us as is the essence of external bodies.³ Without doubt it is the ghost of the Galilean-Cartesian-Newtonian world-view which sidetracks English empiricism from its normal outcome, such as a realism or a radical empiricism, and leads it into an aborted and wavering mentalism and subjectivism, the skeptical note being the result of the felt discrepancy between the wished-for attainment and the actual outcome. Such is the havoc wrought by the uncritical retention of a theory of mind in a system in which it plays no integral part.

A somewhat similar situation is revealed in Kant. Although Kant personally continues to believe in a self or soul capable of immortality, and although there are grounds for the view that it was this transcendent soul

¹ *Op. cit.*, I, 212.

² *Ibid.*, II, 218.

³ Introduction to *op. cit.*

which was the seat of the forms of knowing (the Forms of sensibility, the Categories of the understanding, and the Ideas of Reason) and the unity of consciousness, and which furnished the creative synthetic activity that Kant, helped by Leibniz,¹ invoked to justify the existence of certain but objectively relevant knowledge,² yet Kant's analysis of the so-called rational psychology, revealing the paralogism of the Cartesian reasoning, forces him to admit that the soul or mind when conceived as substance cannot gain entrance into the critical philosophy. Nevertheless, Kant, like Hume, continues to regard the world of experience as produced in the mind,³ and makes the content of experience a result of, and a modification of, the percipient subject.⁴ Kant's general position limits knowledge to experienced content, for only in so far as an object enters into some relation with the subject can it be known a priori that the forms of knowing will apply to it, and so N. K. Smith is correct in insisting that Kant's position should logically end in phenomenalism. But in Kant as in Hume, the ghost of the Galilean-Cartesian-Newtonian world-view continues to walk, and Kant does not cease to believe in a legislative mind and a realm of things-in-themselves, with experience as "mental," and a product of mind and things-in-themselves. In defending himself from the charge of subjective idealism Kant goes so far as to admit that consciousness of self requires a consciousness of external objects,⁵ and this

¹ See the following chapter.

² See N. K. Smith, *A Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* pp. 261, 476, 477. Kant speaks of the "unity of consciousness which precedes all data of intuition, and without reference to which no representation of objects is possible" (Müller, *Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason,"* p. 88; cf. p. 694).

³ Prichard, *Kant's Theory of Knowledge*, p. 279.

⁴ J. Handyside, *Kant's Inaugural Dissertation*, p. 44; N. K. Smith, *A Commentary, etc.*, p. 82.

⁵ Müller, *op. cit.*, pp. 779-81; Prichard, *op. cit.*, p. 321.

does not suggest a mind lying in wait to impress unity upon a disorganized manifold. Whatever may be Kant's general importance, it cannot be said that he advanced to any great degree the understanding of the nature of mind. Though he did begin to point out the process character of mental activity, and call attention, as Plato had done, to the expression of this activity in the domain of the a priori, his views are everywhere superimposed on remnants of the category of substance.¹ In Kant as in Hume the movement away from the substance approach to mind is checked by the retention, as overbeliefs to be sure, of certain features of the Galilean-Cartesian-Newtonian worldview. In Hume it is mainly the ghost of matter that lingers; in Kant it is the ghost of mind.

12. AN EVALUATION OF THE CONCEPT OF SUBSTANCE

There is little difficulty in accounting for the historical dominance of the category of substance. Thought has always sought simplicity but only recently learned to distrust it. In the metaphysics of substance, the "substantiality" of many of the objects of experience obtained its due recognition. Many such things are, at least at the level of ordinary experience, relatively independent and capable of continued existence. Certainly for practical purposes such things are reacted to as one, and what is reacted to singly is usually (and perhaps always) regarded as a single object. The dominant behavior and use of an object lead to a dis-

¹ In the first Analogy of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant correctly argues that if there is change, as opposed to mere succession, there must be something which changes. He realizes, in the section on "The Paralogisms of Pure Reason," that no inference can be drawn from this truth to the existence of an underlying identical substratum. That this theoretical result does not silence Kant's belief is evident in this passage from the first edition of the *Critique* (N. K. Smith's trans., p. 354): "It is nevertheless possible that I may find cause, on other than merely speculative grounds, to hope for an independent and continuing existence of my thinking nature, throughout all possible change of my state."

inction between the substratum and the accidental features: the essence is the essential. As a device for economizing thought and action, no happier concept is possible. The same results hold for the sphere of mind: minds have an obvious unity, a quasi-independence of other minds, and a continued temporal endurance. In the doctrine of mind substance a great mass of indubitable "existence," distinguishable from physical objects, gained simple unification. Add to this practical and empirical motive the fact that a dualism of mental and material substance seemed at one stroke to reconcile deep-seated religious beliefs and demands with the problems of scientific practice, and the historical supremacy of this mode of thought occasions no wonder.

A number of circumstances, however, have conspired to unseat this mighty monarch in the realm of categories. One set of such circumstances is of a cultural nature, and hinges upon the dualistic setting of the concept of substance in the Cartesian world-view rather than upon the concept itself.¹ But a reputation may be ruined by the friends one keeps. On the basis of a dualism of substance, the question of knowledge became acute: how could a mind existentially confined to its own states know a world different in kind from itself? While many thinkers today would insist that such a situation is not incompatible with knowledge, it must nevertheless be admitted that such a view raises serious difficulties in regard to the possibility of verifying truth claims, and has never seemed convincing to numerous thinkers. Further, the early desperate attempt of the dualists to keep mind in interaction with nature broke down in the course of thought, negating the conviction of

¹ A rejection of a substance view of mind does not logically imply the falsity of dualism, the arguments for which must be considered on their own merits. Nevertheless, the historical connections of dualism with substantialism called out a simultaneous distrust of both categories.

man that his deliberation is a moving force in the world which he inhabits.¹ As a result of these two consequences, man as mind became an alien in the world, a lost soul cosmologically if not religiously. None of these apparent implications of the dominant metaphysics fitted in with the enormous growth of scientific knowledge, with the changes in himself and in the world which man had effected by taking thought, or with man's growing thirst for control of the course of nature, a thirst augmented by the first appearance of the blood of conquest upon his hands. In the light of these profound changes of attitude, the implications of the metaphysics which had satisfied the demands of "man the soul" no longer harmonized with the demands of "man the acting thinker."² How much of the dissatisfaction with the category of substance is the reflex of the activity of modern technological man, how far, in Spengler's terminology, it represents the final attempt of Faustian man to free himself from Euclidean categories, is difficult to say, but that the revolt against the metaphysics of substance has its roots in pervasive cultural changes cannot be gainsaid.

A second set of unsettling circumstances has been predominantly logical, and deals specifically with the concept of substance itself. The numerous ways in which the term has been used indicate the difficulties which have been encountered in the attempt to obtain any clear view as to how the substratum is to be distinguished from or related to its attributes. Reference has been made to the dilemma pro-

¹ It might be maintained that with the modern analyses of causation, and with a proper interpretation of the doctrine of the conservation of energy, there is no reason why an immaterial substance could not cause changes in physical nature. Even if this view could now be maintained, it was not a possibility for seventeenth- and eighteenth-century thought.

² So many uses and relations of objects have been found by modern man that the tendency to ascribe *an* essence to each object has been weakened.

posed by Russell: if the substance is not defined by its attributes it cannot be defined at all, and if it is so defined then the substratum aspect, necessary to the concept of substance, drops out. If the alternative that the term must remain undefined be accepted (and some Scholastics seem to argue thus), it may be then pointed out that if a term can neither be defined nor its referent exhibited, the term is meaningless. Can the substratum, then, be pointed out or inferred? The legitimacy of the inference to the substratum has been in dispute (if not disrepute) since the days of Hume and Kant. If it be said that the fact that some propositions are true throughout a process ("the nose remains between the eyes in growth"; "the repaired boat has the same shape") implies an identical element in the process itself, it may be noted, first, that this argument would at the best show the existence of many identical factors, and not one essence or substratum; and, second, that even here identity may mean identity within relevant limits. Identity appears to be a normative concept, and whether applied to things or to meanings gives no assurance that its referents are "absolutely" identical, that is, identical under all conditions and for all purposes. It is a linguistic illusion that a proposition such as "nothing remains the same" seems to imply that there is some absolute sameness, nevertheless, in things or in ideas.

It is also true that the need for the concept of substance has somewhat disappeared. In the new logic of relations, the relations of inclusion and exclusion, fundamental to a substratum-attribute logic, have come to occupy a subordinate place. An increasing number of thinkers have found it unnecessary to analyze a changing thing into a changeless substratum and a set of appearing and disappearing attributes. The growing recognition of the abstrac-

tion involved in securing attributes and events has to many minds done away with the need for a substratum which holds together an aggregate of qualities. In such ways doubt has arisen as to the importance of the category of substance as well as to its legitimacy. Many thinkers have come, with Vaihinger, to look upon substance as a fiction, useful in giving a point of stability for dealing with the appearing flux. But to have accepted an instrumental view of the concept of substance is to have given up its original ontological significance.

A final set of considerations is of an empirical sort. Careful observation shows that the "substances" of daily life have a degree of independence and of continued existence—but only a degree. They are revealed as approximations to the norm of substance rather than as substances. Substantiality becomes a matter of degree, of more or less. Substance turns out to be a normative concept. Under the continual refinement of observation, the unitary, independent, and continuing thing, compatible with less exacting observation and action, gets to be envisaged as a process with varying rates of change, a determinate whole analyzable into an organized but changing structure of events. The demands of action at one level thereby cut under the concepts adequate for the purposes of a simpler level of action and observation.

These social, logical, practical, and empirical changes affect equally the substance conceptions of mind and matter: the classical doctrine of substance tends to be replaced by the concept of organized process. It is true that there is no disproof of the existence of transcendent objects answering to the definitions (or pseudo-definitions) of material and mental substance. It is also true that holders of such a position are not rare, as neo-Scholasticism bears

witness.¹ Nevertheless, the social, logical, and scientific demands of the modern world have increasingly found expression in the replacement of the concept of substance by that of substantive.² That the category of substance has outlived its metaphysical usefulness is perhaps a fair interpretation of the verdict rendered in the court of world-history. In a famous line Goethe stated that "*Natur hat weder Kern noch Schale.*" Less elegantly stated, the conviction has steadily grown that the world is an onion.

¹ "It is animism, but a philosophical and scientific one,—what we call the Mind-Substance Theory,—that the New Scholasticism presents to the consideration of philosophy. We are quite conscious of the fact that of all the ideas which we defend, the idea of substance, and in particular mind-substance, will probably be the very last that modern thought will accept. Since the days of Hume, the functional viewpoint has held undisputed sway and has acquired the prestige of being regarded almost everywhere as axiomatic. The functional idea, however, must be blasted out of the modern treatment of mind problems. In its place we must substitute a dualistic and dynamic philosophy of act and potency, substance and accident" (James H. Ryan, "The New Scholasticism and Its Contribution to Modern Thought," *Present-Day Thinkers and the New Scholasticism*, ed. John S. Zybura, pp. 365-66).

² This replacement does not, of course, mean that the conception of "immaterial" is necessarily devoid of significance. The concept of immaterial substantive finds striking expression in contemporary thought, and will be considered in chaps. iv and v.

CHAPTER II

MIND AS PROCESS

13. IDEALISM AND PROCESS: MIND AS CONCRETE UNIVERSAL

THE Galilean-Cartesian-Newtonian world-view did not take time seriously, development being considered as a recombination of elements whose nature was impervious to time. The neglect of process and passage is the reverse side of the dominance of the category of substance. Mental and physical substances acted, to be sure, and entered into the process of change, but substance remained the center of emphasis and dignity, rather than its "states," and the nature of substance was not constituted by the process in which it appeared.

It is difficult to account for the larger shifts in modes of thought. The latter part of the eighteenth century and the whole of the nineteenth century revealed a growing emphasis upon the notion of development, with a consequent weakening of the concept of substance. It is hazardous to isolate a single factor as the cause of such a pervasive shift. The rapid social changes from the breakdown of the medieval social structure, through the rise of the town, to the unsettlement of the Revolutionary period; the wider knowledge of history and the diversity of customs in different social groups; the attention paid to growth in the developing biological sciences; the appearance of the biological doctrine of evolution; the development of an evolutionary cosmogony; the victory of uniformitarianism in geology

—all of these, whether as causes or effects, signalize the shift in attention to the phenomena of change, process, and development. It is obvious that most of these factors represent social and biological influences, influences outside of the fields of mathematics and physics which had set the pattern for the Galilean-Cartesian-Newtonian world-view, and it is significant that even today those schools of philosophy nearest to social and biological phenomena (pragmatism and, to a less degree, idealism) are most activist in their metaphysics, while those philosophies of a realistic nature which are closest to mathematics and physics tend to notice least, or even to be skeptical of, the category of development. Nevertheless, even in these latter cases, the enormous growth of mathematics in the nineteenth and twentieth century, leading to uncertainty as to the foundations of mathematics, and the development of the physical doctrine of relativity, giving a temporal dimension to all reality, reflect themselves in realistic philosophies into which, almost unconsciously, time has gnawed its way. For better or for worse, the notion of change and development expresses the dominant note of the present cultural epoch, a note epitomized in philosophy by the doctrine of emergent evolution in which idealism, pragmatism, and realism appear to find a convergent point. The modern attitude of relativism is but a corollary of the conviction that the very nature of things is dependent upon the conditions under which they happen, and that these conditions must be given a temporal date. Hence the movement of romanticism, hence the vogue of the genetic approach, hence the countless doctrines of evolution, hence the “discovery of the future”—and much else that is characteristic of the modern world.

Such a *Zeitgeist* often expresses itself in extravagant forms (as in the smug optimistic manner of some moralists),

but express itself in thought and in action it must. As an empirical truth, Peirce's "law of mind" is unquestionable. In the particular domain of speculation about mind, it can be said that the conceptions of mind in terms of process, relation, and function, opposed as a group to the view of mind as substance, reflect this transition in the habits of thought, and as a group bear witness to the importance now ascribed to the changing and the developing.

Of these views the widest and most general would be one which merely insists that mind is a process. Although the conception of mind as process is clearly indicated by Hume, and is common to most contemporary thinkers, the doctrine takes in idealism a special form which exhibits a basic aspect of the idealistic insight. The present chapter will accordingly limit itself to such phases of the process approach as appear in idealism. As is to be expected, the shift from the category of substance to process was a gradual one, and the struggle of these concepts as applied to mind is vividly visible in the idealistic movement.

As a movement, idealism reveals two dominant tendencies: it is both a doctrine of the supremacy of value and a doctrine of the supremacy of mind. The idealist tends to conclude with Bradley that "higher, truer, more beautiful, better and more real—these, on the whole, count in the universe as they count for us."¹ At the same time, as Hoernlé states, the common theme of all idealisms is that "mind is the clue to the nature of Reality."² The general connection between these doctrines is quite clear. While it is possible to believe that the highest human values "count

¹ *Appearance and Reality* (2d ed.), p. 550.

² *Idealism as a Philosophy*, p. 100. Gentile writes that "idealism is the rejection of any reality which can be opposed to thought as independent of it and as the presupposition of it" (*The Theory of Mind as Pure Act*, p. 18). McTaggart combines both aspects: idealism is "the assertion that reality is both rational and righteous" (*Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic*, p. 120).

in the universe as they count for us" without believing the universe to be a mind or to be supported by mind,¹ and possible to believe that the universe is a mind or supported by mind without regarding human values as more than transitory (Schopenhauer may serve as an example),² the more usual belief has been that the supremacy of mind insures the supremacy of value. There are at least two reasons which help to account for this belief, even if they do not justify it: First, there is the fact that at least some of the things which men cherish owe their existence to, and are sustained and amplified by, finite minds, and this fact leads some to believe that a more than finite mind might to a greater degree create, insure, and amplify similar values. The second reason is primarily of a historical nature, and is of more interest in this inquiry. It has been mentioned in the preceding chapter that idealism has played the cultural rôle of restoring to man and his cherished objects a place of importance and dignity in the cosmos whenever a scientific movement has tended to make him a three-dimensional or, with Eddington's emendation, a four-dimensional worm. Idealism has constantly pointed out the abstraction which it insists is involved in materialism and in naturalism, and, indeed, in all science. In modern times idealism has been in opposition to the ever growing advance of the Galilean-Cartesian-Newtonian world-view, and since on this view the entire domain of experience, including value phenomena, was regarded as mental, it was a natural and brilliant counterstroke to assert the basic and pervasive character of mind by attempting to show that

¹ N. K. Smith's *A Prolegomena to an Idealist Theory of Knowledge* illustrates an idealist theory of value combined with a realist account of the relation of mind to its object in knowledge.

² In "The Apotheosis of Mind in Modern Idealism," *Philosophical Review*, XXXI (1922), 215 ff., Loewenberg opposes the idealistic identification of mental and spiritual, claiming that a "mental" world need not be preservative of the highest values.

experience could not be transcended but must be taken as the basic pattern of reality. This attempt to make mind the supreme category is then, in part at least, understandable as an insistence upon the ultimate reality of that realm where alone, on the opposing view, values were allowed to reside. The ensuing counter-revolution by the forces of "mind" was greatly aided by the fact that, as Locke and Hume revealed, the attacked position itself showed a tendency, when logically followed out, to point in the direction of mentalism.

Because of the historical function of modern idealism, it is a reasonable hypothesis that the idealistic theory of mind gains part of its strength from the errors of its enemies, and part of its difficulty from the continuance of inadequate theories of mind simply turned to its own advantage. There is a question whether the idealist is not inclined to carry out his theory of mind only far enough to assure him of the tenability of his views about the relation of value and existence. It is advisable to have in mind one other preliminary surmise. While post-Kantian idealism reveals an increasing tendency to regard mind as systematic process, the interest in value should be expected to lead to an interpretation of process in which mere activity does not submerge attainment, nor development preclude perfection. As a result one would expect to find some of the "substantiality" of substance imported into the conception of process.

Leaving to one side the idealist problem of value and its relation to mind, the present chapter will attempt to analyze and assess the idealist doctrine of mind as systematic process. To this end it will be helpful to isolate three types of doctrine as found in the absolute idealism of Hegel, Bradley, and Bosanquet, in Bergson's version of dualism, and in the activism represented by Gentile.

In denying that perception could be explained by an appeal to material substance, Leibniz signalized the transference of the discussion concerning mind to experiential terms, and by his doctrine of the self-development of the monad helped to determine the later emphasis of German philosophy upon the creative character of the subject. Leibniz set the pattern for the activistic interpretation of the material world as a stage in the development of a subject mind or minds.

Leibniz' thought is nevertheless grounded upon the concept of substance.¹ In pre-Kantian manner he regards the fact of change as indicating the existence of an identical substratum which does not change and in which predicates inhere, and holding that a true proposition is one in which the predicates are contained in the subject, he thinks of a substance as containing all its attributes. A substance, then, is always a subject persisting through change and containing the plurality of its attributes. But while the same substance always has the same set of attributes, so that nothing can happen to a substance from without, it is obvious that a substance does not have all of its attributes at once. Accordingly, Leibniz is forced to consider what it is that accounts for the temporal change in qualities, that is, to think the relation of substance and attribute in term of process.² This attempt to graft activism upon the concept of substance, to reconcile permanence and process, is the characteristic note of the idealist conception of mind.³

Leibniz meets this problem by regarding the substance

¹ See B. Russell, *A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz*, chap. iv, "The Conception of Substance."

² Leibniz at times comes perilously close to defining a substance in terms of a continuity of organization, defining it, in short, as a substantive. See Dewey, *Leibniz' New Essays concerning the Human Understanding*, chap. ix.

³ This is true regardless of whether mind be conceived monadistically or monistically, so that in what follows we shall not be concerned with this family

as essentially active, as having a quality of force or *conatus*, defined as "what there is in the present state that brings with it a change for the future."¹ Each monad thus carries within itself the power by which all its future predicates are derived. The material world, though never satisfactorily accounted for, is interpreted as a low or confused stage in the monad's movement toward self-consciousness. While Leibniz himself preferred to limit the term "mind" (*esprit*) to monads possessing self-consciousness, the apprehension of God and eternal truth, and the ability to reason from these truths,² in the wider sense of the term common in idealism it is clear that for Leibniz the world had become an autonomous mental and spiritual process, each monad pressing toward mind in the narrower sense, giving rise to the "well-founded" appearance of the material world at a certain stage of development. Only spiritual substance remains; the material world is but a stage in the development of spirit. It is this pattern of thought, without the pluralistic setting, which is developed by German idealism. Passing over the growth of this notion in Kant (where it was checked by the encounter with Hume and Newton), Fichte, and Schelling, we may turn to the expression of the position as developed by Hegel and the English absolute idealists.

14. HEGEL'S DOCTRINE OF ABSOLUTE MIND

In reading Hegel one gains a vivid impression of a dynamic process of development. Mind, we are told, is not a static *ens*, but, "of all things, must be looked at in its con-

quarrel among idealists. The problem of the relation of permanence and process is more acute for the monistic idealists, since it is reiterated in the attempt to relate finite minds to the one process.

¹ Russell, *op. cit.*, p. 234.

² *Ibid.*, p. 141; Duncan, *The Philosophical Works of Leibnitz*, p. 191.

crete actuality, in its energy.”¹ Similarly, the world as a whole is conceived as a single comprehensive process, which may equally well be called “Mind” or “Thought” or “Self-ordering Spirit.” The essential feature of this process is that it is systematic. Instead of being a mere succession of change, the process is the development of a universal or identity which persists throughout. This universal or identity is the Absolute Mind or Spirit which attains its development or self-realization by appearing in forms which seem alien to itself, but which are actually only those forms of itself through which greater self-realization is obtained.² Like the mother in the poem of Tagore who tosses her child into the air in order to realize more vividly, when the child returns to her arms, the closeness and identity of their natures, and is thus more aware of herself as mother, so the absolute mind, the world-mother, creates her children and tosses them from her, finding herself more completely by and in their return. Thus “the absolute mind while it is self-centred *identity*, is also identity returning and ever returned into itself.”³ Since the absolute mind comes to itself in the production and assimilation of “others,” mind is, in Hegelian terms, a *concrete* universal. All of nature, for instance, becomes a manifestation of the absolute mind by which this mind attains to fuller concreteness.⁴ As a self-evolving universal, mind has no object outside of itself to which it must conform: the objects which absolute mind knows are its own products, its own self in the form of “otherness.”⁵ It is natural, then, that

¹ *The Logic of Hegel*, trans. Wallace, p. 69.

² Typical passages are found in *The Phenomenology of Mind*, trans. Baillie, pp. 16-17, 22-23, 157, 817-18.

³ *The Philosophy of Mind*, trans. Wallace, p. 291.

⁴ *Phenomenology*, trans. Baillie, p. 821.

⁵ *The Logic of Hegel*, trans. Wallace, pp. 44, 47; *The Philosophy of Mind*, trans. Wallace, p. 229.

consciousness should be considered as ultimately self-consciousness,¹ knowledge as self-knowledge,² substance as Self or Subject.³ Expressed in a sentence: "*The Absolute is Mind* [Spirit]—this is the supreme definition of the Absolute."⁴

Before entering upon a discussion of this conception of absolute mind, there is one phase of the doctrine to which attention should be called. In one sense, as Höffding has emphasized, Hegel's whole philosophy is a mighty attempt to insure the conservation of value, and a mere emphasis upon change would tend in the opposite direction, or would make perfection merely an unattainable goal. The doctrine of mind as a self-centered identity, however, means that process is given a very specific kind of stability, so that while shaken to its depths, the absolute mind is yet in eternal repose, "pulsating within itself, but ever motionless."⁵ Since for Hegel the development is not a development in time,⁶ from one point of view mind is not a developing process at all, but a completely realized perfection. In the light of such qualifications it may be said that although Hegel suggests a process conception of mind, this conception is actually limited to the appearance in finite mind of the absolute mind, which as a realized perfection, complete and independent, suggests the expansion to infinity of the Leibnizian self, a self which now includes all finite minds and the whole of that external nature which the scientist takes as the object of his study. The absolute mind has engulfed whatever might seem to limit and endanger the supremacy of mind and value. The suggestion

¹ *Phenomenology*, trans. Baillie, p. 161.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 81, 822.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 52.

⁴ *The Philosophy of Mind*, trans. Wallace, p. 164.

⁵ *Phenomenology*, trans. Baillie, p. 157.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 813.

naturally arises that absolute idealism, in spite of an insistence upon development, continues to think in terms of mind substance, and that the substance attribute mode of thought reappears in the conception of the Absolute and its appearances. This suggestion will be examined in connection with the consideration of Bradley and Bosanquet.

15. A CRITICAL GLANCE AT THE HEGELIAN POSITION

What is to be said of Hegel's conception of absolute mind as self-centered identity "returning and ever returned into itself," a process not in time and yet appearing as temporal to the finite minds which as microcosms reflect in a lesser degree the nature of absolute mind?

Although Hegel does not state the genesis of his own view, it seems likely that he was particularly impressed (1) by the way in which the human self develops (gaining here a basis for the doctrine of an identity revealing itself through differences, i.e., the pattern of the concrete universal)¹ and (2) by the apparent ubiquity of the subject-object relation (thus gaining a basis for the conception of an absolute subject answering to the whole as object). While the doctrine of the absolute mind has many roots and takes many forms, it is certain that neither of these phenomena need be interpreted as Hegel apparently interprets them.

Turning to the matter of the development of the self, it is evident that the self becomes richer and more stable as it becomes identified with causes and objects "outside" of it. What was apparently foreign is taken in some sense into the scope of the self, and included in it at least as an object of interest. In apparently losing itself the self has more

¹ Royce emphasizes this starting-point in his interpretation of Hegel in *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy*. Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* exhibits with great richness his conception of this process.

completely found itself. Common speech does not hesitate to speak of the same self as revealing itself in and developing itself through this process. It is possible to interpret the element of identity ontologically in substance terms or empirically in substantive terms. It may be said that there is an identical element which appears throughout the change, and that in this case the identical element bears the relation of a substance to its attributes, even though the relation is interpreted "longitudinally" in terms of process.¹ Or it may be held that the identity which is ascribable to a process is an inseparable characteristic of the process and not in any sense the "actual mover." Thus in the frequently used example of the boat that through constant repair has none of the original material left in its construction ("the ship of Theseus which the Athenians are constantly repairing"), it may be said that it is still the same boat, partly because of the gradualness of the changes, partly because the shape has remained practically constant, and partly because of the similar relations of the boat to its users and its environment. (In other cases, such as the development of a butterfly, or the development of a self, there is not even the same constancy in shape.) The element of sameness or identity is empirically a characteristic of a nexus of events such that some statements are true throughout the process while other statements vary in truth value. In no case need the factor of identity be regarded as something absolute and permanent which progressively reveals itself through the process, and to regard it as such is to "bifurcate" a substantive into a substance plus attributes, and to fall into the very type of abstraction

¹ Bradley makes identity a working force. He states of the soul that "the sameness of its states is an actual mover" (*op. cit.*, p. 353). Speaking of identity permanence, and continuity, he writes: "They are unities for ever created and destroyed by the constant flux of experience, *a flux which they provoke*, and which supports them and is essential to their life" (*ibid.*, p. 471; italics mine).

against which Hegel presumably protests.¹ Just as the foregoing alternative view, or some similar one, leads to a different view of the development of the self from the one implicit in Hegel, so the same arguments would question the truth of the statement that experience, and the world in general, are to be construed as a self-centered identity "returning and ever returned into itself." If such a dubious analogy of the "whole" to some component processes is to be used at all, it must be applied in all literalness, and this means that the temporal character of the process cannot be abstracted from in references to the Absolute.

Turning to the second point, Hegel manifestly supplements his interpretation of identity by an insistence upon the ubiquity of the subject-object relation.² The whole course of previous thought had made it easy to regard all that is given as given to a self or mind, and even as a state of a mind or self. Content that is given seems to require a subject; the subject-object relation seems³ to be empirically ubiquitous. While Hegel often talks ambiguously of sensations as "alterations in the substantiality of the soul,"⁴ his "realism" lies in the fact that for the most part he insists that apprehended content is not, to use Lovejoy's term, existentially subjective: "I have not made it, it did not wait for me in order to exist, and it remains although I go away from it. I and the object are therefore two independ-

¹ A strong criticism of the absolute idealist's theory of identity is to be found on pp. 119-23 of Whitehead's *Process and Reality*. It should be read with reference to his theory of change, such as found on p. 92.

² See Cunningham, *Thought and Reality in Hegel's System*, pp. 3, 21. T. H. Green and Royce repeat this insistence.

³ The qualification is necessary since Bradley, among others, has denied the doctrine. He writes: "We have now verifiably some states in which there is no reference to a subject at all," i.e., cases where the subject is not given, and if invoked, it would be as the result of inference (*op. cit.*, p. 249).

⁴ *The Philosophy of Mind*, trans. Wallace, p. 178.

ent things.”¹ It is content for a subject rather than content that is a state of a subject. This, coupled with Hegel’s opposition to pantheism, is a plausible ground for the position that Hegel does not identify God, as absolute mind, with the totality of reality, but simply regards God as the absolute subject, and so a personality, in relation to which all that exists appears as content.² But the interpretation that God is the Absolute, that the Absolute is mind, and that all that exists is in some sense a stage of mind, is equally tenable, since it is undeniable that in the subject-object relation Hegel underlines the subject.³ While finite mind may apprehend reality other than itself, unless the object is ultimately taken up into the subject as a stage in its own development, the object becomes as basic as the subject, and the self grows in contact with objects which may be as external and even hostile to the supremacy of mind and value as any skeptical realist could desire. Hegel’s general doctrine is insured only if the object exists for, and is in some sense an aspect of, the life of the subject, otherwise events in the world can hardly be regarded as the “concreteness” of the self-developing universal mind. The bare fact of the ubiquity of the subject-object relation would give no basis upon which to ascribe any metaphysical su-

¹ *Philosophy of Religion*, I, 107; quoted on p. 257 of Turner’s *Theory of Direct Realism*. Turner seems to insist too strongly in this volume on Hegel’s “realism,” minimizing the relation of all content to the absolute mind.

² Cunningham, *op. cit.*, pp. 114 ff. Cf. Royce: “The whole world of truth and being must exist only as present, in all its variety, its wealth, its relationships, its entire constitution, to the unity of a single consciousness, which includes both our own and all finite conscious meanings in one final eternally present insight” (*The World and the Individual*, I, 397). “You are in God; but you are not lost in God” (*ibid.*, p. 465).

³ Cunningham, *op. cit.*, p. 76: Hegel “did indeed reduce the object to terms of the subject. . . . But he did not destroy the duality within experience. The object was never annihilated as an object, only explained; its alienation disappeared, but its self-identity was never lost.”

premacy to the subject.¹ Even if both subject and object are always given, it does not, as Bradley remarks, necessarily follow "from this that only one of these two things is real, and that all the rest of the given total is merely its attribute."²

If to the foregoing two points be added the observations so often made that the Hegelian absolute mind is really the postulation of an absolute "perspective" which somehow differs from and yet includes all finite perspectives, and that there is no necessary passage from the subject-object relation in finite perspectives to the existence of an absolute perspective (if, indeed, the phrase is not a contradiction in terms), it is possible to conclude that neither the phenomena of self-development nor the relation of apprehended contents to finite subjects renders plausible the conception of an absolute mind as a universal or identity which makes itself concrete through the temporal history of the world and yet, as a perfectly realized or concrete universal, "slumbers in eternal repose." The fact that the usual connotations of mentality are not adequately described in the conception of mind as an identity manifesting itself through differences is partly hidden in the "substantiality" of such terms as "subject" and "self"—terms which bear witness to the fact that Hegel's revolt against substance does not free itself from lingering traces of substance theories of mind. Indeed, it might be argued that these very traces give plausibility to an otherwise "dark" theory, dark by reason of either its profundity or its obscurity.

¹ " 'Being in a mind,' then, can only be a metaphor for 'being an object to a mind' or 'being thought of'; and if the phrase is taken in this sense, we cannot infer from it, as has often been done, that ideas are 'mental,' i.e., that they are, not merely objects apprehended by the mind, but actually mental states or processes—bits of mind as it were" (Hoernlé, *op. cit.*, pp. 66, 67).

² *Op. cit.*, p. 249.

16. BRADLEY: MIND AS ORGANIC WHOLENESS

Bradley was not interested in the question as to whether his results should be regarded as idealistic or realistic,¹ and in calling him an absolute idealist (a just designation in virtue of his treatment of value and his claim that there is no reality outside of spirit or mind),² it is essential to note the specific interpretation that these terms carry for Bradley, or else such a similarity as Whitehead has noted between his results and those of Bradley becomes quite incomprehensible.³

Bradley does not refer to substances in his use of the terms "finite center," "soul," "self," and "spirit." "We find nowhere," he writes, "substance fixed and rigid" (p. 471). The usual difficulties in the relation of soul and body he regards as having arisen because soul and body "have been taken to be things, whose kinds are different, and which have existence each by itself, and each in its own right" (p. 296). He, on the contrary, looks at the body as "one piece of Nature," and the soul as "no more self-subsistent than the body" (pp. 297, 298), and accordingly rejects the view of a "soul or Ego which stands above, and gives unity to, the series" (p. 316). Indeed, soul and body are both "phenomenal series" (p. 335).

A finite center is for Bradley a center of immediate experience. Bradley does not elaborate this position, but I take this to mean that a finite center is a field of the given, a pulse of "feeling" or sentience, similar to what James referred to as a specious present. Such a center "of feeling and felt in one is not to be called 'subjective,' nor is it to be identified with myself. That would be a mistake at once

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 547. Page references to Bradley, unless otherwise noted, will be to this volume.

² *Ibid.*, p. 552. Mind and spirit are equated on p. 530.

³ *Op. cit.*, pp. vii and viii.

fundamental and disastrous.”¹ Instead, a self arises in a finite center only when there appears in the center an “object” as a not-self.² A soul, on the other hand, is an ideal construction, legitimate only within limits, a “finite centre viewed as an object existing in time with a before and after of itself.”³ The relation of finite center, soul, and self is expressed as follows: “There certainly is no self or soul without a centre of feeling. But there may be centres of feeling which are not selves, and again not souls. Possibly also some selves are too fleeting to be called souls, while almost certainly there are souls which are not properly selves” (p. 524 n.).

There remains to be noted Bradley’s use of the term “spirit” or “mind.” “The ideal of spirit,” he writes, “is directly opposed to mechanism. Spirit is a unity of the manifold in which the externality of the manifold has utterly ceased. The universal here is immanent in the parts, and its system does not lie somewhere outside and in the relation between them” (p. 498). Admitting the great difference implied in Bradley’s doctrine of the universal, this use of mind or spirit is somewhat analogous to Whitehead’s use of “organism.” Using mind or spirit in opposition to the mere aggregation and externality signified for him in the notion of mechanism, Bradley continually refers to the given as psychical, calls “immediate experience or feeling” a “stage of mind,”⁴ and yet consistently holds that “pure spirit is not realized except in the Absolute” (p. 499).

While Bradley very seldom uses the term “mind,” preferring “spirit,” the final result in regard to the topic of mind is not so different from that found in Hegel. For

¹ *Essays on Truth and Reality*, p. 189.

² *Ibid.*, p. 416.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 414.

⁴ *The Principles of Logic* (2d ed.), II, 695. In Book I, chap. ii, sec. 65, Bradley criticizes the “atomic” views of mind.

Bradley, as for Hegel, all reality is mind or spirit in some degree of purity, and the Absolute is pure mind or spirit. This is not to be taken as meaning that the Absolute is only "mind," since mind now refers merely to organic wholeness, to a unity in and through differences. There is one major difference here between Bradley and Hegel, and this arises out of the fact that since Bradley does not take the subject-object relation as basic, there is not that ambiguity in his doctrine as to whether the Absolute is a personal God or an absolute self, an ambiguity which gives to Hegel the benefits and the disadvantages of the "substantiality" which such terms carry in their usual non-technical connotation. This very difference brings into bolder relief the divergence between the use of mind to denote the organic character of reality and the use of mind to denote an apprehending self or subject. The idealist plays fast and loose with both notions, and the result can only be confusion. It would be more satisfactory to designate the general metaphysical doctrine by such terms as "spiritual" or "organismic," thereby freeing the term "mind" for more specific and less controversial uses.

17. BRADLEY'S TREATMENT OF FINITE MIND

There is an important aspect of Bradley's position which comes closer to the more usual connotation of the term "mind," namely, his analysis of thought. On Bradley's use of terms, the Absolute would be called pure mind but not pure thought. We are specifically told that in the Absolute thought is so transformed that it can no longer be called thought (p. 172). Although on this distinctly non-Hegelian usage thought is only one aspect of mind, Bradley uses thought in a sense that is wider than that of "thought processes" as studied in psychology.

Bradley denies that thought or ideality is "something

outside of facts, something imported into them, or imposed as a sort of layer above them" (p. 165). Anything is a "that" and a "what," "an existence and a content" (p. 162). An idea is the alienation of the content from the existence, "a content which has been made loose from its own immediate existence" (p. 164), a separation of the "what" from the "that." Stated in more detail:

An idea is any part of the content of a fact so far as that works out of immediate unity with its existence. And an idea's factual existence may consist in a sensation or perception, just as well as in an image. The main point and the essence is that some feature in the "what" of a given fact should be alienated from its "that" so far as to work beyond it, or at all events loose from it. Such a movement is ideality, and, where it is absent, there is nothing ideal [p. 163].

Some implications of this treatment of thought are immediately evident: (1) Thought is a dislocation of reality, and consequently cannot as such characterize the Absolute, which, in fact, may be regarded as the perfect harmony of content and existence (p. 305). The tragedy of thought, as Bradley sees it, comes from the urge of thought to heal the very breach upon which its existence as thought depends (p. 168). (2) Since thought is a dislocation of reality, there can be no thought without reference to reality, no thought which is not an ascription of content to the real, no bare "floating ideas," no "pure" thought. (3) As the foregoing doctrine implies, there can be no thought which is not "carried" by a factual existence: "Every idea, it is certain, possesses a sensible side or aspect. Beside being a content, it, in other words, must be also an event" (pp. 397, 398). This carrier may be a sensation, perception, image—in fact, any event of a finite center. And since a finite center is not subjective and not entirely composed of states of a self, an idea cannot be said to exist in a realm apart from nature. Indeed, if nature be taken to be that portion of

reality considered in abstraction from the psychical (p. 261), a view which allows of the attribution of secondary qualities and even of beauty to nature (p. 279), then it may be said that an idea is always a content or "what" carried by some natural existence.

Bradley recognizes that on this view ideas may be called "symbolical,"¹ and it is apparent that Bradley's view of idea has much in common with the symbolic approach. One question, upon which a difference arises, may be noted here. The question is as to whether the meaning of an idea or symbol is literally a breaking-loose from an object of its "what" or, as some would say, its "essence." It might seem more natural to say that an existent is always a particular existent, and that its "what" can in no way be separated from it, but that the "what" attributed in a judgment to an object is always a *meaning* suggested and carried by an existent, and not the "ghost" of an object. Even if meanings are always derived in connection with objects, compound meanings may arise which cannot be exemplified by any "that," and which to that extent are "floating ideas." In this way it is possible to explain how thought goes "beyond" existence, in imagination, pure science, and mathematics, without either losing the general connection of thought and reality or performing the dubious operation on a thing of separating its existence from its essence.

There is a further extension by Bradley of the term "idea" which is of interest in connection with the query as to how far absolute idealism actually gets away from the category of substance. The extension is indicated by the statement that "appearance is content not at one with its existence, a 'what' loosened from its 'that' " (p. 187). Since appearance means "anything which comes short when com-

¹ *Essays on Truth and Reality*, p. 153.

pared with Reality" (p. 485), if it is legitimate to press the foregoing statement literally, every finite center takes on the character which has been attributed to thought. Accordingly, it seems as if the Absolute is the "that" of which every finite center is a "what." If this is so, Bradley is in danger of assuming that the "what" and the "that" are more than analytical distinctions, and would seem to be clearly approaching a substance-attribute interpretation of the Absolute and its appearances. While "the Absolute is *not* its appearances," yet "the Absolute appears in its phenomena and is real nowhere outside them" (p. 411). Again, "no appearance, or any combination of these, is the same as Reality," yet "the Absolute *is* its appearances, it really is all and every one of them" (p. 486). It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Absolute and its appearances are precisely analogous to the relation of a substance to its attributes. In places Bradley's language is quite explicit: "Every centre qualifies the Whole, and . . . the Whole, as a substantive, is present in each of these its adjectives" (p. 524). Such statements help to confirm the hypothesis that in absolute idealism the emphasis upon process does not actually replace the concept of substance, evident in the conception of the Absolute and its appearances, and in the manifestation of a universal in and through its differences, but merely utilizes that conception in a novel way, with the flavor of activity and development. The repeated statements to the effect that "we do not know why or how the Absolute divides itself into centres, or the way in which, so divided, it still remains one" (p. 527), may be taken not merely as instances of Bradley's sincerity and frankness, but as indications of a basic difficulty in the conceptions themselves. This difficulty appears to lie in the conception of a substance which is neither separable from nor identifiable with its attributes.

18. BOSANQUET: MIND AND TOTALITY

A brief account of Bosanquet's views will bring these general principles into bolder relief and will supply the occasion for a more detailed consideration of finite mind as found in absolute idealism.

Whereas Bradley seldom uses the term "mind," and by implication identifies it with spirit, Bosanquet, agreeing that the Absolute is spiritual,¹ regards thought as the essence of mind.² So used, thought or mind consists not so much in the dislocation of the "what" from the "that," but in the tendency toward the development of greater wholeness, a tendency regarded as characteristic of all experience. Thought or mind is practically identical with logic, as "the supreme law or nature of experience, the impulse towards unity and coherence (the positive spirit of non-contradiction) by which every fragment yearns towards the whole to which it belongs" (p. 340; cf. p. 264). Thought is the "nisus to individualization,"³ "the active form of totality, present in all and every experience of a rational being—perhaps, in a degree, in every experience in the universe" (p. 59).⁴ Stating this doctrine in a way which brings out its connection with the view of mind as a self-evolving universal, he writes: "I shall treat the fundamental activity of thought as the same throughout and as always consisting in the reproduction by a universal or real identity, presented in a content, of contents dis-

¹ *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, pp. 72, 74. Unless otherwise noted, page references will be to this volume.

² *Three Chapters on the Nature of Mind*, p. 156. An additional Bradleian use of the term mind will be noticed later.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 73. The Individual, in this usage, is Totality, the Whole.

⁴ It may be noticed that Bosanquet applies the phrase "the active form of totality" to the self (p. 335) and to self-consciousness (p. 337) as well as to mind.

tinguishable from the presented content, which also are differences of the same universal.”¹

At this point there arises the question as to how the relation of this universal to its content (the relation of thought to reality, of the “active form of totality” to Totality) is to be conceived. Is mind, taken in this sense, a process which runs through a Whole not describable as a mind, or is the Whole itself a mind? Is mind merely an aspect of the Whole or is it somehow constitutive of the Whole? The account of finite mind seems clearly to imply the first alternative, but the dominant tendency seems to point in the direction of exalting thought or mind as the supreme category, thus breaking down the original emphasis on the implied difference between mind and spirit.

Neglecting for the moment the status of finite mind, Bosanquet often writes as though mind were simply the active aspect of a whole that is more than mind. In speaking of the philosophical poverty of panpsychism, he states that this doctrine “transforms the complementariness of mind and nature, on which, as it would seem, their inseparability depends, by an analysis of one into the other such as wholly to destroy the speciality of function for which the one is needed by the other. . . . Why insist on reducing to a homogeneous type the contributions of all elements to the whole [p. 363]?” On his own view “it is all but impossible to distinguish Nature from mind. To separate them is impossible. If you ask, what in Nature is not mind, you can only answer the fragmentary or disconnected *qua* fragmentary or disconnected. If you ask what in mind is not Nature, you can only answer the spirit of totality, the attitude which makes everything alive in its bearing on the whole.” “Mind has nothing of its own but the active form of totality, everything positive it draws

¹ *Logic* (2d ed.), II, 14.

from Nature" (p. 367). Nature is here conceived precisely in the manner of Bradley, so that the Absolute may again be described as "a perfect union of mind and nature" (p. 382). When mind is an effort to self-completion, it would hardly seem that the Absolute as the complete could be described as a mind.

On the other hand, there are many passages which favor the opposite interpretation. We are told that "all that is an object of thought is ultimately a constituent of it";¹ that "it is thought which constructs and sustains the fabric of experience"; that the ultimate tendency of thought is not to generalize "but to constitute a world" (p. 55). Bosanquet even talks of "the complete mind" which must "appreciate the feeling of the finite mind" (p. 389).

Bosanquet's theory of mind thus seems to take two directions. From one point of view mind becomes the active aspect of reality, the tendency to the formation of more comprehensive wholes, "the *nisus* to the whole." On another emphasis mind is explicitly identified with "the conditions of totality," and made constitutive of reality. On the first emphasis, the Absolute, as the whole, could have no *nisus* to wholeness; on the second emphasis, if every whole must center in mind, and if every object of mind is a constituent of it, the Absolute whole seems to become an absolute mind.

19. BOSANQUET ON FINITE MIND

Given Bosanquet's general position, the transition to finite mind follows easily and naturally, and this part of his theory offers much of interest, not being dogged by the ambiguities noticed in the last section.² In general, a man's

¹ *The Meeting of Extremes in Contemporary Philosophy*, p. 23.

² Views of mind having much in common with Bosanquet at this point are found in G. Watts Cunningham (*Five Lectures on the Problem of Mind*) and in R. F. A. Hoernlé (*Studies in Contemporary Metaphysics*, chap. viii, and *Matter-Life-Mind-God*, chap. iv).

mind is simply one stage or level of the larger process which extends above and below him: his ideas "are not created from the void, but simply represent the immanent capacities of his world as it develops in fact and for consciousness towards a more individual whole" (p. 164).

For the most part there are no traces of a substance conception of the finite mind. The doctrine of mind "as an immaterial being, other than and, so to speak, behind or below the uniting consciousness or experience, seems to be unintelligibly framed on the analogy of a material thing" (p. 218). Reference is made to the "superstition" which regards finite minds "as substances, crystal nuclei, fallen or celestial angels, or both at once" (p. 372). As opposed to such superstitions, "we must learn to interpret 'mind' positively, in its own right, by what it is and does" (p. 282); we need "to accept the significance of mind on its own merits, not as a 'thing,' nor yet as a mere power or attribute of a thing (say, of body or of brain), nor again even as a 'life' . . . but as a 'whole' of a special kind, with a structure and concreteness of its own . . . " (p. 283). Thus "the best general description of the nature of mind is to call it a world . . . " (p. 287). What is true of man in general is true of the finite mind: it is "a world that realises, in a limited matter, the logic and spirit of the whole" (p. 287).

Finite mind, then, presupposes a world of which it is a "manifestation" rather than the creator or sovereign (p. 128). Not only does finite mind fail to dominate the larger patterns of history and civilization (p. 152), but even a particular person's mind and purposes "presuppose, accept, and are founded on, his actual body" (p. 154). The relation of finite mind to the world it presupposes is stated in terms suggestive of emergence: "The rule is for the stream to rise higher than its source" (p. 191); "Mind is not so much a something, a unit, exercising guidance upon matter, as

the fact of self-guidance of that world which appears as matter, when that reaches a certain level of organization" (pp. 193, 194). Like the self, consciousness is also characterized as a "supervenient perfection" (p. 202).

This insistence upon the immersion in, and inseparability from, the world which finite mind presupposes and whose patterns it reflects shows the degree to which the absolute idealist opposes the seventeenth-century dualism of mind and nature. In Bosanquet this motive appears in his constant insistence upon the "continuity of the real world with mind."¹ "Thought," he writes, "moves in the world of real objects, and has never come out of it."² "There is nothing to be called the mind of which there are empty acts exercised upon objects";³ "on all sides there is a convergence on the conception of mind as consisting of what it does and experiences."⁴

In this insistence that mind cannot be divorced from the world certain new realists and pragmatists are at one with the absolute idealist. Indeed, there are few thinkers today who would dissent from the claim that the finite mind draws its content from a world which it presupposes and in which it appears. The need, however, would be to specify in more detail the nature of this relation of finite mind and the world-process. In his treatment of mind the idealist is willing to go just far enough to satisfy his doctrines of value, and thus tends to remain content with the most general propositions concerning mind. The very passion of the idealist for metaphysical concreteness may reflect itself in an inverse contentment with emptiness of empirical detail.

¹ *The Distinction between Mind and Its Objects*, p. 49.

² *Three Chapters on the Nature of Mind*, p. 113.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

⁴ *The Meeting of Extremes*, p. 25.

20. BOSANQUET'S PASSAGE FROM IDENTITY TO SUBJECT

Bosanquet's position that the world cannot be divorced from mind has not met the agreement by new realists and pragmatists mentioned in connection with the converse claim.

In one sense, on Bosanquet's use of terms, the claim that the world cannot be divorced from mind is a truism. If mind is simply a discriminable but inseparable process which runs through all reality, then of course neither mind nor reality can occur in isolation. And equally, if mind or spirit be simply taken as a description of a certain organic character of reality, regardless of whether or not reality be stated in terms of a concrete universal, then of course the world can be described as mental or spiritual, since this organic character does not reduce to any homogeneous stuff the actual natures of the discriminable features of the organic whole.

But, as has been seen, Bosanquet's position certainly goes much farther than such truisms. It has already been pointed out that Bosanquet speaks as if mind somehow constructs and sustains existence, as if the absolute mind could "appreciate" the feeling of the finite mind, and as if all that is an object of mind is a constituent of it. Coupling these doctrines with such statements as that "there can be no concrete whole but a whole centering in mind,"¹ "no world without consciousness as its centre," it appears that Bosanquet has without warning or justification passed to another view of mind on which mind is a creating perceiving subject, and this in spite of the fact that he admits that the subject-object relation is not final (p. 284 n.). It is only on some such use of mind that there is any sting in the claim that the world cannot be separated from mind. If

¹ *The Distinction between Mind and Its Objects*, pp. 39, 40.

mind were really only an active aspect of a process, it would be difficult to see how mind is a percipient, or how thought can have "objects," or how a process can be aware of itself as a process, or a universal conscious of its exemplifications.¹ Indeed, the account of mind as a self-evolving universal gives no explicit account of awareness or consciousness.² The "perceiver" is simply smuggled in.

To say that "I do not doubt that anything which can ultimately *be*, must be of the nature of mind or experience, and, therefore, that reality must ultimately be conceived after this manner" (p. 135), means one thing if it implies that reality must be conceived after the analogy of the contents and structure of experienced reality (a proposition with which new realist and pragmatist could both agree), and another thing if it be implied that such experienced content is dependent upon a subject mind.

That Bosanquet often thinks in terms of this second implication may be shown by two examples.³ In *The Principle of Individuality and Value* (p. 361 n.) he writes:

¹ Spinoza has analogous difficulties here. While mind in general is one aspect of reality, finite mind must be somehow a "knower."

² Professors Cunningham, Burt, and Tsanoff all point out here that an idealist might maintain that the relation of a universal to its exemplifications or attributes is precisely the ground of the relation of subject to object, of awareness to content. The conscious subject would then be simply the higher stages of the same situation involved in the relation of any universal to its differences. There is certainly some question as to whether this transition can be made, but in any case idealists who hold this doctrine should give it a detailed expansion. It is not clear that all objective idealists have held such a view. Bosanquet (in the Preface and on p. 175) frankly disclaims giving any explanation of consciousness. It may be noticed that a similar problem appears in many forms of idealism: in Plato's transition from a self-mover to a conscious subject capable of apprehending Forms; in Leibniz' passage from monad as substance to monad as subject; in Fichte's and Gentile's conviction that a pure act is conscious of its activity and of its products.

³ This is not true of Bradley. His essay, "Of Our Knowledge of Immediate Experience," in *Essays on Truth and Reality*, contrasts strikingly with Bosanquet (and idealism generally) in this respect.

The physical world can never, in the last resort, put off its psychical character. A tree is beautiful, and green, and tall. All these qualities are, as presentations, necessarily psychical. . . . They are all . . . psychical *ab initio* as presentations. . . . Taking as the test of psychical nature the being destroyed if the percipient mind were destroyed, it is plain that in a degree, though only in a degree, presentations remain psychical not only as pure presentations, but even as qualities of spatial objects. The subjective mind, which has perceived and which conceives them, being destroyed, their existence would certainly be *pro tanto* diminished, though not necessarily annihilated. A physical object must at least be capable of becoming psychical at any moment. If not, it so far has not full existence.

In spite of the qualifications in this passage, it is evident that the finite mind is here regarded as a perceiver, that its presentations are intrinsically psychical, and that the content presented is to some degree dependent for its existence upon the mind for which it is content. This turn of the argument comes as a surprise after the elaboration of a view of mind on which such statements might seem to have no significance. Bosanquet is here invoking the subject-object relation and falling into a weaker form of the Berkeleian type of argument which affirms that nothing can be experienced or conceived without thereby ontologically relating it to a subject. But such considerations do not show that what is experienced is dependent for its existence upon being experienced, or even that as experienced the content is mental. To argue in this way it would be necessary to refute the reasoning of the new realist, and whether his escape from the egocentric predicament be admitted or not, his criticism of the idealist argument based on this predicament seems to be sound.¹ In discussing Hegel it was pointed out that even if the subject-object relation

¹ Perry's discussion of this predicament (*Present Philosophical Tendencies*, pp. 129-32) has served to focus the question, although, as A. W. Moore has pointed out, the fallacy of accident is all that is involved. Hoernlé, McTaggart, and N. K. Smith admit the validity of the new realist argument on this point.

is ubiquitous, a position by no means certain, this fact would give no basis for underlining the subject and making the object dependent upon the subject. From the fact of givenness neither the dependence of the existence of what is given upon its being given, nor the mental character of the given, necessarily follows.

In *The Distinction between Mind and Its Objects* (p. 48), Bosanquet suggests another form of argument based upon the relativity of observed content to the observer. To the open-door policy of new realism Bosanquet replies: "Your organism, which you cannot separate from its mind, is one of the conditions which things require for the manifestation of their complete being." In this reply it appears that Bosanquet is regarding relativity to the organism as implying relativity to mind, a type of argument used by some idealists in interpreting the theory of relativity in physics as support for an idealist metaphysics.

Leaving aside the question as to whether the organism is a necessary condition for the existence of what is given or only of its givenness (or conceivably of neither), and assuming that the content of experience is emergent upon the presence of organisms, as well as the inseparability of the organism and its mind, it still need not follow, as has already been pointed out, that what is given is dependent upon mind for its existence. It all depends upon the theory of mind that is held. A holder of a relational theory of mind might regard experience as dependent upon the organism, and yet conceive of mind in terms of a relation between these experienced contents. So conceived, mind is "dependent" on experience instead of experience being dependent on mind. Similarly, the pragmatist is often inclined to regard experience as an emergent upon the presence of the organism without feeling any compulsion to subscribe to an idealist theory of mind, maintaining that

mind is a functional relation between experienced contents. Even if experience is dependent upon the organism, and mind inseparable from the organism, it would not follow that the world as experienced is dependent upon mind, provided mind is used in a relational or functional sense.¹

The conclusion seems to follow that the doctrine of the inseparability of the world from mind is either a truism (when mind is a process which runs through all reality, then by definition there is no reality apart from mind) or a *non sequitur* which gains its plausibility by an ambiguous shift in point of view whereby the notion of mind as a perceiving subject is introduced. Like all other questions, the question as to whether reality is mind-dependent can only be answered in the light of what "mind" is taken to mean. It is for this reason that an inquiry into the meaning of terms is of such importance. A realization of this symbolic relativity may help to bury more deeply the old bugaboo that it is impossible to get "outside of the mind."

21. AN EVALUATION OF ABSOLUTE IDEALISM

Because of the lengthy and repetitious character of the foregoing remarks on absolute idealism, it is advisable to bring together in a summary fashion the conclusions that have been suggested.

Measured in terms of the thoroughness with which it opposed on every front the type of thought represented by the Galilean-Cartesian-Newtonian world-view, objective idealism must be admitted to have presented an important philosophical alternative. It is highly significant that Bradley furnished the point of departure and revolt for prominent realists and pragmatists. In both of these movements the discussion of mind in its relation to nature has

¹ It will be maintained in the following chapter that new realism has succeeded in escaping from the mind-centric predicament.

taken place on a level that was impossible before the objective idealists did their work. In reacting against artificial simplifications of reality such as the materialistic phases of naturalism were presenting in the nineteenth century, the idealist rightly insisted upon doing justice to the more complex phases of the world-process, to mind, to art, to religion, and to morality. Protesting against the losing of man in an *art moderne* dance of material particles, the idealist reacted by insisting upon the uniqueness of man's most distinctive trait, mentality, and gave this trait of rationality a cosmic setting and support. Protesting against the losing of man's direct grip on the real by the conception of a world lying behind experience and different from it, the idealist took the world as experienced to be the very type and pattern of the real. Recognizing the neglect of the self or subject in the dominant naturalisms, the idealist championed the fundamental importance of the self in metaphysics. In opposition to a static conception of reality, idealism insisted (within the limits set by its theory of value) upon the reality of process. In its revolt against an ontological separation of mind and nature and against the particular doctrine of representative knowledge which dualism presented, idealism is the precursor of the dominant philosophy of the twentieth century. Idealism has modified the whole course of later philosophy—perhaps no more can be said of any philosophy.¹

The main consequences for the theory of mind have been noted. The dominant motive lies in the opposition to a substance approach by a view of mind as a systematic process inseparable from the world this process pervades. In its emphasis upon this environment in which mind

¹ In *The Revolt against Dualism*, Lovejoy does not do justice to the place of idealism in the movement of revolt, which is identified too closely with the first quarter of the present century.

(finite mind at least) operates, objective idealism displayed a realistic temper, capable of development into a new theory of nature and of allowing for concrete studies of the relation of mind to other aspects of reality—possibilities which have borne fruit in other hands.

When attention is turned, however, to a detailed consideration of results rather than to the historical significance of the movement, the view of mind in objective idealism reveals a number of difficulties: (1) Carrying over the dominant view that what is given is psychical or mental (historically a brilliant tactical stroke), there was revealed a tendency to underline the subject at the expense of the object. This subject then somehow takes on the character of a substantial perceiving mind, the object becoming a state of this mind, and even a form in which the subject realizes itself. Thus arises the questionable doctrine of the dependence (partial or complete) of what is given upon a subject mind, a doctrine of dubious meaning if mind is the active aspect of reality. In the same way, the notion of "thought of" instead of "thought," that is, the problem of consciousness, is smuggled in and is not reconciled with the general approach to mind with which the movement starts. (2) A host of ambiguities arise in the use of the same term in the conceptions of finite mind and absolute mind. The relation of mind and the absolute attains no clear and unambiguous formulation. Mind is confusingly regarded as an absolute subject, and as the organic character of reality becomes identified with spirit. (3) The attempt to combine stability and perfection as value categories with a dynamic conception of the real tends to be accompanied by the treatment of the Absolute and its appearances, or the universal and its exemplifications, in terms of a substance-attribute mode of thought.

As a general comment, it may be stated that throughout

objective idealism the view of mind as systematic process, enmeshed in reality, is ambiguously connected with a substance view which reveals itself in the conception of mind as perceiver, of the Absolute as a subject mind, and of the Absolute or universal as an "actual mover," creative of its appearances but not identical with them.

In pointing out that absolute idealism does not clearly or consistently harmonize the views of mind as subject and mind as pervasive process, and in demanding a more careful use of basic terms and a more detailed working-out of the nature of mind, the demand is merely for that consistency and concreteness which objective idealism has taken for its criteria. If it be agreed that no adequate theory of mind can neglect the view of mind as active process, it is also true that no adequate theory of mind can stop with the objective idealist's formulation of this position. It was necessary to separate the substance and process strains which were intertwined in this formulation, to define more carefully the concepts of self, subject, awareness, dependence, and to investigate concretely the relation of mind to the domains of the biologist, the anthropologist, the linguist, and the logician. Such were the tasks that remained, tasks on the whole dealt with by other hands and directed by other motives than those which dominated the objective idealists.

22. BERGSON AND IDEALISTIC ACTIVISM

For the most part, the element of activism found in Hegel has in French and Italian idealism dominated the absolutism with which it was unsatisfactorily allied in German and English thought. With a growing emphasis upon process, there has been less "solution, dissolution, and resolution of the Absolute" (to use a phrase of Anatole France), and the reverberations of the concept of substance, while still heard, sound like the distant thunder of

a passing storm. As illustrations of the way in which the process of mind tends to become a veritable bacchanalian revel in the extreme forms of modern idealism, a consideration of the views of Bergson and Gentile may serve to bring this chapter to a close.

Bergson's philosophy unites so many fruitful and widespread tendencies that it is somewhat artificial to classify him as an idealist. His doctrine of perception as the direct appearance of the material world points definitely in the direction of new realism, and has much in common with the early position of E. B. Holt, while his treatment of the intellect and its relation to the behavior demands of the organism marks an important stage in the development of a functional theory of mind. Bergson himself frequently presents his analysis as a reconciliation of idealism and realism.¹ Indeed, it is only by virtue of certain general doctrines which remain for the most part in the background, but which link him with French "spiritualism," that he may be called an idealist.

Bergson regards reality as a creative "universal becoming," a process neither mechanically determined by the past nor constrained to the achievement of a foreseen or foredetermined goal.² This creative spiritual process is compared in a vivid (and typically idealistic) analogy to the darting-forth of skyrocket, matter in this pyrotechnic philosophy representing the débris which falls as the life-impetus is spent, while life or consciousness is represented by the ascent of the rockets.³ In some such way the primal

¹ *Matter and Memory*, trans. Nancy Paul and W. Scott Palmer, pp. 304 ff. Unless otherwise noted, page references will be to this volume.

² *Creative Evolution*, chap. i.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 248. "Life as a whole, from the initial impulsion that thrust it into the world, will appear as a wave which rises, and which is opposed by the descending movement of matter," this "rising wave" being identified with consciousness (p. 269).

spiritual urge (which is identified with God) differentiates itself into matter and into intellect, the instrument of action. Our inquiry does not force us to enter into the difficulties of this conception.¹ In all but the most fundamental sense (if, indeed, any qualification at all is permissible), Bergson's view is "frankly dualistic," distinguished by an attempt to "soften" and make more acceptable this dualism. On the one side there is mind, the principle of freedom; on the other side, matter, the realm of determinism. The picture presented is of "an immense current of consciousness" traversing matter.² This current of "consciousness in general" is apparently equated with mind.³

Bergson brings the general problem of the relation of mind and matter to a focus in the consideration of the relation of the finite mind to the body (perhaps unduly neglecting the differences in the two problems). Claiming, as does the new realist, that in perception there always directly appears a portion of nature, so that in perception contact is made with the "real" world and not with a subjective modification of the percipient or with a content whose existence is dependent upon the percipient (p. 306), and that the nervous system is solely an instrument of action and not a fabricator of experienced content or a storehouse of images,

¹ There is little doubt but that while matter is the "obstacle, instrument, and stimulus" of mind (*Mind-Energy*, trans. H. Wildon Carr, p. 23), mind, as the larger process of intuition out of which intellect "condenses" (pp. 191, 217, 268) is more akin than matter to the primal spiritual process from which matter and intellect are simultaneously derived (pp. 187, 199). In the emphasis on the primacy of a "spiritual" process, Bergson expresses the dominant motive of recent idealism. The relation of spirit, consciousness, and mind, however, is by no means clear. Nor is it certain whether matter is the correlate of intellect alone or of the whole process of spirit. It is difficult to know how far to press Bergson's striking figures of speech.

² *Ibid.*, p. 19.

³ In regarding intellect as cut out of mind (p. 217), Bergson does not allow of the identification of mind and finite mind. Mind is perhaps to be identified with consciousness, and consciousness with spirit, although the reservations expressed in the foregoing note preclude any positive statement.

Bergson feels that since memory, which is for him a component of all actual perceptions, cannot be identified with given content or reduced to physiological processes, it must bear witness to another order of being. What is perceived is part of nature or matter, and since in actual perception "the rest comes from memory and is superadded to matter, it follows that memory must be, in principle, a power absolutely independent of matter" (p. 81). Memory, then, allows us to "grasp spirit in its most tangible form" (p. 81). Spirit is a reality independent of cortical processes, since the sole function of the brain is to act as an instrument of action (pp. 82, 83).

Mind, then, is a "force" that "has the faculty of drawing from itself more than it contains,"¹ and which "ceaselessly presses with the totality of its memory against the door which the body may half open to it" (p. 234), the body limiting the appearance of mind to those aspects of memory which further present action (p. 233). Hence Bergson's continual polemic against a psychophysical parallelism which ties down the complexity of mind to the corresponding brain state. Hence his belief in the separability of the mind from the body it uses as an instrument,² and in its probable survival after the destruction of the body.³ Hence the appearance of such "substantial" statements of mind as the following: "It is certain that mind . . . stands over against matter as a pure unity in face of an essentially divisible multiplicity" (p. 235).

23. BERGSON AND UNCONSCIOUS PSYCHIC STATES

No reader of Bergson can fail to be struck with the suggestive implications which Bergson draws from this theory

¹ *Mind-Energy*, p. 21.

² *Ibid.*, p. 57. It would almost be as consistent with his thought to say that the body uses mind as an instrument for action.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

of memory as "the interaction of mind and matter." When the "attention to life" is weakened and diminished, the mind, which contains its whole past in an unconscious form, freed from the restrictions imposed by the normal needs of action, floods the present. In this way an explanation is given of the experiences reported by drowning persons, the luxuriousness of dream life,¹ the loss of mental equilibrium in insanity (pp. 227, 228), and the interesting phenomena of false recognition in which one seems in the present actually to relive the past.² In all such cases the mind invades the present to an abnormal degree, owing to a weakening of the normal control of the body by which only that part of the mind which is useful for present action is allowed to appear.

It would not be possible to examine in detail alternative theories of these phenomena in the endeavor to show that Bergson's explanation is not a necessary one. Instead, two comments on the general theory of memory must suffice, followed by a word on the general doctrine of spirit to which memory is supposed to give the empirical clue.

With memory regarded as the persisting totality of all psychic states, Bergson is forced to justify the existence of unconscious psychical states. He believes that "the idea of an *unconscious representation* is clear, despite current prejudice" (p. 183). Does his analysis validate this conclusion? The argument takes the following form:

If consciousness is but the characteristic note of the *present*, that is to say of the actually lived, in short of the *active*, then that which does not act may cease to belong to consciousness without therefore ceasing to exist in some manner. In other words, in the psychological domain, consciousness may not be the synonym of existence, but only of real action or of immediate efficacy; and, limiting thus the meaning of the term, we shall have less difficulty in representing to ourselves a psychical state which is unconscious, that is to say, ineffective [pp. 181, 182].

¹ *Ibid.*, Lecture IV.

² *Ibid.*, Lecture V.

Bergson attempts to strengthen this position by an analogy with unperceived physical objects. He asks: "How comes it . . . that an *existence outside of consciousness* appears clear to us in the case of objects, but obscure when we are speaking of the subject [p. 183]?" To justify the analogy he continues: "What can be a non-perceived material object . . . unless it is a kind of unconscious mental state [p. 183]?" He concludes that "the adherence of this memory to our present condition is exactly comparable to the adherence of unperceived objects to those objects which we perceive; and the *unconscious* plays in each case a similar part" (p. 187).

Rather than clearing up the matter, there seems to be a whole tissue of difficulties in this conception. Obviously the whole issue hinges upon the isolation of events or entities that can be called "psychical states," unless, indeed, anything that is not an object of consciousness, such as unperceived physical objects, is regarded as an unconscious psychical state (an interpretation which is compatible with the "monistic" aspect of Bergson's doctrine of spirit). If there is a special class of psychical events or states, and if consciousness merely designates the givenness of events, then of course psychical states may be unconscious, that is, not given, and there would arise no paradox of an unconscious consciousness.¹ However, in this case it is necessary to exhibit psychical states which can be either conscious or unconscious, and this Bergson apparently fails to do. One component of what is given is attributed to the actual world. Another component consists in "affections," which are contents or sensations (p. 64) due to the fact that the organism is active and struggling (p. 57), such

¹ Bergson vacillates in his descriptions of consciousness. At times it is stated that "consciousness signifies, before everything, memory" (*ibid.*, p. 55); more often consciousness is made synonymous with choice (*ibid.*, p. 11; *Creative Evolution*, p. 144).

affections being there in the body where they are perceived to be (p. 59). The affections are not psychic states since they are held to be "real actions" of the body, annihilated when the body is destroyed (p. 59).¹ Where, then, are psychical states found? Apparently they must be found in memory, interpreted in a special manner. Memory, empirically described, requires that certain events be "felt" (judged) to have occurred, but judgments and feeling seem to involve the functioning of present content and to include a complexity of "affection," and so are hardly to be regarded as the elementary psychical states with the essential quality of "pastness" which Bergson demands for memory.

A clue to Bergson's meaning of psychical may perhaps be found in his conception of "memory of the present" as utilized in his analysis of false recognition. But here it would seem that psychic states are introduced metaphysically and not discovered empirically. As a general principle it is maintained that "the formation of memory is never posterior to the formation of perception; it is contemporaneous with it."² This memory "seems to be to the perception what the image reflected in the mirror is to the object in front of it."³ "Our actual existence, then, whilst it is unrolled in time, duplicates itself all along with a virtual existence, a mirror-image."⁴ The mirror-image, which is memory, has intrinsically the quality of pastness, for "were it not memory of the past, it never could become so."⁵ False recognition (paramnesia) arises when there is a temporary awareness of this duplication, "a recollection of the present moment in that actual moment itself."⁶

¹ Incidentally, much that new realists call "minding" as opposed to the "minded" could be interpreted as complexes of such "affections."

² *Mind-Energy*, p. 128.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 134.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 135.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 136.

Regardless of the success of the application of this theory of memory to the case of false recognition, the conception of a reduplication of each event in a mirror-image which is intrinsically a "psychical state" bearing the stamp of pastness is clearly a postulation and not a discovery of a class of psychic states. Further, it is a postulate which becomes unnecessary if alternative explanations of memory and of false recognition are satisfactory. It seems necessary to conclude that Bergson has empirically failed to isolate anything which need be called a psychic state, that the conception of unconscious psychical states is therefore left in a questionable form, and that accordingly the notion of a mind or spirit composed in part of all past psychical states in an unconscious form is an arbitrary and dubious notion.

Bradley has maintained that "memory is plainly a construction from the ground of the present. It is throughout inferential, and is certainly fallible."¹ Such a view is able to deny with Bergson that memory is not simply a localized retention in the brain of engrammatic traces, not simply the present performance of previously formed habits, and may justly contend that memory is not to be confused with bare presence of content. Yet such a view need not invoke any passage to spirit to explain memory, and need not introduce any duplication of each moment of existence or hold that duplicated events have an intrinsic quality of pastness. It may be that a psychical state is not a unique kind of existence, but a functioning of other existences, and that the essence of memory lies in the formation of judgments about the past accompanied by belief—in short, that memory is both inferential and fallible.

Only one other point may be stressed in Bergson's conception of mind. This concerns the previously pointed out ambiguity of the wider ontological setting of the doctrine.

¹ *Appearance and Reality*, p. 257.

Bergson at times takes mind to be consciousness and the essence of consciousness to be memory. Does this mean, in terms of the theory of memory, that mind is simply the permanent retention of the duplications of all events? How, then, is mind to be regarded as a current which darts forth, subdues, and traverses matter, particularly since pure memory or the unconscious is inert and powerless? Where consciousness is used as signifying choice, it becomes nothing when there is no alternative action to be performed. Does this mean that "consciousness in general," separable from a finite organism, is still a principle of choice? Or if choice requires organisms, does this mean that there is no consciousness in general? How, in abstraction from finite bodies, is the relation of spirit and matter to be conceived? If insanity represents the chaotic intrusion of the unconscious past into the present, owing to a slackening of the normal bodily functioning, could not, by analogy, the current of pure consciousness or mind be likened to an insane bacchanalian revel of psychic states rather than to a progressive utilization and domination of matter? In still other contexts Bergson states that "intuition is mind itself."¹ How on his doctrine of perception can there be intuition or perception without the selective action of an organism? Finally, what is the relation of the finite mind which can survive the disintegration of the body, and so is to that degree a substance ("a pure unity" standing over against matter), to consciousness in general? Is the latter a substance, or a continuum of psychic states?

While a Bergsonian could no doubt indicate answers to many of these questions and perhaps show that some of them are baseless, taken as a whole they bear witness to the looseness and ambiguity of the Bergsonian treatment of mind. In Bergson's thought there are acute criticisms of

¹ *Creative Evolution*, p. 268.

psychophysical parallelism, numerous insights of great importance for the development of realistic and pragmatic philosophy, and brilliant suggestions as to the way in which a dualism of mind and matter, if initially accepted, may be "softened,"¹ but the conception of mind which is developed is too easily taken as the sole alternative to psychophysical parallelism, the approach from the conception of memory shares the weakness of that conception, and the general view of the nature of mind and its relation to matter is bathed in vagueness and ambiguity. It was inevitable that the approach to mind in terms of the category of process could not remain content with Bergson's formulation.

24. *Actus purus*: LEIBNIZ, FICHTE, GENTILE

The extreme form of activism within recent idealism is found in the writings of Giovanni Gentile, who insists that mind or spirit is not an existence but rather a pure activity generative of all existence.²

The concept of pure act (*actus purus*) is an ancient one. It is suggested by Aristotle's description of Deity, it formed part of the Scholastic system of thought, and it is expressly used by Leibniz and Fichte.

Earlier in the chapter it was noted that Leibniz stressed activity as the principle by which a substance changes from state to state. Activity and substance are correlative terms. Leibniz apparently regards activity as a quality of substance, and Russell warns against saying that Leibniz iden-

¹ I refer particularly to the theory that perception is a slice of matter as well as an element in the human biography, the treatment of quality as the fusion by memory of processes predominantly quantitative, and the insistence upon the necessity of matter as a stimulus, and not merely as an obstacle, to the spontaneity of spirit or mind (see *Matter and Memory*, pp. 324 ff.).

² Other representatives of this mode of thought are discussed in Ruggiero's *Contemporary Philosophy*. Such activism is there the criterion by which all philosophers are assessed.

tified substance and activity.¹ Nevertheless, Leibniz continually tends to think of force as an entity, invoking it to explain absolute motion. God is the prime mover. Leibniz speaks of the "active force in body" as a "substantial principle." He even writes: "I regard force as constitutive of substance, since it is the source of action, which is the characteristic of substance."² So that whatever qualifications Leibniz' occasional words suggest, it is natural to carry away from his writings the impression that stuff has been reduced to activity, an impression deepened by the remembrance that for Leibniz the material world represents a stage of confused perception in the development of active immaterial monads.

Fichte reiterated in a striking form the Leibnizian emphasis upon activity. He takes as his basic conception that of "deed-act" (*Tat-Handlung*), holding that the Ego or spirit, the basic reality, is not an existence but a pure activity which posits its existence, and in so doing posits the existence of things other than itself. That is, from pure activity flow both the subject and the object as existences. Activity, as the basis of existence, cannot itself be made an object for a subject, and so cannot be empirically exhibited.³ The Ego, as pure activity, reflects on this activity, and thus in the process of positing passes to ever higher stages of self-consciousness. Indeed, "the Ego is only free in acting; as soon as it reflects upon this act, it ceases to be free, and the act becomes product." So that "from the impossibility of the consciousness of a free act arises the

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 49.

² R. Latta, *Leibniz*, p. 300 n.; Gerhardt, *Die philosophischen Schriften von G. W. Leibniz*, IV, 472. See also Russell, *op. cit.*, pp. 77, 253. Russell concludes that "Leibniz has inferred, on purely metaphysical grounds, a primitive force of which no dynamical use is made" (p. 96).

³ *The Science of Knowledge*, trans. A. E. Kroeger (1889), pp. 63 ff.

whole distinction between ideality and reality, between representation and the thing in itself."¹

Here again is found the typical pattern of the idealistic derivation of the world from an immaterial spiritual process. Substance conceptions are kept well in the background. The finite immaterial substantial mind or soul is expressly regarded as a logical fiction.² "Substance," we are told, "is nothing fixed, but a mere change. . . . The accidents, synthetically united, give the substance; and the substance is nothing but the totality of accidents. A permanent substrate must not be entertained."³ Again: "Substance signifies the *all-embracing*, not the *permanent*, as is generally supposed."⁴ And yet Fichte continues: "The positing Ego, by the most marvelous of its powers (productive imagination), holds the vanishing accident firmly, until it has compared it with the accident whereby it is pushed aside," and "diverts and guides along itself and in itself accidents which have no *common* bearer."⁵ It seems to follow, then, that activity has itself become the substratum. In the Preface to this translation W. T. Harris suggests the same interpretation: "The ego is not unless it acts—it is pure activity without a substratum of being, but its activity furnishes a substratum of being. Quiescent being cannot be a substrate, but requires or presupposes a substrate of pure activity."⁶ The string upon which are strung the beads of existence is pure activity, and the string produces its own beads. The Ego "is both the acting and the product of the act; the active and the result of the

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 219. Original in italics. The position is remarkably similar to Gentile's distinction between living and dead thought, between *pensiero pensante* and *pensiero pensato*. Memories of Spinoza also arise.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 373, 374.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 170.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 171.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 163.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. xii.

activity; deed and act in one.”¹ It is not stuff which supports an adjectival activity, but activity which as substratum supports and creates stuff. The substance conception of the materialist remains, but turned inside out: existence does not support activity; activity posits existence.

A similar result is attained by Gentile. Mind or spirit is regarded as a pure act (*atto puro*) having no existence apart from its manifestations,² a view which “resolves the world into spiritual act or act of thought” (p. 265). The mind does not exist as a substance before its act, but the mind as subject (the empirical Ego) becomes a reality only when mind as act (the transcendental Ego) posits an object. In words reminiscent of Fichte, “in so far as the subject is constituted a subject by its own act it constitutes the object” (p. 18). In summarizing his position Gentile writes that “mind, the spiritual reality, is the act which posits³ its object in a multiplicity of objects, reconciling their multiplicity and objectivity in its unity as subject. It is a theory which withdraws from mind every limit of space and time and every external condition” (p. 241). Mind or spirit must not be conceived “as a fact, that is, as something done. A thing made presupposes the making; and from the deed we must rise to the doing, but to a doing which shall not itself be a thing done, a fact, and similar therefore to the doings which we witness as mere spectators. The doing in which our autonomous becoming is detected is that one of which *We* are not spectators but actors, we the spectators of every other doing, we as the thinking Activity” (p. 124). Thus the fountain of reality is activity, also called

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 68, 69.

² *The Theory of Mind as Pure Act*, trans. H. Wildon Carr, p. 20. Unless otherwise noted, page references to Gentile will be to this volume.

³ Gentile frequently uses this Fichtean term.

by Gentile "transcendental thought," *pensiero pensante*, "transcendental Ego," "We," "the Person," "Spirit," "Man." From this activity flows the world of empirical objects and subjects, the flame of spirit producing in itself the fuel it feeds upon. The world of fact is derived from act: activity can never as such become an object for itself, but as one act is followed by another, the first act becomes object, becomes *pensiero pensato*, becomes, as Fichte would say, product, while at the same time spirit thereby attains a higher stage of self-realization.¹ In Hegelian fashion, the world of nature is seen as an "abstract moment" of that mind or spirit which as an "ever-living act of self-production" realizes itself in an eternal process of self-realization. And since mind is Man, naturalism is repudiated and the human spirit is vindicated: "All is in Us: We are All."

25. GENTILE: MIND AS PURE ACT

It is not our purpose to discuss in any fulness Gentile's thought, be it a humanistic triumph or a humanistic nightmare or the "last word" in idealism. Space permits only a consideration of the concept of pure activity, and a brief reference to Gentile's mentalism or spiritualism.

The question to be raised is whether in spite of all protests and warnings pure activity does not itself become a substratum, a stuff to which things in nature are adjectival. Gentile, like Fichte, insists that "mind . . . is act or process not substance," that "mind has no existence apart from its manifestations; for these manifestations are . . . its own inward and essential realization" (p. 20). He continually maintains that there is no unity *outside* the multiplicity (p. 39). Even more strikingly he writes: "There is no kernel to the spirit"; it is "motion without a mass."²

¹ See A. Crespi, *Contemporary Thought of Italy*, pp. 154-57.

² *The Reform of Education*, trans. Dino Bigongari, p. 126.

Yet it seems perfectly clear that while mind as pure activity *has* no substratum, pure activity *is* the substratum for which all else is attribute, the identity which realizes itself in and through differences.¹ Gentile speaks of "one *person*, and things innumerable!"² He holds that "the spirit has already a content of its own, which cannot be absent from any of its historical configurations."³ He speaks of "this concept of a reality on which all other realities depend, and which cannot but be one alone, and infinite and really universal. Alone, because in it all opposites must coincide."⁴ Finally, he writes of "the unity which is always the same, no matter under how many aspects it may present itself."⁵ From such statements it seems permissible to draw the conclusion that spirit (as *causi sui*) stands to the world of existence as substratum to attribute, and in this case it is not surprising that the typical difficulties in conceiving this relation should reappear. In Gentile the relation of the one to the many (of one mind to many objects) becomes quite naturally the central problem. Gentile warns against definitions of mind since "all the attributes we employ to distinguish mind tend, however we strive against it, to give it substance" (p. 26). Regardless of the general truth of this observation, it certainly applies to Gentile's definition of mind as pure act.

The question now arises as to whether "pure activity" is a defensible concept. Gentile admits that the conception of a "gazing spirit" or a "motion without a mass" is not

¹ See, in general, the *Sistema di logica*, Vol. II, Part III, chap. v, "Il dialettismo"; *The Theory of Mind as Pure Act*, chap. iv, "Mind as Development."

² *The Reform of Education*, p. 94. Similarly, the Ego is "unico e immoltiplicabile." The multiplicity of its acts "non trae il pensiero ad uscire infatti dalla propria essenziale eternità" (*Sistema di logica* [2d ed.], II, 145, 63).

³ *The Reform of Education*, p. 225.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 115, 116.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 219.

imaginable: a more basic question is as to whether it is thinkable.

It will seem to some thinkers that a pure act, an act that is not the act of something, but rather an act by which the actor himself comes into being, is a pure nothing. There are undoubtedly loose-thinking scientists, or more often "interpreters" of science, who talk in similar terms. There are glib repetitions of such statements as that matter has been reduced to pure force or energy, that the substantiality of the electron is created by "its" activity. It was noticed that Leibniz gave some excuse for such an hypostatization of force and activity. However, no critical physics can countenance such hypostatization, since force and energy are themselves defined in terms of material bodies. Neither pure force nor pure energy can have any ontological status in the natural sciences. Force and energy are at best descriptive adjectives or fictive abstractions, and not substances or pure acts. Nothing in scientific procedure warrants the view that there is a pure activity constitutive of objects.¹

Similar considerations hold for the notion of pure activity when applied to mind or spirit. While it is legitimate to talk descriptively of concrete situations as manifesting activity, the situation cannot be regarded as a product of the activity. Although a subject cannot be regarded as a substance or substantive separate from its activity, neither can the activity be conceived as constituting the subject. In general, even if reality is inseparable from activity, it cannot be reduced to activity.² The only mind that is

¹ Cf. Bridgman's treatment of force in *The Logic of Modern Physics*; also Russell's statement: "We must not conceive 'force' as an actual agency, as the older mechanics did; it is merely part of the method of describing how bodies move" (*The Analysis of Matter*, p. 77).

² Dewey has recognized that the idea of accidents without the substratum is itself a remnant of the metaphysics of substance (*Essays in Experimental Logic*,

known empirically is active but not pure activity, and what is true of empirical thought must be true of "pure" thought, if the term "thought" is to retain any meaning whatsoever.¹ Such considerations furnish a legitimate basis for questioning the foundation of Gentile's activistic approach to the nature of mind.

In the substance tradition it had been customary to dignify stuff at the expense of the attributes, permanence at the expense of change. With the shift to process conceptions, force and activity, as introduced by Leibniz, gradually came to encroach upon the permanent substratum of stuff. With the idealistic hostility to a world which conditions and limits mind,² it was natural that for idealists, activity, interpreted as a spiritual principle, should supplant the stufflike core of the substance tradition. The attributes, alone remaining stufflike, became the attributes of the spiritual substrate of pure activity.³

Such a conception of pure activity is simply the opposite error of the materialistic emphasis upon the immutable material core: both alike move in the realm of substance

pp. 220, 221). Hume, Russell, and the "momentariness" of certain Buddhist schools give point to the observation. The same remark is applicable to any attempt to make activity dominant over stuff.

¹ This is so regardless of whether "pure" means "unmixed" or the Kantian "transcendental."

² A hostility nourished by a belief in the security of value in a mentalistic world. Thus Gentile speaks of "the absoluteness of the value of all the affirmations of mind" (p. 143).

³ H. Wildon Carr asks (*Contemporary British Philosophy*, ed. Muirhead, I, 116), "Is 'activity' substantive? Does 'pure act' convey an intelligible meaning?" He admits that "in ordinary common-sense usage activity is always an adjective," that "to speak of reality is to speak of things, and not of their qualities, or attributes, or activities." But, he continues, "idealism reverses this mode of thinking. For idealism, thinking, the pure act, is original and the thing thought is derived." Thus, "it is impossible to conceive the derivation of activity . . . from originally inert elements; but if we conceive activity to be original, it is possible to derive the permanent, the immobile, the inert."

conceptions, the former making change and activity adjectival to stuff, the latter regarding stuff as adjectival to activity. Both extremes are vicious abstractions. A fire without fuel or which produces its fuel is a bifurcation of determinate reality no more legitimate than the conception of a caloric substance which enters into and sustains the process of conflagration. In spite of the fact that Gentile calls his view an "*actual* idealism," the notion of pure activity proves to be as unsatisfactory as the concept of passive stuff. What *is* actual is a process or set of processes analyzable into determinate wholes or substantives, which, on the one hand, are always active, always in process, and, on the other hand, always composed of some stuff or content. There is never found pure activity or inert stuff, nor is there any need to infer either as a "transcendental" condition of empirical reality: stuff and activity are correlative aspects of substantives, and neither is the substratum to which the other is adjectival. Search always reveals actives *things* and things which are *active*. If it be remarked that "search" can never reveal pure activity, since this can never be made an object to itself, the proper answer is that unless "activity" continues to retain its empirical meaning it has no meaning, since a reference to the transcendental does not confer meaning or validate a meaning which is empirically illegitimate.

26. THE CASE AGAINST MENTALISM

The idealistic emphasis upon mind seems, by reason of historical associations, to remove the harsh foreign aspects of brute nature, to interpret the world as material which makes possible the satisfaction of certain human longings, to stimulate confidence, to awaken, in short, a combination of humanistic and religious emotions. "All is in *Us*; We are All!" The basic idealistic doctrine of mentalism or

spiritualism demands some consideration before concluding this chapter.

The materialisms and naturalisms which idealism historically opposed left no adequate place for mental appreciation, creation, or control. Gentile, for instance, constantly criticizes realism for identifying thought with some bare passive intuition of reality, thereby missing the dynamic aspect of the mental life.¹ That such a realism is inadequate cannot be doubted; that no other realistic or naturalistic alternatives exist is highly doubtful. To give thought or mind a proper place need not mean to give it the whole place. Conversely, it is not at all sure that a world of mind must be such as to favor the dominance of value: only if mind is "good" would this result follow.² The argument as to the mental or spiritual character of the world must be met on its own grounds;³ it is not the sole alternative to those realisms which fail to give mind its due, nor is it the sole or necessary basis for an adequate treatment of value.

It is not at all clear in Gentile's account why "pure act" should be given the honorific labels of thought and spirit; nor how such an act is self-conscious, a "spectacle to itself," an "activity perpetually watching over itself."⁴ Like Leibniz and the absolute idealists, Gentile simply seems to assume that an identity or universal is conscious of its differences, and, since the differences are its own, conscious

¹ *Sistema di logica*, Vol. II, chap. iii, "Essere e pensare."

² According to Gentile "all human sorrow proceeds from our incapacity to recognize ourselves in the object, and consequently to feel our own infinite liberty" (*The Reform of Education*, p. 228). High comfort during a tragic death in the face of natural calamities!

³ Limitations of space have made it impossible to consider McTaggart's defense of a spiritualistic metaphysics, and are also responsible for the omission of a discussion of Royce's utilization of Peirce's doctrine of symbolism, represented in the former's doctrine of an idea as a symbolic state of consciousness used with a purpose.

⁴ *The Reform of Education*, pp. 129, 131.

of itself. The step from activity or identity to subject is not clarified.

At times Gentile falls back upon the typical Berkeleian argument: we cannot think of anything not in relation to mind, since to think of anything is to relate it to mind. Thus to think of the conditions of thought would be impossible, for "the condition must be, if you succeed in thinking it, a reality unthought (not entering into the synthesis of your thought). That is, it must be thought to be unthought. Berkeley will laugh at you. We will be content to point out to you that it is an abstraction which can only live in the synthesis of thought" (p. 201). In general "the object with absolutely no relation to the subject is nonsense" (p. 90); "everything is within consciousness, and no way can be devised of issuing forth from it."¹ Such an argument is in part tautologous, in part questionable, and in part fallacious. Of course there can be no *object-for-a-subject* that is not an object-for-a-subject (just as a traveler cannot visit the places he does not travel to), but this truism does not establish the claim that all that is given is given to a subject, or that the subject is a "mind," or that all objects must be objects for a subject. Bradley denied the first claim, the functional views of mind deny the second, and the third claim is usually recognized as involving the converse fallacy of accident.

Gentile often uses a related argument for mentalism to the effect that "multiplicity implies a spiritual unity."² It is claimed that a pure multiplicity is unthinkable, since to think a multiplicity is to unify it. In addition to the counter-arguments mentioned in the foregoing paragraph, it may be further pointed out that in thinking of a multiplicity it is still the *multiplicity* that is thought. It is playing with words to hold that being unrelated means being

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 56.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 107, 108; see pp. 104-9.

related since unrelated is still a relation, so that to think of things as unrelated is to thereby relate them. The fact that A thinks of B and C, gives B and C no relation to each other which they did not have before.¹

A more crucial objection to idealistic argument lies, however, in this fact: idealism is not a necessary implication of an admission of the ubiquity of the subject-object relation. This is true not merely because the subject in this relation is not shown to be a "mind," but because there is no need to assent to the idealistic underlining of the subject in the subject-object relation. That Hegel does this has already been pointed out. Similarly, Gentile holds that "the reality of the spirit is not in the subject as opposed to the object, but in the subject that has in itself the object as its actuality."² More briefly, "the synthesis is not subject and object, but only subject."³ Obviously this conclusion need not be drawn from the alleged ubiquity of the subject-object relation. If one member must be underlined (and the justification of this is not at all obvious), it would be as reasonable to underline the object as the subject. Parodying Gentile, "the reality of the world is not in the object as opposed to the subject, but in the object that has in itself the subject as its actuality." There is no absurdity in this position; it underlies Santayana's treatment of the psyche in *The Realm of Essence*.

There remains to be mentioned a final and insuperable obstacle to mentalism. It may be stated thus: No proposition of the form "All things are composed of or are reducible to or are differentiations of x " is of philosophical significance, since no such proposition is distinguishable from

¹ The point is not that there *is* a pure multiplicity, but simply that whatever degree of multiplicity does exist, exists in its own right, irrespective of whether it is thought or not.

² *The Reform of Education*, p. 229.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 250.

another. The reason for this lies in the fact that a concept which denotes everything connotes nothing. Whatever the x may be, the same further distinctions must be made: in one interpretation it is necessary to recognize the difference between a stone and a thought process, only the distinction is called a difference between levels of mind; on another common interpretation it is still necessary to recognize this difference, only now it is called a difference between levels of matter, and so on.¹ The result is that the proposition "nothing exists but mind," or "the world is spirit alone," is without distinctive meaning, and so without significance. A contrary conviction can only be due to the emotional reverberations of the word "mind" (which suggests that a world of mind is better and safer than a world of matter), for in fact mind and matter have exactly the same meaning in this connection. Thus do the extremes meet in contemporary philosophy!

Even though the mentalism of idealism be condemned, it must be granted that idealism, with its theory of mind as systematic development, has forced philosophy to recognize that mind cannot be separated from the world of nature, that mind is more than a mere collection of separate units or a passive receptacle, and, finally, that mind as process cannot be "reduced" to other phases of reality. It may be agreed that no theory of mind which does not profit by these results can prove adequate. Whatever be the defect of the idealistic view of process, its activist emphasis has been prophetic. The strength of idealism lay in its activism; its weakness in its mentalism: in avoiding the dual-

¹ On the principle of polarity in meaning see Bogoslawsky's *The Technique of Controversy*, pp. 119 ff. Morris Cohen has remarked that "the proposition that all is mental, like other assertions about *all things* is futile," since "we are still left with a distinction between ideas like spoons with which we eat, and ideas in our minds only" ("The Distinction between the Mental and the Physical," *Journal of Philosophy*, XIV [1917], 263). Cf. *Reason and Nature*, pp. 311-22.

ism between thought and sense, mind and nature, experience and reality, idealism overgeneralized its case in regarding mind as the sole reality.

If it be maintained that the difference in attitude between mentalism and materialism is the difference between assimilating the lower to the higher and the higher to the lower, it must be doubted whether any such assimilation is possible or desirable, since both parties must admit that the higher manifestations are inseparable from the lower and yet must be distinguished from them. In any case, the blanket designation of reality as mind or spirit solves no genuine problem, and with the advent of the philosophies of emergence, and the banishment of the old atomic materialism, the main motives for this violation of the principle of polarity in meaning (whether by mentalists or materialists) seem to have disappeared. It is commonly recognized that blood-and-thunder materialism has received its official burial; it should also be recognized that the corpse of mentalism was lowered into the same grave. The two deaths were simultaneous; the death notice of the latter was somewhat delayed.

CHAPTER III

MIND AS RELATION

27. THE FOUNDATIONS OF NEW REALISM: HUME

THE steady historical shift away from reliance on the substratum-attribute mode of thought was met by the appearance of a doctrine of mind based on the category of relation. A logic built upon the relational basis was already at hand, a logic which (anticipated by Leibniz) had come into being primarily as the result of the labors of mathematicians interested in the logical foundations of their study. A theory of mind, raised upon this logic of relations, was the product of the new realists. Since some members of this group supplemented the emphasis upon relation by a view of mind as "act of awareness," as "conscious act of direction toward," the approaches to mind in terms of relation and conscious act, both stressed by members of a single movement, may conveniently be dealt with in the course of this and the following chapter.

Spaulding contrasts the new realism as a "relational view of the universe" to the "substance and causal views," insisting that "no empirical evidence is discovered either for the universality of causation or for one substratum, whether this be mind, matter, or an 'unknowable.'"¹ The insistence that all relations are not causal relations, combined with the claim that the Aristotelian logic could not deal with all types of relations (particularly with series),

¹ *The New Rationalism*, p. 43. Italics omitted.

since its model was "interacting physical things,"¹ may be taken as the foundation of the new realism, which is a revolt in the name of the category of relation against the twin categories of substance and cause, and their dominance in the history of thought.²

It is not surprising that Hume, who had declared war on the same conceptions, should make a suggestion that may be regarded as one historical fountainhead of the relational theory of mind, nor that he should himself abandon it because of an inconsistent retention of the very categories which he ostensibly opposed—a retention whose influence has already been discussed in connection with his skeptical and subjectivistic tendency.

Instead of regarding the contents of the experienced world as intrinsically mental or "in" a mind, Hume makes the bold suggestion that mind is simply a grouping of such contents (which Hume calls "perceptions").³ So interpreted, mind becomes dependent upon a non-mental field of content, and experienced contents are no longer dependent upon mind. Since "a *mind* is nothing but a heap or collection of different perceptions, united together by certain relations,"⁴ for a content to pass out of mind it would merely sever its membership with the group of perceptions which constitute the mind in question.⁵

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 157, 158.

² Spaulding notes: "Modern science has made its advances and won its victories by finding *what happens and is done, rather than by finding what 'things' are. Relations, events, and unattached and disembodied qualities* concern it more than *do substance and things*" (*ibid.*, p. 255).

³ *Treatise concerning Human Understanding*, Book I, Part IV, sec. 6.

⁴ *Ibid.*, sec. 2; Selby-Bigge's ed. p. 207.

⁵ Berkeley, in the *Comomplace Book* (Fraser, *Berkeley's Complete Works*, I, 27), had said that "mind is a congeries of perceptions." Woodbridge remarks in an article on "Berkeley's Realism," *Studies in the History of Ideas*, I, 207 n., that the term "perception" is used so vaguely in this context that it is doubtful whether mental act or experienced content ("idea") is referred to. Considering

Hume not only never re-worked his philosophy on the basis of a relational view of mind, but rejected this view for reasons which now appear to be insufficient.¹ The primary consideration which leads him to this rejection is his belief that perceptions are relative to and dependent upon the physical organism. As so dependent, Hume concludes that perceptions (perceived content) cannot be given an existence independent of the percipient, and that therefore the human mind cannot be regarded as a selection from a larger group of contents which pass in and out of mind by becoming members of, or by severing membership with, the group which constitutes the individual mind.

Hume's rejection of this view is not convincing. In the first place, the argument smuggles in a world of physical objects different from "perceived" content and yet the cause of such content. Empirically considered, however, Hume admits that "nothing appears requisite to support the existence of a perception,"² and any appeal to non-experiential physical bodies, including the organism, as a cause of perceptions, is, on Hume's own analysis of causation, unjustified. But even if, in some sense, perceptions are dependent on the body, there is still the question, based on a distinction not formulated in Hume's time, as to whether it is the *givenness* of perceptual content, or the *existence* of such content, or both, which is so dependent. Does the body act merely selectively, or does it generate content by its presence among objects? Conceivably, the body may act as the condition for the givenness of certain

other passages in the book (see pp. 27, 34), it would seem that Berkeley is really anticipating Hume's suggestion here, without continuing to accept it in the development of his thought. Berkeley even wonders if he should not "allow colours to exist without the mind" (p. 88).

¹ *Op. cit.*, Book I, Part IV, sec. 2; Selby-Bigge's ed., pp. 210, 211.

² *Ibid.*, Selby-Bigge's ed., p. 234.

content without being the condition for the existence of such content. Finally, even if the body is a necessary condition for the existence of given content, such a relativity to the organism, as was pointed out in the discussion of Bosanquet, need not be confused with the dependence of such content on mind, since mind may be regarded as a relation between experienced content, even if such contents are dependent upon the organism for their existence. It follows that the relational approach to mind which Hume suggested is not necessarily invalidated by the real or apparent dependence of given contents upon an organism, and it causes no astonishment that the brain-child so summarily deserted by its father should be nurtured and brought to manhood by later realists not obsessed with the doctrine that what is given is necessarily or solely mind dependent.

28. CONFUSION OF MIND-CENTRIC AND BODY-CENTRIC PREDICAMENTS

It was inevitable that the idealistic attempts to interpret reality in terms of mind or spirit would meet strong opposition from those thinkers who voiced the temper and aspirations of modern science. The clash of attitudes took its sharpest form in connection with the absolutistic emphasis in the idealism dominant at the close of the century. In opposition to the doctrine of the Absolute, and to the dependence of reality upon mind, the realistic and pragmatic movements appeared, nurtured by modern science—the realists being predominantly influenced by the mathematical and physical sciences, the pragmatists by the biological, psychological, and social sciences. The vigor of the opposition to idealism somewhat obscured the fact that both new realism and pragmatism were part of a larger opposition to the framework of the Galilean-Cartesian-New-

tonian world-view, a revolt in which idealism itself (as the representative of an older tradition) had played a rôle of great importance.¹

In Germany, Mach signalizes the early form of the movement, while certain phases of *Gegenstandstheorie* (particularly as found in Meinong) indicate its later development. In England, at the beginning of the present century, there grew up around G. E. Moore a vigorous new realistic movement. In America, centering around Peirce, James, and Dewey, there developed a reaction which led to both new realism and pragmatism, doctrines which the present volume regards as revealing complementary but divergent interests.

The general direction of new realism is quite clear. Emphasizing the concept of relation, made prominent by the logical revision expressed in symbolic or mathematical logic, the new realism passed to the doctrine that things may be related without being dependent on each other (the doctrine of the externality of relations),² and this led naturally to a view of mind not patterned on the analogy of one thing affecting and being affected by others. These tendencies made possible a non-idealistic revolt against dualism. If all relations are not causal relations, it is at

¹ Laird, in *A Study in Realism*, regards Arnould's *Des vraies et des fausses idées* and Reid's *Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense* as important landmarks in the history of realistic thought. Undoubtedly the empirical aspect of the English tradition as reflected in Mill, Spencer, and the Associationists helped prepare the ground for modern realism, as did certain phases of the thought of Brentano, Bradley, and Bergson. That twentieth-century realism and pragmatism drew its major nourishment from historical sources does not, however, seem apparent. Their basic impetus seems to have been gained from the logical, methodological, and factual results of modern science, results which furnished a convenient point of opposition to the absolutism and mentalism of the then dominant idealism.

² See R. B. Perry's treatment of independence in *The New Realism*; also Spaulding, *op. cit.*, pp. 177 ff. Note that Spaulding does not hold that all relatedness signifies the independence of the related terms.

least possible, even if mind be a substance, for things to pass in and out of a relation to mind unchanged. Indeed, even if the ultimate empirical situation revealed a content-given-to-a-subject, it might be that the content was still independent of the subject, in that it could exist if the subject were destroyed, though this independent existence could never be a datum for a subject. The fact that things can be known only by being brought into a cognitive relation, new realism argues, does not prove that only known things exist; because thought and action can deal only with objects of actual or possible experience does not mean that these things as experienced are not independent of their being experienced. Such an "escape" from the egocentric predicament, dependent as it is on the view that the relation of percipient to perceived, of subject to object, is not a causal relation, would obviously be greatly strengthened if the percipient or subject mind could be so regarded that it could not enter into causal relations. Thus while the logic of new realism is applicable to a substance theory of mind, the argument becomes more cogent when mind is not regarded as one thing interacting with others. When mind is not interpreted in terms of substance, it becomes easier to think of given content as not intrinsically mental, but as being literally aspects of a non-mental world. In so far as new realism regards mind relationally, it combines its attack on epistemological dualism with an attack on psychophysical dualism.

One important ambiguity may be noted. New realism does not often distinguish between two fundamentally different questions: it is one thing to argue that reality, including given reality, is not dependent upon mind, and another thing to argue that given content exists precisely as given when not given. Stated in other words, the new realist is likely to confuse in his application of the doctrine

of the externality of relations to the egocentric predicament, the "mind-centric" with the "body-centric" predicament, regarding his escape from the former as also an escape from the latter. It is, however, important to note that an escape from the mind-centric predicament does not necessarily depend upon the general doctrine of the externality of relations, and does not necessarily involve an escape from the body-centric predicament. The first point causes no difficulty. On any view which makes mind a relation of given content, or a particular type of functioning of such content, there is no sense in which this content is dependent upon mind, or necessarily connected with any doctrine of the internality or externality of relations. Only those new realists who interpret givenness as givenness to a mind need to invoke the doctrine of the externality of relations in order to defend the claim that reality is not mind dependent. But grant that reality is not mind dependent, in whatever way "mind" is used, and it still does not follow that given content continues to exist when not given, since the organism may be the necessary condition for the emergence and existence of given content. The relation here may be internal or organic. As a simple example, take the case of a person standing on a scale, reading his weight by means of the pointer. The position of the pointer need not be dependent upon its being noted. Nevertheless, the position of the pointer is dependent upon the person on the scale. The claim that this position is not mind dependent would not justify the view that the position of the pointer is the same when the person has left the scale. Hence it may be that what is given is not independent of the organism, and that knowing is not the mere givenness of a content which is independent of the fact of givenness, even if the given is not mind dependent.

Whatever be the final disposal of the fundamental issues

involved, it is important both to the new realists and to their critics to distinguish the two questions. For the new realists who hold a relational view of mind the distinction is important since the claim that reality is independent of mind is freed from the troublesome question as to the nature of relations, and from the question as to whether knowledge is direct or mediate. For other thinkers the distinction is important since it would permit of accepting the general doctrine of independence of given reality from mind, while differing, if need be, from the claim of certain new realists that knowledge is direct, and that what is given is independent of any and all organisms. In this way the attacks of the critical realists and objective relativists may be seen to affect only one aspect of the new realist position, and at the same time receive justification as criticisms of an ambiguity which infected the original statements of the doctrine. Indeed, in the light of this distinction the appearances of critical realism and objective relativism become not only understandable but are seen to be necessary.

With this digression, the relevancy of which will appear in what follows, we may return to a direct consideration of the new realistic theories of mind. As already noted, two tendencies in the interpretation of mind appeared in the movement: an attempt to regard mind as an "act of awareness" or "intentional act" whose content is non-mental, characteristic of the German and English new realists; an attempt by the American new realists, drawing inspiration from James, and joined in part by Bertrand Russell, to conceive of mind as a relationship between things not in themselves mental. It will be convenient to consider the second attempt before the first, although its formulation among the new realists is in the main temporally later. Whatever violence is thereby done to historical

sequences is atoned for in the logical simplicity which results. The American position represents the skeletal simplification of the movement. It then becomes of interest to see whether the English and German formulations (temporally earlier for the most part) are able logically to meet the difficulties which the American group revealed in its attempt to dispense with any domain of intrinsic mentality.¹ Should this not prove to be so, the question is raised as to whether the American movement has proved abortive, or whether its essential insight that mentality is relational is capable of development by the elaboration of a more adequate treatment of mind and knowledge in functional terms. That the latter possibility has been actualized in instrumentalism and the metaphysics of objective relativism is the contention of the chapters that follow.

29. HOLT: MIND AS FIELD OF OBJECTS SELECTED BY RESPONSE

The clearest and purest form of the American new realistic position, in its original opposition to both epistemological and psychophysical dualism, is to be found in the views of Edwin B. Holt.

¹ The three movements seem to have originated and developed autonomously, the American from William James ("Does Consciousness Exist?" *Journal of Philosophy*, 1904), the English from G. E. Moore ("The Refutation of Idealism," *Mind*, 1903), the German from Franz Brentano (*Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte* [1874]) as developed by Twardowski (1894), Meinong (1899), and Husserl (1901-2). The fact that a similar idealism dominated all three countries is sufficient to account for the similarity of the realistic revolts. If there is an influence, it would be natural for it to proceed from Germany, because of the early date of Brentano's work. Could there have been an influence through James Ward? (A brief search has revealed nothing to substantiate this.) T. K. Oesterreich ("Die philosophischen Strömungen der Gegenwart," in a co-operative volume, *Systematische Philosophie*, p. 377) notes the close relation of G. E. Moore to the German movement, adding, "obwohl eine äussere Abhängigkeit nicht zu bestehen scheint." In the 1903 article Moore makes no reference to German sources. The American movement does not seem to have received any specific influence from the Germans, although Pitkin was an early student of Husserl. Nor does English influence seem to have been prominent. Except for

Holt avoids at the outset an ambiguity in James's stuff-like conception of experience. For Holt, experience "includes . . . whatever one happens, whether for a long or brief interval of time, to meet with."¹ On such a denotation of the term, it follows that "experience" is defined in terms of its content rather than the contents being defined in terms of "experience." "The 'objects' of experience together compose experience, and they have being, not *qua* experience, nor *qua* objects of experience, but *qua* themselves" (p. 82). Thus, following Sheffer, the start is made with a class of neutral entities, "neutral" not signifying that the ultimate components of the universe have a single neutral stuff which they share in common, since as denoting everything the term connotes nothing (p. 136). With this starting-point, it becomes possible to investigate the meaning of such terms as "experience," "consciousness," "mind," and "matter" without assuming that these are intrinsic qualities of any or all of the ultimate components.²

Russell, the English have been little influenced by the American development. Laird writes: "I don't think American new realism had any effective influence upon the British development—to our shame, I daresay, but so it was."

¹ *The Concept of Consciousness*, p. 77. Unless otherwise stated, page references to Holt will be to this volume.

Mr. E. B. Holt writes that this early work represents for him what are now dead issues. Hence in what follows it must be remembered that the views under consideration do not (except in the case of *The Freudian Wish*) necessarily represent Holt's present views. They are included since they constitute, in my opinion, an important type of theory, the cleanest-cut form of American new realism. Incidentally, as Holt himself states, it is primarily the concept of subsistence which has become a dead issue for him, since in his recent volume, *Animal Drive and the Learning Process*, he continues to oppose any form of psychophysical dualism, suggesting an emergent and materialistic view of mind to be developed in a second volume along the lines sketched in pp. 153–208 of *The Freudian Wish*. While his position is now physiologically oriented, the emphasis upon emergence distinguishes his present view from a radical behaviorism. He has not given up, I take it, the emphasis on specific response, or the definition of consciousness in terms of an object of response (with suitable restrictions to avoid subsistence).

² It is doubtful if Holt consistently maintains the neutrality in respect to neutral entities that the position demands. He often seems to imply that these

On this general basis the treatment of mind or consciousness is developed with great ingenuity and simplicity. The concept of "cross-section" is first introduced. Imagine a geometrical plane passed through a tree. This plane "defines by its intersection a collection of contours that is a true portion of the tree" (p. 169). Similarly, a navigator who picks out his landmarks by the use of a searchlight cuts out a group of neutral entities from the environment which, like the contours of the tree, are genuine portions of the environment. In both cases there is a selection of neutral entities from the total class of such entities, a selection which, while part of the environment, is not "organically" related to the environment, since neither the tree nor the course traversed is in any sense dependent upon where the geometrical plane is passed or upon where the searchlight is turned. A cross-section thus becomes "any definable part that is in no wise *organically* related to the whole" (p. 170).

If now an organism is substituted for the plane or the searchlight, there is gained a definition of consciousness as "a cross-section of the universe, selected by the nervous system. The elements or parts of the universe selected, and thus included in the class mind, are all elements or parts to which the nervous system makes a specific response," so that consciousness is "out there wherever the things specifically responded to are."¹ The group of en-

entities do not have any such intrinsic characters as mentality or materiality, but that such characters are solely relational. This may be so, but the foregoing use of "neutral" does not necessarily imply that it is so.

¹ *The New Realism*, p. 354. The position of R. B. Perry is practically identical with that of Holt, in that Perry regards mind and matter as reducible to neutral entities, defines the object of mind as that aspect of the world upon which the interested organism is focused, thus accepting the position that entities become mental content "when reacted to in the specific manner characteristic of the central nervous system" (see chap. xii of his *Present Philosophical Tendencies*). The two views diverge in the explanation of error.

tities to which an organism reacts specifically constitutes its field of consciousness, the organism acting only as the condition for the selection of certain components of the universe, components which are as they appear, which owe nothing of their nature to the responding organism, and which, as constituting mind, are obviously in no sense mind dependent. Mind is not located within an organism, since "in the organ of response (the brain and other nerve tissues) nothing, *absolutely nothing*, is to be looked for except just an organ of response"—"the house of the brain is not haunted" (p. 310). Mind thus has nothing which is intrinsically its own; its material from first to last is drawn from the neutral universe, its reality consists entirely in the particular collection of contents selected by the responding organism. In the searchlight analogy, the physical searchlight is replaced by the organism, and the field of illuminated objects becomes the contents of mind or consciousness, contents which pass in and out of mind as they become or cease to become objects of response.

Holt summarizes this view in the following words:

In the view now before us, consciousness and "the subjective as such" are done away with. Consciousness is not a substance but a relation—the relation between the living organism and the environment to which it specifically responds; of which its behavior is found to be this or that constant function; or, in other words, to which its purposes refer. This is the relation of awareness, and the cognitive relation. There will be no consciousness except in a situation where *both* living organism and environment are present and where the functional relation already described exists between them.¹ . . . In short, those objects or aspects toward which we respond, of which our purposes are functions—these are the "contents of consciousness." And these immediately, not some pale "*representations*" thereof.²

Holt accordingly can say with Aristotle that "the mind *is* the thing when actually thinking it."³

¹ *The Freudian Wish and Its Place in Ethics*, p. 96. ² *Ibid.*, p. 97. ³ *Ibid.*

Such a theory of mind is at the farthest possible remove from the treatment of mind in the Cartesian world-view: the contents of experience are now completely returned to a non-mental universe, avoiding the last remnant of a mind-nature bifurcation; mind has none of the characteristics of a substance; instead of being located in the brain or organism, mind now designates a relation which events assume in the presence of an organism; the genuine correlate of this view, since qualities are no longer tucked away in the organism, is a thoroughgoing behavioristic psychology. Here at least is one metaphysical rock upon which behaviorism could build, without apology, its psychological house.¹

30. DIFFICULTIES IN THE CONCEPT OF SPECIFIC RESPONSE

Before discussing the implications of this view, it is necessary to evaluate the concept of specific response, upon which the whole doctrine hinges.

Holt contrasts a specific response to "the ordinary in-

¹ It is of interest to note the similarity between Holt and Bergson, and the point at which the divergence begins. Bergson is as realistic as any new realist in insisting that what is given in perception owes its existence to neither a perceiving mind nor a focal organism, giving one of the most radically selective, as opposed to generative, accounts of *sensa* that is to be found (see particularly chap. i of *Matter and Memory*). With Holt he would agree that the body is solely an instrument of action and is not a generator or storehouse of content, that the perceived world is the objective world as cut out or selected by the activity of the organism, and that quality differs from quantity in being a "fusion" of "slow" periodic processes. For both men the destruction of the body only destroys the condition by which self-existing content is brought into relation to an active organism. The difference in the views comes in the fact that Bergson introduces spirit or mind in addition to such selected content, as a means of dealing with thought and memory, while Holt, aided by the concept of subsistence, attempts to carry through the doctrine of selected content, now made equivalent to mind or consciousness, throughout the whole range of memory, knowledge, error, and illusion, invoking no additional principle of mind or spirit. In the doctrine of perception, however, Bergson is quite as new realistic as is Holt.

organic case of released energy," such as the explosion of gunpowder, where "the process, once touched off, proceeds solely according to factors internal to the mechanism released."¹ Behavior, which is equated with specific response, as "any process of release which is a function of factors external to the mechanism released,"² is thus a process constantly correlated with, oriented upon, and directed by something outside itself, a view which "neither excludes nor yet makes essential the case of the immediate stimulus being the object of which the behavior is a constant function."³ In order to discover what an organism is conscious of, it is only necessary to know what stimulus or set of stimuli is the object of the specific response, that is, what factors in the environment of the animal are the functional correlates of its behavior processes (p. 180). Or conversely, since it is denied that more than one entity can call out a given response (p. 206), it would be theoretically possible to determine what the organism is conscious of by knowing the exact response which is made. There is thus a 1:1 correlation between behavior and the objects of consciousness.

Two comments may be made on this conception of specific response. The first concerns the legitimacy of a sharp distinction between the behavior of organisms and the inorganic release of energy. From either side the line is hard to draw. There are certainly movements of an organism, such as the simpler reflexes, where "the process, once touched off, proceeds solely according to factors internal to the mechanism released," and some physiologists would argue that all complex organic movements are summations of such releases. It is conceivable that there is no difference except in complexity between the patellar re-

¹ *The Freudian Wish*, p. 167.

² *Ibid.* Original in italics.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 169.

flex and the stalking of a bird by a cat. One seems to be as much or as little "behavior" as the other. From the other side, it is not difficult to find examples of inorganic energy releases that are under the constant control of factors "outside" the process. The case of the changes in a piece of iron run through different environments, or even exposed to a constant source of temperature, affords a simple illustration. The distinction between internal mechanism and the environment in which the mechanism runs its course is always an arbitrary one, and furnishes no clear basis for the separation of specific responses or behavior from inorganic energy releases. Even within an inorganic system a distinction can be made so that part of the process is a "specific response" to some other part. For instance, in the case of the gunpowder the heat generated by the first explosion exerts an effect on the rest of the series of minor explosions, the explosion as a whole being regarded as a summation of component energy releases. It would seem that either the notion of specific response is not adequate to define the object of consciousness or else that every energy release is a specific response, selecting out as a conscious cross-section those aspects of the world which initiate and direct the process.

There remains the further question as to whether every object of a specific response can justly be called a content of consciousness. Consider the gradual increase in temperature in a room in which one is sitting. Unquestionably there are constant changes in the organism, functionally related to and initiated by the changes in temperature. Yet normally the temperature is not said to be "given" until the change is of a certain magnitude. On Holt's position it would seem that awareness, consciousness, and cognition must be invoked throughout the process, a position which, within limits, is made reasonable. Holt insists that we must

not "confuse the content of consciousness with such small part of that content as subsequent reflection is able to vouch for" (p. 199), since "the process of reflection is distinct from the processes of perception and sensation" (p. 201). Thus without invading "that mysterious and luxurious jungle of the Subconscious" (p. 202), Holt is able to insist that the field of consciousness is more extensive than the field certified by reflection. He might argue, accordingly, that the first small changes in the temperature of the room were conscious content even though this were not a fact for reflection. But even with this extension, and granting for the moment that organisms alone respond specifically and that the content of consciousness is always the object of a specific response, it is still not convincing to call every stimulus to a specific response a content of consciousness.¹ Since the body is always in delicate, complex interaction with the environment (in breathing, walking, temperature regulation), since it is constantly adjusting itself to its own movements, and since internally there are an enormous number of reactions to the presence of objects in the stomach and intestines, to the secretion of glands, and to various other internal processes, the field of consciousness becomes not only unbelievably extensive, but even arbitrarily so, depending upon how far one is willing to isolate within the total field of organism and environment processes of response from the stimuli which initiate and control them.

Although such considerations do not make it impossible to hold that every object of a specific response is an object of consciousness, they do bring out the ambiguities in the

¹ In spite of anything that is said in the text, Holt's contention that "there will be no consciousness except in a situation where *both* living organism and environment are present and where the functional relation already described exists between them" is still a probable one. No criticism is made of this position in the foregoing comments.

concept of specific response, the arbitrariness in the selection of the field of consciousness, and the divergence of this view from any position which requires of consciousness at least a minimum of "givenness." The fact that organisms often seem to respond to factors of the environment which are not given as conscious content¹ is at least one reason why both critical realists and fellow new realists have opposed the strictly relational approach to mind on the ground that it has no place for the fact of givenness.

31. HOLT ON KNOWLEDGE, MEANING, AND ERROR

Even if Holt's position could give a satisfactory account of the content of consciousness, it would still be necessary to show the adequacy of the view in dealing with reflection, knowledge, memory, and error.

Because of the natural alignment of a relational new realism and a thoroughgoing behaviorism,² it is to be expected that Holt's treatment of reflection will be in terms of behavior. He speaks of his "view of mind as integrated reflex behavior," a reference that must be to reflective mind, since mind as a cross-section of the universe selected by behavior is not itself behavior.³ He is willing to regard cognition as identical in principle with such integrated reflex behavior. Thinking becomes "the preceding labile interplay of motor settings which goes on almost constantly,

¹ Holt denies any such distinction: "I know not what distinction can be drawn between the object of consciousness and the object of behavior." The knower in the cognitive relation "can be nothing but the body itself; for behaviorism, the body is aware, the body acts" (*The Freudian Wish*, pp. 173, 174). But unless the body is aware of every stimulus to which it reacts, there must be some such distinction, even though the former is a special case of the latter.

² Holt regards his emphasis upon emergence as distinguishing him from Watsonian behaviorism.

³ Unless the quoted statement is intended to replace the cross-sectional definition.

and which differs from overt conduct in that the energy involved is too small to produce gross bodily movements,"¹ and is thus a process which depends upon the higher reflex levels of behavior (p. 332). That there is such implicit behavior involved in thought and reflection can hardly be denied, the real question again being whether reflective consciousness and such implicit behavior are identical. The unconvincing attempt of some behaviorists to reduce truth, hallucinations, illusions, error, dreams, and imagination to implicit behavior is avoided by Holt's (early) appeal to a realm of objective neutral entities, so that such phenomena are not regarded by him as dependent upon either reflective or unreflective mind.

This "objective" analysis may be approached through Holt's treatment of the symbol. For him "the symbol does not represent or stand for anything except it have some identities with the thing . . ." (p. 251). "Nothing can represent a thing but that thing itself," so that "a representation is always partially identical with that which it represents, and *completely identical* in all those features and respects in which it *is* a representation" (p. 143). This view of the symbol, apparently at odds with the fact that words, the basic symbols, do not seem to be in any way identical with what is symbolized, has clear, if unusual, implications. It is seemingly invoked because of the fear of admitting any representative element into knowledge. Thus "the adequate 'idea' of a minute or of an hour is just a minute or an hour" (p. 146), the general result being that "there are no two such things as knowledge and the object of knowledge, or thought and the thing thought of" (p. 148). Rather, the object specifically responded to is as such known and directly known.

When applied to knowledge of the past or knowledge of

¹ *The Freudian Wish*, p. 94.

the distant in space, this view demands that the nervous system be able to respond specifically to past and distant events. In some instances "the present response is . . . not solely a function of the present stimulus but of past stimuli as well; it is, and will ever continue to be, a revived response to past stimuli," hence "the argument . . . that one's thought is here and now, because one's nervous system is active here and now, is not valid" (p. 247). A similar doctrine of memory as the direct response to the past has been tentatively suggested by Bertrand Russell,¹ and considered, with negative results, by C. D. Broad.² If the past continues to exist (if past does not literally mean "passed"), and if a view of causation is defended which makes it possible to consider seriously a present response as directly initiated by a past event (and not indirectly through the "traces" remaining in the organism), it is perhaps possible to hold that "the knowledge of a past event is identical with a part of that event" (p. 249). But where an object has literally passed out of existence or where it has not yet been constructed, it becomes more difficult to see how the knowing and the known, and thought and the thing, are one and the same, since the object is nonexistent while the thought is actual. Such cases are not plausibly explained by a doctrine which holds that "knowledge is a cross-section of the realm of *being*, and so far as it *is* at all, is identical with the so-called 'object' of knowledge" (p. 254).³

¹ *The Analysis of Mind*, Lecture IV.

² *The Mind and Its Place in Nature*, pp. 440-62.

³ The fact that we can refer (symbolically) to the past, the future, and the spatially distant need not imply that a response is being initiated by a past, future, or distant object. To hold such a view gives direct causal efficacy to the nonexistent and the absent. Certainly Holt's claim that "the symbolic representation of the past involves . . . a knowledge of the past which is represented, and cannot itself afford us any solution of the problem as to how in the last resort

If knowledge and its object, thought and the thing thought of, are identical, how is error possible? The usual answer, that the thought and the thing are not identical, so that in error the thing thought of does not exist, is of course not open to Holt. It might have been possible for Holt to approach error through the failure of implicit behavior to secure the adjustment of the organism, or through the partiality of the identity between thought and thing, but he chose to maintain that error, like illusion and hallucination, is "objective" and "non-mental." Objectively, error is contradiction. Human error is simply the specific response to such objective contradiction, while truth is the specific response to objective non-contradiction.¹

In calling "the physical or so-called 'outer' or 'real' world" contradictory "through and through" (p. 271), the sense in which the "contradictory" is used must be carefully noted. It is not terms or objects which are contradictory, but propositions: "Every case of error or untruth is a case of contradictory propositions: and a single proposition is neither true nor false" (p. 264). The contradictory propositions in the case of error are not "mental"; they are neutral entities on a par with all other neutral entities.² Thus "the laws of nature are not 'convenient constructions' devised by man, but they are an integral part of nature and the source of its activity; they are the neutral elements called propositions" (p. 274). When an object is

that past itself is known" (p. 250) proves nothing against the symbolic view, since it merely adds the very assumption in question, namely, that the past *is* known in some other way. Where Holt identifies thought with implicit behavior it seems inconsistent to identify thought as response with the object responded to. This, again, is perhaps due to a clash between earlier and later positions.

¹ A systematic discussion is given in *The New Realism*, pp. 357 ff.

² Subsistent, rather than existent. Cf. Meinong's *Objektive*. It must be remembered that Holt now repudiates his earlier doctrine of subsistence.

subject to two "forces," as in the classic analysis of the motion of a planet, the early Holt states that "two laws of motion have met in contradiction. . . ."¹ Here one law, a part of nature and a source of its activity, causes the planet to move off at a tangent, while the other law directs it to the sun. Thus the law to move in a certain way is contradicted by a law not to move in that way, but in another. Such a situation is objective contradiction or error, whether or not selected by a nervous system.

This analysis is certainly quite artificial. Neglecting the fact that on the theory of relativity the foregoing two laws are called in question, and the planet conceived as moving freely in the region warped by the presence of the sun—a fact which might illustrate that "laws" do bear some relation to the merely human—it would still seem that there is no objective "error" in the case of the planet. Another "law" must decree whatever motion does take place. Unless it is affirmed that the planet moves solely tangentially, or solely toward the sun, there would seem to be no error involved, and such propositions are wrong not because two contradictory propositions are responded to specifically, but because the sun does not move in the way that either proposition alone maintains. In general, to know two propositions as contradictory is not to be in error but to have truth, and it is difficult to see that this truth is only the response to two non-contradictory propositions. Even if propositions subsisted as candidates for apprehension, error would not seem to lie in the bare apprehension of contradictory propositions, or truth in the bare apprehension of non-contradictory propositions.

It may be noted that Holt's bold attempt to make error the apprehension of one class of neutral entities has not in general found favor with other new realists. Spaulding, it

¹ *The New Realism*, p. 364.

is true, does make illusion and error objective, the "taking" or regarding that to exist which does not exist alone being "subjective."¹ Russell also conceived of truth and error as characters of subsistential propositions whose elements stood in 1:1 correlation with the elements of fact.² But Perry, Montague, and Pitkin, in order to explain error, frankly introduce some form of dualism depending upon the presence of the organism, even though this dualism is for them objective and does not depend upon mind: Perry³ insisting upon the possibility of selecting neutral entities to produce a "subjective manifold" differing from and mistaken for the groupings which make up the objective world; Montague⁴ regarding error as due to an uncorrected "distortion" somewhere introduced into the physical process in which the organism is effected by external things; Pitkin⁵ interpreting error as due to entities that are "projectively indiscernible," so that a present content is responded to as being projected by an object which is not actually "projecting." This divergence of opinion shows that the attempt to separate error from mental processes is fraught with difficulties, and that the introduction of some dualism within the world makes it difficult to maintain that the world as given is the world as it really is, for if things are always as they appear to be, and error not due to some additional mental process (such as judgment), error would seem to be impossible. In attempting to explain error "objectively," the new realist endangers his cardinal principle that things appear as they are. Pitkin even states that the view that "consciousness is the mere knowing of physical things as they are 'in themselves' "

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 293, 294.

² "On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood," *Philosophical Essays*.

³ *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, pp. 324, 325.

⁴ *The New Realism*, pp. 286-300.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 459.

is a "naïve doctrine."¹ On the strength of such statements, it is evident that within the new realism itself appeared the seeds out of which an opposing "critical" realism was to grow.

Inadequate as the treatment of Holt's early position has been, certain conclusions seem to be suggested. While mind and matter may well be composed of the same stuff, the treatment of mind as the field of objects specifically responded to, and thus as a class or aggregate of non-mental entities, appears unable to deal convincingly with knowledge and error, and seems to give no satisfactory account of givenness and awareness, or of the dynamic aspect of mental life. Holt's early formulation involves the difficult concept of the objectivity of hallucinations, illusions, and error. It runs counter to the apparent existential dependence of some or all given contents upon organic conditions. It would appear that American new realism, in the endeavor to escape mentalism and subjectivism by conceiving mind relationally, failed to develop an adequate theory of mind. This does not mean that the movement failed to escape the mind-centric predicament, or that mind cannot be conceived relationally, but merely that this current of new realism failed to specify adequately the type of relation by which to define the mental. Before entering upon an attempt to evaluate in more detail the status of the relational form of new realism, a somewhat similar attempt by Bertrand Russell to integrate mind and nature must be considered.

32. MACH AND RUSSELL: MIND AS A COLLECTION OF EVENTS

The claim that mind and matter are but different relations between elements that in themselves are not mental,

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 463.

psychology and physics dealing with the same objects considered in different relations, is found, with some reservations, in Bertrand Russell, and, indeed, was clearly stated by Avenarius and by Ernst Mach.

For Mach the physical and the mental are determined by different systems of elements, not by different elements. He writes in a well-known passage:

A color is a physical object as soon as we consider its dependence, for instance, upon its luminous source, upon other colors, upon temperatures, upon spaces, and so forth. When we consider, however, its dependence upon the retina . . . , it is a psychological object, a sensation.¹ . . . There is no rift between the psychical and the physical, no inside and outside, no "sensation" to which an external "thing," different from sensation, corresponds,² [since] the world of sense belongs both to the physical and the psychical domain alike.³

Russell's somewhat similar attempt⁴ to integrate mind and nature by considering both to be relational complexes of events may be briefly sketched as follows. The ultimate constituents of the world are happenings finite in all dimensions, that is, "events." The most obvious examples of events can be taken from the domain of experience: sounds, flashes of lightning, and the like. On grounds that need not be considered here, Russell is led to postulate other events besides "percepts" or experienced events. Events are so related that one event is connected with

¹ *The Analysis of Sensations* (Open Court ed., 1914), p. 17.

² *Ibid.*, p. 310.

³ *Ibid.* Cf. Titchener's definition of mind as "the sum total of human experience considered as dependent upon the nervous system" (*A Text Book of Psychology*, p. 16). Cf. *Systematic Psychology*, pp. 142, 264, for Titchener's definitive statement.

⁴ One difference between Russell and Mach grows out of Russell's rejection of phenomenalism and radical empiricism (*The Analysis of Matter*, p. 399). While for Mach sensations are not in the head, since the "'head' shares with them the same spatial field," Russell consistently locates sensations and *sensa* in the head, admitting Mach's statement to be true only of perceptual and not of physical space.

other events, and some events may be regarded as "appearances" of other events in virtue of their close correlation with these other events. Thus there are any number of perceived and unperceived events which may be regarded as appearances of a star.¹ If the appearances of different stars are collected at a given place where there is a brain, such a collection is a mind (a percept, which Russell, unlike Mach, always calls "mental," is "the appearance of the object from a place where there is a brain"),² while if all the appearances of a particular star are collected at different places, the collection is a physical object, in this case the star itself. Mind, then, is a collection of appearances at a place where there is a living brain. There is nothing in mind but the sensations so related except images, and images do not logically differ from sensations, the difference lying in the mode of causation. Mind is composed of nothing beyond the complex of sensations and images.³ Just as there is no "the" real table, the table being simply the whole set of correlated appearances,⁴ so there is no mind substance to be contrasted with the set of sensations and images.

It may be noted that Russell's later works show a decided movement in the direction of critical realism. His position in *The Analysis of Matter* is an interesting combination of new realistic and critical realistic conceptions. Even in *The Analysis of Mind* Russell had regarded psychology as nearer to the data of experience than physics, and in *The Analysis of Matter* all percepts are located in

¹ *The Analysis of Mind*, pp. 99 ff.

² *Ibid.*, p. 131.

³ The fact that images are not considered part of the physical world (*ibid.*, p. 25) illustrates the degree to which Russell there qualifies the position that the physical and the mental differ only in relation and not in kind. In *The Analysis of Matter*, images as parts of the brain are regarded as part of the physical world, as well as components of mind.

⁴ *The Analysis of Mind*, pp. 97-99.

the brain and are not regarded as belonging to the set of appearances which constitute the object that is being known. Mental events are "events in a living brain, or, better, in a region combining sensitivity and the law of learned reactions to a marked extent."¹ Each mental event belongs to the events "constituting the electrons in the brain." Thus while Russell continues to insist that physics cannot ignore quality, or exclude percepts from the physical world, he now completely gives up the epistemological monism of Holt's new realism: "We cannot . . . suppose that the external event is exactly what we see or hear; it can, at best, resemble the percept only in certain structural respects."² In a similar vein he writes: "I should say that what the physiologist sees when he looks at a brain is part of his own brain, not part of the brain he is examining."³ Accordingly, while Russell admits that the intrinsic qualities of nature may be similar to, and in part identical with, the world as perceived, on his later position physics can only deal with the inferred structure of the world. As in critical realism, the brain has become a "brain-mind," experience has been mentalized and located in the brain, and the world which physics describes is no longer open to direct inspection.

The situation may perhaps be expressed in this manner. While Russell wishes to minimize the gap between the world as experienced and the world of scientific objects, he is not now willing to regard the latter as containing such contents as are experienced. Hence the world of physical

¹ *Philosophy*, pp. 280, 281. The reference to learned reactions in this passage indicates an aspect of Russell's views that is not here criticized. Indeed, the point of these pages is that if Russell would make learning and symbolism basic in his doctrine of mind, there would be no excuse to regard sensations and images as "mental," and no need to shift from a new to a critical realist basis as Russell has (unconsciously) done.

² *Ibid.*, p. 294.

³ *The Analysis of Matter*, p. 383.

objects, regarded as the cause of what is given at an organic center, must be inferred from experienced data, and since the data are organically conditioned, this world can only be known in its structural aspects and not in its intrinsic nature. But with this conclusion the tendency, prominent in *The Analysis of Mind*, to regard the appearances which constitute mind as at the same time part of the physical or scientific object is considerably weakened. While it is still true that mind is a collection of contents at a place where there is a living brain (and in this sense the theory of mind has suffered no change), it is no longer true that these contents are also parts of the objects upon which knowledge is directed, except, possibly, in the case of knowledge of one's own brain. The contents which compose mind are still part of nature in one sense, that is, they are events helping to constitute the nature of the "physical" brain, but they are not also parts of the object known when this is other than the knower's brain. Thus while Russell opposes even more strongly than previously psychophysical dualism in his insistence that all that is mental is also physical,¹ that is, is a part of a physical object as Russell defines a physical object, he repudiates an epistemological monism which asserts that the datum for knowledge is identical with the object of knowledge.

Russell's attempt to bridge the gap between experience and nature, his thoroughgoing relational approach to mind and matter, and his location of given content in at least one part of the world of nature are all motives characteristic of new realism, but the location of sensa in the brain, and the doctrine that the physical world is inferred and not directly experienced are characteristic motives of the critical realist approach. To inquire into the success of this mediating position, with its doctrine that what is given is

¹ It is no longer held that "images belong only to the mental world."

a part of the brain, would require a lengthy digression into the philosophy of nature that cannot now be entered upon.¹ But there are some phases of Russell's view of mind as it appears in *The Analysis of Mind* which are pertinent to the present theme, and which must be discussed before attempting to estimate the general success of this form of new realism.

33. MEANING AS IRREDUCIBLE TO SENSATIONS AND IMAGES

The central claim of the *Analysis of Mind*, namely, that the analysis of mental phenomena reveals no "stuff" other than sensations and images, may conceivably be taken in two ways. It might be taken to mean that everything mental² is simply a collection of sensations and images, or to mean that mental phenomena are non-additive characteristics of groups or wholes and not of the elements into which the wholes may be analyzed. Are mental phenomena collections or are they characteristics of wholes? While Russell's atomistic and pluralistic tendency undoubtedly causes him, and his readers, to think for the most part in terms of the first possibility (and that is what is here opposed), there are statements in Russell's exposition which would permit of the second interpretation. In the passage in which sensations and images are said to be the sole stuff of mind, Russell adds that everything else that is mental "can be analyzed into groups of sensations related in various ways, *or characteristics of sensations or of groups of sensations.*"³ In spite of the statement that he will return to

¹ Some aspects of the claim that the mental is part of the brain will be considered in the following chapter (see Lovejoy, *The Revolt against Dualism*, chap. vii).

² Under "mental" Russell includes percepts (*Philosophy*, p. 286), beliefs and desires (*The Analysis of Mind*, p. 9), pleasures and pains (*ibid.*, p. 13), and images. The term "mental" remains ambiguous.

³ *The Analysis of Mind*, p. 69. Italics mine.

the matter of the relations between the elements of mind, the promise is not explicitly made good. In the treatment of belief, of consciousness, and of meaning he does, however, introduce considerations which seem to require an insistence upon the systematic and *Gestalt* quality of at least some mental phenomena.

A belief is defined as "that way of being conscious which may be either true or false."¹ This seems to indicate that a belief has a unitary nature dependent upon but not identical with the components into which it may be analyzed. This is further brought out by the analysis of consciousness which is introduced into the definition of belief. While consciousness is not regarded as the fundamental characteristic of mind, Russell insists that it be defined in terms of meaning and not in terms of sensations as such (p. 292). The account of meaning is stated in terms of signs or symbols. "Meaning . . . is a characteristic of 'signs,' and 'signs' are sensible (or imaginal) phenomena which cause actions appropriate, not to themselves, but to something else with which they are associated."² This operation of signs may be conscious or unconscious, depending upon whether or not an image of that with which the sign is associated is evoked.

Thus, as Russell himself admits (pp. 238, 239), a belief, since it always involves meanings or symbols, cannot consist of sensations and images as such, that is, sensations

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 13. (Page references in the present section, unless otherwise noted, are to this volume.) This is hardly a satisfactory definition of belief, which seems to involve a claim that a proposition is true. The truth of the belief is independent of the truth status of the proposition believed, since it may be true that a false proposition is believed. If it be admitted that there are meaningful propositions which are neither true nor false, Russell's words do not even define a proposition.

² "The Meaning of 'Meaning,'" *Mind*, XXIX (1920), 402; cf. *The Analysis of Mind*, p. 191.

and images must function in a symbolic fashion, and this symbolic functioning is a characteristic of the stuff of mind only in certain relations and is not a characteristic of the isolated components. It would seem that the more typical or complex mental phenomena—belief, consciousness, memory—depend upon a symbolic functioning of events and are not simply a class of isolated appearances at a place where there is a living brain.

Indeed, it is only by a recognition of a process or functioning of events not identical with the components of the process revealed to reflection that *The Analysis of Mind* can be kept from becoming a treatise on how to analyze mind away. The view that all mental processes are bare aggregates of sensations would not give any insight into the systematic character of mental activity which idealism rightly stressed. What of the enormous "mental" labor performed by Russell in connection with *Principia mathematica*? Is that adequately regarded as nothing but a collection of sensations and images at a place where there was a brain? Take any proposition in the *Principia*. Does not its very nature and meaning depend upon its being taken as a whole, that is, as a proposition, and in not being broken up into a collection of sensed marks?¹ Since Russell

¹ There is, of course, a further problem as to the sense in which sensations are primitive. Russell's analysis of data (pp. 297 ff.) regards data as derived and not as primitive, appearing "when a science is well advanced," and "affording grounds for inference to other parts of the science, without themselves being believed on any ground except observation." While for Russell all data are sensations, he apparently would not convert the proposition and regard all sensations as data, and so as not primitive in the sense of being given to observation without the intervention of analysis. It is not necessarily true that God has joined what man can put asunder. As Dewey has said: "To be a composite is one thing; to be capable of reduction to a composite by certain measures is another thing" (*Experience and Nature*, p. 143 n.). To define a thing as a collection of entities or events is to fall into the opposite error of the substantialists: the "substance" of the older theory is replaced by the set of attributes. A doctrine of substance and a logical atomism are equally unwarranted bifurcations of actual substantives.

has given less and less importance to the realm of subsistence which enveloped his earlier mathematical philosophy, he seems to provide no place for the type of object and mental activity which mathematics and the mathematician requires. Just how the *Principia* fits in with the framework of *The Analysis of Mind* would be hard to see, unless more of an emphasis is laid upon the symbolic process than Russell explicitly demands. It is significant that Russell makes no attempt to frame a definition of mind in terms of meaning or the symbolic process, and does not expressly employ such concepts as a means of relating mathematical procedure to mental processes.

However, even if the importance of meaning and the symbolic process were brought more to the fore, Russell might refuse to define mind solely in such terms, claiming that sensations and images are "mental," and exist as the condition of the more complex processes. The problem then becomes one of inquiring why sensations and images are called "mental."

One possible contention, which Russell occasionally uses in regard to images (p. 25), is that images are not part of the physical world, and so are mental. However, unless all that is not physical (however defined) is mental, the fact that images are not part of the physical world would not make them mental. In *The Analysis of Matter* Russell clearly regards images as being physical in the sense of being components of the brain. If this is so, the fact that images are parts of some physical objects and not parts of others would not warrant calling the images mental, a procedure which would have peculiar consequences if consistently applied. And since sensations are consistently regarded as physical (as parts of objects as well as parts of the brain in *The Analysis of Mind*, and as components of the brain in *The Analysis of Matter*), and are not regarded

as intrinsically cognitive (p. 143),¹ there is even less reason for calling them mental.

It might be thought that the term "mental" gives a valid way of distinguishing those appearances or events in or conditioned by a living brain from other events. But in Russell's analysis this is doubtful, since on his non-phenomenalistic view there may be events in a living brain that are not sensations or images, and so are not to be labeled "mental." Further, as a part of nature the brain acts as the condition for the occurrence of all sorts of events, in and out of the organism—events which on Russell's view would not be mental.

Another suggestion would be to the effect that those appearances at the place where there is a living brain which can be the object of awareness or have the quality of being given are mental. In the hands of some thinkers a strong argument might be based upon the introduction of awareness, but this course does not seem open to Mr. Russell. In his reaction against a subject or ego which is aware of content, Russell was led in *The Analysis of Mind* to the identification of sensa and sensation.² Whether or not this means that he is prevented from giving any account of givenness, it does mean that he cannot characterize the mental in terms of the object of awareness.

As a final suggestion, it might be said that sensations and images are mental in the sense that they are the components revealed in the analysis of the admittedly mental processes of belief, consciousness, and memory. Such a use of the term seems ill advised. The characters into which a whole or a process is analyzed need not themselves have

¹ There is great doubt as to whether Russell is consistent on this point. See the following section.

² Thereby giving up the "act" aspect of his "British" new realistic stage, in which he held views closely akin to those of G. E. Moore and A. Meinong.

the characters of the analyzed process or whole, and in the cases at issue certainly do not have. The pieces of sulphur obtained in the breaking-up of a large lump of sulphur are still pieces of sulphur, but the bricks composing a house, or the separate elements of a chemical combination, or the physiological changes in the legs of a running man do not have the characters of the whole in which they function. Sensations, similarly, do not have the characteristics of judgments, beliefs, consciousness, or memory. Indeed, it is even possible, if mentality be the characteristic of a functional process, that all the component factors of the process are of a physical nature. For such reasons, to call the elements analyzed out of a mental process "mental" is a dangerous and misleading use of the term.

If the foregoing considerations are sound, it would seem that there is no compelling reason on Russell's view for regarding sensations and images as mental. Nor should Russell desire to do so, since if sensations and images are not as such mental, his attempt to avoid psychophysical dualism is made that much easier. If this result be admitted, the way is open for identifying mind with a functional process of the symbolic sort, a way which would make unnecessary the shift to critical realism. From this point of view *The Analysis of Mind* would find its importance not as an adequate description of mind, but in its exhibition of what is not found when an analysis of mental processes into their component features is undertaken.

34. RUSSELL'S REFORMULATION OF THE NATURE OF MIND

Upon reading the preceding sections dealing with his views, Mr. Russell writes, in June, 1931, that since "there are things in *The Analysis of Mind* which I no longer care to defend, . . . it seems to me the best plan is to set out

positively what I think." This section contains his statement, together with some footnote comments. The objections previously raised concerning (1) the inadequacy of a collection theory of mind, and (2) the lack of necessity for regarding as "mental" the components into which mental phenomena can be analyzed are avoided so far as Russell himself is concerned: the first by the admission "that wholes have important properties not necessarily deducible from their constituents and the relations among these"; the second by the statement that the designation of the components of mental phenomena as "mental" is perhaps a verbal matter. It should be noted that givenness is regarded as cognitive, so that if there was no distortion due to mediums, the given event would be identical with the object about which knowledge is concerned, and this possibility is regarded as being realized in what he calls "experiencing." But since in perception there are distorting mediums, what is given is not part of the object (as it was regarded with some vacillation in *The Analysis of Mind*) and so is located in the brain, a result which seems to follow from Russell's failure to take seriously his own statements that sensation as such is not cognitive. For if this is so, mediums cause no knowledge problems, and do not make it necessary to deny to the object those characters which it appears to have in the presence of perceivers. Russell's statement follows:

Analysis of Mind.—In analyzing mental phenomena it seems to me very important to realize that a very great many of the terms traditionally employed are essentially vague, and must be abandoned if scientific accuracy is to be obtained. Among such vague terms I include the word *mental* itself. I think that *mental* is an adjective of degree, like *hairy* or *clever*. There are a number of words which I think should disappear from the psychological vocabulary: among these I include *knowledge*, *memory*, *perception*, and *sensation*. I refuse to be criticized for not providing precise definitions for such terms, since I

consider them incapable of precise definition. To explain this, I will begin with my own positive theory.

To distinguish between the causal and the logical analysis of a set of phenomena is both more difficult and more important than is generally supposed. The causal skeleton of the world is, I think, to be sought in physics, and in physics alone. I am persuaded that the behaviour of the human body is governed completely by the laws of physics, and could be worked out by a Laplacean calculator. I say this in spite of the talk of Eddington and others about atomic free will, which I regard as mere anti-Bolshevik propaganda. Modern physics is not, as the old-fashioned physics was, concerned with movements of matter. Matter has disappeared, while space and time (and therefore motion) are rapidly disappearing along with everything else that we owe to the Greeks. What remains is mathematical method.

"Knowledge," which used to be conceived mystically, should instead be regarded as a causal conception, but when so regarded, it is seen to be essentially vague. Some chains of physical causation, for example, the journeys of light quanta from the stars, are to a considerable extent, though not wholly, independent of the rest of the world. When an event belonging to such a quasi-independent causal series occurs in a region subject to the law of conditioned reflexes, this event is said to be a percept of the supposed object at the centre of the said system of quasi-independent events. This is what we ought to mean when we say that we see a certain star. Most of the objects that we say we see are seen by means of reflected light, and in this case the explanation is slightly more complicated, but not different in principle. What makes the notion of perception essentially vague is the fact that the causal chains in question are never *wholly* independent of the medium through which they pass. There is always therefore in perception some element of the kind of error that occurs when we look through blue spectacles. In looking at an object through shimmering water this becomes evident. It is impossible to say at what moment we cease to see the object and see a mere blur.

What has just been said about perception applies *mutatis mutandis* to everything cognitive.¹ The whole conception of cognition is essentially vague. I hold, however, that cognition of events in my own head is likely to be less vague than other cognition, since there is less intervening medium. This does not apply to the sort of cognition of my

¹ [This transmissive and causal concept of knowledge forms a striking contrast to the type of theory found in Dewey.—C. W. M.]

head which a physiologist seeks. If I were to cut a hole through my skull and attach a mirror and a microscope, I might study my brain in the physiologist's way. I should, however, have interposed several distorting mediums, and should therefore acquire less accurate knowledge of my brain than I acquire through introspection, in which the intervening medium is much less. In saying this, however, I am speaking of logical analysis, not of causal explanation. For it appears that the causal explanation of the world depends upon certain highly abstract properties of phenomena, and is obscured by taking account of their concrete detail.

While knowing, perceiving, and remembering are vague concepts, involving a causal element, believing and reminiscing do not share this vagueness. I cannot think of a word to express what occurs when we think we perceive. Let us for the moment use the word *experiencing* to express this. Then I should say that experiencing also does not share the vagueness that belongs to perceiving.

When I say that the stuff of the mind consists only of sensations and images, I doubt whether what I am saying is more than verbal. Mental phenomena, like all other phenomena, consist of particulars variously related. Sensations and images are merely names for these particulars,¹ sensations being those which have proximate causes outside the brain, and images being all the rest. I have no objection whatever to *Gestalt* psychology, and I am not the least anxious to deny that wholes have important properties not necessarily deducible from their constituents and the relations among these. I refuse, however, to be in any way humble about the fact that my psychology is not yet adequate to explain the most complex of the higher mental processes. One might as well complain of Galileo because he did not understand electricity. The proper scientific procedure is always to master the simplest phenomena first.

In conclusion, I cannot admit that the views which I advocate are inapplicable in comparative psychology, psychopathology, and anthropology. I have myself paid a great deal of attention to child psychology, and have never been driven to admit the inadequacy of my conception of mind. It is certainly adequate to the interpretation of Pavlov's results. I have studied psychoanalysis as much as a layman can, and have not seen anything there either which demands an inter-

¹ [To call them "mental," then, has no more significance than to call the constituents of houses "housal," or the elements into which living organisms can be analyzed "living."—C. W. M.]

pretation other than I should naturally give to it. I do not therefore see any reason to abandon the views that I have expressed in *The Analysis of Matter* and *The Outline of Philosophy*.¹

35. THE AVOIDANCE OF PSYCHOPHYSICAL DUALISM

BY AMERICAN NEW REALISM

The relational theories of mind of the new realists so far considered furnish a striking contrast to characteristic idealistic formulations. Where the idealist expands mind to include or characterize all reality, the new realist of the purely relational variety so limits mind that there is nothing which mind can intrinsically call its own. All the contents of the Cartesian mind have been returned to the world, either as subsistent entities or as parts of physical objects, and mind has become merely a relation between the very contents which it had so proudly claimed. To an idealist, the mind envisaged by new realism must appear to be a very feeble and forlorn aspect of reality. While for the idealist, mind is creative and constitutive, for the new realist, mind, as a relation between neutral or physical events, can do nothing. As Laird suggests, for "construction" the new realist substitutes "finding."² While for idealism the object of knowledge cannot ultimately be severed from mind, for the new realist knowledge is an external relation in which the object known owes nothing to being known. Where idealism stresses the systematic unity of mind as a self-evolving universal, and is not free from the influence of substance modes of thought, the new

¹ [The present concern was only with the new realistic phase of Russell's thought, with its conception of mind as a collection of "mental" sensations and images. The other strain in Russell, now dominant, in which mind is related to symbolic and conditioned behavior, is functionalistic, and not questioned here. It is these notions, I suggest, which have proved fruitful in Mr. Russell's experience.—C. W. M.]

² *Op. cit.*, p. 201. Laird himself would not agree that such a substitution is everywhere justified.

realism so far considered states mind in terms of a class or grouping of contents, and replaces completely the logic of substance and attributes by the logic of relations. Whether mind is regarded as a grouping of neutral entities (Holt, Perry), or a non-additive property of organized wholes (Spaulding),¹ or an implicative presence of a thing (Montague),² or a projection field (Pitkin),³ the American new realists unite in agreeing that mentality is not a characteristic of things in isolation, but of things in relation to the reacting organism. Mind does not exist apart from things, events, or entities in relation, the things, events, or entities not being dependent upon this relation for their existence. Certainly if the idealist has unduly magnified mind, this type of new realist has unduly minimized it. Some middle ground would seem to be demanded, and it is of interest that pragmatism and critical realism defend positions which avoid both the idealistic magnification and the present type of new realistic minimization of mind.

Any attempt to assess the attempt of American new realism to furnish a relational definition of mind is beset with difficulties. In many respects the results which were desired seem to have been obtained, while in other respects the results are glaringly inadequate. As the demonstration of possible alternatives to a mentalistic idealism and to

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 484, 485. The content of consciousness is "the new dimension that 'arises' through the *non-additive organization*" of its "spatial and physical" conditions.

² "All matter is instinct with something of the cognitive function; . . . every objective event has that self-transcending implication of other events which when it occurs on the scale that it does in our brain processes we call consciousness" (*The New Realism*, p. 283). "Consciousness," then, "is the potential or implicative presence of a thing at a space or time in which that thing is not actually present" (*ibid.*, p. 281). A functionalist could accept this statement.

³ Pitkin (*ibid.*, pp. 443 ff.), using an analogy from projective geometry, regards the field of consciousness as a projection of the environment (the projected complex) upon the reacting organism (the projectorial referent).

psychophysical dualism, new realism may be said to have established its case; as for the positive presentation of an adequate alternative view of mind in terms of relation, American new realism must be judged a failure.¹ These two sides of the case may be discussed in turn.

That the new realistic movement provides a solution of the mind-centric predicament, and an avoidance of psychophysical dualism, may be argued as follows. In the first place, there can be no reasonable doubt but that all relations are not causal relations, and that relatedness is compatible with independence. If so, then regardless of what mind is, even if it be an act of awareness or an immaterial substantive or substance, the relation of a content to a mind may not involve any dependence of this content on mind. This argument does not show what mind is, nor does it prove that psychophysical dualism is avoidable, nor does it demonstrate that relatedness to mind is a case of relatedness without dependence; it merely gives the logical possibility that whatever mind may be, its content is not dependent upon it, or in any sense mental, where mental means "dependent upon or of the nature of mind." And this is an important result of the British and German movements, since it establishes against mentalism a counterclaim of equal logical cogency.

In the second place, the American group went farther. The foregoing possibility would be realized in fact if mind could not be regarded as something upon which things could be dependent, or, positively put, if mind could be regarded as a relation between non-mental entities rather than something to which other things are related. If, for instance, mind could be regarded as the relation of being given, or the relation of organism responding to stimulus,

¹ The same claim will be made for the other wing of the movement in the following chapter.

or the class of appearances at a living brain, then what is given or responded to or which appears would in no relevant sense be mental. In this case, not only would there be no mind-centric predicament, but there would be no psychophysical dualism in the sense that the stuff of mind was different from the rest of existence. It cannot be claimed that the American new realists succeeded in this program; indeed, the result was a caricature of mind. But it can be claimed that the movement mapped out the road to the promised land, and that the objective relativists, led by the instrumentalists, have carried on the same relational assault, only stressing another type of relation for the erection of a functional theory of mind. Opinions may differ as to whether or not the promised land has been entered, but to the American new realists must go the credit for the blueprint of the attack upon mentalism, in both its monistic and its dualistic forms.

It must be specifically pointed out that this type of theory of mind, even if successfully carried out, does not in itself prove a number of things which the new realists themselves have often believed and regarded as proved. It does not show that knowledge is "direct" (epistemological monism), nor that given events are merely selected and are not emergent upon the presence of organisms,¹ nor does it show that the given non-mental events are part of the physical world.² These doctrines had to be defended on their own grounds, and it is important to remember that the failure to demonstrate some or all of these positions is not a disproof of the claim that new realism pointed the way out of the morass of mentalism.

¹ The solution of the mind-centric predicament is not a solution of the body-centric predicament, problems confused in the ambiguous term "egocentric."

² Such events may be subsistent, nonexistent (illusory), existent and physical, existent but non-physical.

Since Professor Lovejoy's trenchant criticisms of certain of these additional doctrines of new realism¹ may seem to many, as they apparently have to their author, to refute the importance claimed for new realism concerning mentalism and psychophysical dualism, the issue must be briefly mentioned here, leaving until later an analysis of Lovejoy's own position. The point to be noticed is that "psychophysical" has a different meaning to the new realists (or at least in the claim made above for new realism) from that which it has to Lovejoy. New realism, it seems, must be understood as a reaction against the idealistic position that it is impossible to get beyond a subject mind, and not primarily as an attempt to set up a complete theory of nature or the physical world,² so that an avoidance of psychophysical dualism meant here a denial of any reality akin to the subject mind of the idealist which held within itself the world as given. Lovejoy's interest, on the other hand, is solely in the question as to whether given contents can be regarded as physical,³ and since he believes that they cannot be so regarded, and holding as he does that the mental is the non-physical,⁴ for him psychophysical dualism means that there are existences (namely, the whole field of the given) which cannot be regarded as part of the physical world.⁵ It is obvious that new realism may

¹ *Op. cit.*, chap. ii.

² Lovejoy seems to doubt this. In *op. cit.*, p. 365, however, Spaulding takes the basic doctrine of the new realism to be the solution of the egocentric predicament. Neither of the terms "physical" or "material" plays an important place in the argument of *The New Realism*.

³ For Lovejoy the physical world is spatial, temporal, existent between and independent of perceptions, its components interacting causally whether perceived or not, and is "a common factor in or behind the experience of all percipients" (*op. cit.*, p. 27).

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 39.

⁵ Lovejoy expressly says that in calling given content "mental" the dualist "need not be understood to say that it has the same properties as are (for some

have shown the possibility of avoiding psychophysical dualism in the first sense, without having avoided it in the second sense. And this is all that has here been contended. Lovejoy's own criticism of new realism makes no reference whatever to the topic of mind; his whole concern is whether the new realist succeeded in making perceptual content part of the physical world. It is claimed that such content is identifiable with the physical object neither at the time it began to act as a stimulus nor at the time when the perception takes place, nor with any other physical object. Then, since the perceptual datum is not physical, it is by definition psychical or mental, and so psychophysical dualism results. This argument need not be here discussed, since an escape from such psychophysical dualism has not been claimed for new realism.¹

36. DIFFICULTIES OF THE RELATIONAL THEORY OF MIND

Even if new realism in its thoroughgoing relational form has saved the world from the domination of mind and mind from isolation within the world, its positive theory

philosophers) connoted by the noun 'mind,' nor yet that the 'mind' has the properties which sensory data are experienced as having" (*ibid.*). But "mental" is surely an adjective of the noun "mind," and even if there is a body of content not part of the physical world, it is an arbitrary use of terms to call the non-physical order "mental" just because it is not physical. It may be added that Lovejoy holds a double psychophysical dualism, since he believes in mental acts of awareness in addition to mental content.

¹ With Lovejoy's use of terms, it is believed that he establishes his case. It may be pointed out, however, that there are other legitimate uses of the terms "mental" and "physical." Even if the given content is not physical in Lovejoy's sense of the term, it need not be mental unless mental is adequately defined as the non-physical. And of this there is great doubt. But also the term "physical" may be defined in a way which does not deny that the emergent characters which things assume in the presence of organisms are any less a "part" of the things than the characters assumed in the presence of other things. Such emergent characters need not be due to mind or be mental. On such an alternative definition, perceptual contents can be regarded as physical in the sense of being characters of physical objects.

of mind can hardly be regarded as satisfactory. There does not seem to be "enough mind" to account satisfactorily for givenness, knowledge, and error, or to do justice to the systematic, constructive, and even "creative" character of the more complex forms of mental activity.

The question as to the meaning of "givenness" is a complex one and cannot be raised in detail at this course of our argument. It must suffice to call attention to the fact that the term "given" seems to imply that content so designated is given to something, and that there is an "awareness" of content. Holt's view is not convincing on this point since the fact that a specific response can be made to many stimuli that are not ordinarily regarded as given content would appear to make the concept of specific response an unsatisfactory criterion for givenness. Similarly, since for Russell there are events in the brain which are not given, the mere appearance of an object at a place where there is a brain would not be a sufficient condition to insure givenness. Without implying that the new realist position of the American variety could not deal with this topic, the usual failure to consider in detail questions centering around the self, and in particular the topic of awareness or givenness, gives to the movement the appearance of having left out of account a large part of what some philosophers regard as basic in a discussion of the nature of mind.

In the consideration of knowledge, it is usually felt that in knowledge of the past the new realistic position is weak. At least in the case of objects that are not merely no longer present, but no longer are (as the house that has burned down), it is necessary to admit that there is some duality between present content and the past claimed to be known, some intermediate "ideas," whether Cartesian or pragmatic in nature. Once this is admitted, it is natural to ask if

knowing is ever the mere presence of content.¹ That other alternatives besides a theory of direct knowledge are open to new realists is brought out by the fact that an avoidance of psychophysical dualism need not imply the rejection of the view that knowledge always requires mediation. Dewey's denial of the doctrine of "immediate knowledge" is a case in point. A given content may be known to be a part of a physical object without the presence of the content itself being a case of knowledge.

Similar considerations apply to the new realistic treatments of error. The very existence of error seems to require some type of duality, since if knowledge is always direct error would be impossible, unless, to be sure, error is dealt with in the heroic but unsatisfactory manner of Holt. In so-called conceptual error it is propositions that are false. While a proposition can be regarded, with the earlier Russell, as a subsistent entity which may or may not be given, and whose truth or falsity is determined, say, by an identity or lack of identity of structure between it and its objective, this is rather a strained interpretation, to say the least, as the shift in Russell's view attests. In *The Analysis of Mind*, propositions, while labeled beliefs, are regarded as typical mental phenomena. Once admit that in some cases error involves an element of meaning, imputation, or prediction, and the question arises as to whether this element can ever be absent in error, whether, in short, error without meaning is not a contradiction in terms.

That the American new realists have given very skimpy accounts of the higher mental processes is obvious even to a casual reader. One looks in vain for a detailed treatment of the reflective process, dreams, the "constructive" im-

¹ It is significant that Russell, in *The Analysis of Mind*, invoked meanings to explain memory.

agination, the "ideal objects" of the scientific and mathematical disciplines, the rôle of hypothetical judgments, the significance of the *a priori* in reflection, the mental processes of the artist, or the relation of mental processes to the control of behavior. In short, one looks in vain for an appreciation of the insurgent and impudent way in which a mental scaffolding is erected around the actual world, making it more amenable to human purposes and desires. The tendency to substitute "finding" for "constructing" leaves little place for a "creative intelligence." The assurance is expressed by some new realists that these matters will find an explanation in terms of neutral entities, but the "how" is not forthcoming. With mind reduced to a bloodless shade, the things squeezed out of mind must be returned to the world, and those which the realm of matter will not accept must be harbored by the realm of subsistence. Here they lie in wait from all eternity for the nervous system which can bring them into the realm of experience. Fortunate for Newton that his nervous system selected out the law of gravitation, and the propositions of the calculus! Fortunate for Cantor that his nervous system selected out the transfinite numbers and brought them into the domain of human mathematics! The history of the human mind becomes the history of human nervous systems; the impudent surge of mental inventiveness and creativity becomes a static tale of the discovery of substantial entities. It is true that the "impurities" in Russell's new realism, evidenced in his analysis of the symbol as the vehicle of the meaning aspect of memory, truth, and consciousness, prevents his view from being so easily caricatured, but in spite of the advantage thus gained, Russell does scant justice to the systematic phases of mind, or to the social aspects of mental processes.

It has been pointed out that new realism tends to con-

fuse an escape from the mind-centric predicament with an escape from the body-centric predicament. It was argued that it does not follow that because given content is not dependent on mind, such content does not owe its existence, in whole or in part, to the organism. Whether a given content is merely selected by the body or emerges with the presence of the organism is a problem to be met on its own merits. While such critics of the selective theory as Broad and Lovejoy have admitted the bare possibility of the truth of this view, the content of dreams, emotions, and imagery, seems with difficulty to be regarded as cases of selection. The development of the doctrine of emergence, not in general prominent in the writings of American new realists,¹ has served to strengthen the possibility that some given content, if not all, is emergent upon the presence of the organism. If this be true, and critical realism and objective relativism both harbor this conception, the doctrine of immediate knowledge is further weakened, though not necessarily the claim of new realism to have avoided psychophysical dualism. Critical realism, it is true, does often see in this situation an argument in favor of such dualism, but objective relativism, which is a development of new realism in harmony with the doctrine of emergence, and often coupled with a pragmatic analysis of reflection, does not. The merits of these competing claims regarding the doctrine of emergence will demand attention at a later point, but it is obvious that new realism has not given due consideration to the questions raised by emergence.

It is hardly necessary to add that mind as conceived by the new realists does not adequately meet the demands for a theory of mind by those working in fields other than philosophy. The movement in general offered neither insight nor guidance to the workers in comparative psychol-

¹ Spaulding is an exception.

ogy, to psychopathologists, to students of the social and anthropological aspects of mind, or to investigators in the field of the higher mental processes such as occur in logical and mathematical investigations. Neither within nor without philosophy proper could the early new realistic analysis such as considered in this chapter furnish a resting place for speculation concerning the nature of mind. It remained for other workers to develop the potentialities inherent in the relational approach to mind.

CHAPTER IV

MIND AS INTENTIONAL ACT

37. BRENTANO AND THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

HISTORY seems to have sustained the verdict that if to the idealists it must be said "more matter, never mind so much about mind," to the realists so far considered a similar warning must be issued: "more mind, never matter so much about matter," or at least, "less neutrality about neutral events." Not merely is this verdict encountered in the pragmatists and critical realists, but it is found in one group of the new realists themselves, and that the larger and historically prior group.

The theory developed by these new realists¹ is of ancient lineage. Not without reason has Aristotle been regarded as its father.² It finds expression in the *Sāṃkhya* philosophy.³ There are even traces of it in Descartes and Berkeley.⁴ And from the Scholastics the theory passes through

¹ Husserl, it is true, believes the theory leads to idealism, and phases of the theory are found in such critical realists as Broad, C. L. Morgan, and Lovejoy. The functionalist, too, is entitled to his say in the matter. The theory is, however, predominantly new realistic. Husserl's phrase is used in the chapter title.

² Titchener (*Systematic Psychology*, p. 158, n. 12), ascribes the theory to Aristotle, referring to *De anima* 424a, 425b, 429a, 430a, 431b.

³ "The *Sāṃkhya* philosophy establishes a dualism between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*, where *prakṛti* is the source of all existence and *puruṣa* the disinterested spectator of the evolution of *prakṛti*. It also holds to the plurality of *puruṣas* or knowing subjects" (S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, I, 259).

⁴ Descartes at times suggests a ray of consciousness which falls on objects. For Berkeley see Hoernlé, *Idealism as a Philosophy*, pp. 101ff.

Franz Brentano, and dominates the realistic movement of Germany and England. Meinong and Husserl, with their schools of *Gegenstandstheorie* and phenomenology, are developments of this impulse; in Britain (though here the diffusionists do not have a clear case) Moore, Russell, Alexander, Laird, Lloyd Morgan, and Whitehead hold the same general type of theory of mind, however different the details may be. And the names of Witasek, Stumpf, Lipps, Messer, and Stout bear witness to the wide influence in psychology of this theory.¹

The doctrine itself is somewhat difficult to characterize in a phrase; "mind as intentional act" has been chosen since it suggests the idea of "intending," "direction toward."² More simply, the theory might be called "mind as consciousness," since it draws its sustenance from the common recognition that consciousness (or awareness) is always "consciousness of." As Husserl writes: "Consciousness is just consciousness 'of' something; it is its essential nature to conceal 'meaning' within itself, the quintessence of 'soul,' so to speak, of 'mind,' of 'reason.'"³ On this view, the essence of mind is then "conscious direction toward something," and it is the emphasis upon consciousness and direction, upon a "psychical" something which is consciously concerned with things (in the widest sense of the term) other than itself, which is the unique note of this theory, and which sharply distinguishes it from the attempts of Avenarius, Mach, and the American new realists to dispense with a domain of the psychical or conscious as such.

¹ On the psychological aspect of intentionalism see Titchener, *op. cit.*, particularly pp. 193-256.

² The "intentional act" must not be confused with the "pure act" as discussed in chap. ii.

³ *Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology*, trans. W. R. Boyce Gibson, p. 251.

The famous and oft-quoted passage of Franz Brentano¹ gives the keynote of the intentional theory of mind:

Every psychical phenomenon is characterized by what the scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (also the mental) inexistence of the object, and what we, although with not quite unambiguous expressions, would call relation to a content, direction towards an object (which is not here to be understood as reality), or immanent objectivity. Each contains something in itself as an object [*enthält etwas als Objekt in sich*], though not each in the same way. In presentation something is presented, in judgment something is acknowledged or rejected, in love something is loved, in hatred hated, in desire desired, and so on.

This intentional inexistence is exclusively peculiar to psychical phenomena. No physical phenomenon shows anything similar. And so we can define psychical phenomena by saying that they are phenomena which intentionally contain an object in themselves.

As this statement shows, it is held that psychical phenomena or "acts" are directed upon, intend, are "conscious of" some object or content. The act is mental or psychical and intrinsically so; the content is physical.² Thus does psychology as the science of the psychical separate itself from the physical sciences. Thus is mentalism overcome, since at each instant consciousness is directed upon a real something beyond itself.³ Consciousness becomes known by a self-evident inner perception (which is distinguished from observation) or by an observation made possible

¹ The passage is from Brentano's *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte*, p. 115. I have followed Russell's translation, *The Analysis of Mind*, pp. 14, 15. For a similar statement cf. Husserl, *op. cit.*, pp. 242, 243.

² Note that intentionality may be regarded as constituting the very nature of the mental (in which case there need not be anything intrinsically psychical or mental), or as a characteristic of the intrinsically mental. There is some ambiguity in the movement on this crucial issue. The first interpretation points to functionalism and is not here opposed; it is the opposition to the second view which constitutes the task of this chapter.

³ Brentano later held that the content was always "real" (see Titchener, *op. cit.*, p. 9, n. 13; p. 195, n. 81).

through memory.¹ As a continuum of acts of perceiving, wishing, imagining, remembering, feeling, willing, and desiring, the concept of mind seems "thick" enough to do full justice to the richness of "living" mind.

In tracing the fate of this fertile insight, it will be convenient to glance first at some phases of the British development, particularly as found in Alexander and Laird, and then to examine and expand the conclusions there suggested by a brief reference to Meinong and Husserl.

38. MOORE, ALEXANDER, LAIRD: MIND AS CONTINUUM OF ACTS OF AWARENESS

Soon after the beginning of the present century G. E. Moore called attention to the same distinction which Brentano had made, in a way which has been as decisive for succeeding English realism as has been James's suggestion of a relational view of mind for the American realists. The basic claim was that in every case where a content is given two distinct elements are present: the object of consciousness or awareness, and an act of consciousness or awareness.² It is only the "transparent" or "diaphanous" act of awareness which is mental, the content being in every case non-mental.³

Upon the basis of this distinction Samuel Alexander has built an imposing metaphysics. Alexander rejects the rela-

¹ See *ibid.*, p. 13. The way in which the act is known continues to be a problem throughout the movement.

² *Philosophical Studies*, pp. 17, 20, 24 ff. The original article, "The Refutation of Idealism," appeared in *Mind*, 1903. The use of the term "act" is striking. Could a Brentano influence have come through G. F. Stout? Titchener (*op. cit.*, p. 158, n. 11) states that "recent English psychology, through G. F. Stout (*Anal. Psychol.* i, 1896, 36, 40), has been influenced by Brentano." Titchener himself discusses Stout under intentionalism. Like Ward (who influenced Alexander and Laird), Stout regarded experience as having subjective and objective poles.

³ *Philosophical Studies*, p. 29.

tional view of mind, such as is found in Holt, claiming that it does not do justice to the fact that *we* are aware of what is before *us*. The searchlight analogy must be pressed literally: the "light" of the searchlight must not be omitted. It is analogous to the light of awareness, being a light thrown upon objects and not identical with the physical searchlight or the responding organism. Alexander therefore falls back upon Moore's distinction between mental act and non-mental content.¹ In any experience, it is claimed, there are two factors, the awareness of the object and the object of awareness. The object of awareness is "contemplated," the act of awareness is "enjoyed." Thus, "the mind enjoys itself and contemplates its object. The act of mind is an enjoyment; the object is contemplated."² These two aspects of experience are related by being together or "compresent."³ Mind cannot be an object to itself, cannot contemplate itself; so-called introspection does not make the mind an object to itself but merely clarifies the enjoyment.⁴

It must be admitted with Alexander that it is possible for us in looking at a horse to experience the fact of our togetherness with the horse, but the question immediately arises as to whether this togetherness is the compresence of a mental act with non-mental content, or whether it is merely the compresence of two contents that are existentially of the same order. In this event the experiencing would itself be one existential complex, and the experience of the relationship of compresence between the given self and the given content another existential complex of the same order. On this approach, to be more fully stated and defended later, the contents of experience really stand on their own feet, as James would say, since the perceiver and

¹ *Space, Time and Deity*, II, 109-15.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

² *Ibid.*, I, 12.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

his perceiving themselves become existential (but non-mental) contents which may or may not be experienced. Experience, in other words, becomes a relation of existentially similar contents, and the act of experiencing introduces no ontological distinction between the mental and the physical. Alexander, however, refuses to set out along this road. We are told to "seek for the enjoyment as something which you mind or live through, and which you are . . . and . . . you will assure yourself of the compresence of the non-mental object with your enjoyed mind."¹ Admitting that the fact of givenness must receive its due place, many who have earnestly "sought" have not been able to find in "activity" anything that requires the doctrine of a mental act of awareness. Not merely have the American new realists not accepted this analysis, but Russell, in spite of the early influence upon him of G. F. Moore, has come to reject the doctrine.² Many searchers for the act of awareness have had the experience of Hume and James in searching for the self, namely, the experience of finding only more content. The mental act must be found in experience, but since it cannot be found as an object, that is, cannot be contemplated, it is difficult to know whether it is found or not.

This apparently fatal difficulty in Alexander's view is denied in Laird's interesting defense of the presence of an act of awareness in his volume, *A Study in Realism*. Like Alexander, Laird rejects the view of mind of the American new realists, claiming that in neglecting the fact of givenness it gives an account only of the objects of consciousness, and not an account of consciousness. "Things may

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

² *Op. cit.*, pp. 14-18: "The act in thinking is not empirically discoverable, or logically deducible from what we can observe." It is regarded as "the ghost of the soul."

exist without being given," he writes, "and it is useless to argue about the given without admitting the ultimate fact of givenness." When content appears, it must "appear to something, and this something must be or contain awareness or consciousness."¹ Consciousness, then, requires some element of "togetherness" (p. 153), and this element is omitted in a purely relational view of mind. Even if this be granted, however, the question still remains as to the nature of the two component factors.

In the defense of the doctrine of the act, Laird challenges the objectivists to show that "the subjective side of experience is really part of the objective side" (p. 165). This he believes is impossible; there are *observable* differences which are not differences in the object.² He points out that perceiving, doubting, believing, inferring, and the like are not due to "any difference in the object," since the same thing can, for instance, be doubted or believed. "Surely," he writes, "there is no need to prove that doubting, supposing, believing, and the like, are conscious processes and that their differences are differences in consciousness." On the other hand, the "objects of consciousness are not consciousness at all, except in the special case of introspection. Consciousness is the awareness of them, the striving for them, the joy in them, not the things striven for, apprehended or enjoyed" (pp. 167, 168).

Thus the essence of consciousness is "an act of reference to an object,"³ each such act probably having "a specific

¹ *A Study in Realism*, p. 164. Unless otherwise noted, the page references to Laird will be to this volume.

² In comment Laird adds: "These, in my view, are observable in what Ward called the 'subjective side' of experience. Both Alexander and I were working on a Wardian basis, but criticising and developing it differently."

³ *Problems of the Self*, p. 79. Acts of cognition, feeling, and endeavor occur simultaneously with reference to an object, feeling and endeavor being *dynamic* references, cognition *adynamic*.

difference according to the different object referred to.”¹ The particular mind or soul or self is a unity of such acts, which Laird calls “experiences.” This unity Laird designates as a substance, “a *res per se subsistens*, a distinct, particular thing existing by itself.”² In the terminology here adopted, however, Laird’s view is clearly a substantive one, since it is held that the substance simply *is* this unity and not something over and above it.³ In regard to material things, “the fact of substance is that a certain organisation of matter tends to continue in that organised form in spite of, or because of, its give and take with the environment.”⁴ Similarly, there is a soul or mind or self “when and so long as there is a characteristic unity of experiences” or acts of reference to objects.⁵ Such acts “must exist as parts of a unity, and the existence of all of them in a unity through time (though perhaps with intervals) *is* the soul, the psychical substance.”⁶

Laird specifically contends that we may be aware of the acts of awareness which in their unity constitute the mind. He notes:

The analysis of act and object has suffered some harm by Mr. Moore’s description of “acts” as “diaphanous.” . . . The diaphaneity of an act of knowledge, as I understand the description, only means that the characteristics of the act do not appear in the object, and not that the act has no observable characteristics when attention is paid to it. . . .

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 200.

² *Ibid.*, p. 348.

³ “The transcendent doctrine of substance . . . is never required. It solves no theoretical difficulty. Like a corpse that has been embalmed for ages, it crumbles to dust at the slightest touch” (*ibid.*, p. 360).

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 357, 358. Cf. G. Dawes Hicks, “Immediate Experience,” *Aristotelian Society* (Suppl.), IX (1929), 192.

⁵ *Problems of the Self*, p. 359.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 360. The fact that the body is not part of the mind, but only an object to acts of reference, is what makes it possible, according to Laird, for the mind to survive the death of the body—possible, that is, if the body is not necessary for the existence of the mind (*ibid.*, p. 367). In this connection Laird himself opposes the emergence of mind from body (*Our Minds and Their Bodies*, p. 119).

The objection that the observation of consciousness transforms it into an object may be dismissed very briefly. . . . The subject "as known" or "as an object" is just the subject itself [p. 171].

Without implying "the absurdity of an act of attention attending to itself," it is held that "another act" may observe the act in question, and that there is no reason why the act of the subject so observed may not be a part of the "real self" or subject and not merely a part of the "phenomenal self" (p. 172).

39. LAIRD, BROAD, AND THE EXISTENCE OF THE ACT

Laird thus insists that the experiencing of content must not be confused with the content which is experienced, and that the act of awareness (the experiencing) can itself be experienced (be an object of awareness). These two points may be discussed in order.

The warning against confusing doubting, believing, perceiving, and knowing with what is doubted, believed, perceived, or known may be a necessary warning to some of Mr. Laird's fellow-realists, but the avoidance of such a confusion hardly bears on the point of issue. The question concerns the nature and status of such processes. These processes of doubting, believing, and the like, rightly distinguished from their objects, are empirically found within a whole which includes more than the processes themselves, and there seems to be no more reason to say that the differences between such processes are "differences in consciousness" than to say that the differences between contents, or between contents and these processes, are differences in consciousness. On the analysis of James and Dewey, these processes do not belong to a different order of being from their objects.¹

¹ In *Our Minds and Their Bodies*, Laird conceives of mind and body as distinct but interacting orders. He specifically rejects a relational approach to mind.

The acts of perceiving, knowing, and believing are distinguishable from the object perceived, known, or believed, but that they are other than complex interactions of events of the same order as the object is not so clear. It is certainly possible to argue that such processes involve events in a symbolic relation, used by a biologically active organism, rather than a discriminable psychic element or "act" or state to which non-psychic events are given.¹ It may be that in seeing a color, instead of there being an act of awareness for which the color is given, the awareness is a property of an organized whole which includes the color and the organism. Such a whole need not itself be an object of awareness, and indeed there is reason to doubt whether an object of awareness is not simply an aspect of such a whole in a specific relation (not here specified) to the responding organism. Even when the object of awareness is such a complex as "the experiencing of an object," it might be argued that as given this content has now become part of a more complex whole (involving an additional response) within which the former experiencing and experienced are compresent discriminable factors.

In some such way it would be possible to admit (as must be admitted) that the fact of awareness or givenness can be both known and observed, without holding either that an act of awareness is aware of itself or that an act of awareness is a discriminable "psychic" existent to which non-psychic objects are given.

The foregoing statements do not in themselves furnish a theory of awareness or givenness,² but they may serve to

¹ This is really the point at issue. These pages attempt to carry on James's polemic against consciousness as a discriminable stuff to which things are given. They do not deny that perceiving is done by a subject and not by the object. The question is as to the nature of this subject.

² Dewey's views, furnishing an expansion of these suggestions, are developed in chap. vi. A distinction will there be made between givenness or awareness, and consciousness.

indicate that an admission of the difference between experiencing and the experienced, and an admission that experiencing may itself be known, does not necessarily furnish any evidence for the existence of a distinct order of reality, "psychic" in nature, composed of acts of awareness to which contents are given.

This question may be further considered with reference to C. D. Broad's defense of the doctrine of act. Broad's own view of mind is vague.¹ He opposes new realism both in perception and in memory, and unlike most new realists holds that mind is an emergent from material substance, so that a consideration of his general view would not be in place here. Nevertheless, an "experience" is defined as "a mental event which is owned by some mind,"² noises and toothaches are not regarded as states of mind or even as existentially mind dependent,³ and mind apparently consists of acts of apprehension rather than of the content apprehended.⁴

The question, as Broad discusses it, is whether we have introspective knowledge of the sensing of a noise or the feeling of a toothache, in addition to inspective knowledge of the noise or toothache itself. He feels that we do have such introspective knowledge of mental events or acts, otherwise we could not distinguish the object from the apprehension of it.⁵ Against those who claim that such introspective knowledge of acts is illusory he raises two points: (1) If there are both acts and contents "we ought not to expect the relating relation, which makes this a complex of such and such a structure, to be presented to us in the same way as the substantival constituents."⁶

¹ He admits he does "not know how to define a 'mind'" (*The Mind and Its Place in Nature*, p. 390).

² *Ibid.*, p. 376.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 227.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 290, 304.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 310, 311.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 308.

Thus in the case of three dots on a line, we know that *b* is between *a* and *c*, but we do not see the relation in the way we do the dots. Similarly the complex of terms inspected “*is* the objective mental situation of sensing the noise or feeling the toothache; and we have direct non-inferential knowledge of its relating relation, as we have of the relating relation of ‘between’ when a pattern of three dots in a line is presented to our inspection.”¹ As regards this analysis, it must be admitted that the relation itself is not a term—what is given is a whole in which the dots may be considered singly. The relation is not an element in the whole, but a character of the whole itself, that is, the character of the whole such that *b* is between *a* and *c*. Analogously, the act of awareness is not one component of the whole but a characteristic of certain wholes. Hence this analysis supports, rather than opposes, the suggested organizational view of awareness, and lends no support to the view that the act of awareness is a discriminable component of every act of experience to which the object is given.

(2) Supposing that only the toothache or noise can be inspected, Broad argues that we could not conclude “that the situation *does not* contain anything but the noise or the toothache, or . . . that I cannot *know* directly and non-inferentially that it contains more than this,”² for if one constituent of the situation can be only felt or sensed and not inspected, then, since this constituent “is sensed or felt by us, though it cannot be selected or inspected by us, we might quite well know with complete certainty that what we are inspecting is not the whole of the situation.”³ Neglecting difficulties, and granting this argument, the constituent in question may, *but also may not*, be a mental act of awareness; it might be other felt or given contents of the same order of events as what is inspected.

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 309.² *Ibid.*, p. 310.³ *Ibid.*

Accordingly, there is nothing in Broad's analysis which negates the possibility of an analysis of the act of awareness in terms of the characteristics of certain organized wholes, or which requires any qualification to the conclusion that Alexander and Laird have failed to make plausible the conception of an act of awareness as a unique and discriminable element *within* a whole or *to which* content is given. The attempt to find the nature of mind in such acts or systems of acts cannot be judged as successful. The turn given to new realism by James appears to have greater promise than that given by Brentano and by G. E. Moore. That there are acts of awareness and, in some sense, a knowledge of awareness cannot be denied, but the explanation of such phenomena can take other directions than that followed by the English new realists. "Act of awareness" still remains a denotative term whose exact referent is unclear; that it denotes a psychical element to which content is given is doubtful. Such acts, so interpreted,¹ are not a promising foundation upon which to erect the house of mind.

40. ENGLISH NEW REALISM AND THE PROBLEMS OF AWARENESS, KNOWLEDGE, AND ERROR

Since, however, the question of awareness is a complex one, it may be well before discussing it further to notice the result for new realism if the existence of acts of awareness such as Moore, Alexander, and Laird defend is admitted. The adequacy of new realism as a theory of mind, it is believed, is not greatly strengthened. While the resulting theory seems richer and less artificially simplified by the insistence upon awareness or givenness, the diffi-

¹ Functionally interpreted, such intentional acts may be regarded as the backbone of the pragmatic theory of mind. But such an interpretation makes no reference to a continuum of intrinsically mental events.

culties in regard to knowledge, error, the complex mental processes, and the active aspect of mind do not become less acute by admitting the existence within an intentional process of an element of bare awareness.

For Alexander, knowledge is the compresence of content and act of awareness: "Whenever a mental process exists in compresence with some existent of a lower order,¹ it is aware of that existent which is its object."² "To know anything is to be along with it in Space-Time."³ Somewhat similarly Laird regards memory of the past as "the mind's awareness of past things themselves" (p. 56).⁴ Quite aside from the question as to whether knowledge is ever identical with bare confrontation, the ability of a present act of awareness to be compresent with, or to inspect, an object that no longer exists is hardly more understandable than the capacity for a specific response to be instigated by a stimulus which no longer exists.

The explanation as to the possibility of error is as unsatisfactory as before. For Laird the element of awareness would appear to have nothing to do with the matter. He introduces the typical (but disastrous) qualification of many new realists in maintaining that perception is not always "a faithful witness," that "that which confronts the mind may or may not be as it seems" (p. 41). He quite frankly admits the ultimate impossibility of explaining error (p. 103), as indeed he had admitted in regard to memory as well (p. 59). Alexander's explanation involves the capacity of mind to dislocate and distort the content of

¹ A qualification which Laird would not make.

² *Op. cit.*, II, 81, 82.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 87.

⁴ In comment Laird adds: "My point is that if you cannot inspect anything except what is present, you cannot inspect (and therefore cannot be acquainted with) anything timeless or anything past; and this seems absurd. I regard the literal temporal presence of the object known as a mere superstition for which there is nothing to be said as soon as the point is raised."

the world, but such capacities, since they cannot be attributed to awareness as such, involve a further substantive extension of his theory.

Although mind cannot "look on, as it were, from the outside and contemplate its own passing states," Alexander regards it as necessary to postulate a mind whose "connection with mental acts must be as intimate as the connection of any substance with its functions."¹ Accordingly, "every act of mind is . . . a fragment out of a larger though finite mass."² This mind, which cannot be directly contemplated at the human level, would become an object of contemplation for a superhuman mind, that is, would be seen as an object among objects, not as a com-presence of an enjoyed mind and a contemplated non-mental object.³ So contemplated, mind would be seen as the highest of the finite emergents, an emergent from life. As such an emergent, mind is then located in the body, and, more specifically, in the "brain or some part of it."⁴ "That which as experienced from the inside or enjoyed is a conscious process, is as experienced from the outside or contemplated a neural one."⁵ Not all neural processes have mental aspects (and this prevents the position from becoming a generalized psychoneural double-aspect view), but when they do "the mental process and its neural process are one and the same existence, not two existences."⁶ As neural, mind may enter into causal relations with other neural processes;⁷ as neural structure, mind reflects the unity or lack of unity of this structure.⁸

Difficulties arise in reconciling the view of mind as enjoyed act, with the view of mind as neural process. Even

¹ *Op. cit.*, I, 17.

² *Ibid.*, p. 23.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 101.

⁵ *Ibid.*, II, 5.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

if it is not impossible to conceive of mental acts compresent with and knowing objects that are past and future as well as present, it is difficult to see how a neural process knows a table by being alongside of it, or how a neural process in the present can be compresent with the death of Aristotle in 322 B.C. A further complication appears in connection with the problem of error. If mind is simply an awareness of objects that are independent of mind, simply "bare givenness," how is error possible? Wishing to avoid an appeal to the realm of subsistence, Alexander here shifts to the neural aspect of his theory. Even though mind as neural complex only "selects" its content from the world, it has "interests" and can "distort" and "dislocate" this content. Most mathematical objects are "ideal selections,"¹ but mind can also build such things as a four-dimensional space which is "rather a work of art than a discovery."² It may even "falsify by the introduction of objects which do not belong to the thing."³ In illusions "the mind squints at things and one thing is seen with the characters of something else. . . ."⁴ "Illusions are the real world seen awry or squintingly," and such dislocation is "the mind's own work."⁵ Truth, on the other hand, must be stated in terms of coherence and not in terms of correspondence; truth requires that reality "admit" the proposition,⁶ but whether it does or does not do so is regarded as involving an appeal to "the collective mind."⁷ In the case of error, at least, mind as neural process seems to produce the illusion which mind as act simply apprehends. It then becomes difficult to see how in the last analysis the act of awareness and the neural process are

¹ *Ibid.*, I, 151.

² *Ibid.*, p. 163.

³ *Ibid.*, II, 93.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 216.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 216.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 252.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 239-41, 258.

identical. The relation between these two aspects of Alexander's treatment of mind is a puzzling problem.¹

It must be admitted that a nervous system capable of such acts of apprehension and dislocation, and capable of the construction of four-dimensional spaces, is a much more remarkable neural process than any that is known to science. The conviction develops that Alexander, in endeavoring to return the contents of experience to nature while still taking account of error and illusion, has not only utilized a dubious distinction between mental act and apprehended content, but has made a scapegoat out of the nervous system. Alexander is no exception to the claim that the central weakness of new realism lies in its theory of mind. Fortunately there are alternatives available which do not find it necessary to invoke either diaphanous mental acts or squinting nervous systems.

41. THE HIGHER MENTAL PROCESSES

Nor does the introduction of an awareness factor open any doors into the dark passages of the higher mental processes. Laird approaches such processes by a consideration of meaning rather than by an application of the doctrine of awareness. He introduces in the conception of "sign-facts" a type of analysis encountered in the theory of symbolism. Themselves facts, the sense-data are apprehended as signs,² that is, as meaning something beyond themselves: "The meaning has been acquired, to be sure, but we perceive it when it is acquired. I do not mean, of course, that we perceive what is *meant* precisely in the way

¹ In an article, "The Dual Rôle of Mind in the Philosophy of S. Alexander," Mary W. Calkins has argued that these two aspects of the theory are incompatible (*Mind*, N.S., XXXII [1923], 197-210).

² "A sign is something which is capable of doing duty for the thing it signifies. . . . Nothing can become a sign unless it has been experienced along with some other thing" (p. 34).

in which we perceive meaning. A sign is never what it signifies. I mean that we perceive *significance*; and, indeed, that we always perceive *sign-facts*, not sense-data devoid of meaning" (p. 24).

Rejecting sensory atomism on the ground that it neglects meaning, which is "directly perceptible just like colour and sound" (p. 27), Laird is able to deal with processes which a realism of Holt's type simply passes over. Nevertheless, meaning is not incorporated into Laird's theory of mind as it is in Russell's. For Laird "meaning or significance is something thought of, not part of the mental process of thinking. Meaning may need a mind but it is not mental. And the opposite view is untenable" (p. 35).¹ Hence whatever the merits of Laird's conception of "sign-facts,"² the results are not to be attributed to the doctrine of mind, since sign-facts are simply one class of objects among the objects of awareness. With sign-facts removed from the process of thinking, some other explanation must be found for the latter, and it is certainly doubtful whether any complexity of acts of awareness, such as is involved in Laird's theory of mind, can furnish an explanation of the hypothetical, deductive, and inferential character of the complex thought processes.

Nor does the British doctrine of the act of awareness account for the insurgent and constructive activity that is usually regarded as the high peak of mental processes. Laird again will be considered, since he has particularly

¹ This last statement is certainly arbitrary. If the "act" theory remains dubious and unconvincing, where is it more natural to look for mental phenomena than in the functional relation of events which constitutes the symbolic process? That meaningful events are mental events will, at least, be the proposal defended in these pages. Intentional references are regarded as symbolic references.

² On these grounds Laird is able to admit the importance of the symbolic or representative type of knowledge, while still claiming that it is not the whole of knowledge or the basic type of knowledge (p. 209).

endeavored to meet the usual objections to new realism. Images, "the stuff of fancy," are given to the mind like all other content (p. 64), Laird suggesting that they are "really physical facts, partly identical with perceived or remembered things, and differing from these latter precisely in the respects in which their image-meaning claims to be different" (p. 69). Nor are values dependent on mind, since value, whether ethical or aesthetical, belongs to action and to things "in the same sense as redness belongs to a cherry" (p. 144). Neither in the domain of fancy nor in the sphere of value does mind seem to play any rôle beyond that of being a glassy eye. But in the development of his view, mind is given a rôle which completely goes beyond the doctrine of mind as act of awareness, even when this includes acts of feeling and endeavor as well as cognition. Concerning the importance of the hypothesis in reflection, Laird writes that such considerations "prove at the best that the mind can construct as well as know, that it may know its own constructions, and that its knowledge of these constructions is often more serviceable for action and for speculation than direct perception of the phenomena," a view which "does not contradict realism; for realism does not imply that the mind cannot construct or that its constructions cannot be known" (pp. 185, 186).

Such an emphasis on the ability of the mind to construct, the admission that the mind can combine contents (p. 81), the view that art is a creative "product of the spirit" (p. 208), while representing noteworthy attempts to remedy the omissions and inadequacies of the early new realism, obviously involve a doctrine of mind as more than intentional act. Good intentions need not be good cobblestones. Nor do they make comprehensible the ability of a mind which is simply a unity of acts of feeling, endeavor, and cognition to construct contents of which it is then

aware. When Finding has pushed Construction out of the front door, a readmission through the back door is not to be so easily allowed. The more thoroughly Alexander and Laird avoid the difficulties of the purely relational approach to mind, the more clearly do their own views move in the direction of a substantive theory of mind.¹ Certainly awareness alone (whether a fact or a dubious theory) does not account for the fact of "imaginativeness and constructiveness in all important thinking."

The conclusion seems to be that the admission of an intrinsically "mental" act of awareness different in kind from the object of awareness does not appreciably strengthen the case for new realism. There is still not "enough mind"—and both Alexander and Laird supply more by advocating a substantive conception of mind: a double-aspect theory in the case of Alexander, and a frank philosophical dualism (with mind as an immaterial substantive) in the case of Laird. But with such additions, the movement has gone a long way from its earlier forms, and new realism as a theory of mind merges with and is supplemented by other currents of philosophical thought.²

42. MEINONG'S "GEGENSTANDSTHEORIE"

In addition to questioning the fruitfulness of the conception for a theory of mind, the preceding discussion of British new realism raised a doubt as to the existence within an intentional process of a pure act of conscious-

¹ It is not suggested that Laird and Alexander attempted to improve a relational new realism, and were pushed in the direction of a substantive view of mind; Laird remarks that they "began" with substantive views. The present interest is in the logical, not historical, relation of the two wings of new realism.

² G. F. Stout's animism is another instance of this transformation. Regarding mind as essentially the act of experiencing, he is led in *Mind and Matter* to a view of mind as an immaterial substance, which, in the case of God, is creative of matter. A criticism of the transformation is made in a review of the book, *Philosophical Review*, July, 1932.

ness to which objects are given. It will be well to examine this conclusion in the light of German intentionalism, particularly since further distinctions are there made which have not so far been considered. And since the fact of givenness does require that something is given to something, and as mind is certainly inseparable from intentional reference, an eye should be kept open for alternative interpretations of the intentional process which avoid putting an act of awareness at what C. L. Morgan, in *Mind at the Crossways*, calls the "feathered end of the arrow of reference."

A. Meinong and Edmund Husserl developed independently from Brentano. Both of them present a three-term analysis of intentional reference into act, content, and object,¹ distinguishing between content and object in a way which Brentano (nor the English group in general) did not do. The content (*Inhalt*) is in both cases regarded as that part of the experiencing side of the intentional process in virtue of which the object (*Gegenstand*) is intended. Thus in perceiving a tree, or even in thinking of one, there is in addition to the act as such the sensory or imaginal contents which are not themselves intended or referred to but rather the vehicles which carry the reference. Beyond this general agreement the roads diverge, Meinong drawing realistic and Husserl idealistic conclusions from the analysis.

According to Meinong's *Gegenstandstheorie*,² there are orders of simple and complex psychical experiences correlated with and directed upon various orders of *Gegen-*

¹ Husserl dislikes these "catchwords," feeling that their recital hinders the detailed analysis needed in each case.

² References are to Meinong's outline of his views in Vol. I of *Die deutsche Philosophie der Gegenwart in Selbstdarstellungen*, ed. Raymund Schmidt. Cf. B. Russell's series of articles "Meinong's Theory of Complexes and Assumptions," *Mind*, Vol. XIII (1904).

stände, or objects in the widest sense of the term. These objects need not exist; they may only subsist (as do ideal objects and propositions) or even just have bare "objectivity." All such objects are logically prior to the acts by which they are presented, and can be neither created nor modified by such acts. A realist as regards the existence of objects in the narrower sense, Meinong is an objectivist in regard to all nonexisting *Gegenstände*.¹

Corresponding to the four main classes of objects (*Objekte*, *Objektive*, *Dignitative*, and *Desiderative*) are the four classes of elementary experiences—presentations, thoughts, feelings, and desires—all of which are intentional, directed upon objects. The two former classes are intellectual experiences, the two latter are emotional. As noted above, *Gegenstände* are apprehended by contents (the tree by the given sensory contents), and it is significant that these are regarded as part of the experience side, as psychological data, and therefore as "subjective." The content, in brief, is that part of an experience (*Erlebnisstück*) responsible for the fact that a certain object and no other is intended. While closely correlated with the object, it must not be confused with it. The act (*Akt*), on the other hand, is that part of the intentional experience which can remain constant while the object and content vary, or can vary, while they remain constant (p. 21). Thus certain sensory items, correlated with the intended tree, may remain constant while various acts of liking, feeling, and thinking take place, all directed upon the tree. Conversely, a single type

¹ As the name of Russell recalls, this type of realism has greatly influenced logical theory. Meinong himself regards his views as basic to symbolic logic. The same is true of Husserl. Concerning Meinong and Husserl, T. K. Oesterreich writes: "Sie eröffnen einen Einblick in eine neue Sphäre, die jenseits von Raum und Zeit steht und über der die Weihe der Ewigkeit liegt: das rein Logische" (in a co-operative volume, *Systematische Philosophie* [3d ed.], p. 376). The realm of subsistence is for both men considered the domain of a priori necessary knowledge.

of act (such as perceiving) may be directed through many contents to their correlated objects.

The act is clearly conceived by Meinong as a psychological existent, distinct from the object and content even if not found without them. Such "inner" "psychical" acts form the existential material of the science of psychology. Unlike "outer" perception, which always requires an experiential content other than the act proper, in "inner" perception the experience presents itself, as it were, acting as its own pseudo-content (p. 22).

Nothing in Meinong's doctrine of the act seems to negate the previously suggested conclusions. There is no question but that the description in its fulness is a high contribution to the logical analysis and classification of given phenomena. Acts in the sense of perceiving, remembering, feeling, wishing, and desiring do, of course, occur, and are subjective, that is, of the subject. When psychical simply means "of the psyche," without any prejudice as to the nature of the self, they may even be called psychical. And such acts are distinguishable from their objects and are not reducible to contents. But this seems to be true precisely because such acts are *processes* involving natural events rather than existents in their own right. They seem literally to be functional (symbolic) processes involving activities and attitudes of an organism, activities and attitudes either directed by existent things or induced by symbols of things.¹ Nowhere is to found a conscious stuff to which

¹ The interpretation of act as activity is heresy to the schools of Meinong and Husserl; it smacks of "psychologism." Thus Meinong writes, "Akt ist nicht Aktivität" (p. 21), and Husserl more strongly, "Der Gedanke der Betätigung muss schlechterdings ausgeschlossen bleiben" (*Logische Untersuchungen*, II, 379). There is one sense in which this protest seems legitimate. If, as is here maintained, the intentional process is the symbolic process, it is true that this process in which one thing means another is not reducible to physiological behavior. In this sense the experience of meaning A by B is not "activity." But it is also not the full act, which certainly involves actual behavior.

objects are given, but rather a rich articulated field of the given, within which may be discriminated things, organisms directed upon and intending objects, events functioning symbolically, and the like.¹ Nothing, in short, which negates James's conclusion that consciousness as stuff is not to be found, consciousness in the concrete being composed of the same stuffs as things are composed of, functionally born and bred in the world of natural objects and events.

A follower of Meinong might reply that acts and contents are existentially composed of the same events, namely, "psychical" events. But to distinguish between content and object, to admit, with Laird, that what we perceive are "sign-facts," given events that point beyond themselves, or with Dewey, that the objects we perceive are "events with meaning," it is not necessary to hold that the given event is itself psychical and not a character of the object being perceived.² It is true that normally a tree is seen, and not a gray patch (the content), but the gray patch may be regarded as part of the tree, an event in the determinate whole which is the tree; it is certainly not a psychical experience just because it functions to a responding organism as a sign of the whole of which it is a part.³ To hold that the given is as such psychical or

¹ "An act of experiencing is one object, among others, which may be discriminated out of the original experience. When so discriminated, it has exactly the same existential status as any other discriminated object; seeing and thing seen stand on the same level of existentiality" (Dewey, *Essays in Experimental Logic*, pp. 136, 137 n.). For the nature of givenness (which does not presuppose "consciousness") see chap. vi of the present volume.

² It may be a character of the object only in the presence of the responding organism. It is not implied that all that is given is a character of objects other than the subject.

³ Meinong's position is rendered ambiguous by regarding the content as always on the side of the act. He regards knowledge as a selection from objective entities, and yet he speaks of the subjectivity of the primary and secondary qualities, and contrasts inner and outer perception, the latter, unlike the former,

mental or experience is perhaps to prepare the way for a critical realism (if idealism can be avoided), but to do so involves forfeiting not only what might be called the radical interpretation of Brentano's famous statement (the view that mentality is nothing beyond intentional functioning), but also to lose the entire new realistic significance of Brentano's own view that mind is always and continually confronted by realities other than itself.

43. MIND IN HUSSERL'S "PHÄNOMENOLOGIE"

It was noted that Husserl finds idealism in intentionalism, and, it may be added, an unassailable idealism. The reasons for the appearance of this full-grown idealistic camel in what was regarded as the realistic camp is instructive. Since this result is made possible by a gradual expansion of the place of the act, finally conceived as an intrinsically psychical somewhat, owned by a pure Ego, conferring meaning on a lower level of psychical content, and thereby "constituting" reality, Husserl's account serves to underline, as it were, the interpretation of intentional act which these pages have called in question.¹

being only quasi-perception, serving only as a presumptive basis for the existence of external things and for a knowledge of certain relations between their characters (pp. 43, 25). His qualification, "auch die 'Subjektivität' etwa der Sinnesqualitäten besagt nur, dass diese Auswahl durch die Beschaffenheit des erfassenden Subjektes und nicht durch die der zu erkennenden Wirklichkeit bestimmt ist" (p. 43), does not explain why if the effect of the subject is merely selective outer perception is only *Halbwahrnehmung*, nor does it fit in with the doctrine that outer perception lacks direct evidence (pp. 26, 27). In the alternative applied in the criticism of the text there is no difference in certainty between knowledge of the subject and of the object. All that is given is indubitable as given, but beyond this knowledge is of the relational structure in which the given is imbedded, and as functioning in such intentional processes as sign-facts, all given contents, whether characters of the self or other objects, share equally in the "transcendence" of knowledge. It is an illusion that knowledge of things is any more transcendent and more dubious than the knowledge of the self, an illusion shared by Meinong and furnishing the very basis for Husserl's idealism.

¹ It is true that Husserl insists that his theory is of essences and not of existences, and that he is not interested in the question of the existence of the experi-

In Husserl's hands, the intentional process appears to be very complex. The "act, content, and object" description is further divided and refined. Experience, in the widest sense of the term, is said to have a dual character, a subjective and objective aspect intentionally related, called by Husserl the *noesis* and the *noema*, akin to the relation between experiencing and experienced, consciousness and the object of consciousness. The distinction is not, however, that of the psychical and the physical, as it was for Brentano, but simply that of the psychical as opposed to the meaning or intending an object (the intentional or immanent object), since the object proper, conceived naturalistically, is not itself part of the experience. What Brentano and the realists generally mistakingly take for the literal presence of the object is regarded by Husserl as the content of the act (the hyletic datum), and included within the subjective or experiencing side of the given. It comes as no surprise that the object proper is finally done away with as a co-ordinate aspect of experience, and is replaced by the object-as-meant, the intentional or immanent object constituted by the act on the basis of the hyletic data.

In a wide use of the term "act" includes the content as well as what we may call the "act proper" (*Aktcharakter*); while in the narrow use of the term, act as the act proper is distinguished from the content. That the act proper is

ences (*Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology*, trans. W. R. Boyce Gibson, pp. 225, 119, 120; unless otherwise noted, all page reference to Husserl will be to this volume). Nevertheless, he expressly notes the "thoroughgoing parallelism between a (properly elaborated) phenomenological psychology and a transcendental phenomenology" (p. 15), the same content being considered from two different points of view: "to each eidetic or empirical determination on the one side there must correspond a parallel feature on the other." He himself at times uses the terms "act" and "contents" in an explicitly psychological sense (p. 254). Husserl often gives the impression of gathering his honey from "natural" experience, and then, when this same standpoint is used to question his results, of pointing out that he is only considering essences and not existences.

regarded as a psychical existent seems certain. While it is not so affirmed, it is at least not denied that it can stand apart without sensory contents (p. 247). The act proper, like the content or hyletic datum, is regarded as a "real" part of experience, in contrast to the *noema* or intentional object (pp. 282 ff.). It is admitted that the existence of the act proper must be directly intuited if it is to be justified at all, and in the case of the difference between a bare sound and the same sound as a meaningful name, it is so intuited.¹ Neither the act proper nor the sensory content is given as object, although both are given,² and may be made the objects of other acts of reflection (p. 123). The act proper is consistently regarded as conferring meaning on the content (p. 247).³ The intentional act is regarded as irreducibly psychical. Husserl sharply opposes the theory that the physical and the psychical are simply relational differences, depending upon a choice of point of view. Such a position he regards as confusing the appearing object with the experience in which or to which the object appears.⁴ There is then little doubt that the act proper must be considered as an intrinsically psychical⁵ existent, and if so, the queries and objections previously raised to such a conception become pertinent.

Husserl's analysis does not stop here. His early attempt in the *Logische Untersuchungen* to dispense with the pure Ego is now rejected.⁶ In the *Ideen* all experiences are regarded as belonging to the pure Ego which lives in them, and which "glances" through them to the object. This Ego

¹ *Logische Untersuchungen* (2d ed.), II, 508.

² *Ibid.*, p. 385.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 384. Here the *Aktcharakter* is spoken of.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 349.

⁵ Husserl substitutes the term "noetic" for the terms "psychical," "consciousness," "awareness" (pp. 249, 250).

⁶ The Ego has had a variable fate in intentionalism. It is affirmed by Lipps, for instance, as vigorously as it is denied a place by Stumpf.

is "self-identical." While in some sense and in some degree a phenomenological datum,¹ it is not, as is the act proper, a real part or phase of experience (pp. 172, 173). These "glances," these "sheer acts of the Ego," may themselves become an object for the Ego, who is able to direct its glance upon its own experiences (pp. 216, 221). Such experiences are subjective states of the soul (pp. 17, 18, 250). Here appears the substantive (or even substance factor) in intentionalism already noticed in connection with Laird and Alexander. Meinong's act may perhaps be regarded as "the ghost of the soul," but Husserl's act is the possession of a very much alive and full-blooded soul.²

Given pure acts and a pure Ego, the stage is set for idealism. It has already been noticed that sensory content (the hyletic datum) is regarded by Husserl (and by Meinong) as part of the subjective pole of experience. What then remains as the object pole? For Husserl nothing "real" can so remain. The object side reduces to the immanent or intentional object, to the *noema*, which comes perilously close to, if not identical with, the object-as-meant, and this is frankly stated as belonging inseparably to "the current experience itself as its objectively intended [correlate] or 'objective meaning' " (p. 25). The meant object as conceived naturalistically is not itself existentially present: "A thing cannot be given as really immanent . . . in any possible consciousness" (p. 133). As so far stated, the position might still be interpreted realistically.³

¹ The pure Ego is not considered as canceled by the transcendental reduction. Intentionality of necessity involves the pure Ego. The pure Ego is further distinguished from "the pure experience as act" which remains after the reduction. Obliging enough, the Ego is granted a "transcendence in immanence" denied to things (p. 173).

² The doctrine of the self-identical Ego and the whole conception of essence suggests a substratum-attribute mode of thought.

³ C. L. Morgan's position in *Mind at the Crossways* may serve as an English parallel. Morgan distinguishes objective reference from subjective awareness

There is certainly a realistic flavor to many of Husserl's statements. It is said that the thing is transcendent to the perception in "all its parts, aspects, and phases" (p. 130), that is, while the perspective content which varies with the object (p. 132) is psychical, since it is part of experience, the object proper lies outside of experience. Thus the perception of things is regarded in the *Logische Untersuchungen* as being necessarily inadequate since an intention can be adequately fulfilled only when the intended object can itself be intuited, and while this can be done in the case of psychical events, it cannot be done in the case of physical objects. If there are no objects in the realist's sense, a reader might well wonder if the tale told by these statements is not nonsense.

Nevertheless, the strain in Husserl's exposition which seems to regard act proper and object proper as in every way correlative is dominated by an idealistic note in which the only object introduced is the object constituted by the act. After the transcendental reduction, through which the naturalistic standpoint is "bracketed," there is supposed to remain over a domain of pure or transcendental consciousness (pp. 113, 114). This is stated to be "*a self-contained system of Being*" (p. 153) which "conceals in itself all transcendences, 'constituting' them within itself" (p. 155).¹ The term "object" becomes "a title for essential

(p. 47), the two together making up mind. A subjective awareness is at the head of each arrow of reference. In his case, however, the retention of subjective awareness leads to a double-aspect theory, so that his view is realistic in spite of the fact that like Husserl he holds that "the object of reference is, so to speak, a synthesis of arrowheads" (p. 67). That is, in addition to the intentional object he acknowledges "the existence of a physical world," adding, "if you demand of me proof of its existence independently of me I can give you none" (p. 237). According to Morgan, this world of physical things "is not revealed or disclosed under direct apprehension" (p. 204); both the arrowheads and the feathered ends of the arrow of reference are mental, and "both are in someone's mind" (p. 84).

¹ It is not clear whether God is regarded as an exception.

connexions of consciousness" (p. 402). It is now stated that "that which 'exhibits' itself in its variety and 'varies perspectively' has its place in the *noema*" (p. 284.)¹ We are told that an object can never be out of relation "*to consciousness and its Ego*" (p. 148), that even when things are not perceived they are "*there for the Ego even then,*" since from the actual perceptions there leads up to the thing a series of possible perceptions (p. 142).² On the idealistic emphasis, less is heard of truth as the fulfilment of an intention, and more of self-evidence. In the final analysis the real is taken to be the rational: truly to be is "to be rationally posited" (p. 395). The existent world is only the "intentional meaning-product of transcendental subjectivity" (p. 21).

44. RADICAL EMPIRICISM AND HUSSERL'S IDEALISM

One who stressed "phenomenology" in the sense of James's radical empiricism, thereby making the field of the given the subject matter for philosophical inquiry, would certainly not need to grant that Husserl's reduction (in which the naturalistic view of one's self as living in a world of things is transcended) leaves a world of pure consciousness. What it does leave is simply a field of the given considered as material for generalized description rather than as cues to forward-looking action. It is the attitude of an intellectually alert but solitary spectator who, neglecting his reliance on the testimony of others and the evidence of his cameras, looks on at the passing show and makes gen-

¹ It is true that the object-as-meant may be an object that exhibits itself perspectively, but even here a realist would insist that the object-as-meant must not be confused with the meant object.

² Corresponding to the realistic and idealistic strains, nature at times seems to be regarded simply as the correlate of consciousness, and at times as a correlate produced by consciousness itself.

eral statements concerning what is seen (and calls this result the intuition of essences). It is the attitude of one who does not choose to live forward by the use of the given, but who prefers the security of the given, one who considers the fact that he believes and remembers, who notes that he intends or perceives a certain object on the basis of given content, rather than simply believing and remembering and perceiving, and acting on their basis. The attitude is that of an introvert who lives at a secondary level of action (Husserl speaks of "such acts of the second level"), reacting to his own implicit tendencies to action. It has been well remarked that Husserl is a philosophical Proust. It is theoretically true that certainty can be obtained in this way, since the judgment never intends more than is immediately present—and Husserl has clearly set out upon the quest for certainty.¹ There is intended no criticism of this attitude: phenomenology in both the stricter and the looser senses of the term must remain at least the core of philosophical inquiry. But it is an illusion to suppose that idealism results in this way. The world which remains after the transcendental reduction is not another kind of world which can be opposed to the naturalist's world, since a limitation of attention to what can be described furnishes no basis to set up such an opposition. It is action and the speculative demands of action that are bracketed, not the world.

¹ Husserl certainly does not keep to the given. The doctrine of the self-identity of the Ego, together with the idealistic conclusion, and the implied theology and theory of intersubjectivity are hardly found in the given. A descriptive account of the given would seem to be of necessity neutral in regard to the status of the non-given. As for the certainty motive, the vigorous opposition to empirical psychologism is in large part due to the belief that psychology can only give contingent results. In the *Logische Untersuchungen*, a psychological basis for logic was condemned on the ground that logic would thereby lose its absoluteness. The host of differences, denials, and disputes concerning the act should make it clear that mere restriction to the given, even in its "essential" aspects, is no magic road to certainty and agreement.

Even if it be granted that an intrinsically mental subject pole which intends objects is always given (is "seen"), this fact would not establish idealism. Husserl writes at times as if the naturalist was forced to deny that things may be ever given, simply because he doubts that they are ever given in their entirety or that they need be given. Granting that "the thing is thing of *the world about me*" (p. 148), it does not follow that this thing is "*mere intentional Being*" (p. 153). It is not at all clear that the given factors upon which the intention is based are always part of the subject pole, or that there is (phenomenologically) any meaning in calling them psychical. It is true that in imagining, for example, certain given, such as words and images, are either seen to be or plausibly regarded as part of the subject pole, while the object pole is simply an imagined object; but it is also true that in perception certain contents which are vehicles for intending the object are regarded as, or "seen" as, parts of the object pole, parts of the object intended.¹ It is only because Husserl insists upon putting all the vehicles of the intentional process on the side of the subject that he makes plausible the view that the object side of experience (the given) is only ideal and not real. The truth about the given is in no significant sense merely truth about the subject or about mental events or about a domain of pure consciousness.² The sub-

¹ Normally, colors, for instance, are "seen" as parts of the object pole. It is only a sophisticated theory which (rightly or wrongly) attributes them to the subjective pole. How can it be seen phenomenologically that colors are subjective? Husserl speaks of "the real experiential unity of hyletic and noetic factors" (p. 285). It is true that in perception the content, as part of an intentional process, may be felt as part of the process, but it is no less felt as part of the object which it helps to intend.

² Many of Husserl's followers have refused to accept the domain of pure consciousness which confers meaning, and have stressed an object phenomenology rather than Husserl's subject phenomenology. See Paul Linke's article in *Philosophy Today*, ed. E. L. Schaub; also the volume *Kant und Husserl*, by Walter Ehrlich.

ject pole is no better known or more certainly known than the object pole, and to know either is to follow out, through activity, the context in which it is imbedded. There is no significant difference between inner perception and outer perception when it comes to stating the nature of the subject or the object.

The only reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the whole preceding discussion of various theories of the act is that beyond pointing out in a general way the existence and significance of the intentional process, the term is without clear meaning and of questionable value. That it denotes a conscious stuff, or a pure Ego, or a meaning-conferring experience is not evident. At the very least, the numerous divergencies of testimony should lead to an abandonment of this use of the term "act."¹

Nor does such a relinquishment of an ambiguous term weaken the importance or hinder the description of the intentional process in terms of the symbol.² Some content appearing in a field of the given focused at an organic center becomes a substitute for and a reminder of something beyond itself. In such an event the content may be said to be a symbol *to* the focal organism *of* the object for which it is a substitute. The meaning-experience is the experience, within the field of the given, of the content's symbolic functioning. The object that is referred to may or may not be given, may or may not exist, may or may not include the vehicle of the symbolic process (the content) as one of its aspects. The object-as-meant is of course always given. "Act" is an ambiguous and unnecessary term which may

¹ Titchener concludes: "There is no psychology of act, there are only psychologies" (*op. cit.*, p. 253).

² Husserl has himself made important contributions to the analysis of the symbol (particularly in the study *Ausdruck und Bedeutung*, Vol. II of the *Logische Untersuchungen*), but believing that meaning is conferred by an act does not equate the mental and the symbolical.

refer to the activities and attitudes of the subject (where this is *not* a pure Ego), or to the experienced reference in the meaning-experience, or perhaps to the whole symbolic process. The "content" is the existent serving as symbol. The "intentional object" is the object-as-meant, and as a relational and functional complex, Husserl is right in denying that this is a second existential object. The object proper (the referent of the symbol) is that for which the symbol is a substitute and to which reference is made.¹ No statement need be added concerning a meaning-conferring awareness or pure consciousness. The fact that the description is not dependent upon the existence of anything intrinsically mental opens the possibility of equating the mental with the entire intentional process, of identifying, in short, the mental with the symbolical. In this way the "truth" of intentionalism is preserved in a functional theory of mind.

45. WHITEHEAD: MIND AS PREHENSION OF ETERNAL OBJECTS

In the account of mind in *Process and Reality*, Whitehead presents in a novel form motives characteristic of new realism, English new realism in particular, upon a philosophical background of emergence and relativity. In this "philosophy of organism" or "organic realism" there is not the shift toward a substance view of mind that is noticeable in some of the efforts to avoid the inadequacies of earlier new realistic formulations. Under the influence of the notion of emergence, the emphasis on process takes precedence over the usual new realistic emphasis on relation, just as this continues to take precedence over the substance-attribute mode of thought. Since Whitehead's own starting-point was new realistic, and since his theory

¹ The object of symbolic reference may be other symbols, or, indeed, the symbolic process itself.

of mind is a peculiar variety of the doctrine of mind as act of awareness, a discussion of his views is advisable at this point, admitting that Whitehead's synthetic results break over any simple classification of theories of mind, combining in a remarkable way insights of idealists, realists, and pragmatists. Indeed, to some thinkers Whitehead's results have appeared as the long-awaited synthesis of contemporary philosophy. In spite of the notes of relativity and emergence, Whitehead does not make mentality an emergent relation between events, so that his attempt to conceive of mind as organic to nature diverges sharply from the functional theory of mind represented by Dewey—a view which is also based upon an emergent and relativistic world-view. The centrality of the issues involved warrants a careful study of Whitehead's position.¹

Whitehead's course of procedure is to give a comprehensive description of human experience (a description unique in the way in which the usual stereotyped and highly abstract classification of the components of experience is transcended), and then to take this description as the key

¹ The volumes which precede *Process and Reality* do not provide any clearly worked-out theory of mind. They do reveal that Whitehead's thought has passed from a new realistic theory of "act" on which nature is closed to mind, to a view in which mind is completely restored to nature.

The position of *The Concept of Nature* implies that an adequate description of nature requires no reference to mind. Here the percipient event is not regarded as mental, but as "that in nature from which the mind perceives. . . . This percipient event is roughly speaking the bodily life of the incarnate mind" (p. 107). Sense awareness is interpreted as "a relation of mind to nature" (p. 67). Whitehead has admitted that his early formulations moved in the direction of withdrawing mind from nature (*Principles of Natural Knowledge* [2d ed.], p. 202, n. 1).

The tendency of the later works is to repudiate the view that mind is separable from nature and that nature can be described without reference to mind. In *Science and the Modern World*, p. 102, Whitehead states that "for Berkeley's *mind*, I substitute a process of prehensive unification," and since every actual entity prehends, it is implied that mentality is a characteristic of all such entities. He also distinguishes the mere prehensive unity in a percipient event from the awareness of that prehensive unity as it is found in sense-aware-

to the nature of reality. The procedure is in temper radically empirical, the results being then given an ontological extension.

Neglecting the refinements of analysis, the description of human experience is as follows. Experience is defined as the "self-enjoyment of being one among many, and of being one arising out of the composition of many."¹ There are initially many data which are "felt" as one by an actual entity, the subject, a process of concrescence in which a multiplicity becomes an organic whole, a new entity in the universe. The data are components of the universe which are grasped or prehended in a subject which is an actual entity. A feeling is thus "the appropriation of some elements in the universe to be components in the real internal constitution of its subject" (p. 353), a process in which the subject appropriates for itself the data (p. 249). Such a feeling or positive prehension involves both the ingression or the objectification of the prehended entity as "a datum for feeling" and "the feeling whereby this datum is absorbed into the subjective satisfaction" (p. 82). This feeling or prehension of data is the subject's experience (pp. 252, 253). The subject is "the entity constituted by the process of feeling and including this process" (p. 136).²

ness (pp. 103, 104). In the *Symbolism* volume Whitehead does not equate mind with the symbolic process, but regards symbolic reference as contributed by the mind, so that mind is something which functions symbolically "when some components of its experience" are symbolic (p. 8). This refusal to equate mind with the symbolic process indicates Whitehead's divergence from a purely functional theory of mind.

While these later works represent an attempt to avoid the earlier bifurcation of mind and nature, they do not present any clear or comprehensive doctrine of mind. In *Process and Reality* Whitehead works out in detail a theory in which mind is "organic" to nature, completing systematically what is confusingly hinted at in his previous works.

¹ *Process and Reality*, p. 220. Unless otherwise noted, page references will be to this volume.

² See also pp. 43, 234, 236, 339, 341.

The way in which the subject prehends the data is called the "subjective form." Emotions, valuations, purposes, aversions, and consciousness are varieties of such subjective forms (p. 35). Thus in the process of prehension the data are prehended by an actual entity which through feeling appropriates the data, the result being an emergent whole in which the subject (the prehending actual entity) becomes a developed subject (a superject), reflecting in its subjective form the objects prehended.¹ Since the data prehended are "selected from the actual world" (p. 356), the account appears new realistic. The emergent whole, inseparable from a subject and yet constitutive of the subject, is itself a new factor in the same actual world, capable of entering into a similar process of concrescence. The doctrine of feeling through which the prehension occurs is suggestive of the English new realists (on p. 65 Whitehead notes the close analogy to Alexander's "enjoyment"), and yet by being placed in a process, feeling is not left hanging in the air as it is by some adherents of the doctrine of mind as act of awareness. Through emergence feeling is integrated with the subject which feels and with the object which is felt or positively prehended.

The doctrine of mind follows from the recognition of the subject, feeling, and subjective form in the organic whole of experience. Experience is bipolar, possessing a mental and a physical pole (pp. 54, 165, 366). All prehensions, however, are not mental. Mentality primarily consists in conceptual prehensions, that is, the prehension of "eternal objects" or "pure potentialities" (pp. 49, 50, 367), where an eternal object is an object that "does not involve a necessary reference to any definite actual entities of the temporal world" (p. 70). Eternal objects are therefore universals. A physical prehension, as the prehension of an ac-

¹ In Bradley's terms, every concrescence is "spiritual."

tual entity instead of a pure potentiality, is not mental. Mentality, then, requires conceptual prehensions, although in its common forms it is "impure," that is, intertwined with physical prehensions (pp. 49). But even a mental prehension need not be conscious. Consciousness requires that there be a proposition¹ as a constituent of the conceptual prehension, and that in the complex prehension there be also an element of mere fact which is felt in contrast to the theory embodied in the proposition (pp. 286, 326). As requiring a combination of conceptual and physical prehensions, consciousness becomes of secondary metaphysical importance (p. 211), appearing as a factor only in some subjective forms. Instead of being the basis of experience, it is only a special and relatively rare experience (p. 83). The same thing may be said of knowledge (pp. 243, 244). Thus the philosophy of organism, as a "critique of feeling," regards mind as one omnipresent aspect of and factor in an emergent process, and consciousness and knowledge as complex and special phases of such a process. With both James and Bradley, Whitehead agrees that such special phases are "growing pains" that have no place as such in the final "satisfaction" which supervenes, and which such phases merely help to bring about.

The foregoing account of human experience is then read off ontologically. The basic components of reality are regarded as actual entities and eternal objects. Every actual entity is a "subject" feeling the universe from which it arises (p. 89). It is "an act of experience arising out of data" (p. 65). Since every actual entity is felt by some actual entity, there is nothing apart from the experience

¹ A proposition is "a hybrid between pure potentialities and actualities," the subject of the proposition consisting of actual entities, the predicate of eternal objects (pp. 282, 283).

of subjects (p. 254). Hence actual entities may be regarded as "drops of experience" (p. 28). While all eternal objects are not prehended by actual entities (except in the case of God), some eternal objects are prehended by each actual entity, even if *sensa* alone are prehended (*sensa* being the lowest grade of eternal object). Mentality, then, is a characteristic of every actual entity, all of which are bipolar (p. 88). Consciousness, as a particular form of mentality, is not ascribable to all actual entities.

46. THE THEORY CONSIDERED IN RELATION TO THE DIFFICULTIES OF NEW REALISM: GIVENNESS

That the difficulties previously considered in connection with new realism are either avoided by Whitehead's formulation or appear in quite another form is clear.

Whitehead cannot be accused of neglecting the fact of givenness. The root meaning of "togetherness" is regarded as togetherness in experience, a view which avoids "the disjunction of the components of subjective experience from the community of the actual world" (pp. 288, 289). It might seem, then, that every entity is given to every other, and there are some statements which can be construed in this way. But this interpretation is not clearly consistent with Whitehead's position. Admitting that "every actual entity requires a totality of 'givenness'" (p. 127), Whitehead is quite aware that givenness requires some principle of limitation and exclusion. In regard to eternal objects, it is clear that the contention is that in reference to any actual entity some such objects are given (p. 69), but not all eternal objects (God is an exception). When sense-data are given for the experience of a subject, their givenness is held to arise "from the functioning of the antecedent physical body of the subject" (p. 97). Is anything given except eternal objects? Whitehead is not

explicit as to whether every feeling or positive prehension involves givenness. Since he speaks of some eternal objects as felt and some eternal objects as given, it is perhaps possible to assume that every feeling or positive prehension is a case of givenness, and vice versa. While "every actual entity is felt by some actual entity," and every entity in the actual world of an entity is felt by that entity, Whitehead can hardly mean that every actual entity is felt by or given for every other actual entity. To mention merely one passage, the doctrine of the "medium" on page 345 is unintelligible on such an assumption.¹ Since all feeling is not of eternal objects, some actual entities and some eternal objects are given to or for every actual entity. These objects and entities are given in the sense of being positively prehended or experienced. To be given means to be a datum felt by a subject and appropriated by a subject.

It would appear, then, that, aside from God, there are some actual entities and some eternal objects not prehended by any particular actual entity.² What is the relation of two actual entities which do notprehend each

¹ "The medium between D and A consists of all those actual entities which lie in the actual world of A and not in the actual world of D." The definition of contemporary events also does not seem compatible with the view that every actual entity is given to every other. Nevertheless, Whitehead specifically writes that "if we allow for degrees of relevance, and for negligible relevance, we must say that every actual entity is present in every other actual entity" (p. 79), and this last clause is identified on the following page with "objectification" and so signifies a positive prehension. I cannot reconcile this with the insistence that givenness requires limitation and exclusion, that "the meaning of 'givenness' is that what *is* 'given' might not have been 'given'; and that what *is not* 'given' *might have been* 'given'" (p. 70). If givenness is ubiquitous, the term loses all meaning. I have accordingly assumed that every actual entity is not given to every other. The contrary assumption is not, in any empirical sense, a theory of givenness at all, even though it may represent Whitehead's own opinion.

² The question as to whether contemporary entities are ever prehended will be discussed in connection with knowledge.

other? Suppose that these two actual entities, A and B, are both prehended by another actual entity, C, and so are "together" in the experience of C, then the very conditions of the example preclude that B is experienced by A as together with it in A's experience, and that A is experienced by B as together with it in B's experience. This example may be regarded as showing that experience reveals, in addition to the togetherness of data with a subject, a togetherness among data where the data may not experience each other. The claim that all experience is of the first type is a claim not demanded by experience. Accordingly, there may be a togetherness of elements in which the elements do not experience the elements they are together with, and it is possible to hold that givenness is an emergent character of a whole of elements under particular circumstances.¹ The problem would then be to specify the particular circumstance under which givenness becomes the characteristic of a system of elements.

The question is whether the difference between givenness and the absence of givenness is properly identified with the presence or absence of positive prehensions among entities. To some this will seem a very wide use of the term "givenness," since every actual entity is thereby allowed a field of givenness. It is a usage which makes it necessary to hold that the beach and neighboring stones are given to a particular stone, and that the sun is given to the planets. While such an ascription is perfectly compatible with Whitehead's theory of prehension, and with the position that there is nothing apart from the experiences

¹ If it be said that in the foregoing example there is still the togetherness with a subject, and that any other kind of togetherness is subordinate to this, the question raised is simply another form of the egocentric predicament. Whitehead admits that "the prevalent notion, that the particular subject of experience can, in the nature of the case, never be eliminated from the experienced fact, is quite untrue" (p. 297).

of subjects, it is not a position which will meet with favor with those who question this universal doctrine of subjectivity. If prehensions are admitted, such persons will perhaps feel that givenness is not a characteristic of all prehensions, and that Whitehead has not specified the conditions under which givenness appears. Whitehead cannot be accused of neglecting givenness. The question is not whether he has place enough for givenness, but whether he does not have too much. To identify givenness and positive prehension is to employ the term in too wide a sense; if this identification is not made, Whitehead has failed to furnish the specific criterion which distinguishes the former term from the latter.

47. PSYCHOPHYSICAL AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL DUALISM

That Whitehead's position involves a psychophysical duality rather than a psychophysical dualism must be granted. Since every entity has a mental pole and a physical pole, is a mind in virtue of its conceptual prehensions, and is physical in virtue of its physical prehensions, mind is a characteristic of every actual entity,¹ and not a name for a separate class of entities. There can be no discarnate mind, or nothing that is physical but not mental. Mentality is part of the activity of prehending which constitutes an actual entity. Nor are the mental and physical aspects "two sides of the same thing" since the mental, to mention only one point, is not divisible in the way in which the physical is divisible by "co-ordinate division" (p. 436). Nor can Whitehead be accused of setting up a dualism within each actual entity, since the two aspects are not separable but are inextricably intertwined. Rather than

¹ Even though in this view mind is given no reality apart from a process of prehension, the ascription of mentality to every actual entity not only shows that on Whitehead's view mentality is not emergent in time, but also sharply differentiates it from a specifically functional view of mind.

being two attributes of a single substance, each actual entity is conceived as a substantive constituted by mental and physical prehensions. Since minds are not one class of entities¹ and physical objects another class, since prehensions are not separate entities but components into which actual entities may be analyzed, that is, components of substantives, and since what is prehended need not be mental, Whitehead may be said to have avoided a metaphysics of substance, and anything which can be legitimately called a psychophysical dualism.

Is the position, however, epistemologically dualistic? The question cannot be answered by a simple yes or no; for the most part Whitehead is, as Lovejoy maintains, an epistemological dualist, but, consistently or not, there is also a strain of thought which recognizes and defends "direct knowledge."

This latter tendency of thought, suggestive of the orthodox new realism, appears in many forms. It is implicit in the frequent statements that the initial data are selected from the actual world, that "already-constituted actual entities" are among the objects prehended (p. 335). One obtains the conviction that it is actual objects which are directly prehended, and at times feels that prehension is the *tour de force* by which subjectivism is overcome. There are passages in the discussion of both causal efficacy and presentational immediacy which strengthen this conviction. In perception in the mode of causal efficacy, the primitive mode of feeling exemplified in anger, love, "massive enjoyment," there is "direct knowledge of the antecedent functioning of the body in sense-perception" (p. 125). Memory is regarded as an instance of causal efficacy,

¹ The endurance of minds furnishes no exception. As in the case of all enduring objects, the enduring mind is not a persisting substance, but the existence of a "historic route of actual occasions" (pp. 166, 167).

a direct knowledge of earlier members of a historic route. Causal efficacy also apparently gives a sense of the causal efficacy of the objects in nature which at more advanced levels are consciously prehended. It is this grade of perception which is invoked to avoid the "solipsism of the present moment" (p. 125). It is illustrated not only in memory but "in the silence" where "the irresistible causal efficacy of nature presses itself upon us" (p. 267). Further, the mode of perception called "presentational immediacy," which, "by means of a sensum, rescues from vagueness a contemporary spatial region, in respect to its spatial shape and its spatial perspective from the percipient" (p. 185), is treated in a way which does not exclude direct knowledge. Thus the sensum "gray" is the gray of a stone if "this contemporary region is the prolongation of that historic route [which constitutes the stone], into the presented locus" (p. 261). In all these cases the possibility of direct knowledge is clearly implied.

But other, and more prominent, statements throw a large part, if not the whole, of the doctrine of direct knowledge in doubt. It has already been noted that at times knowledge, like consciousness, is regarded as a late stage in the process of concrescence of some actual entities. In this event the more elementary prehensions would seem to supply material for knowledge without being themselves instances of knowledge. There is some doubt then as to whether perception in the mode of causal efficacy is knowledge at all. This doubt is increased by the fact that although Whitehead's language seems to imply that perception in the mode of causal efficacy can occur without perception in the mode of presentational immediacy,¹ yet since every actual entity has a mental pole which consists

¹ On p. 261 presentational immediacy is assigned "only to organisms of a relatively high grade."

of the prehension of eternal objects, and since *sensa* are the lowest grade of such objects, it must follow that one mode is as primitive as the other. It is expressly said that "the experience of the simplest grade of actual entity is to be conceived as the unoriginative response to the datum with its simple content of *sensa*" (p. 176). Hence it is doubtful if perception of causal efficacy takes place without presentational immediacy, the latter mode seeming only to enhance what is already vaguely there in the former mode (p. 262). The admission, seemingly without qualification, that particulars "are prehended by the mediation of universals" (p. 230), coupled with the above-noted relation of the two modes of perception, seems to imply that all prehension of particulars is indirect and capable of error. Thus while direct knowledge cannot be said to have been completely denied, the emphasis has clearly shifted to the indirectness of the knowledge process. Even if Whitehead is somehow able to regard perception in the mode of causal efficacy as basically direct (and if the foregoing considerations are sound the ground for this is not evident), the indirectness of perception by presentational immediacy is so strongly insisted upon that the position tends strongly in the direction of a critical realist theory of knowledge.

Thus the apparent directness of knowledge in the statement that presentational immediacy is "our perception of the contemporary world by the senses" is dissipated when it is realized that such perception involves conceptual feelings, and so *sensa* or other eternal objects (p. 474). The givenness of *sensa*, though not their existence, is due to "the functioning of the antecedent physical body of the subject" (p. 97). "The geometrical details of the projected sense-perception depend on the geometrical strains in the body, the qualitative *sensa* depend on the physiological

excitements of the requisite cells in the body" (p. 193), and are given when these cells are excited, however they are excited. Thus what is given in this mode is regarded as "completely independent of the contemporary actualities which in fact make up the nexus of actualities in the locus" (p. 193), the mode yielding "no direct experience about the contemporary world" (p. 485). In fact, mutually contemporary occasions are defined as occasions which do not contribute to each other's datum (p. 188), and except for the qualifications noted which seem to make such statements too extreme, it would follow that contemporary entities are never given and that there is no direct knowledge of the contemporary world.¹ This result is qualified in an additional way: presentational immediacy is regarded as exhibiting the extensive structure of the contemporary world (p. 193). Since there is only a geometrical structure common to the datum and the contemporary world, Whitehead virtually accepts the position of Russell and certain of the critical realists (such as Sellars) that knowledge only grasps the mathematical structure of the external world (pp. 498, 508). Whitehead himself states that if "animal faith" be taken as "perception in the mode of causal efficacy," Santayana's doctrine becomes practically identical with his own (p. 215). Here causal efficacy is invoked to keep a direct contact with the "external" world, but the difficulties in the treatment of this mode and in its relation to presentational immediacy, and the difficulty of seeing how on Whitehead's theory of knowledge causal efficacy can be known to be "direct," only increase the suspicion that Whitehead's view of knowing is practically identical with that of critical realism. To this extent *Process and Reality* supports Lovejoy's similar analysis based

¹ "What is 'given' is given by reason of objectifications of actual entities from the settled past" (p. 260).

on the preceding works. In any event, Whitehead's results unwittingly furnish another line of significant evidence of the impossibility of holding with the earlier new realists that the knowledge process is unmediated, that givenness is as such knowledge. And then the old question raises itself as to whether knowledge is ever "direct." Whitehead's own formulation wavers between an insistence on the directness of knowledge and an admission of the necessity of mediation in knowledge. At times he seems to uphold the existential givenness of the external world; at times he seems to imply that the external world is only given cognitively and not existentially.

48. IS KNOWLEDGE DIRECT OR MEDIATE FOR WHITEHEAD?

The reasons for the admission of the indirectness of knowledge are apparent. They center around the necessity of providing some place for error, and for admitting, as Whitehead thinks is required by physiological considerations, that what is given owes its givenness to the subject rather than to the actual entities contemporary with the subject. These two problems are related in that the recognition of the place of the subject in givenness furnishes a basis for the explanation of error. "The ingression of the eternal objects termed 'sense-data,' into the experience of a subject cannot be construed as the simple objectification of the actual entity to which, in ordinary speech, we ascribe that sense-datum as a quality" (p. 100), since by "creative emergence" there may appear in the mental pole conceptual feelings not entirely identical with the eternal objects constituting the original datum.¹ Thus may arise "delusive" perceptions of various sorts, such as perceiving a chair when there is no chair, seeing a star where it is not

¹ This is the category of "reversion" (see pp. 40, 380 ff.).

or when it is not, and the phenomena of mirror-images (p. 100). Such cases provide the "limitation to the security of direct knowledge based on direct physical feeling." What is given in such cases is not as such in error, since error consists in regarding, by symbolic reference, what is given as forming part of a historic route prolonged into the present, when what is given is not a part of this route (p. 274). As this suggests, error really involves a factor of meaning, and propositions, rather than given content, are the elements which are true or false. When the predicate of a proposition is "derived from the real nexus, and not refracted by the prehending subject," so that there is no "reversion," then the proposition is true (p. 401).¹ Since "truth and falsehood always require some element of sheer givenness" (p. 395), this view of truth demands a "conformity of proposition and an objectified nexus . . . within one experience" (p. 290).²

In respect to knowledge, then, Whitehead's analysis certainly avoids the difficulties of any new realism which makes knowledge consist in bare givenness, whether to an organism or to an act of awareness, and thereby makes error impossible. At the same time, Whitehead seems to have left a place for direct knowledge in both basic modes of perception. In spite of his own statements that presentational immediacy gives no direct knowledge of the contemporary world, it is perfectly consistent with some lines

¹ There is a strong analogy between Whitehead's use of "reversion" and Alexander's employment of "dislocation."

² This view of truth does not seem to be consistent with Whitehead's claim that causal efficacy, apart from propositions, gives direct knowledge, or that presentational immediacy gives a knowledge of the mathematical structure of the contemporary world, unless knowledge means something less than truth. In any case, on the theory of truth, his theory of knowledge cannot be known to be "true." Whitehead does bring in "force and vivacity" and "the illumination by consciousness of the various feelings involved in the process" as "immediate" tests, but these certainly may be mistaken, and cannot be known to be "true" tests.

of his thought to admit that what is given may be part of the external object that is being prehended. The status of causal efficacy is so involved, and apparently so ambiguous, that no comment can safely be hazarded as to whether the claim to direct knowledge in this mode can be substantiated.

Nevertheless, in both cases the term "direct knowledge" is not without fault. If mere prehension is knowledge, and propositions are not necessary for knowledge, then every actual entity knows its world. This view would be in conflict with Whitehead's doctrine that knowledge is a late and complex phase of the process of concrescence of only some actual entities. That a portion of the datum may at times be correctly regarded as the present prolongation of the historic route of an external enduring object is possibly "true" and a case of knowledge, but the truth would lie not in the fact alone but in the "conformity" of a proposition to that state of affairs. There would seem to be no advantage in separating truth and knowledge here. The advantage of the identification would be that it would avoid two kinds of knowledge: one dependent upon propositions and the other not so dependent. In this way there would be a clear-cut recognition of the dependence of truth, knowledge, and error upon meaning, a category neglected by many new realists.¹ This theory of knowledge is consistent with Whitehead's occasional recognition that it is not what is given that is true or false but the inferences based on the given and the claims made about it. This recognition of the place of meaning² in knowledge, while

¹ The meaning factor need not of course be formulated as a *verbal* proposition. The reflected image of the bone in Aesop's fable of the dog meant or pointed to further events: the mistake of the dog was in mistaking the symbolic reference of a natural event.

² Whitehead admits that a proposition is an abstraction from a judgment, and that a proposition has meaning only for a judging subject (pp. 293, 294).

avoiding the view that knowledge is "unmediated," is perfectly compatible with the claim that what is given may be part of an enduring object other than the percipient, only it insists that this claim is a candidate for knowledge, and that what is given, aside from a symbolic reference, is not knowledge at all.

This result may be approached in another way. To some readers the existence of delusive perceptions may suggest that Whitehead is actually committed to a psychophysical dualism, since the nonexistent chair which is seen cannot apparently be put in the "objective" world. Nevertheless, since for Whitehead there are no novel eternal objects, the content involved in the perception is still ingredient into nature, but ingredient into the subject (by the categories of reversion and dislocation) rather than into the supposed object. There is then simply a mistake in the locus of certain contents (see p. 274), and no need is felt to introduce a special class of psychic objects excluded from the processes of nature.

Whitehead's occasional failure to make this clear perhaps lies in an insufficient application of his own important analysis of the symbolic process. He admits that symbolism (which for him consists essentially in a reference of the mode of presentational immediacy to the mode of causal efficacy)¹ is "very fallible, in the sense that it may induce actions, feelings, emotions, and beliefs about things which are mere notions without that exemplification in the world which the symbolism leads us to presuppose."² But instead of consistently holding that knowledge as well as

¹ *Symbolism*, pp. 10, 30, 80, etc. For a discussion of the general principles of symbolism see chap. viii of *Process and Reality*, particularly pp. 274-79. His important analysis is weakened by the ambiguities and difficulties which surround his conception of the nature and relation of the two modes of perception.

² *Symbolism*, p. 6.

error requires this symbolic factor, he often speaks of "the knowledge provided by pure presentational immediacy,"¹ with the result that "direct experience" is regarded as "infallible."² But if knowledge can be immediate, it would seem that error could be immediate, and the reader is constantly tempted to conclude that in error some unique kind of object, which cannot be assigned a place in nature, is required. Were it consistently recognized that knowledge and error both require the mediation of a symbolic factor, and that perceptual "error" is therefore a mistake in the locus of natural events, no need would be felt to regard the existence of delusive perceptions as constituting a ground for psychophysical dualism.

A more consistent use of the principles of symbolism would, it is suggested, avoid many ambiguities in Whitehead's views, particularly in the treatment of knowledge and error.³ It would allow him to recognize the mediate-ness of knowledge and error without giving the appearance of having passed from a new realistic ontology (in the form of an objective relativism) to a "dualistic" version of critical realism. The rejection of epistemological monism would not seem to imply the acceptance of psychophysical dualism.

The other two questions discussed in connection with previous new realists need only brief mention. By virtue of the importance attributed to emergence, and to the categories of reversion and transmuted feeling, Whitehead's analysis is able to provide a place for the higher thought processes, so often neglected by new realists, in the complex stages of the process of concrescence. He is similarly able to take account of the active or "creative"

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

² *Ibid.*, p. 6.

³ It would not be without influence on his theory of mind or on the demands met by the concept of prehension.

place of mind. In the statement that "the whole doctrine of mentality—from the case of God downwards—is that it is a modifying agency" (p. 496), he seems to overstate the case, a tendency which he is often likely to show. He admits "unoriginative responses" to data, and his doctrine of truth certainly requires that the subject mind does not "refract" or add to the datum. But granting that all reality is not the work of mind, mind is contributory to the concrescent result, and in those entities where the mental pole is most prominent, the rôle which mind plays is correspondingly great. As one component of the emergent process, mind plays an active part in this process.

49. A FUNCTIONALISTIC ALTERNATIVE TO WHITEHEAD'S EMERGENT NEW REALISM

In any detailed investigation of Whitehead's system, the theory of prehension, basic to the whole doctrine, would require a minute examination and careful evaluation.¹ The doctrine of mind as consisting primarily of conceptual prehensions depends on this concept. Similarly, since a conceptual prehension is a prehension of eternal objects, the whole theory of mind depends upon the validity of the notion of eternal objects. The result is that the doctrine of mind is entirely dependent upon the Platonic strain in Whitehead's thought. Since even the "impure" operations of mentality (those which involve physical pre-

¹ Lovejoy has suggested a line of criticism of the notion of prehension through an analysis of the denial of simple location (*op. cit.*, pp. 173-84). A connected line of approach might be found in the relation of causation to prehension. Whitehead writes that "a simple physical feeling is an act of causation. The actual entity which is the initial datum is the 'cause,' the simple physical feeling is the 'effect'" (p. 361). Is the temporal interval abolished here? If simple location is denied, is the effect literally the same as the cause? If it is not, is not the prehension merely the causal effect on one entity or another? Is prehension invoked to make possible direct knowledge, and is it necessary if in the light of the theory of truth direct knowledge is relinquished? The whole topic of causal efficacy requires a detailed and careful study.

hensions) are inseparable from the prehension of eternal objects, mind is primarily the grasp of the eternal, the timeless. Thus instead of the universal being regarded as a stage of mind, and propositions being taken into the mental process, propositions and universals continue to be enshrined in the realm of subsistence (however named and however closely connected with the actual world by means of the ontological principle), and mind remains primarily a grasping of such entities. Whatever be the validity of Whitehead's concepts of prehension and eternal objects, it must be admitted that a theory of mind dependent upon these concepts, and upon the generalization which is given to the concept of the subject, is not the only one, or the most natural one, that can be built upon the basis of an emergent cosmology.

It was previously pointed out that experience may be consulted as to the view that there is a togetherness of data which is not necessarily the same as the togetherness of data and a subject—a fact which makes possible the position that entities may be together without there being for each entity an experience of this togetherness. In this way a basis could be obtained on which to deny the claim that “there can be no ‘many things’ which are not subordinated in a concrete unity” (p. 322). There could then be an emphasis upon a pluralism more akin to the earlier new realism. It would not have to be held that the emergent properties of certain wholes (such as the *Gestalt* properties of human experience) need be attributed to the factors into which experience can be analyzed. Could not the characteristics of experience and mentality be characteristics of groups or societies of entities, and not characteristics of the component entities of a group or society, or of the entities which do not form part of any society? Such comments are clearly of a random nature, but

they may suggest that an admission of the importance of emergence need not require such a divergence from the earlier new realism as is found in Whitehead. It requires neither Whitehead's particular doctrine of prehension, nor the claim that all entities are subjects with mental poles, nor the view that the content of presentational immediacy consists of eternal objects.¹ Even if the admission of emergence into the new realistic movement spells a transition to objective relativism, Whitehead's position represents only one form which an objective relativism may take, a form confused in its theory of knowledge and dominated by the acceptance of the reformed subjectivist principle that "apart from the experiences of subjects there is nothing, nothing, nothing, bare nothingness" (p. 254).

There are those who believe that the most fruitful direction of present-day philosophy lies in a synthesis of the attitude of new realism and the doctrine of emergence, but such a synthesis takes on a different appearance from Whitehead's doctrine when coupled with a functional theory of mind. This synthesis of the new realistic, emergent, and functional conceptions is the distinctive note of Dewey's and Mead's approach. In these thinkers, the presence of the functional theory of mind permits of the avoidance of the view that mentality is an intrinsic character of all actual events, gives a view that is not complicated by the doctrine of immediate knowledge, and dispenses with the categories of prehension and eternal objects.

50. A GLANCE BEHIND AND A GLANCE AHEAD

By way of conclusion, the central contention of this and the previous chapter may be recalled, and a glance taken at the road which lies ahead.

¹ The suggestions of emergence in Spaulding's *The New Rationalism* do not tend in these directions.

It has been claimed that new realism provided the means of avoiding psychophysical dualism and the mind-centric predicament by suggesting a relational approach to mind. The significance of this insight, however, was obscured by a confusion of the mind-centric and the body-centric predicament, by the retention of a theory of direct knowledge which permitted of no acceptable solution of the problem of error, and by the failure to state clearly the sense in which the field of the given belonged to nature.

The central weakness of new realism revealed itself, however, in the reliance upon an inadequately developed theory of mind. The relational approach to mind as found in Holt and Russell erred in failing to state satisfactorily the particular type of relation which constituted mentality. Instead of stating this as a functional relation, the attempt was made to conceive of mind as a class of entities selected by the organism from the components of the objective universe. This conception of mind as an aggregate of atomic entities proved incapable of dealing with active, systematic characters of individual minds, or the tentative, aggressive nature of the complex thought processes, and failed to do justice to the fact of givenness. At the same time, the theory of mind as an organically selected aggregate furnished no mediating factor to account for error. Indeed, since knowledge was regarded as direct (existential givenness being conceived as cognitional givenness), the very existence of error seemed to belie the claim that nature was existentially given. Some thinkers took refuge from this dilemma by emphasis upon a realm of subsistence, the necessity of which revealed the poverty of the original definition of mind.

It was argued that the retention of an act of awareness remedies none of these shortcomings, with the possible ex-

ception of the topic of givenness.¹ The notion of act of awareness was seen to be vague and of doubtful validity. It was suggested that the "truth" of the act theory resided in its recognition of the central place of the intentional process in a theory of mind, but that this process might be analyzed in functional terms that dispensed with the concept of act and conscious stuff. A tendency was noticed in such menders of the new realistic nets as Alexander, Laird, and Husserl, all of whom sharply oppose a relational approach to mind, to develop a definitely substantial notion of mind by the erection of some form of psychophysical parallelism or dualism, or even by a flight to a system of transcendental idealism. All these developments depend upon a belief in the existence of reality that is intrinsically mental, a belief common to all the theories of mind considered in this volume with the exception of the relational and functional schools.

Whitehead's introduction of the concepts of relativity and emergence into the new realistic world-view, combined with his appreciation of the importance of the symbolic process, presented afresh the possibility of developing on a new basis an adequate neo-realistic doctrine of mind. His account, however, was rendered ambiguous by a half-hearted retention of a theory of direct knowledge, while his statement of mentality in terms of prehension rather than in functional terms, together with his generalized doc-

¹ The new realistic neglect of the social aspects of mind (a curious neglect common to most theories of mind) is avoided by the theory of C. Delisle Burns that the act ("enjoyment") is social. The distinction of other minds as "other" is regarded as a late distinction within "the enjoyment of mind" which is not characterized by being "mine" or "yours" (*The Contact between Minds*, p. 40). In general, "minds in communication are only with difficulty thought of separately, and there is no evidence for the existence of any mind not in communication with other minds" (p. 57). Space does not permit of an attempt to justify the statement that this socialization of the conception of act fails to explain satisfactorily the social phases of mind, or the knowledge of other minds.

trine of the subject, complicated his theory by the introduction of the concepts of prehension and eternal object, and gave an idealistic turn to his doctrine at variance with the dominant attitude of the realistic movement.

None of the new realistic thinkers considered unites a genuinely functional view of mind with an objective relativistic metaphysics, an approach perhaps capable of surmounting the previous difficulties of the movement by furnishing the element of mediation necessary for the explanation of error, and by rendering intelligible the partial dependence of the perceived on the perceiver, without thereby weakening the claim that nature is existentially given. After a consideration in the following chapter of certain arguments concerning the existential givenness of nature, psychophysical dualism, and the question of the substantiality of the mind (arguments in part directed against new realism), a final chapter will be devoted to an elaboration of the above-suggested emendation of new realistic motives by the union of a symbolic theory of mind with an objective relativistic cosmology.

CHAPTER V

MIND AS SUBSTANTIVE

51. DRIESCH AND IMMATERIAL SUBSTANTIALISM

CONSIDERING the rôle which the concept of substance has played in the history of thought, and recognizing the obvious inadequacy of the usual statements of mind in terms of process and relation, it is natural that earlier substance modes of thinking should not merely persist, but that new theories emphasizing the substantiality of mind should appear. Whatever the difficulties in the notion of a substance underlying adjectives, it cannot be denied that a mind does have some degree of unity and of continued existence—in short, some kind of substantiality. If not a substance, mind may yet be a substantive, or at least a quasi-substantive.

Contemporary attempts to do justice to the substantiality of mind take a number of directions. Neglecting for the present the position of the functionalists, the dominant tendencies have been to regard the substantiality as immaterial, to explain it by a frank identification of mind with brain or organism as conceived in strict biological terms, or to advocate some form of double-aspect theory in which mind and body, or mind and brain, are regarded as two sides of the same reality.

The identification of mind with the biologically conceived organism will receive no separate treatment, the relevant aspects of the identification gaining some incidental reference in this and the following chapter. The

double-aspect theory, however, in which mind and body, or mind and brain, are regarded as inner and outer aspects of the same substantive is a theory prominent among critical realists, and since this is a major movement of contemporary thought, the examination of certain features of the critical realist's treatment of mind will constitute the main task of this chapter.

The immaterialist views range all the way from the Scholastic defense of mind substance to Laird's doctrine of mind as a continuum of acts of awareness.¹ Since the extremes of these views have received discussion in the pages on mind as substance, process, and intentional act, no extended discussion of immaterialism is here necessary. Instead, one further representative of this position will be singled out for consideration. The name of Hans Driesch occurs in this connection as particularly suitable.

In Driesch's presentation, mind is introduced in the following way: Since "all *immediate objects* are *my* objects,"² given content is content for a subject. The basic proposition is "I have a content." But this content slips away, and a new situation arises expressed by the proposition, "I have the content 'I had a content.'" The "I" which "had" he calls "my self"; the "I" for which content is present he calls the "Ego." Accordingly, "*I* thus posits *my self* as that which 'has' the 'had'" (p. 148). But such a self is only momentary and discontinuous, and mind is invoked to fill in the discontinuity; mind is the self "regarded as continuous," as "completed by unconscious (but not physical!) being" (p. 152). As so posited, "the mind is like an uncon-

¹ Reference may be made to McDougall's *Body and Mind*; W. H. Sheldon's article, "The Soul and Matter," *Philosophical Review*, Vol. XXXI (1922); and J. B. Pratt's *Matter and Spirit*. Bergson is the most eminent contemporary representative of immaterialism.

² *Mind and Body*, trans. Theodore Besterman, p. 91. Unless otherwise indicated, page references will be to this volume.

scious, unperceivable, and intangible organism with its own immanent law of activity. It is conserver ('memory') and orderer" (p. 154). Further, "the mind's 'unconscious' activity and becoming and capacities, is to be understood to have just the same reality and meaning as we attribute to any given natural object" (p. 156). So interpreted, "*mind* and *nature* are wholly disparate realms of being. There can exist no becoming and activity between them" (p. 156).

The distinction between the mind and the Ego, the unconscious and the conscious, is a basic one for Driesch. All that is consciously experienced by the Ego is produced unconsciously by the mind (p. 159), the mind itself not being part of the content experienced, except in the limited sense that the Ego is part of the mind, the part that becomes aware of certain products of the mind's activity.¹ The realm of consciousness, of objects given to the Ego, is passive and inactive, a "sequence of electric sparks" struck off by the unconscious activity of the mind.² Driesch is emphatic on this point: "We do *not* speak of a *conscious activity*, No such activity exists! Psychical doing, becoming, performing, and, therefore, thinking and willing also, taken as *processes*, do *not belong to the conscious sphere*."³ Thus what is given is not the thinking but the resulting thoughts, thought being identified with those "suchnesses" which are meanings.⁴ While there is no pure thought, no thought without a "sensible bearer,"⁵ there is pure thinking as an unconscious activity of the mind. Even though "unconscious ideas" ("unconscious conscious contents") are "sheer nonsense,"⁶ the concept of unconscious

¹ *The Crisis in Psychology*, p. 174.

² *Ibid.*, p. 46.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 42.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 192.

mental activity is a valid concept—indeed, all mental activity is unconscious. So conceived, mind is as “‘substantial’ as any ‘mediate object’ of *quasi*-independent existence which is presupposed in the theory of order: that is, it persists as ‘*the same*’ for a given time according to its characteristics in each case. But I do not attempt in any sense to determine how long the ‘given period of time’ is; nor do I either express any view concerning the ‘real’ nature of the mind” (p. 175).

The relation of mind to the psychoid which governs the body must be noted. In brief, the two are in the end identified (pp. 160, 161). Accordingly, the utter disparateness of mind and nature, the “parallelism,” is now qualified. The genuine parallelism is between given content, the state of mind, and the state of the psychoid, i.e., the parallelism is all “psychic” (p. 161). Driesch writes: “If it is desired to allow ‘mental factors’ to be nature-determining, then these can only be ‘unconscious mental factors’ ” (p. 162). There might seem to be some option here, but if the psychoid and the mind are ultimately identical, and if the psychoid is metaphysically entelechy, then mind must interact with nature, even if its activity is “autonomous” and “non-mechanical.”¹ As an example of the relation of entelechy, mind, and the Ego, the following passage is typical:

Let us enumerate what happens psychophysically in a process which begins with a perception and ends in an action. There are, say, electromagnetic waves in a particular combination; the retina is affected, so is the optic nerve and a specific part of the brain; this affects “entelechy” and its parallel, the soul; *then I see an object*. Feelings and thoughts now arise, governed by “determining tendencies,” then a particular “willing” comes in, marking a particular state of the soul and its parallel, “entelechy.” “Entelechy” affects the motor brain parts, this affection is followed by the stimulation of a motor nerve and the whole process ends in the contraction of certain muscles.²

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 147, admits this.

² *Ibid.*, p. 153.

52. DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED

Driesch's view is a type of theory in which the substantiality of the mind is connected with a doctrine of the unconscious, a theory of interest to both dualists and psychical researchers. It has the merit of being developed in the light of important biological and psychological phenomena. As a result of his analysis Driesch believes that the soul or mind "has again come to occupy its rightful place."¹

The theory is frankly inferential. In recognizing that associationism neglected the systematic and directed character of the thought process, Driesch justly holds that "we must have limiting and directing agents."² He admits that the "dynamical psychical agents" introduced for this purpose are "pure theoretical entities that do not rest on any immediately conscious foundation at all."³ In general, mind is invoked to fill in the discontinuities of the Ego and to give a principle of activity and order to the show of presented content. The question at issue is simply whether such an inferred soul or mind is a necessary or satisfactory postulate.

To show that the postulate is not necessary, it would have to be shown that the systematic and directed character of the thought process, together with the phenomena of psychical research and abnormal psychology, can be explained without appeal to the postulate of unconscious psychical activity, in the form in which Driesch uses this concept. The alternative principle of explanation must either be found within given content or else it must be shown that where an inference is necessary, the inference need not be to an entity of the "soul" type. The fact that most psychologists and biologists do not think in such terms, coupled with the fact that idealists, realists, and pragmatists

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 155.

² *Ibid.*, p. 54.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 62.

have explored alternative conceptions of mind in terms of process, relation, and function, certainly shows that Driesch's particular inference has not generally been felt to be the necessary one. It must be admitted that certain "parapsychological" phenomena have not received adequate explanation by these alternative theories, but such explanations can hardly be said to have been given at all, and in a domain where even the most elementary facts are in doubt, no one theory can claim to have established its case.

That Driesch's theory of an inferred mind or soul is not without difficulties is quite obvious. The view has much of the inconclusiveness of the Cartesian mode of thought. To hold that the soul controls the body by pushing the pineal gland is no further from empirical evidence than a conception of entelechy responding to changes in the brain, causing thoughts and other content to arise before the Ego, then affecting the brain, thereby bringing about a contraction of the muscles. One conception is as much, or as little, pure romance as the other. The difficulty of interaction is heightened in each case (even if not made impossible) by the conception of the soul or mind as not only autonomous, but as non-extended.¹ Like Descartes, Driesch holds that given content is a state of the Ego.² The discussions in previous chapters should have made it clear that even if experienced content is "before" a subject, and is dependent upon a subject, such content need not be a state of the subject. Driesch supposes a "dim instinctive knowledge of general 'you-ness'" which constitutes a basis for the knowledge of other Egos, but this basis is very dim, and Driesch would logically seem to have as much difficulty in avoiding subjectivism as had Descartes. The

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 169.

² *Ibid.*, p. 19.

placing of the body in nature rather than among the class of presented contents needs further justification.

Nor can all be said to be in order within the house of the mind. The unextended non-spatial mind or soul is an "intensive manifold" with rather surprising capacities. Not only can it control the body and so interact with nature, but in its dominantly unconscious activity it produces that content of which a part of itself, the Ego, is conscious.¹ This is certainly a remarkable process, the details of which are entirely unexplained. Just how an unconscious activity is part of the same intensive manifold as a passive consciousness is by no means evident. The nature of awareness or consciousness does not receive the desired elaboration. Nor is the relation of apprehended content to the soul and its percipient part, the Ego, made intelligible. Such contents are produced by the soul and apprehended by the Ego. At times the view seems to be maintained that such contents are products rather than properties of the mind, and yet are states of the Ego. But since the Ego is part of the mind, such contents must be part of the one intensive manifold. This means that the entire perceptual field, with its character of extensiveness, must in some way be located in the unextended intensive manifold of the mind, a manifold which must include active unconscious psychical processes, an apprehending consciousness, and the products of unconscious activity. As a substantive,² the mind becomes as "disorderly" as the disorder it was invoked to remedy.

A theory which thus combines the difficulties of the classic substance theories with those of the concepts of the

¹ Do not all the difficulties discussed in connection with "pure activity" reappear?

² Driesch apparently does not think of the unconscious as the substratum of which the conscious content and the Ego are attributes.

unconscious and psychical activity can make no lasting appeal unless it should happen that alternative theories collapse in the face of material uncovered by the parapsychologist. The initial probability, however, is that no such theory of mind as immaterial substance or substantive will become a dominant theory in the stream of contemporary thought. Such substantial immaterialism is as much an anachronism today as would be a resurrection of nineteenth-century materialism. That there exist aspects of mind not adequately considered by alternative theories may be admitted, but that these neglected aspects can receive their sole or even most satisfactory explanation in terms of the doctrine of immaterial mind is highly doubtful.

53. THE ORIENTATION OF CRITICAL REALISM

The identification of mind and brain that is found in Alexander is more common among critical realists than among new realists. The critical realist's dissatisfaction with the new realistic position arose both from the problem of error and from the complexity of nature which seemed to result from the analysis. In addition, the critical realists have felt that new realism failed to recognize the fact of awareness or consciousness. To deal with the problem of error, it was clear that some distinction between the vehicle of knowledge and the object of knowledge had to be recognized. Without some such distinction, it becomes impossible to admit that thought can be about the nonexistent. At the same time, the complexity of nature which results from attributing to the object all that is given leads to a defense of a position which has obvious affinities to the Galilean-Cartesian-Newtonian world-view. That is, the vehicle recognized as necessary for knowledge is not, for the most part, regarded as a constituent of nature, and

even when so regarded, the locus is that of the subject rather than that of the object known. Sellars' remark is typical: "We must appreciate subjectivism and yet be realists."¹

The central problem which is thus raised is evident: Does the recognition of the vehicular nature of knowledge, coupled with a just treatment of awareness, imply the position that the vehicle of knowledge is not part of nature, or at best only a constituent of the knowing subject? Does epistemological dualism or pluralism require a psychophysical dualism and furnish a refutation of the view that mentality is a functional rather than an intrinsic characteristic of some or all events? Here is the "great divide" in contemporary philosophy. It is here that the alignment of new realism, objective relativism, and pragmatism, on the one hand, and critical realism, on the other, takes place. Dewey, for instance, would deny the doctrine of immediate (non-mediated) knowledge, and yet would hold that the vehicle of knowledge is itself part of the same order of events that is the object of knowledge. Is this a possible position, or does the admission of an element of mediation in knowledge require the acceptance of an ontological dualism or perhaps a panpsychism? Does the attempt to get "enough mind" to meet the difficulties of new realism require so much mind that psychism, partial or complete, is dragged back on the stage of thought? Here is a crucial issue. The vigor of the critical realist movement is shown in many ways: by Morgan's espousal of critical realism on a framework which Alexander intended as new realistic; by the critical realist doctrines which have crept into the later thought of Alexander and Whitehead; by Meinong's and Husserl's emendation of Brentano's two-term analysis of cognition; by the clear divergence of Rus-

¹ *Essays in Critical Realism*, p. 190.

sell's later views from the new realism of his middle period. Does this strong movement show that the "revolt" against psychophysical dualism has been checked; that the program of the revolt was too ambitious, too extreme? The centrality of the question thus raised justifies a careful consideration of the relevant problems in this and the following chapter.

Critical realists have called the vehicle of knowledge the "datum" or "essence" or "character complex." A central problem obviously centers around the nature of this vehicle in relation to the subject and to the object. Three major types of analysis are possible: (1) The vehicle might be a part or component of the physical world (which, of course, includes the organism). This position does not require a denial that some reality is private or subjective, but only that such reality is merely the "inside" of that which seen from the "outside" is physical. This alternative, embraced by Dewey and the objective relativists, is rejected by critical realists on the ground that the vehicles of knowledge are such that they cannot find a place in the physical world.¹ (2) The vehicle might be intrinsically mental, and so not a component of the physical world. It may, however, be (*a*) the mental aspect or side of the same world which has also a physical aspect or side, whether the double-aspect view be held in an unrestricted fashion (Morgan, Strong, Drake) or be limited to the brain or to some portion of the brain (Sellars);² or (*b*) neither a part nor an aspect of the physical world, still remaining a mental existent (Lovejoy). (3) The vehicle might be neutral, in the sense of being neither intrinsically mental nor a component

¹ If judged a critical realist, the Russell of *The Analysis of Matter* is an exception, since sensa are regarded as components of the brain.

² Alexander, who shows critical realist tendencies, holds a double-aspect view limited to certain brain processes.

of the physical world. While so neutral it could be (a) a particular (Broad)¹ or (b) a universal or essence (Santayana).²

It must be added that to take a critical realist's pulse in regard to the status of the vehicle of knowledge is not necessarily to complete the examination needed for a diagnosis. There remains to be ascertained the nature of the subject for which the vehicle is a vehicle, and here critical realists also show great differences of opinion. Broad and Lovejoy, for instance, agree that in addition to the datum (which is neutral for one and mental for the other) there is an existent awareness, while other members of the movement (such as Sellars) do not show this note of English new realism. And there are other tangles in regard to the relation between datum and mental state, essence and existence, and the like. Nevertheless, there is a strong convergence of opinion in the belief that whatever be the status of the datum (neutral or mental), there must be an intrinsically mental subject, either an act of awareness, or, more characteristically, a subject who is mental from the inside and physical from the outside. Since the status of the "act" does not demand further attention, it is the double-aspect doctrine which commands central consideration, a doctrine that in its brain-mind or body-mind form exhibits itself as a substantive or quasi-substantive view.

¹ Strong may perhaps be included here, since he now holds the datum to be a particular, a "*phantasm* . . . generated by the activity of the self." Terminologically, however, Strong speaks of the vehicle as the non-given psychic state which is the "inside" of a neural process, and does not refer to the datum (the phantasm) as the vehicle. His view then combines a belief in psychic states with a doctrine of a neutral phantasm—unless, indeed, he regards the phantasm as mental.

² Drake may also be included. He holds a combination view similar to Strong's, except that for him it is an essence rather than a phantasm which is introduced in addition to the psychic state. Until very recently this was also Strong's view.

Since, however, the discussion of the following chapter is based on the alternative rejected by critical realism (the position that the datum is part of the physical world), it will be necessary to show not only that a double-aspect view is questionable, but that the vehicle is not neutral and not mental in any sense which precludes it from being part of the physical world. The questions of the neutrality of the given, the double-aspect doctrine, and the mentality of the given will be taken up in order.

54. STRONG AND PANPSYCHISM

The attention which Charles A. Strong has devoted to the topic of mind gives him a central place among the critical realists in this respect. No contemporary philosopher has worked more ably or persistently on this problem. It is accordingly advisable to consider his position in some detail, especially since it unites upon a panpsychistic world-view motives found in critical realism with an emphasis upon behavior as vigorous as that of any pragmatist.¹

¹ In fairness to Mr. Strong it should be carefully noted that he prefers to be judged by his volume, *Essays on the Natural Origin of the Mind*, and by a brief article, "Is Perception Direct, or Representative?" (*Mind*, XL [1931], 217-20), rather than by such earlier books as *The Origin of Consciousness*. If the aim were simply to expound Strong's present view, it would be necessary to limit attention to the later works. The main difference concerns the replacement of the view that the sense-datum is an essence or universal by the view that it is "a particular, occurring only when it is intuited; that it depends for its temporary being on the intuition of it, and therefore does not exist independently or continuously; that, though not in space and time in the sense in which a real thing is in space and time, it is yet bound down to certain places and times; that it is a *phantasm* or *apparent*, generated by the activity of the self" (above-mentioned article, pp. 217, 218). Even in the *Essays* it had been admitted that in use the essence "has become a particular, referred to the here and now" (p. 98). This change has important ontological bearings and introduces some difference in the theory of knowledge, but I do not see that it makes any important difference in the treatment of mind, or in the following criticism of the neutrality of the datum, a criticism which applies equally well to the notion of phantasm. Like the essence, the phantasm is neutral in the sense that it is not a physical or a mental state. Even if for some reason it be called "mental," it is not mental in the same sense as are the mental existences which help to constitute the self. Accordingly, I

With the English new realists, Strong holds that American new realism has no adequate theory of mind or consciousness, claiming that this follows from the denial of any reality that is intrinsically psychic.¹ If givenness is an intrinsic character of objects, it is impossible to explain non-givenness; if it is not, in a world consisting solely of physical objects it is impossible to explain givenness. According to Strong, psychic states, known by introspection, are necessary to make givenness possible. What, then, is the nature of givenness, the nature of psychic states, and the rôle played by psychic states in givenness?

"Givenness" or "awareness" or "consciousness" (the terms are used as synonyms) is the fundamental fact *about* experience (p. 35). Nevertheless, givenness is not a deliverance *of* experience; we are aware solely of things, not of the awareness of things. What is given is a datum, not a datum-as-given. Strong accepts James's "epoch-making discovery that *awareness is not a datum of experience*" (p. 32). His own view is called a vehicular theory of givenness; givenness requires a vehicle which is not itself given, and this vehicle is a psychic state. Thus "while only the essence [or phantasm] is given, the sensations nevertheless are there" (p. 130). Givenness or consciousness is an external relation, the "relation of symbolism *as exercised by a psychic state*" (p. 123). It is "simply the meaning . . . which the sensation acquires through becoming in fact the

have not dropped the extensive references to *The Origin of Consciousness*. Since these pages have received Mr. Strong's helpful criticisms, and since the effects of the change of position have been taken into consideration, it is not believed that an injustice has been done to Mr. Strong. His defense of the essence doctrine was so vigorous that I feel obliged to discuss it regardless of his later rejection of the doctrine, as in the parallel case of Mr. E. B. Holt.

¹ The obverse side of this criticism is brought out in the statement that "the identification of the object with the given-essence has led to an illegitimate projection of the mind into things" (*The Origin of Consciousness*, p. 164). Page references, unless otherwise noted, will be to this volume.

index of the object" (p. 122). The doctrines that psychic states are the vehicle of givenness, that the datum is a simplification and projection of a psychic state, and that data are given to a psyche demand careful attention.

Psychic states are states which have a "psychic" character. This character is not relational (p. 79); it is not the character of being an object of consciousness (p. 23): it is "the character we find in a feeling of pain or a sensation of cold" (p. 14), the character which sensations, images, pleasure and pain, emotions, and desire have in common (p. 23). Attention is "the psychic fact par excellence—the very essence of what we mean by a psychical fact" (p. 87). Such states are known by introspection. They "are *not* identical with the perceptual essence" or datum (p. 198); they may exist or be there in the knowledge process without being given or known to be there. They are objects of introspection, not of inspection. Since this is so, no contradiction is found in the concept of "unconscious mental states": "If feelings are distinct from the acts of awareness . . . there is no longer any reason why feelings may not exist outside a consciousness or mind."¹

By means of psychic states something may be given. To what? To the psyche. A psychic state is simply "the psyche in a certain state" (p. 105). The self is made up of such psychic states, and is conceived as a substantive rather than as a substance (p. 104).² In virtue of his panpsychism, Strong regards the psyche and the body as metaphysically identical, the body being the appearance of the psyche to the "outer senses" (p. 182). The psyche is thus "at once psychic and extended" (p. 13). The psyche, like the psychic state and the fact of givenness, is unknowable at the

¹ *Essays, etc.*, p. 295.

² Cf., *ibid.*, chap. vii: The soul or self is "composite and divisible."

moment of knowing, but by means of another psychic state "*is knowable the moment after*. And only then does givenness—as distinct from what is given—become inferable" (p. 183). There is, however, no reason to doubt that the self as known and the self as knower or subject are the same (pp. 106, 107).

It is by means of this conception of the psyche that Strong hopes to explain givenness: "If the ego were not psychic, nothing would ever be given; and a psychic ego can come by evolution only out of a psychic world" (p. 322). Mind-stuff, feeling, or sentience furnishes the stuff of mind; mind at the level of consciousness and intellection is an emergent function of this basic psychic material, a function of distinct biological advantage to the organism.¹

This mind-stuff is in time and space, is capable of change, and possesses the psychic character. Intrinsically it is not cognitive or volitional, it has no unity beyond the unity of the brain, and it is not characterized by the sensible qualities (p. 317).² The psyche arises from the organization of such stuff; consciousness and thought arise from a particular functioning of states of the psyche. Thus Strong's view "consists in regarding all awareness as functional, and sentience as the permanent nature of things."³

¹ Intellection is "*a more complicated givenness*" (p. 118), "a device for seeing beyond the horizon set by the senses. . . . Thought looks before and after. It permits adjustment to objects while they are yet unseen, to events in advance of their occurrence. It is a sort of anticipatory vision, as vision is a sort of anticipatory touch" (p. 117). Thus for Strong the problem of mind must be met at a lower level than intellection, namely, at the level of givenness, even though mind is defined as "the self in so far as it is aware" (*ibid.*, p. 160). It is to deal with givenness that mind-stuff is invoked.

² Sensible qualities (as phantasms) are regarded as simplifications and projections of psychic states, and so distinct from the psychic states by which they are given.

³ Strong's position is not, therefore, a psychophysical dualism. In place of such a dualism is substituted "a duality of the psychical and the form in which the psychical appears" (*Essays*, p. 117). Thus while the account of mind proper—thought and consciousness—is functional, it is held that such functioning re-

55. THE ARGUMENT FOR THE EXISTENCE OF
PSYCHIC STATES

As has been noted, the psychic character is "that which all psychic states have in common." Strong adds, "I have never said what it is, beyond referring the reader to introspection; for any attempt to express it in words is apt to lead to misunderstanding" (p. 234). It might seem that an insistence upon the psychic character is simply a way of protesting against the denuding of reality by materialism. Thus Strong holds that a sensation is "experience" even when not experienced, i.e., that it is still full of "inner light" or "luminosity,"¹ and suggests the identity of matter and immediate experience.² But to argue that the world has the characters it is experienced to have, and that in some other kind of world mind could not arise, would not alone justify the introduction of a psychic character. Is it known that sensations, emotions, images, and the like have some character in common? It is of course true that certain components of the experienced world must be distinguished from other components that can be weighed, handled, and measured, and this difference may be expressed in the opposition of the terms "psychical" and "physical," but this in itself does not indicate that the "psychical" components have some positive quality in common, or that psychic events are not the object of inspection.³ For Strong, however, psychic states, whose

quires the existence of a psychic stuff. Strong's functional analysis of acts of awareness differentiates his view of such acts from the views of Laird and Alexander.

¹ *A Theory of Knowledge*, p. 49.

² *Ibid.*, p. 23.

³ Strong comments as follows: "If they have not something in common, why are they all called 'psychical states'? What they have in common is not a *character*, but a *mode of being*. They are all *sorts of feeling*." The answer to the question is that they are all "states of the psyche," components of the self. This admission does not give them a character in common, or a special mode of being; nor—be it added—does it support a double-aspect theory.

study constitutes the task of psychology, are not given or inspected but are introspected. Introspection is "presentation of a state of the self either by means of a later phase of the state, or by means of an image almost exactly resembling the state: so that the conditions for truthful and adequate presentation seem here to be fully realized."¹ Nevertheless, introspective knowledge may be non-veridical (and is in the case of qualities, externality, and magnitude, which are not regarded as attributes of psychic states),² so there is some question as to whether it may not be non-veridical in ascribing a common character to psychic states. There is, in fact, a peculiar circularity in the argument for the existence of psychic states. These states, supposed to be discovered by introspection, are actually pre-supposed in order to render introspection trustworthy, since the identity in nature between the vehicle and the object known is the ground for the confidence in the validity of introspection. Actually, psychic states are simply postulated on the ground that they are necessary to account for givenness, and if givenness could be otherwise explained, the necessity for postulating such states would be lost. Strong, no more than Bergson, has succeeded in proving the existence of components of reality with the intrinsic characteristic of being psychic or mental. The basic stuff seems to be called mind-stuff only by an act of grace.³

¹ *Essays*, p. 119.

² *Ibid.*, p. 121.

³ Strong writes: "I define 'sentience' (*ibid.*, p. 268) as whatever nature is necessary in things in order that, when they get together in the form of an organism, there may be consciousness. If you say that *no* nature is necessary for this, that implies that *any* elements arranged in the form of an organism—e.g. bits of matter as the crude materialist conceives them—would be conscious. If you do not think this, you admit that *some* nature is necessary. If so, my definition of sentience, as *whatever* nature is necessary, cannot be wrong." The conclusion is surely unquestionable, and without any exceptions for the crude

It is not clear, moreover, that non-given psychic states simplify the problem of givenness or of consciousness, or that they perform any function which experienced items could not perform. Even if the vehicular nature of consciousness is admitted (and not a mere compresence of events), there is still doubt as to how a psychic state makes a better vehicle than any other experienced item. The natural retort that experienced items are themselves given and so require a vehicle other than themselves, raises the question as to whether givenness is vehicular, whether givenness in its simplest form is a case of consciousness.

Is givenness properly described as a symbolic relation? It will be argued in the following chapter that *consciousness* does involve a symbolic relation (though not that the vehicle of the symbolic process is a psychic state). Are "givenness" and "consciousness" equivalent terms, as Strong's analysis implies? A difficulty in this identification may be brought out as follows. Suppose that one is in a dark room when a flash of light occurs. It would ordinarily be said that if the person is awake, is normal, is turned in the proper direction, and the like, that that designated by the term "flash of light" was given. If the person is an adult human being, there will most likely occur symbolic processes (in the sense of Strong's "intellection") referring to the light, and possibly the light itself functions symbolically. But it is also possible that no such symbolic process occurs, and yet that that which could have been perceived as a flash of light was still given. Would this involve a lower order of symbolic functioning, the symbolic functioning of a psychic state, or of anything else? It is no

materialist: some nature is necessary for there to be givenness. But what this nature is, is not shown by calling it "sentience" or "mind-stuff"; nor is it at all certain that it is non-given "psychic states." Some states of the psyche may be necessary for givenness, but not necessarily "psychic" states.

doubt true that organic conditions¹ were necessary for the appearance of the event, and that there may have been attendant or successive feelings, organic sensations, and the like. But it is not obvious that these factors were playing any symbolic part, nor that the flash was a psychic event or a projection of a state of the apprehending subject. It would seem that there can be givenness without there being any consciousness of what is given as being given, and without any symbolic relation whatever. Does not a symbolic process involve a given something indicating or pointing to or meaning something else? Strong admits that the vehicle upon which givenness depends is not an object of consciousness, but that it nevertheless is "there." Would not content that is "there" in the way necessary for participation in a symbolic process normally be regarded as given? In the previous example, the walls of the room were also "there" spatially, but not "there" in the same sense as the light, and the difference would not seem to be one of symbolic functioning. It would appear to be more just to say that an element is given when it is functioning or could function in a symbolic or conscious process than to say that for an element to be given a symbolic or conscious process must take place. Accordingly, it seems advisable not to identify givenness and consciousness, but to regard consciousness as Strong regards intellection, namely, to regard it as a more complicated form of givenness or there-ness which involves symbols. And with this shift the symbolic or vehicular explanation of givenness need not be re-

¹ Strong adds: "Organic conditions *of what kind?* If you conceive them merely as physical, as motions of electrons, the fact that the given is *seen, experienced, felt*, remains unaccounted for." It is perhaps not possible to specify at present the precise organic events involved in the emergence of given events, but it certainly does not help merely to give electrons psychic insides. Here as elsewhere Strong puts no faith in the appearance of the genuinely novel. It is no doubt true that the materialist has vastly oversimplified the nature of the physical and the conditions necessary for givenness.

tained.¹ Such an analysis would strengthen the previous doubts as to the existence of mind-stuff and as to the claim that the vehicle of the symbolic process is a psychic state.

56. GIVEN EVENTS AS NONEXISTENTIAL

The position that it is simplifications and projections of psychic states which are given may now be considered. This position gains its significance in the light of the problems of knowledge and error. According to Strong, the error of new realism consisted in making knowledge infallible, that is, in making error impossible. If it is the object itself that is given, hallucination, dreams, and thought about the nonexistent would not be possible (pp. 37, 38). But if only the simplification and projection of a psychic state are given, and if the knowing activity is the givenness of such a datum and "the acting in consequence as if an object existed" (p. 40), truth and error are both possible: the knowing is true when the datum coincides with the object,² and is false when this is not so. Knowing, then, has a symbolic aspect. In addition to the psychic state³ it involves a representative factor, the sense datum, formerly regarded as an essence and now as a phantasm.

To allow of the possibility of error, Strong feels it necessary to insist that the datum is not a character of the thing

¹ For Strong, cognition (seeing, hearing, touching) is one sort of consciousness and intellection another. When so used, cognition is more than bare givenness (since the given itself is now a symbol of the more of which it is a part), and is a simpler level of the symbolic process than intellection which involves other symbols than the appearing event. But then neither cognition nor intellection is equivalent to bare givenness.

² "Such coincidence is possible, because the sense-datum is a mere phantasm" (*Essays*, p. 36). In the *Origin* truth was obtained when the essence was "really the essence of the object" (p. 41).

³ Unlike many critical realists, Strong does not call the datum the "vehicle" but reserves this term for the psychic state. In the *Essays* the term "vehicle" is not used. Loosely speaking, Strong has two vehicles, the psychic state and the phantasm or sense-datum.

cognized; that data "are directly dependent on the individual organism, not on the external object."¹ The facts of memory, hallucination, perceptual error, and perspective; the change of data with change of distance from the object; the difference in time between the percept and the event—these are all regarded as establishing the position that the datum must not be confused with the object (pp. 191, 60 ff.).

Nevertheless, Strong is equally desirous of avoiding a representationism which separates the knower from the things known. Perception is said to involve intuition (the givenness of the datum), intent (reference to an object), and animal faith (the assumption that the object given is real).² When animal faith is canceled by doubt, an "apparent thing" results; when both animal faith and intent are canceled, a sense-datum or phantasm results, and perception has shrunk to bare intuition.³ In veridical perception the apparent thing coincides with the real thing, and then "we not only 'have to do' with the real thing, but 'apprehend' it, and that directly. How can a just view of cognition demand more?"⁴ It is true that all perception is not veridical; since "action causes sense-data to arise by simplifying and projecting states of sentience,"⁵ it may be that the sense-datum is not exactly like some character of an object. Thus when a white wall is seen with a red spot, the error does not lie in a wrong inference, but "in perceiving something to exist which in fact does not exist."⁶ In general, however, awareness would have been biologically useless or harmful "if there had not been really a thing at that point: psychological fiction therefore implies epistemologi-

¹ *Essays in Critical Realism*, p. 225.

² *Essays on the Natural Origin of the Mind*, p. 93.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 97.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 109.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 96.

cal realism as its necessary counterpart.”¹ Thus while the sense-datum is not itself a part of the thing (which is not ever existentially given) but is “representative,” the claim is that “perception by means of the sense-datum is direct. We directly apprehend the real thing, and nothing else; its characters and also its existence.” This is the answer “which seems to come as near as it is possible to come to bridging the gap between neo-realism and critical realism.”² Strong illustrates his position by a striking simile:

Suppose a child, who had had no experience of cinemas, were taken to one for the first time; and that behind the screen there were persons exactly like those shown on the screen, and doing exactly the same things. This child might imagine he saw the real performance. But he *would* be seeing it! If one performer stabbed another drawing blood, and the child ran and told the police, he would not be wrong. This I take to be the exact situation in perception; and the upshot is, that, though sense-datum and real thing are not identical but their relation is one of representation, perception is nevertheless direct. And that is what it must be, if perception is to yield knowledge.³

He adds:

In this simile, the lantern with its inner light corresponds to the self; the light rays that project the image, to intuition; the image on the screen, to the sense-datum; and the adjustment of the instrument so as to throw the image on the screen, to intent.⁴

In this carefully worked-out theory of knowledge, the consequences of denying that the datum is ever a part of the thing are clearly visible: a knowledge-claim about things or psychic states cannot be directly tested since what is meant cannot ever be existentially present. Strong states that simplification and projection “bring the result-

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 46.

² Is Perception Direct, or Representative? *Mind*, 1931, p. 217.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 219, 220.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 220.

ing sense-datum in some respects nearer in its characters to the external thing signified,"¹ meaning that it more correctly reports that thing, but the grounds for such optimism are not apparent since further testing would merely present additional phantasms. If the real world cannot be intuited, how can it be asserted that color "disappears from the real world,"² that sensible size is an instance of "normal error," and that the spatial character of the datum "possesses partial truth"?³ By regarding the vehicle as necessarily a state of the self, and the given as a nonexistential universal or particular (essence or phantasm), no direct test of knowledge claims about the existent world is possible.

This point has been raised so often that it hardly needs stress, particularly since the critical realist, following the philosophic maxim of "when in difficulty, make a distinction," simply proceeds to distinguish the nature and test of truth (falling back frequently upon "pragmatic" tests which no critical pragmatism would recognize as adequate), or entering upon an encomium in favor of "animal faith and instinctive trust" to assure himself and his reader of the existence of an external world and of some knowledge about this world. Were the position merely that many statements about existences could not be verified by experiencing what is intended, it would hardly be called in question by realists; it is the extremity of the position that no such claim can be so verified which arouses attention and opposition.

Two main reasons for the denial that events as given may be existent parts of the object are found in the occurrence of perceptual error, and in the alleged impossibility of rationally conceiving the object to possess the data by which it is known. The second reason is prominent in the

¹ *Essays*, p. 103.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 174, 175.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 175.

writings of Lovejoy and Broad, and will be considered later; Strong stresses the problem of perceptual error. Attention must now be turned to the question whether what is called perceptual error requires that the given be regarded as an essence or as a phantasm.

It may be noted that if it were possible to hold that givenness as such (intuition of content) is not knowledge, and that what Strong sharply distinguishes as cognition and intellection, perceiving and thinking, perceptual and conceptual error, differ only in degree, both being symbolic,¹ referential, and predictive, there would be no need to maintain that what is given is a homeless essence or an equally homeless phantasm, called down from a unique realm of being or produced by a simplification and projection of psychic states. And if, further, the physical world can be conceived as housing given events, there would be no motive for regarding the given as either mental or neutral.² The problem of knowledge would then become in both cognition and intellection (in Strong's use of the terms) solely the problem of the correctness of a symbolic reference capable in at least some cases of being verified, and this problem would not be complicated by the introduction of psychic states, neutral data, or panpsychism. In this event, the earlier view of Strong, held before he sharply distinguished sense-datum and sensation, could still be defended—the view, namely, that the sense-datum “is another existence in the same world with the object.”³ It is a plausible contention that not only was Santayana's “precious conception of essence” an unnecessary and compli-

¹ In perception the given event is itself symbolic of the whole of which it is a part; in conception additional symbols are involved.

² Neutral here means merely “neither mental nor a component of the physical world.”

³ “The Nature of Consciousness,” *Journal of Philosophy*, IX (1912), 567.

cating addition to Strong's analysis (as he now admits), but that the introduction of a phantasmic order of being will prove equally unnecessary.

57. ESSENCES AS MEANINGS: SENSAS AS EXISTENTIAL

In attempting to assess the doctrine of the datum as essence (which Strong now repudiates) and of the sense-datum as a phantasm (of the same order of being as a seen ghost), it must be noted that the critical realist in general includes both sensible content and meanings under the term "datum," and excludes physical objects (as in the case of Strong he often excludes both psychic states and physical objects). Is this lumping-together of contents and meanings justified? Are both alike nonexistent?¹ Is either justly regarded as a projection and simplification of psychic states? Consider the two cases of a flash of light seen in a dark room, and the complex "propositional essence," "There are many tigers in India." Even if the flash be regarded as a projection and fusion of psychic states, it is not clear that a complex meaning can be so regarded. The meaning is not projected, it is not an appearing thing, nor is it a fusion of a set of existences, psychic or otherwise. Such a meaning may justly be regarded as an essence.

It is possible that all the functions essence is required to perform are met by a limitation of essence to the phenomena of meaning as empirically described. Empirically, the carriers of the meaning relation or function may be regarded as items discoverable in the observed world, and need not be sought for among a class of non-given psychic states. Knowledge would arise when the claimed character of the object embodied in the meaning is found to be the character of the object, and error would arise when this is

¹ Strong notes: "Sensible qualities are non-existent in the sense in which phantasms (e.g. ghosts) are not real things."

not so. By a compounding of meanings, nonexistent objects may be intended. A recognition of the place of meaning in knowledge justifies the view that knowing always involves an essence (meaning), and makes comprehensible the existence of error. At the same time it is compatible with the affirmation that not only essences are given, and with the denial that what is given is a condensation and projection of psychic states. A limitation of "essence" to "meaning", coupled with a symbolic account of meaning, offers the possibility of reconciling the contention of the critical realist that knowledge is mediated with the new realist attitude that existents, and not merely essences, may be given.

For Strong, however, sensible contents are phantasms and so nonexistent. Sensa are not, in their qualitative character, veridical appearances of physical objects, or completely veridical appearances of psychic states. In some way, a fusion of existents produces a nonexistent particular (a remarkable process, to say the least!).¹ This doctrine of the nonexistent nature of sensible content is regarded as necessary to account for such phenomena as perceptual error, hallucination, and mirror-images. In such cases it might seem that the datum is not a meaning and yet not an existent. The case of seeing on a white wall a red spot that is not "really there" may serve as a concrete example. For Strong, the error in such a case is perceptual and not inferential, to be sharply distinguished from conceptual error. A fused product of a psychic state is wrongly seen as a color on the wall.

There is certainly doubt as to the need of this analysis.

¹ Strong notes: "Behaving towards a white spot in a churchyard as if it were a spirit produces a ghost. Remarkable, but not unheard of!" But does it produce a new kind of nonexistent particular which is not merely a meaning? Is anything more involved than behaving as if the white spot meant what "ghost" means?

No verbal proposition need be formulated, but unless the given content or datum had some referential or symbolic character, and led to some expectation of further consequences, it might be plausibly held that no cognitional process is involved, veridical or non-veridical. The color must first be seen as a color-on-the-wall. Whether a given content is a component of a certain object, or an aspect of the subject, or neither, is a problem *for* knowledge—the mere presence of content need not be regarded as a case *of* knowledge. Without the element of meaning, without the imputation of the red color to the white wall, as something implying further and future consequences, truth or error would not arise.¹ That the red color is an event in the life of a psyche may well be true, but to hold that this color is a nonexistent essence or a phantasm is a position not demanded by the case. It would appear that when the vehicle of the meaning is not part of the object known (and it may be but need not be), the duality of vehicle and object does not imply that the vehicle is a non-given psychic state of the self, or that what is given is nonexistential. The vehicle may itself be part of the same order of existence to which the object belongs.

¹ Strong remarks: "Quite so—but it is imputed when you take it for physically real." But granting thus the factor of meaning or imputation in perception (which is compatible with a denial of the presence of concepts), perceptual error certainly must lie in the imputation or meaning and not in the content itself. The content is wrongly regarded as on the wall, but the content itself need not be a unique nonexistent particular, a phantasm. In the case in question further experience shows the content to be a component of the subject. To believe otherwise is to fall into the common critical realist confusion of meaning and content (function and existence) under the vague expression "datum." Elsewhere Strong writes of an object: "I perceive it as a book by being prompted to the act of opening and reading. This felt tendency to a particular reaction is, in effect, a judgement that the object is a book" (*Essays*, p. 201). Again: "The sense-datum is essentially an 'idea,' and when referred to an external place it becomes the idea of a real thing—an idea which may be right or wrong" (*ibid.*, p. 112). Here the failure to distinguish the content and its meaning-function is obvious.

This suggestion will receive expansion in the course of the chapter. In effect, the suggestion is that the truth in the critical realist's doctrine of essence must be embodied in an adequate theory of meaning, and that when so embodied, and when truth and error are frankly recognized as involving meaning (so that perceptual and conceptual error differ only in degree), the motive for reducing all sensible content to the status of nonexistential essences or phantasms is lost.

58. SANTAYANA AND THE REALM OF ESSENCE

One further development concerning the neutrality of the datum may be mentioned. At times Strong had argued as if essences constituted a unique realm whose being is not dependent upon being "in the mind" (p. 176), but this suggestion never received any elaborate metaphysical development. In Durant Drake, however, the realm of essences plays a more important metaphysical rôle: "The world of existents, vast as it is, is but a speck in comparison" to the "realm of essence."¹ The world of appearance is simply that part of the infinite realm of essence which is given. It is in Santayana, however, that the realm of essence obtains its most luxurious growth. Here what is given is regarded as a selection from the infinite domain of eternal, inert, and passive essences, essences which have no origin, which are not abstractions or tools of language, which are not mental, and which do not "exist." While in one sense essences are said to have no metaphysical status,² in another sense they are the "deepest form of reality,"³ and are "prior to existence."⁴ Spirit, the "living light" which falls upon es-

¹ *Mind and Its Place in Nature*, p. 197.

² *Scepticism and Animal Faith*, p. 78.

³ *The Realm of Essence*, p. 14.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 81.

sences, is generated by matter, and yet is "another realm of being."¹ However, "the admission that nothing given exists is not incompatible with belief in things not given."² Animal faith impels the belief in the existence of the physical organism in a physical world. Knowledge employs essences in the invasion of such a world, but since "all data are symbols,"³ knowledge is really belief—it is "faith mediated by symbols."⁴

Unless essence be interpreted in terms of meaning, and meaning be interpreted as a relation of natural events, the temptation to set essences apart in a separate realm is a great one, as the history of classic and contemporary thought makes evident. That the erection of such a realm is beset with difficulties is clear in the case of critical realism.

If the essence is, as Strong did and Drake does maintain, an "imputation," a projection and simplification of psychic states under the urge of action, it would appear to follow that without such states and such behavior essences are doubly nothing, and that accordingly an essence must be given to be at all.⁵ If it be said that essences are simply selected in the process of behavior, the question arises as to why it is easier for a biological organism to intuit essences than to intuit things. In the degree to which the cleavage between essence and existence is sharpened, the biological plausibility of the position is weakened. It is not

¹ *Scepticism and Animal Faith*, p. 288.

² *Ibid.*, p. 105.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 98.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 164. In a lucid article, "Literal and Symbolic Knowledge," *Journal of Philosophy*, XV (1918), 421-44, Santayana seems to admit that in some cases, such as a map, the symbol is "a full-fledged thing, in the same world as the object" (p. 439). However, in virtue of his doctrine of knowledge, the given as such is regarded as symbolic of the natural world which cannot itself be literally given. The symbol then lies in a different medium from what it signifies: "Signs can not be parts of what they signify, nor essences parts of things" (p. 442).

⁵ This is admittedly true of a phantasm; it has being only while given.

difficult to think of a biological organism acting as if something existed which did not exist, but it does strain the imagination to see how a biological organism acting in a world of things makes this adjustment via a realm of non-existent essences which somehow float in at the proper moment between the organism and its world, and somehow have relevance to this world and reveal its nature. The difficulties of explaining this remarkable co-operation of the subsistential and the existential renders more natural the view that the items which are the vehicles of knowledge are part of the same nexus of reality as the reacting self and the world reacted to. Strong writes that "Nature would have difficulty in hiding from beings who are parts of herself," a difficulty, one would believe, which would extend to hiding herself under or revealing herself through non-existent essences.

Santayana admits that "all data are symbols," but apparently would not hold that essences are intrinsically symbolic. Since, however, the symbolic status is the essential thing for knowledge, there is no advantage in holding that the vehicle of the symbol is itself an essence rather than a part of nature. If the term "essence" is limited to the symbolic or meaning relation, there is no compulsion to say that all that is given is an essence or that nothing which is given exists. In general, it is truer to say that what is given is not an essence than to say that essences alone are given. What is given may be a component of nature and a vehicle by which something else, also a component of nature, is meant.¹ An adequate doctrine of symbolism, in which meaning is relationally described, may do without a "realm" of essence, and may strengthen the new realistic contention that what is given is a natural existent.

¹ Lovejoy's denial that this possibility is realized will be discussed in the course of the chapter.

The phenomena of universals might be regarded as presenting an obstacle to this analysis. But even if there are identical objects, identical characters of different objects, or identical meanings, the identical element need not be given the status of an essence which appears now here and now there. The universality of the essence may still be found in the fact of meaning, that is, in the fact that one vehicle refers to all the instances of the identical element. That there are such identical elements may itself be doubted. To modify a phrase used by Broad in connection with substance, there may be "degrees of universality" without there being any pure instance of universality. Universality would thus become, like substance, a normative concept. Unless an absence of noticed or relevant difference be taken as proof of ultimate identity, there is no reason to regard two reds as ever being identical for all purposes and all observers. Nor is the claim that two meanings may be identical strengthened by the position that an essence is a projection and simplification of a state of the self. When it is recognized that a proposition is an abstraction from a judgment, and when the complex temporal, contextual, and physiological conditions of meaning are taken into account, it becomes highly doubtful that two meanings are ever exactly the same. The conception of degrees of universality opens the way for an account of universality in terms of symbols. In any case, it is not clear that the problem of universals makes impossible the view that the truth of the doctrine of essences is explicable in terms of an adequate theory of meaning.¹

¹ Whitehead's discussion of the relation of proposition and judgment (*Process and Reality*, pp. 293, 294) supports this uniqueness of meanings. Whitehead, however, retains a realm of eternal objects. Sellars' "Critical Realism and Substance," *Mind*, N.S., XXXVIII (1929), 473-88, contains an illuminating treatment of universals as arising *in mente*.

59. THE DOUBLE-ASPECT DOCTRINE: DRAKE,
MORGAN, SELLARS

Strong's contention that psychic states form "the inner being of brain-processes," that mind and the brain are the same thing seen from two different points of view, may be considered in connection with the positions of Professors Durant Drake, Roy W. Sellars, and C. Lloyd Morgan. And with this, a passage is made to the second main problem of the discussion of critical realism.

Drake, like Strong, distinguishes mental states from what is given. He writes:

I suggest that the mind *is* the brain; *i.e.*, that it is that cerebral mechanism which receives impressions from the outer world and evokes adjustments of the organism. In using the term "mind," we are conceiving these cerebral events as they are on the inside, so to speak; *i.e.*, we are thinking of their substance. When we use the term "brain," we are looking at them from the outside, through our sense-organs; that is, we are exteriorizing our own mental states and thinking of the brain in terms of *them*. Or we are thinking of them in terms of the atoms and electrons of physical science.¹ [In brief] the mind *is* the reality which, when cognized through the senses, we call the brain.²

This position bears an obvious similarity to the Spinozistic metaphysics, modified in the direction of a Leibnizian pluralism. While there is a plurality of units, there is still a single universal stuff both psychic and extended, and the physical and the psychical "are simply two aspects of a single set of events."

The unrestricted double-aspect doctrine is also at the basis of C. L. Morgan's thought.³ There is for him "a two-

¹ "What Is a Mind?" *Mind*, N.S., XXXV (1926), 234.

² *Ibid.*, p. 235.

³ In the doctrine that mind includes both the minding and the minded, the doctrine of mind as intentional act is combined with the view that what is given is mental. These motives, together with the emphasis on emergence, are not found in Drake (see *Emergent Evolution*, p. 41).

fold story of one natural order of events.”¹ Every event has both a physical and a mental side. Even emergence is *within* a psychophysical world: the “duality of nature does not *arise* in the course of evolutionary advance; it is there *ab initio*.”² In language suggestive of Spinoza, the mental and the physical are regarded as “kinds” and emergence is restricted to the modes within each kind.³

What the mental concomitant of inorganic nature is, Morgan does not say; he simply calls it the “other than physical.” But concerning mind at the organic level, he has much that is important to say. Here mind is characterized primarily by subjective awareness (the *ings* of tasting, touching, imagining, remembering, and the like) and by objective reference (involving the corresponding *eds*).⁴ Concomitant with each level of reference (percipient, perceptive, and reflective) is the level of awareness involved in sense-experience, fore-experience, and fore-planning.

Corresponding to influences from the environment which produce changes in the physical side of the subject is a concomitant subjective awareness which is the arrowhead of an objective reference to the environment.⁵ The result is that “with each item of physiological process we may hyphen an item of subjective awareness.”⁶ This conception of

¹ *Life, Mind, and Spirit*, p. 46.

² *Ibid.*, p. 232. “There is no emergent step from the physical to the mental” (*Mind at the Crossways*, p. 172).

³ *Mind at the Crossways*, p. 28.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 47. The relation of this analysis to intentionalism was noted in the discussion of Husserl. The account of the levels of reference, meaning, the symbol, guidance, and the like is important, and, like much of intentionalism, is in harmony with a functional point of view.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 77, 92. There is “a deep-seated background of awareness” in addition to the specific *ings* (p. 117), more in the system of awareness than “the feathered ends of reference” (p. 83).

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 50.

"the organism as body-mind"¹ is clearly a substantive conception, while the emphasis upon reference seems to avoid a subcutaneous solipsism.²

A form of restricted double-aspect theory, leading to the concept of a brain-mind instead of a body-mind concomitance, is represented by Roy W. Sellars.

For Sellars, that which is given is an existent, personal, psychic, and subjective in nature.³ The datum is "in the individual percipient" (p. 33): it is an "intracortical occurrence" (p. 39), arising "*in* the organism" (p. 51). In place of a mind conceived dualistically, or a brain pictured in the fashion of physical science, the conception of a "brain-mind" is proposed, a view regarded as avoiding the "too hasty" rejection by the new realist "of an internally rich, functioning mind."⁴ The desire is expressed "to achieve an adequate idea of mind which will harmonize the conclusions of behaviorism with those of the more traditional psychology" (p. 315). To accomplish this we must "deepen our conception of the brain as at once activity and content. It is sensori-motor, ideo-motor; it is a stream of tendencies lit up by consciousness" (p. 316). While in general "mental processes are brain-processes" (p. 302), consciousness is regarded as a particular specialization of such

¹ *Ibid.*

² Avoiding general criticism for the moment, one point may be brought forward. Morgan is anxious to make mind causally effective. He regrets that some readers have found epiphenomenalism in his theory of unrestricted concomitance. While his theory of guidance of behavior by objective reference is, at least to me, convincing, I do not see that mind as subjective awareness can make any difference whatever. If there were no mind-story in the sense of subjective awareness, how would the life-story differ? Surely there can be no interaction between concomitant aspects.

³ *Evolutionary Naturalism*, p. 32. Mental is regarded as meaning "*non-physical, bound up with the organism, open to inspection*" (p. 60). Unless otherwise noted, page references will be to this volume.

⁴ "A Re-examination of Critical Realism," *Philosophical Review*, XXXVIII (1929), 443.

processes. It is "a term for data open to inspection and analysis. Of it, alone, do we have acquaintance. It follows that the *setting* of consciousness in the brain cannot be given in the same way that the psychical is given. In other words, by the very nature of the case we are precluded from witnessing the ontological linkage of consciousness with the being of the cerebral processes" (p. 310).

This view implies that there are two kinds of knowledge. The objects of the external world are regarded as cognitionally given, but not as existentially given. In this case "knowing is never a literal givenness of the object in the private stream of consciousness."¹ Rather it is "mediated revelation," "*resting on* mediations of all sorts, sensory and conceptual."² The knowledge of the external world is simply of the order or structure of this world.³ There can be no comparison between the idea or vehicle and the object, since the object is never existentially given: "If, by hypothesis, our knowing is mediated by ideas we cannot know objects apart from them. And that's that."⁴

In endeavoring to gain a habitat for the "logical ideas" which mediate knowledge, without erecting a realm of subsistence, Sellars introduces another kind of knowledge in which the element of mediation, so rightly insisted upon by critical realism, is lacking.⁵ We are told that "in consciousness we are literally on the inside of being in the case of our brains. *Consciousness is a qualitative dimension of being characteristic of this high level of emergent evolution.* I have called this the double-knowledge approach to the mind-body problem."⁶ The result is that except for the identi-

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 441.

² *Ibid.*, p. 445.

³ *Mind*, N.S., XXXVIII (1929), 486, 487.

⁴ *Philosophical Review*, XXXVIII (1929), 449.

⁵ Here is a sharp divergence from Strong and Drake.

⁶ *Mind*, XXXVIII (1929), 487; cf. *Evolutionary Naturalism*, pp. 306, 307.

fication of datum and mental state (a view which makes possible a direct intuition of mental states), Sellars' conception of the brain-mind is not basically different from that of Strong and Drake. In all cases the brain seen from the inside is psychic, and the conception of the brain is "wonderfully enlarged" by the attribution to the brain of the material garnered by an introspective or inspective psychology.¹

60. THE BASIC CONFUSION OF THE DOUBLE- ASPECT THEORISTS

The doctrine that the human mind is the body or the brain seen from the inside seems to offer a simple way of reconciling a common physical conception of the world with an ontology which does not neglect the sensible and the mental aspects of reality. To those who believe in the existence of psychic states or conscious stuff revealed by inspection or introspection it offers a reconciliation of these deliverances with those of "outer" perception.

Such a concomitance, whether restricted or unrestricted, is speculative: Morgan frankly "acknowledges" (postulates) the double-aspect ontology, granting that there is no empirical proof possible. This postulate gains its claim to significance only if it is first shown that there exist intrinsically physical and mental components of reality which stand in need of reconciliation. For Morgan it is the belief in subjective awareness, for Strong and Drake it is the introduction of psychic states, for Sellars it is the mental status of the given which poses the problem met by the double-aspect ontology. Starting with two realms, a uni-

¹ Differences arise in virtue of Sellars' use of "emergence." Since Sellars holds that sensory qualities, like all mental events, are emergents at the level of the brain, he is able to admit the emergence of the psychical from the non-psychical, and thus to avoid panpsychism.

fication of the two is obtained by regarding one as the other seen from the "inside."

Both the existence of the original cleavage and the legitimacy of the later union are doubtful. The first part of this proposition has already been discussed at some length. Neither in the substance theories, nor in idealism, nor in intentionalism has the existence of the intrinsically mental been demonstrated, and the critical realists who have figured in the preceding discussion have given no ground for modifying this conclusion.

There are, of course, given events. Most, if not all, of these events are found to be discriminable members of substantives. At least some of these substantives are "physical." The term "physical" is highly ambiguous, certainly as much so as the term "mental." At the level of a sophisticated physics it has become smart to define the physical as that which satisfies the laws of physics. In some cases it almost seems to be suggested that physicists once convened in the early dawn of history, laid down the laws of physics, and have since gone through the world with these laws as a torch determining what is physical and condemning the rest to the realm of the shades. But, in truth, long before the laws of physics were conceived of, men had been dealing (for "dear life") with things that could be grappled with, handled, moved, and measured—physical things. It was in the quest for the ways such things moved, and could be moved, that the laws of physics arose. From the beginning the physicist's interest neglected many of the characters of such things, and gradually the object of the physicist came to be regarded as the physical object. Such is the autocracy of a dominant interest. As physics has advanced, interest has in many cases been lost even in the physicist's object of the past, and the concern with matter and motion has given way to a preoccupation with rela-

tional structures. The legitimacy of such a step is not hard to understand, although its justification is the business of the physicist; in any case the physicality of the empirical thing is not in the least affected by the course of theoretical physics. The physical world was not in the first place, nor need it be in the last place, the world of the physicist.

Physical objects are qualified objects. If the term "physical" be applied to the substantive as such, then the color of a physical tree is physical only in the sense of being a component of a physical substantive. Nevertheless, such an elliptical expression is clear, and will be adopted. If it be preferred, the color could be called "neutral" to emphasize that it is the substantive as such and not the components into which it can be analyzed to which the term "physical" is applied.

According to previous chapters, there is no clear evidence of immaterial substantives. In that case, all given items can be called "neutral" (as *only* components of physical substantives), or, as is here preferred, "physical" (as components of physical substantives). In either case, there still remain non-functional relations between physical objects and between components of such objects, and functional relations (such as are involved in meaning) which are not properly called physical.

This analysis may now be applied to the organism and the brain. The organism is one physical substantive among others, and given in the same way and to the same degree. Like other objects it is qualified, but empirically it can only be given those qualities which it is discovered to have. There is no need, however, to hold that a substantive is exhausted by what appears in any specific perspective or from any specific point of view. Not all of the characters of an object observable in one perspective can be observed

in other perspectives.¹ The organism, for instance, as observed by the biologists may be only a part of a more inclusive substantival whole. Most readers will admit that they are more than the combined report of biologists would show. It is this fact which is at the basis of such vague distinctions as that between observing from the inside and from the outside. The point here insisted upon is that the difference between the contents of the perspectives is a matter of more and less, and not the difference between the inside and the outside (interpreted as the mental in contrast to the physical) of a two-sided substantive.

Emotions, pains, images, kinesthetic sensations, and the like may be regarded as further components of the same substantive as the biologist studies. Again there appears the problem of terminology. The substantive as such may be called a "self," a term which then includes the organism proper, that is, the self as seen by the biologist. Such events as emotions and pains may be called "physical" (as components of a physical substantive), or "neutral" (as only components of such an object), or even "psychical," when this term means only that the components of the self or psyche so designated cannot be given to an outside observer, whatever co-ordinate center be chosen.² Whatever be the choice (and again preference is felt for the term "physical"), no double-aspect theory is involved, nor is any warrant given for attempting to localize the entire field of the given as the inside of the brain or organism.³ In no per-

¹ It is planned to discuss fully at a later time the important methodological problems involved in the position of the text.

² With this use of "psychical," apparently the only legitimate use, it must be noticed that "physical" and "psychical" are not contrary or contradictory terms: *the psychical is a subdivision of the physical*. It may be added that no reason is seen for identifying physical with the object-of-this-physicist. Which physicist, which period of physics, and which branch of physics is to give the criterion?

³ The speculative character of the identification of experienced content and brain states is brought out by the fact that R. B. Perry, as a new realist, while

spective are brain states perceived to have psychic insides, or to house the *ings* and the *eds* of experience.

The double-aspect theory first accepts and then tries to soften a dualism. It gains its apparent plausibility by drawing from the legitimate distinction between what is observed in the perspective of the self and not in the perspectives of others, the illegitimate (or, at the least, the dubious) conclusion that the content of the former perspective is the "inside" of the content of the latter. The difference may seem to be slight, since the alternative position suggested admits with the Spinozist that the self or psyche is not exhausted by the accounts of the biologist, and that, in that sense, there is a domain of the psychical. But in reality the differences are great. If the self-observer and the outside observer are only seeing different components of one and the same substantive, no psychophysical parallelism results, since all components alike are physical in the sense of being components of a physical substantive; "introspection" reveals no domain of pure consciousness;¹ the psychical is not destined to be an otiose accompaniment of physical processes; and no motive is left for mentalizing the field of the given in its entirety.

It may then be said that the given includes contents which are components of objects and those which are components of the self, but nothing which must be set off as intrinsically mental. Knowledge must then require a physical datum, and error must be sought not in a class of neu-

accepting the distinction of "the mind within" from "the mind without," identifies the objects given in the former perspective with the parts of the environment responded to when the response is seen from without. Hence for him, as opposed to the critical realist, the identification is of object responded to and experienced content (see "The Mind Within and the Mind Without," *Journal of Philosophy*, VI [1909], 169-75).

¹ Psychology may, on this view, rightfully resume its title of the science of the self or psyche, and recognize that the introspectionist (who reports on the psychical) and the behaviorist give complementary reports on the same object, give the "less and the more" of the self.

tral phantasms or essences, but in the indicative or referential function which physical data may assume.

61. LOVEJOY'S ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF DUALISM

The suggestion that given events may be regarded as physical is in direct opposition to Professor Arthur O. Lovejoy's claim that given contents must be regarded as irreducibly mental.¹ Lovejoy's own view illustrates the third major alternative found among critical realists, the view that experienced contents, the vehicles of knowledge, are mental existents. Lovejoy accordingly rejects the double-aspect theory and with it a substantive view of mind. In a sense, therefore, his views fall outside the scope of the chapter, but since his defense of psychophysical dualism, and his belief that no theory has succeeded in giving a physical status to experienced events, are incompatible with previous suggestions and with a purely functional theory of mind, it is advisable to consider in some detail the grounds for Lovejoy's opposition to the modern stormers of the dualist's heaven, and the theory which he himself defends.

According to Lovejoy, the opponent of psychophysical dualism "must either prove that the percept or the memory-content is identical with the object perceived or remembered, or, if not that, he must definitely show how and where *another* place *in the physical world* is to be found for both percepts and memories," as well as for all "wild" data and affective states.² The phrase "in the physical world"

¹ Lovejoy's views have much in common with those of C. D. Broad. Both reject epistemological monism and the existential givenness of the physical world, and both accept an act of awareness and the existential status of the given, but while Lovejoy regards the given as mental, Broad does not. Broad's position is therefore a "neutralism," but no less opposed to the claim that given events are components of physical objects than is Lovejoy's.

² *The Revolt against Dualism*, p. 32. Second italics mine. Unless otherwise noted, page references to Lovejoy will be to this volume.

indicates Lovejoy's procedure: there are first set up the criteria for admission to the physical world, and then, by definition, all that does not meet these criteria is judged as mental, the exhibition of such entities completing the argument.

The nature of these criteria, and the reasons for refusing given content a place in the physical world, are stated by Lovejoy as follows: "To be physical means (to repeat our definition in part) to be, at the least, a factor in the executive order of nature apart from being perceived; to be potentially common to the experience of many percipients, as an external cause of their sensations if not as an actual datum; and to conform to the laws of physics." Given data, however, have none of these "accepted marks of physicality. They are destitute of causal efficacy, at all events unless they are perceived; they give no evidence of continuing to exist and undergo regular changes when unperceived; they are strictly private affairs, accessible only to the consciousness connected with the brains that severally beget them; so far as we have any knowledge of them, they do not conform to physical laws. They are much more like 'ideas' than they are like anything that has ever previously been called a physical object."¹ Since all given data are similarly regarded, the world as given (together with the accompanying awareness) is classed as mental or psychological, a "putative offspring of the brain."

If it be desired to oppose this conclusion, three approaches suggest themselves: (1) to deny that given items fail to conform to the proposed criteria of the physical; (2) to deny that data are mental simply because they are not physical; (3) to deny the adequacy of the definition of the physical.

The first approach is of some interest, but can hardly

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 106, 107.

justify itself in any convincing fashion. Lovejoy's position is based both upon the claim that given events are emergent upon the presence of the organism (pp. 48, 49) and upon the claim that such events have no existence when not given (pp. 103-6).¹ If a plausible case could be made out that given events are selected, then of course such events could be regarded as existent and causally efficacious when unperceived, and could be a potential cause of the experience of many percipients. Although there may still be something to say in favor of a selective view (particularly as regards the presence of relational structures), in the light of Broad's criticisms in *Perception, Physics and Reality*, and in the face of the attitudes of biologists and psychologists, it will hardly be denied that at least some given events are dependent for their existence upon the organism. Nevertheless, the question might still be raised as to whether the existence of organically conditioned events necessarily coincides with their period of givenness. Images might continue after the conditions of their genesis had ceased, and objects wear as an afterglow the colors due to the gracious organisms which had wandered among them. Lovejoy, however, holds that "in all probability, sense-awareness and its immediate objects are generated together and are incapable of existing separately" (p. 186).

Certain of the phenomena of abnormal psychology might seem to support the view that sensory contents exist when not given. Then, too, a color exposed to sunlight and only perceived intermittently seems to undergo changes as regular as the fire which is looked at from time to time, and it is not impossible that the same is true of images. In such a case, colors and images might be regarded as not only ex-

¹ "The *sensa* are sensed. Through what revelation is it disclosed to us that they *could* exist unsensed—in other words, that what is empirically an invariable concomitant of their occurrence is not an indispensable condition of it [p. 104]?"

istent, but as also causally efficacious when not given. It would still be true that such events are private, and here the only recourse would be to doubt whether mere *de facto* privacy is a satisfactory criterion for the non-physical. It might be argued that there are many physical objects which in actuality can be the datum of (or a cause of the datum "in") one and only one observer. If it be said that potentially they are public, it may be replied, as Mead has done, that if we were all joined like the Siamese twins, images might be sharable, i.e., that they too are "potentially" public.

Not much faith can be put in these possibilities. Obviously, *sensa* may be given without consciously being noted or perceived, and perhaps without being the object of an "act of awareness," but where givenness requires presence in a perspective conditioned by an organic center, and when it is admitted that the events in question are so conditioned, there remains no further sense in which events that are given may be said to exist when not given. Even a co-conscious event is given in this sense, although not present in the same perspective as are the events which can be consciously noted and perceived by the then dominant personality. While, therefore, some results of interest might be gained by attempting to deny that given events are not physical in the sense of Lovejoy's proposed criteria, the attempt does not seem destined for high success. It can hardly be denied that at least some events are mental when judged by these criteria, particularly since the latter require that to be physical an event must be causally efficacious when not given.

The second alternative mentioned was the denial that the mental is adequately defined as the non-physical. Here a stronger case can be made. By regarding the mental as that which is cast off by the physical, no meaning is given

to the term not conveyed by the colorless term "non-physical."¹ A mind, on the other hand, is felt as something essentially positive, something connected with thinking, guidance of behavior, mental disease, and the like. By its origin the adjective "mental" connotes something of the nature of mind, some component or activity of mind, and not something that is merely other than physical. Lovejoy's use is confusing in other respects. There is some doubt as to whether relations are properly called physical, and yet it would be opposed to ordinary usage to call them mental. Does a particular instance of the relation "between" conform to the laws of physics? If it does not, then an instance of this relation between physical things is mental to that extent, although physical in other respects, such as in existing when unperceived. It is often said that the unique features of a thing escape the laws of science. If this is so, then while such features of a thing may be physical in terms of certain of Mr. Lovejoy's criteria, they are mental in the sense of not conforming to the laws of physics.² On such grounds, it is evident that the purely negative definition of the mental is not satisfactory,³ and doubt is raised as to whether the criteria for the physical form a consistent set.

The third alternative, like the second, is directed against

¹ This observation brings out the unsatisfactoriness of a definition in terms of the contradictory of a specified class. As Morris R. Cohen remarks: "If we divide the total universe into two mutually exclusive classes or substances, one of these will have to be defined in purely negative terms; and all negative classes are essentially indefinite" ("The Distinction between the Mental and the Physical," *Journal of Philosophy*, XIV [1917], 266). Titchener's criticism of Bain's view of mind is based upon this same point (*Systematic Psychology*, pp. 154-57). The game can be played both ways: if the mental is defined as the symbolic or the intentional, and the physical as the non-symbolical, it is "proved" that images, pains, colors, shapes, and relations are all physical.

² I owe this observation to Mr. Lewis E. Hahn.

³ That is, a dualism of the physical and the non-physical is not in any significant sense a psychophysical dualism.

a basic definition, in this case the definition of the physical itself. Some evidence has been noticed to the effect that the demand that physical things must, in all their features, conform with the laws of physics is not always in harmony with the demands of the other criteria. What, it may be asked, of the other criteria themselves? Except for one point, these criteria seem to be acceptable to any realist. That physical objects are spatio-temporal existences "in the executive order of nature apart from being perceived," and are "potentially common to the experience of many percipients, as an external cause of their sensations if not as an actual datum," no realist need question.¹ But why, a realist may legitimately ask, is it necessary that every character or attribute of a physical object must meet all the criteria for the physical object as such? Why may not certain given events be regarded as characters of physical objects, even though characters only in the presence of the organism? Such events would then be physical in the sense of being characters of physical objects.² Not all such characters need fall within the scope of physics, since physics deals only with a tamed and mutilated physical object: the physicist's object is less than the physical object.³

The only significant difference between this view of the physical and Lovejoy's view arises out of the fact that Lovejoy equates the physicist's object with the physical

¹ Nor need it be denied that physical objects conform to the laws of physics. This criterion introduces no inconsistencies if it is not required that every character of such an object obey such laws.

² Such terms as "character," "aspect," "attribute," and "component" are capable of subtle distinctions. For our purposes, however, the only important distinction is between such terms and the term "part." A part of a physical object is always itself a physical object, but a character of an object is not another object.

³ Lovejoy admits with Meyerson that physics deals with only a part of the world, but he could not consistently admit that it deals with something less than the whole of physical objects.

object, and that in conformity with one tradition in physics (the Newtonian tradition) he denies to the object of the physicist any of the qualities it wears in the presence of organisms. He is willing to grant that the character of a piece of iron differs in the neighborhood of a magnet, but not that certain given events can be regarded as the characters of things in the neighborhood of an organism. Why this distrust of the organism? Why should not the emergent characters which physical things assume under certain organic conditions be really their characters, physical characters as characters of physical things? By leaving out this one insistence that the physical be defined as the imperceptible, a position is reached which allows full justification to the physicist's object, without having to deny that physical objects are directly given, or to mutilate the term "mental," or to hold that no claims made about physical objects are ever capable of direct verification.

62. A DEFENSE OF OBJECTIVE RELATIVISM

Lovejoy would hardly be placated by the suggested emendation. The proposed view is a form of objective relativism,¹ and objective relativism has been pronounced a failure. While no claim has here been made that every given event is a character of an object other than the subject, Lovejoy's criticisms apply even to the double claim that some given events are characters of objects external to the percipient organism, while the rest, although also physical, are characters of the percipient organism itself.

¹ Not a form, however, which has pure acts, or eternal objects, or which reduces all reality to perspectives, or which asserts that no given event is a character of the self. For a presentation of some aspects of objective relativism, see the articles of Arthur E. Murphy, "Objective Relativism in Dewey and Whitehead," *Philosophical Review*, Vol. XXXVI (1927); "The Anti-Copernican Revolution," *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XXVI (1929). Mr. G. H. Mead had often described his doctrine in terms of the adjectives "objective" and "relative" (see *Journal of Philosophy*, XIX [1922], 158).

The two contentions are related, but warrant separate treatment.

According to this position, as Lovejoy notes, "a character, even though it is admitted to be causally, or even existentially, subjective,¹ might nevertheless be said to have attributive objectivity if it is *ascribable to the object of knowledge* as an attribute, *or to the place which the object occupies*" (p. 97). Objective relativism (as here defended) primarily asserts that although certain given events are emergent upon and exist only in the presence of a percipient organism, these events are objective in the sense of being existential attributes of the physical object attended to.

In part, again, Mr. Lovejoy's differences arise out of terminological differences. In so far as he defines "objective" as meaning existence independent of the percipient organism, and requires the objective relativist to prove that given events so exist (pp. 89, 148, 154), he of course scores an easy victory. But why should objective in the sense of "being a character of an external object" be required to mean "existing independently of percipient events"?

At times Lovejoy seems to admit the claim in question. He regards it as a platitude "that if a thing [or event] has a certain character in or by virtue of a certain relation, then it 'objectively,' i.e., truly, has that character; in short, that whatever exists 'relatively' nevertheless 'actually exists' " (p. 148). The claim is made a platitude, however, only by changing the sense of the statement in the second clause: the point is not merely that what exists relatively nevertheless exists, but that even if certain given events owe

¹ Causally subjective means that the organism is one of the causes of the event's existence; existentially subjective means that the event has no existence when not given.

their existence to an organism these events exist as genuine characters of physical objects. Since Lovejoy's polemic must, to possess any point, be taken as denying this claim, the position can hardly be regarded as a platitude.

As against that position, Lovejoy's central point (if I do not do him an injustice) is that given events cannot be located in the space of physical objects, where this is clearly conceived as equivalent to the physicist's space (pp. 32, 116-17, 262). It is insisted that no given contents can be in this space in any sense different from the apparent existence in space of a hallucination (p. 118).¹ So stating the issue involves a shift in the argument that must be noted. To say that given events are components or characters of physical objects is not necessarily to make any affirmation of the relation of such contents to space, and, in particular, is not to affirm that they are in the space of physics.² It must undoubtedly be held, in the fashion suggested by Russell and Whitehead, that such events have a place in some wider relational structure which includes the space of the physicist, but it need not be held that they are "in the physicist's world" as such. Indeed, if it be held that the

¹ This is part of the general claim that given data do not have the characteristics of physical objects: they are not public, they have no being in space aside from being perceived, they have no dynamic relations with physical objects, the mass of the planet does not vary with their appearance or disappearance (p. 187). These objections are very queer. They seem to assume that given events are things, rather than characters of things, and that because qualities are components of physical things, they must be parts of physical things, i.e., smaller physical things. The difference between characters of physical things and physical things is a poor basis upon which to claim a psychophysical dualism.

Another criticism of objective relativism made by Lovejoy concerns the topic of knowledge. He wonders if knowledge is possible at all for the objective relativist since to know means apprehending a fact "*not* relative to the special standpoint of the organism in an individual perception or judgment" (p. 129). This objection, too, is surprising, since that view does not make knowledge impossible in any sense that his own view does not, and, in fact, is assured of some knowledge of physical objects since such objects are at least in part given.

² Cf. Hume's insistence that smells, sounds, passions, and moral reflections "*may exist, and yet be nowhere*" (*Treatise*, Book I, Part IV, sec. 5).

physicist's object is a selection from a fuller and more complex physical object, and that the space of the physicist is the space of such objects, the demand that the objective relativist put all the qualities of objects in this space is grossly unfair. And yet this is the main theme of Lovejoy's argument. It is undoubtedly true that objective relativism has not worked out a complete philosophy of nature, that the wider relational continuum which includes physical space has not been fully worked out, and that much remains to be done in clarifying the actual methodology of the physical scientist, and Lovejoy has done well to point out the embryonic status of the whole movement, but the movement cannot be judged a failure just because it has not done what it has not aimed to do, and could not do if its own guiding assumptions are sound.

Nevertheless, it is not true that the objective relativist must renounce the attempt to regard some given events as characters of external physical objects, and as in the space of such objects. A seen color, when the color of an external object, has a different spatial status from an hallucinatory color.¹

Lovejoy's constantly recurrent example at this point is the case of seeing a star (pp. 31-32, 172). Owing to the finite velocity of light, the sensum, it is said, cannot be at the place where the star is, nor at any other place in space (p. 119). This means, I suppose, that if a Euclidean straight line were extended from the eye in the direction of the sensum, the line would not pass through the astronomer's star, nor would the sensum "really" be any place along this line. But surely the color is not hallucinatory even under these conditions. One might hold with the Russell of *The Analysis of Mind* that the star is an aggregate which includes the given event, regardless of the spatial spread. Or

¹ The status of such given events will be discussed in the following section.

more plausibly (since this still leaves the location of the sensum in doubt), one might regard the given event as the character of a physical process sent out from the star but now considered as a separate physical object, the quality, say, of a vibrating series of particles seen "head on." However, the conditions which Lovejoy apparently imposes in the case of a seen star are artificial to the relativist. Why in the relativist's world must a Euclidean straight line be extended out from the eyes?¹ And if not, why cannot the star be seen where it now is, so that the rest of the star lies along the line traced in going out in the direction of the sensum? To think that it would be anywhere else would be simply to make a false inference based on Euclidean habits of thought.

Since this position may seem novel, the point may be further expanded by considering the additional claim that the star is not only seen where it is, but also as it now is.² What is implied is that even in the case of a star the characters of the star in the presence of an experiencing organism are genuine attributes of the star. Even the stars owe something, however little, to the watchers of the night! This does not, of course, mean that the given event is the same event that would be given if one were elsewhere, say at the astronomer's star, but simply that under the conditions of the organism, the medium, and the finite velocity of light, the star itself assumes a certain character, name-

¹ Cf. F. B. McGilvary's discussion, "The Revolt against Dualism," *Philosophical Review*, XI. (1931), 255, 256.

² This was the contention of G. Dawes Hicks in an article in the symposium of the 1911-12 *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, entitled "The Time Difficulty in Realist Theories of Perception." Lovejoy discusses this thesis on pp. 62-67. Professor G. Dawes Hicks couched his argument in terms of a selective theory, while the present adapts the thesis to an emergent type of objective relativism. This change avoids many of the difficulties of the earlier presentation, particularly the implication that the character of the stimulus was irrelevant.

ly, the character that is seen. This character, further, is a present character and compresent with the process of experiencing. There is no question of a sensum being produced at the organic end of a long process and then projected out in some miraculous manner to the star: the temporal transmission of a stimulus from the star and the existence of certain organic conditions precede the existence of the field of givenness in which the star is seen to have a certain character. Nor is there any question of a character being at the star and then miraculously transmitted unchanged to an organism, or producing in the organism an exact duplicate of itself. The point is much simpler, merely that under the conditions in question the star has the character it is seen to have.¹

Certain of the objections which Lovejoy raised against G. Dawes Hicks's similar position, but based on a selective rather than generative view of the given, may be considered.² Concerning the case of seeing a star that has gone out of existence, the retort is that no such star can be seen. A star may die by degrees, but if it is seen, then all of it has not gone out of existence, since at least one of the components remains. There is no paradoxical attempt to render the specific character of the stimulus otiose, since the velocity of light becomes one of the conditions under which the event happens. There is no need for the satellite of Jupiter when first emerging from its eclipse considerably to "pause in its revolution until the light reaches the eye," since the phrasing of the problem assumes *a* first moment of emergence instead of admitting that the period of emergence from an eclipse depends as much upon the point of reference as does the setting of the sun. The objection that "if

¹ This position has obvious affinities to some aspects of Whitehead's affirmation of prehension and denial of simple location.

² *The Revolt against Dualism*, pp. 65-67.

we always saw things as and where they are, there would be nothing to explain" in the errors produced by refraction, should have no terrors to those who admit that knowledge is mediate, and that things are often thought to be where they are not. Finally, the objection that cameras do not postdate their report but show the star as it was when the light left it, and yet without any discrepancy with direct observation, may be met by denying that the camera showed the star when the light left it. The camera plate does not show anything, but has a character, as a result of the causal process, which is similar to the retinal image of the eye, and which, had it occurred in the proper organic setting, would have been one of the conditions under which the star was seen.¹

Since the example of the star is only an extreme case of the situation of seeing any object, and since sight presents no relevant differences from other cases of perceiving external objects by means of other senses, it is concluded that Lovejoy's arguments do not refute the position that some of the characters that things seem to have in the presence of organisms are actually the characters of things, and physical in the sense of being characters of physical things. His arguments do not show that any generative theory of *sensa* bifurcates nature (pp. 152, 153), nor that no part of the physical world "belongs to it solely by virtue of the occurrence of a perception" (p. 27). They gain their plausibility either by defining given events that owe their existence to the organism as subjective or by challenging the objective relativist to put his results in terms of the traditional physics, thus demanding the fulfilment of tasks which the program of objective relativism regards as impossible and unnecessary.

¹ Since there are no given events in the case of a camera, the analogy to seeing is not legitimate. The spot on the camera plate must be compared to the retinal image, not to the seen star.

Beyond this issue concerning the physicality of given events, there is no cause for further disagreement. That physical things are existent and causally efficacious when unperceived, potentially common to many percipients, and describable in terms of the laws of physics, the objective relativist may well agree. He as well as Lovejoy must justify a belief in the existence of such things, must develop an adequate theory of memory and error, and square himself with the question as to whether knowledge (including physical knowledge) is concerned with the given or the non-given characters or parts of physical objects. If anything, these problems are somewhat less acute for the objective relativist than they are for Mr. Lovejoy, since the former, unlike the latter, has only to render probable that there is more to physical objects than is or can be given, and not to prove that objects exist which by definition cannot be given, and since he can admit some knowledge of the physical world subject to direct verification. The objective relativist can agree with Lamprecht: "We never have the task of getting from the realm of 'psychic states' into the world of physical existences, but simply the task of getting from the world as it is partially perceived to the world as it is more largely inferred to be."¹

63. THE PLACE OF THE SELF AND THE SUBJECTIVE IN OBJECTIVE RELATIVISM

There remains another side to the problem. Lovejoy writes at times as if the objective relativist had set out to show that all that is given is an attribute of objects other than the organism as knower or perceiver, that sensory contents and dream contents are equally objective (p. 105).

¹ "The Metaphysical Status of Sensations," *Journal of Philosophy*, XIX (1922), 173. Objective relativism is compatible with either a realistic conception of the physical object, or with such a positivistic conception as is found in V. F. Lenzen's *Physical Theory* and in the movement of logical positivism.

If so, the task has surely been shown to be fruitless by the consideration of dreams, illusions, and hallucinations. An objective relativism, however, which does not undertake this task, and which refuses at this point to fall back upon either a neutralism or an immaterialism, must show how subjective or psychical events can be regarded as components of a physical object, in this case, the organism as subject. Attempts have been made by Russell and Dewey to defend such a position, and since both have been criticized by Lovejoy, a consideration of these attempts furnishes a convenient point of departure.

It has been noted that in *The Analysis of Mind* Russell had admitted that images could find no place in the physical world as components of physical things, and that in *The Analysis of Matter* he had regarded all given events ("percepts") as "inside our heads." Lovejoy remarks that this claim implies "that percepts are in 'physical space' [i.e., in some space common to them and to physical objects]" (p. 226). Nevertheless, a large part of the (often illegitimate) fun which Lovejoy and the reader have with this thesis of Russell rests upon retaining the notion that it is the head as conceived by the physiologist and physicist which is to house the field of the given. But since Russell in both books had referred to a "space" wider than but inclusive of the physical order (p. 242), and had expressly admitted that "there will remain a certain sphere which will be outside physics,"¹ there would be nothing to prevent Russell from conceiving the brain as a more inclusive substantive than the brain of physics and physiology, a substantive composed of images as well as physiological tissues. It is not clear that Russell himself had such a position in mind, but the view is not at all ridiculous. There may be good reasons for not calling this substantive a brain, and cer-

¹ *The Analysis of Matter*, p. 389; quoted by Lovejoy, p. 254.

tainly the phrase "inside our heads" is confusing and ambiguous since it seems to suggest that images might be found nestling among nerve cells, but the notion that there are physical substantives of a more inclusive order than the objects of the physicist, and that the head is such an object, is unaffected by Lovejoy's criticisms. His arguments gain their force through supposing that all the "extra" components of the brain are new physical objects in the physicist's space (and not, as he first said, in "some space common to them and physical objects"),¹ and through the difficulties and ambiguities of Mr. Russell's own extreme attempt to put all given contents into the brain, an attempt made necessary only by his departure from the new realistic attitude of *The Analysis of Mind*.

Russell's concentration on the brain does not seem a particularly happy one, since the brain is not a substantive separable from the rest of the organism. An emphasis upon the entire organism is suggested by Dewey, and for similar reasons. The issue as to whether any events are not members of physical wholes may be sharpened by the consideration of a specific and crucial case, brilliantly discussed in a controversy between Dewey and Lovejoy.² Dewey had argued that mentality is an adjective applied to a thing in virtue of its symbolic functioning, and that neither the thing meant, nor the thing signifying, nor the "meaning" itself is a mental existence.³ Lovejoy criticizes this as fol-

¹ Thus it is said that the surgeon removing a tumor from another brain must in reality be removing it from his own, as though Russell meant that the given events involved in perceiving a tumor themselves constituted the tumor in the physicist's sense. Similarly, he criticizes Russell for an intracranial dualism in which images and the like are physical in only a "shadowy" sense, implying again that images are rivals to the objects of the physical scientist (see particularly p. 239).

² *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XIX (1922). Dewey's article is entitled "Realism without Monism or Dualism"; Lovejoy's, "Time, Meaning and Transcendence."

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 357, 358.

lows: Before a thing can become a symbol it must evoke in experience a genuine surrogate of what is meant, and this surrogate, at least, is intrinsically mental. "To constitute a knowledge of an absent fire a present smoke is not enough; . . . the fire too must in some fashion be recognized as a part of the present content of the experience; and yet . . . , since the actual fire is truly absent, it can not, so to say, also be present *in propria persona*, but must be represented by a sort of deputy-fire, a true 'surrogate.'"¹ Since such a surrogate conforms to what the dualist has meant by an "idea" as contrasted with a physical thing, here, in a crucial case, the existence of content intrinsically mental is regarded as having been exhibited.

Postponing until the next chapter the details of Dewey's argument, it may simply be noted here that images are regarded as "qualities of *partial* organic behaviors, which are their 'stuff.'"² What is here suggested falls in line with the previous analysis. The implication is that what the biologist studies as the organism is only a selection from (although undoubtedly the major portion of) a wider substantive which includes those events given to self-observation called images. The same suggestion is applicable to all psychical contents, such as pains, kinesthetic sensations, and images. These component events are not "in" the organism as the blood is in blood vessel or as the green is on the tree, they are not themselves objects to be weighed on scales, they are not, in short, physical things, but attributes or characters of certain physical things under specific conditions, and as such (and only as such) they too may be called physical.³

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 538.

² *Experience and Nature*, p. 241.

³ It may be recalled that there is an alternative terminology which to some will seem preferable. It has not been employed here, since in the setting of Mr. Lovejoy's thought its use might give the appearance of avoiding the issue. The

In terms of the analysis of this and the preceding section, given events may in part be regarded as the characters of external objects and in part as characters of the subject, in part as in the space of the physicist and in part as not in physical space but in a wider relational continuum which includes the space of the physicist. Whatever be the relation of given contents to space, all such contents are physical in the sense of being components of physical objects.

To this claim Lovejoy might reply in the terms he used in connection with the doctrines of Russell and Whitehead: "The bifurcation does not disappear, but is merely shifted to another point" (p. 188). Even though all events are called physical, there still remains, he might say, the dualism between the full-blooded physical objects and such shadowy physical "event-objects" as images. Pink rats may have genuinely physical causes, but they do not have physical properties, they have no mass, and they do not conform to physical laws (p. 253). In general, "from the assumption that all mental existents have physical causes it does not follow that they exemplify the laws of physics, i.e., the laws supposed to hold good to the behavior of physical realities outside experience" (p. 253). With seventeenth-century thinkers Lovejoy agrees that "it is to the advantage of the philosophy of nature to keep the physical order homogeneous. They felt—and, as it seems to me, for sound reasons—that the admission of a radical discontinuity *within* it was more to be avoided than the admission of a radical discontinuity between it as a whole and an essentially distinct and disparate realm of being" (p. 240).

term "physical" may be left to the physicist, the term "object" be used in a sense wider than physical object, and all characters or components (but not parts) of objects may be called "neutral." There is not much to choose between the two terminologies: if the wide use of "physical" as employed above seems confusing, the use of "neutral" in the second alternative is contaminated with all the ambiguities of an equally confusing term.

If sound, the preceding discussion has somewhat shifted the field of discussion. The philosophers of the seventeenth century that Mr. Lovejoy speaks of were talking with the voice of physicists. Provided, however, that the physicist's order remains homogeneous, there is no reason to erect a dualism between this order and the rest of the world, between the physicist's object and the physical object of those who are not physicists. The whole course of thought after the seventeenth century shows the results of such a dualism. The fact that "the world of 'mental' entities served as an isolation-camp for all the 'wild data' " which disturbed the orderliness of the physicist's world (p. 29) is only of historical interest if the demands of the physicist can be met in other ways. The demands of the physicist were and are methodological and not metaphysical. However interpreted, his province has been won. It is the rest of "God's chilluns" who feel that their wings have been clipped. They are justified in holding that the difference between the physicist's object and their physical object does not coincide in any significant sense with the difference between the physical and the mental, nor with the distinction between given and non-given reality. The difference, of course, remains and must not be lost sight of. Pink rats are not billiard balls and should not be in any physics. Neither are emotions pink rats, nor are theories emotions—and these differences are likewise precious. An opposition to dualism need not be a clinical symptom of dyophobia, nor merely the expression of piety toward the word "one": it may equally well express a pluralistic insistence on the many differences of the characters of physical objects, related though they are in some wider and more complex fashion than physics need admit. The fact that physical characters or attributes of objects are not themselves phys-

ical objects is certainly no sufficient ground upon which to proclaim the failure of the revolt against psychophysical dualism.

64. AN EXAMINATION OF LOVEJOY'S ALTERNATIVE

A final glance may be given at the complications of Lovejoy's alternative position.¹ On his account,²

in sense-perception there is, first, a series of causally-linked events, conforming to ordinary physical laws, temporally and spatially inter-venient between the object and the peripheral nerve-terminus, and other series of such events within the nervous system; and there is, further, the wholly unique phenomenon of the production, as an effect of these neuro-cerebral processes, of certain non-physical entities and events, *viz.*, *sensa* and the awareness of them.³ There are, in short, changes in certain physical structures which generate existents that are not physical in the sense in which those structures are; and these non-physical particulars are indispensable means to any knowledge of physical realities.

The relation of such brain-begotten entities to the physical world, and the question as to how the physical world can be known by such entities, obviously present problems.

What is the ontological status of mental entities and acts of awareness, both emergent from brain processes? Lovejoy does not locate them in the brain, and his criticism of the attempt of Russell to do this is a significant dissent from the brain-mind doctrine of critical realism. Since such mental entities and acts of awareness are not located in any other part of the physical world, the resulting conception is of a physical order which at times generates entities of an-

¹ Cf. Arthur E. Murphy, "Mr. Lovejoy's Counter-Revolution," *Journal of Philosophy*, XXVIII (1931), 29-42, 57-71.

² *The Revolt against Dualism*, p. 319.

³ The first are examples of "psychical objects"; the second of "psychical events"; both are "transphysical" emergents ("The Meaning of 'Emergence' and Its Modes," *Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy*, p. 30).

other order. Emergence can do much, and perhaps this much, but such a world-view as found in Lovejoy and Broad saves the physical world for the physicist by the erection of a realm of existents whose relation to the physical world remains dark. Not only is man's "animal faith" that he can shake the universe by the hand and scan its face outraged,¹ but no clarification of ontology is gained as a reward. The essence wing of critical realism can justly point out its divergence from Descartes and Locke, but with a dualism of existents this divergence, as Lovejoy admits, is practically obliterated. Indeed, as a means of explaining the life of mind the Cartesian soul has advantages over a view which leaves mental events just hanging in the air, without even the substantiality of the brain-mind conception.

It might seem that the logical result of such a view is an epiphenomenalism: acts of awareness and intuited contents emerge from physical processes but do not themselves influence or modify physical processes. It would also seem that such a view makes the claim to knowledge precarious to just the degree that the given differs from the physical world.

Lovejoy is not unmindful of these difficulties, but in meeting them he seems to destroy, or at least to weaken, the grounds for dualism. While insisting upon the disparity between the given mental content and the non-given physical world, upon "two distinct planes of existence"

¹ Lovejoy's marginal comment that "it is epistemological dualism (which does not seem to be challenged), and not psychophysical dualism, which does this," points out an ambiguity that should have been previously noted. Lovejoy distinguishes two uses of epistemological dualism (pp. 15, 16): the first is essentially the claim that knowledge requires a vehicle (which is not opposed); the second is the contention that this vehicle cannot be part of the existent known, so that the object of knowledge is not given (a position denied in the preceding account). The acceptance of epistemological dualism has meant here merely the acceptance of the view that knowledge is mediate or vehicular.

conforming to "some sort of deeply significant doubleness in things"¹ he regards this bifurcation as falling within nature.² He admits with Meyerson that scientific explanation involves a restriction of interest to some part of nature and the banishment elsewhere of all refractory factors, a view not at odds with the position that physical science deals with an abstracted structure of the same process which includes the given. He likewise admits that psychical factors are involved throughout the process of making decisions, introducing a psychophysical interactionism, heaping scorn upon the epiphenomenalist.³ The given is seen not only to emerge from the physical but at times to influence the physical. In this case the given might plausibly be regarded as simply one stage in a process conditioned by certain factors in this process and in turn conditioning others. The ostensible psychophysical dualism would then reduce to a psychophysical duality—a way of recognizing that there are differences in nature and that the portion or

¹ "Reflections of a Temporalist on the New Realism," *Journal of Philosophy*, VIII (1911), 597, 598.

² Cf. "La théorie de la stérilité de la conscience dans la philosophie américaine et anglaise," *Bulletin de la Société Française de Philosophie*, 1925, p. 114: "Car, quoiqu'il y ait, comme je l'ai dit, une vraie 'bifurcation de la nature,' il n'y a pas deux 'natures.' Bien qu'il faille insister sur la disparité profonde entre le monde du physicien et le monde de nos données immédiates, ils sont tous deux réels, c'est l'ensemble de ces deux parties si disparates qui fait la réalité concrète. La nature contient les sensations, les images, les objets du rêve et de l'hallucination, aussi véritablement que les électrons et ce 'quelque-chose-qui-ondule.'"

In comment Lovejoy continues: "In other words, both are real, i.e., truly existent, and the one is derivative from the other, and, where it emerges, it causally interacts with the other: it is in this sense that they are said to constitute one 'nature.'"

³ "Pragmatism as Interactionism," *Journal of Philosophy*, XVII (1920), 632. Mr. L. E. Hahn has raised the question as to whether physical things, apparently subject to the doctrine of the conservation of energy in Lovejoy's interpretation, can be causally influenced by "mental" events. Lovejoy would seem to be as little entitled to interactionism as was Descartes. If, however, interactionism is insisted upon the self-containedness of the physical system is put in doubt and its metaphysical purity seriously soiled.

structure of nature studied by physics does not contain all the differences which actually exist. The question would then become relevant whether the marking of such differences indicates in any significant way the difference between mind and the physical world, or between the given and the non-given portions of nature. Morris Cohen's words would still be to the point: "I fail to see that he [Lovejoy] has ever met the point made by the neo-realists to the effect that the difference between the different levels of existence, such as between appearance and reality [or between the appearance and the non-appearing?], does not coincide with the difference between the mental and the non-mental."¹ Dewey has insisted that "dualities are just dualities, distinctions having instrumental and practical, but *not ultimate, metaphysical worth*," in short, that such dualities do not "indicate a radical existential cleavage in the nature of things."² Dewey criticizes Lovejoy for turning a logical or functional duality into an epistemological and ontological dualism.³ This conversion of duality and plurality into a psychophysical dualism is one basis of A. E. Murphy's recent criticism.⁴

Having ostensibly saved the physical from the intrusion of the mental, Lovejoy is himself forced to give the two realms enough in common to make knowledge possible. It is assumed that the two realms may both exemplify the same universals so that "the broad structural characters of

¹ "Qualities, Relations, and Things," *Journal of Philosophy*, XI (1914), 626.

² "The Realism of Pragmatism," *op. cit.*, II (1905), 326. Italics mine.

³ "Realism without Monism or Dualism," *op. cit.*, XIX (1922), p. 358.

⁴ *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XXXVIII (1931). Lovejoy remarks that "the question still remains of what specific sort the duality is. This question seems to me to be simply evaded by Dewey *et al.*" It is "not met by playing upon the terms 'dualism' and 'duality,' nor by saying that the differences between the two orders are merely 'functional' (blessed word!). I can see little more in much of this passage than the expression of piety towards the word 'one.'"

the perceptible are also the structural characters of the inferred-unperceived or imperceptible" (pp. 295, 296); and that "the external world with which I am in relation in action" is "fundamentally homogeneous with the perceptual world" (p. 300). Knowledge nevertheless remains precarious:

No judgment concerning a particular existent—other than the immediate and transient private datum, about which no act of judgment is necessary—can conceivably attain experiential verification in any literal sense; for the existent complex of ideas which is the content of the judgment can never, by any finite and temporal knower, be brought into the same locus with the existent to which it refers. Since our knowing is characteristically concerned with beyonds, we know by faith (p. 318).

Russell's position is regarded as issuing in an "intra-cortical solipsism"; by what many will regard as a questionable blending of faith and knowledge, Lovejoy glides over a mentalistic implication of his own position.

The doctrine that the task of knowledge is to grasp physical events underlying the world as given, is, even if in part justified, a caricature of the greater part of knowledge.¹ How much of the knowledge contained in an encyclopedia is of this character? How much of the knowledge of the social scientist, the physician, the explorer, the man of affairs? Lovejoy frankly falls back upon experiential tests in specific instances. It is remarked that in science a theory is used until it breaks down "by leading to inferences concerning the observable which do not accord with the facts" (p. 296). This constant appeal to the observable in scientific procedure only enforces the paradoxical character of the

¹ Lovejoy remarks that he has merely asserted that "some part of the task of knowledge is to do this if it can. If it can not do this at all, the obvious result is the idealistic variety of psychophysical monism." Aside from noting that phenomenalism and not a form of idealism would result, attention may be called to an alternative use of the term "knowledge." Knowledge may be restricted to the verified and verifiable without denying that non-verifiable propositions are believed for various reasons, good and bad.

claim that "it is never the true *cognoscendum* as an existent that is present to us as an actual experienced datum" (p. 318).

The issue would seem to reduce to these terms: if the given is regarded dualistically as a different order of existence, the relation of the two orders that is involved in choice and required by knowledge remains dark; if it is admitted that the given arises from and again enters into non-given processes, and if this wider world can convincingly be said to be known, the purported dualism collapses into a recognition of the dualities and pluralities which actually exist in the processes of nature. In this case the distinction between the given and the non-given cannot be satisfactorily regarded as marking the difference between two orders, mental and physical.

Grant, on the other hand, that the given is composed of attributes of physical objects, that given events are not intrinsically mental or cognitional, that mind and consciousness require a certain functioning of given contents, that the characters which physical objects assume in the presence of organisms are genuine characters of such objects, that knowledge involves following out the relations which bind the given to the rest of nature in which it is set and of which it is an instance, and the genuine differences between natural existents need not be transformed into a dubious psychophysical dualism or into a self-defeating epistemological dualism in which no knowledge claim concerning physical nature can be verified through the appearance of that which was intended.

65. THE STATUS OF CRITICAL REALISM AS A THEORY OF MIND

In bringing this chapter to a close, it is significant to reflect that in spite of centuries of criticism of the world-view

elaborated in the seventeenth century, the latest philosophy in time should be the nearest in spirit and results to this very world-view. With the Cartesians, the critical realist denies the direct presence of the physical world in experience, insists on regarding the given world as intrinsically mental, and holds some form of psychophysical dualism.¹ Two considerations at least help to explain this striking fact. Of immediate significance was the failure of new realism to carry through convincingly its program of pan-objectivism. Of deeper significance is the insistent power of the movement of natural science, a power which was in part gained by leaving to one side the qualitative richness of the experienced world.² The history of science gives no grounds for doubting the wisdom of the seventeenth-century program as far as science itself was concerned. The history of philosophy, however, suggests that in that program a methodological need (grounded on a factual basis, to be sure) was erected into a metaphysics which the factual basis itself would not support. Cartesianism gave a habitat in mind to those aspects of the world which a young science found it convenient to ignore. But as doubt came to be cast on the integrity of the host, philosophers became troubled as to the locus of the directly given world. The soul in its poverty could no longer house this world, and the realm of matter would not accept it. Small wonder that the concepts of the neutral and the substantial received such a warm embrace! But the cold arms of this ghostly mistress did not long give solace, and

¹ It is unnecessary to point out the many differences. The doctrine of substance drops out and a domain of essence is often introduced, but the major change is in respect to the nature of mind. Even here, both movements stress the substantial character of mind.

² The qualitative aspects of nature are constantly used by the physical scientist as clues and cues, but seldom obtain an honorable place in the final structure—a peculiar form of ingratitude.

the homeless waifs of the world longed for a flesh-and-blood resting-place. Could they perhaps find it in the organism as a whole or in the brain?

Critical realism answered this question in the affirmative, and its answer was reinforced by the vast increase in the knowledge of neural processes, and by the growing psychological and biological cast of contemporary thought. Here seemed a way to keep intact the temper of the scientific tradition, and still do justice to the experienced world and to the neglected "substantiality" of mind. The nervous system is obviously the modern substitute for the Cartesian soul.

Neglecting the difficulties in connection with knowledge, the problem of the relation of experience to the brain and the body has disturbed the redeeming simplicity of the brain-mind or body-mind doctrine. In the neutralist wing of critical realism, it is not experienced items which are put inside the brain, but inferred psychic states which by a process of fusion and projection allow essences or phantasms to be given. It has been noted that the existence of such psychic states is doubtful, that to regard them as the brain seen from the "inside" is to confuse the more or less of a thing with the inside and outside of a thing, and that on this approach the realm of the given still remains in a twilight zone between existence and nonexistence. If, on the other hand, datum and psychic state are identified, difficulties still appear. Where the psychic state is viewed as the brain seen from the inside, the foregoing comments are again applicable. If the contents of experience are regarded as mental existents emergent from brain processes, their relation to the physical world which they cognitively reveal becomes puzzling, and the substantiality of the brain-mind conception is lost: such contents have again become homeless waifs. In short, if given events are the

“insides” of the brain they are aspects of some physical objects, and again disturb the purity of the physicist’s world; if *sensa* are mental existents emergent from the brain and not characters or components of objects, the relation of *sensa* to the brain and to nature is as dark as in the days of Descartes—and the purity of the philosopher’s calm is disturbed.

In this situation it is impossible to resist the conviction that a new conception of mind and of nature is demanded which will do full justice to the procedure of physics without either opening the doors to a Platonic heaven or closing the doors of the physical world to the full richness of the world as given. Neither the soul nor the realm of subsistence nor the brain nor the organism has satisfactorily housed the world as given—perhaps nature has not been given an adequate chance. Both within science itself and in the philosophy of science the framework of a new conception of nature is being laid which the Macedonian cries of the critical realists to panpsychism or to psychophysical dualism are not likely to check. Whatever may be the success of this undertaking, it would be fatal to forget that the possibility of holding to the existential givenness of physical objects is not in opposition to, but must rest upon a satisfactory account of the factor of mediation in knowledge and error. To have shown this in spite of its contrary conviction is the unintended, but no less valuable, gift of critical realism to the dialectic of contemporary philosophy.

CHAPTER VI

MIND AS FUNCTION

66. THE PRAGMATIC ORIENTATION

THERE remains for consideration the approach to mind in terms of the category of function, an approach distinctive of the pragmatic or instrumentalistic movement as this has developed from William James to John Dewey and George H. Mead. The pragmatic movement has been characterized by an emphasis upon the place of action in the mental life: representing "the influence of Darwin on philosophy," it has demanded the reinterpretation of philosophical problems and concepts in terms of the materials uncovered and the viewpoints gained in the biological, psychological, and sociological sciences. The resulting reinterpretation of mind is perhaps most adequately embodied in the concept of function.

A further but related factor enters into the pragmatic account through the fact that in origin and spirit pragmatism is part of the revolt against an ontological dualism. Yet while sharing with new realism the opposition to any view which isolates mind from nature, the emphasis upon the activity of the self has led many pragmatists away from a selective theory of the given. There results a metaphysics of objective relativism on which the given is regarded as a genuine part of nature even though dependent in part upon the activity of the organism. At the same time, while keeping the doctrine of the existential givenness of nature, pragmatism, in the development of the func-

tional note, has come to insist that all knowledge requires mediation. The new realists affirmed epistemological monism and existential givenness, and the critical realists denied these doctrines; the pragmatic position may be regarded as denying epistemological monism and affirming an existential givenness of physical nature. Such a mediating position opens the possibility of avoiding the new realist's difficulty with error and the critical realist's difficulty with knowledge—the factor of mediation applying to the first, the factor of existential givenness to the latter. The conception of mentality as a function within the life-process provides an opportunity to do justice to the active and systematic features of mind while admitting with the realist that mind operates within a larger non-mental setting.

Certain phases of the functional approach to mind precede or fall outside of the American pragmatic movement—of these phases only a bare mention will be made. A discussion of the functional view of mind as it appears in the thought of Peirce, James, Mead, and Dewey constitutes the major task of the chapter. The central place which Dewey holds in this development is justification for the extended consideration of his views.

67. THE MEANING OF "FUNCTION"

The term "function" has a variety of meanings—there are functionalists and functionalists. The factors common to these meanings are perhaps the connotations of process, activity, and relation. The term "function" is often used to denote the normal mode of performance of some thing or organ, as when an engine or a heart is spoken of as functioning well. Closely related to this use is the employment of the term "function" to indicate the purpose which

something fulfils, as when we speak of the function of the heart as the distribution of blood. A third use of the term indicates that a thing plays a certain rôle, as when it is said that a particular actor is Hamlet. Then there is a fourth meaning of the term, in which one variable is a function of another if, when a value is assigned to one, the second variable receives a specific value. Of these four uses, the second and third—purpose and rôle—bear specifically upon the topic of mind.

The functional theory of mind may be said to take two main directions, depending upon whether the term “function” is meant to refer to purpose or rôle. The two emphases are logically separable, even if not actually separated.^a One may, for instance, insist that mind is an instrument in the service of organic needs, that furnishing such organic aid is the function of mind, without thereby subscribing to any specific theory as to the nature of mind. Similarly, one could maintain that mentality is a characteristic of events in a certain rôle without holding that this functioning which constitutes mentality has as its purpose or function the furthering of organic behavior. The essential characteristic of the pragmatic interpretation is that both of these uses of the term “function” are employed—the theory is doubly functional: mind, on the one hand, serves the purpose of furthering organic action, while, on the other hand, mind is regarded as the functioning of events that are not intrinsically mental. Mentality, then, is similar to the status of being a paper weight, or, better, an actor: whether a specific material object is or is not a

^a Rôle involves things taking the part of other things, and performing their functions. Although a certain purpose is thereby fulfilled, the concept of rôle does not designate merely the purpose fulfilled but the vicarious and substitutive fulfilment itself. In this sense, it is true, as Dewey notes, that the difference between the two concepts is between “a wider and narrower concept of purpose. In both the concept of function has a teleological reference.”

paper weight depends upon the rôle it performs. Likewise, an actor is Hamlet in a certain situation without being always Hamlet. The same stone may or may not be a paper weight; the same person may or may not be Hamlet. In the same way a bit of reality may be mental or "in mind" one moment and non-mental and out of mind the next. The insistence upon both the instrumental and (to anticipate) the symbolic nature of mind is characteristic of the views of Dewey and Mead, and, to a less degree, of James. Not all functional thinkers, however, have held both positions. Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Vaihinger may be taken as examples of those who have held an instrumental view of the purpose of mind without explicitly developing a functional view of mind itself. It is less easy to illustrate the view that mind is a functioning of events in a certain rôle without being by nature instrumental to the guidance of behavior. However, in F. J. E. Woodbridge's article, "The Nature of Consciousness,"¹ it is maintained that mind or consciousness is simply that continuum of natural objects and events in which the component members have "become representative of each other," and this doctrine is not there developed with any reference to the demands of behavior. Likewise, certain idealists seem to approach the view that the mental aspect of reality resides in the symbolic pointing of every event to a wider context, without holding an instrumental view of this process. Since, however, this type of theory has received no adequate development, attention will be limited for the present to those who have held an instrumental view of the function of mind without explicitly developing the view that mind is a functioning of non-mental events.

¹ *Journal of Philosophy*, II (1905), 119-25.

68. SCHOPENHAUER, NIETZSCHE, AND VAIHINGER
AS INSTRUMENTALISTS

The view that mentality functions in the service of the organism has seemed to many thinkers an inevitable implication of the evolutionary point of view. It is certainly a position congenial to modern irrationalism and voluntarism. According to Schopenhauer,¹ for the most part "we find the intellect secondary and subordinate everywhere, and destined exclusively to serve the purposes of the will"; "we find the will everywhere as the *prius*; its equipment, the intellect, as the *posterius*." In general, the will provides itself with intellect "for the sake of its relations to the external world."² The exception to which Schopenhauer refers is the knowledge of the Idea, where the subject ceases to become a struggling individual and becomes "the pure will-less subject of knowledge,"³ an exception that is required in the interest of Schopenhauer's demand for salvation, but which is hardly an integral part of the instrumental theory of mind.

This view of the intellect, without the exception noted in Schopenhauer, is emphasized even more strongly in Nietzsche: biological utility as the very reason for the existence of mentality is continually insisted upon. "Knowledge works as an *instrument* of power." "*The utility of preservation . . . stands as the motive force behind the development of the organs of knowledge.*"⁴ "*Consciousness extends so far only as it is useful.*"⁵ Even logic and the categories are "merely a means to the adjustment of the world for utilitarian ends."⁶ In general, conscious

¹ *On the Will in Nature*, chapter on "Comparative Anatomy."

² *The World as Will and Idea*, ed. Haldane and Kemp, II, 406.

³ *Ibid.*, I, 230-34.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

⁴ *The Will to Power*, English ed., II, 11, 12.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 85.

life works for "the greatest possible perfection of the means (for acquiring nourishment and advancement) serving the fundamental animal functions: above all, the *ascent of the line of Life*."¹ He surmises, "perhaps the whole of mental development is a matter of the *body*: it is the consciously recorded history of the fact that a *higher body is forming*."² In this view of the biological basis and justification of mentality, Nietzsche insists upon the utility of fictions in the process. Since "the object is not 'to know,' but to schematise,—to impose as much regularity and form upon chaos as our practical needs require,"³ the aim of thought is not to conform passively to reality but rather "to *stamp* Becoming with the character of Being."⁴ Illusions and fictions are the necessary forms which thought takes in so falsifying the flux as to make it amenable to the purposes of organic life. Thought is not a passive mirror, but an active and aggressive distortion and falsification of the world of Becoming, a method of conquest, a process by which a center of power satisfies its lust for ever greater power.

A similar doctrine, influenced by Kant, is represented by Vaihinger's fictionism, a doctrine whose essential basis was formulated as early as 1876. While Vaihinger admits with Schopenhauer that thought may, at its peril, break loose from its main purpose (illustrating the law of the preponderance of means over end), he holds that the essential nature of thought lies in the fact that it is "an instrument in the service of life."⁵ Accordingly, "the object of the world of ideas as a whole is not the portrayal of reality—this would be an utterly impossible task—but rather to provide us with an *instrument for finding our way about more easily in the world*."⁶ Knowledge itself "is a secondary

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 145.

² *Ibid.*, p. 150.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 29.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 107.

⁵ *The Philosophy of "As If,"* trans. C. K. Ogden, p. 5.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

purpose and, to a certain extent, only a by-product, the primary aim being the practical attainment of communication and action."¹ When thought cannot attain its goal more directly, it resorts to the use of fictions, ideas which do not have any exactly corresponding reality, and which may even be contradictory in their own nature, but which are useful instruments in accomplishing the task of moving around in the world. Since logical processes are not a selection from reality, but a way of dealing with the world, Vaihinger insists that objective reality "does *not* consist of logical functions, as Hegel once thought."² The real clue to ethics, religion, science, and mathematics is rather to be found in the development of fictions. In such fields the lesson is enforced that "the mind is not merely appropriative, it is also assimilative and constructive."³

Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Vaihinger⁴ have brought out vividly one aspect of a functional theory of mind, namely, the position that the function of mind is to administer to organic adjustments. Many doctrines which pass popularly as pragmatic are often only an insistence upon such instrumentalism, and are frequently developed in ways that none of the foregoing thinkers, or reputable pragmatists, would allow. The facile conclusion is frequently drawn that since the task of an idea is to effect a biological adjustment, truth is simply an adjective descriptive of ideas which so "work"—that any useful idea is a true idea. Schopenhauer and Vaihinger both admit some limitation to the instrumental character of thought, and both Nietzsche and Vaihinger would insist that false

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 170.

² *Ibid.*, p. 8.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

⁴ Bergson's thought is also an important contribution to later instrumentalism. Since, however, Bergson restricts the instrumental function to intellect and does not extend it to mind in general, he continues to hold a dualistic view not acceptable to a generalized instrumentalism.

ideas may be useful, thereby implying that truth is not to be identified with useful ideas. Indeed, Vaihinger specifically opposes what he (wrongly) regards as the pragmatic view, namely, that ideas fruitful in practice are therefore true;¹ for him fictions are ideas that are false theoretically considered but nevertheless of great practical usefulness. A recognition of the biological function of thought need not, then, supply a sufficient criterion for truth and knowledge.

The view of thought as an instrument in the service of life is in fact open to two sorts of objections, since it may be pressed either too far or not far enough. It may be that much of thought is of no biological advantage whatever, but is a luxury tolerated in the biological process. Even when the intent of thought is utility, the intent may not succeed, and the thought prove fatal to the life-process. Similarly, thought may function in the service of an acquired interest whose fulfilment is disadvantageous. There is also truth in Parker's observation: "The mind, like the body, in large part—certainly in by far the largest part—is developed with reference to the external world in order to dominate it"—nevertheless, "the mind, like the organism, is a little world by itself, and so, to a certain extent, ruled by its own laws and possessed of an independent career."² The other danger is to fail to see the truth in the instrumental view when attention is centered upon the complex thought processes involved in philosophy, art, logic, and mathematics. It is a reasonable hypothesis that the most complex processes of thought are instrumental to the satisfaction of an organic need, however well the need is disguised and regardless of how the need arose.

¹ Schiller denies that any "representative pragmatist" has ever held this position (*Logic for Use*, pp. 157, 158).

² *The Self and Nature*, p. 91.

It is evident that the instrumental side of a functional view of mind is no mere national development of American pragmatists, but a doctrine conditioned by the growth of interest in biological phenomena approached from the evolutionary point of view. The distinctive contribution of the pragmatic movement lies in developing the view that mentality not merely has a biological function but that mentality is itself a specific kind of functioning of natural events. This additional dimension of the functional concept must now be considered in detail.

69. PEIRCE ON MIND AND THE SYMBOL

The pragmatic contribution to the theory of mind lies in the attempt to state in detail the particular kind of functioning which a natural event must assume in order to acquire the status of mentality. The final result is the statement of this functioning in terms of the concept of the symbol, a position prepared by Peirce, hesitatingly developed by James, and specifically formulated by Dewey and Mead.

The tremendous vitality and range of the thought of Charles Peirce is just beginning to be appreciated in philosophy, and with the materials necessary to appraise his significance only now being made available, no extended account of his views is advisable or possible at this point. However, mention must at least be made of two important topics: his instrumentalism and his emphasis upon the relation of the concept of the symbol or sign to the topic of mind.

The farthest beat of Peirce's wings in the air of idealism and logical realism places him outside of the central pragmatic movement, but in ways long familiar his insistence as early as 1877 and 1878 upon the relation of thought and meaning to action bore a rich harvest (with

intermingled tares to be sure) in the development of pragmatism.¹ Peirce insists that "the irritation of doubt is the only immediate motive for the struggle to attain to belief." And as inquiry begins with doubt, so "with the cessation of doubt it ends."² It follows that "the whole function of thought is to produce habits of action,"³ that "there is no distinction of meaning so fine as to consist in anything but a possible difference of practice."⁴ In his familiar words: "Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object."⁵

Turning to the topic of the symbol, no philosopher may be so justly regarded as the parent of modern symbolism as Peirce, and certainly no thinker has given the concept of the symbol such an extended analysis or granted it more philosophical significance. For Peirce, the concept of the sign (which he employs as the general term) is a fundamental category since "all thought . . . must be in signs."⁶

¹ See Dewey's article, "The Development of American Pragmatism," reprinted in the collection of essays entitled *Philosophy and Civilization*. Also the article, "The Pragmatism of Peirce," *Journal of Philosophy*, XXI (1916), 709-15.

² *Chance, Love and Logic*, ed. Morris Cohen, p. 16.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 43.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 44. Peirce's instrumentalism is not incompatible with his vigorous defense of the scientist's right to avoid the question of the utility of his work, a defense often couched in such extreme statements as that "true science is distinctively the study of useless things" (*Collected Papers*, ed. Hartshorne and Weiss, I, 32). While, as Professor A. W. Moore used to say, scientists simply do not go about collecting facts indiscriminately, do not for instance measure the distance from the corner of their desk to every other object in the room, an instrumentalist is perfectly consistent in maintaining that the work of the scientist is not to be disturbed by *irrelevant* considerations of practice.

⁵ *Chance, Love and Logic*, p. 45.

⁶ "Questions concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man," *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, II, 111. Peirce, in a way reminiscent of Locke, thought of logic as having for its subject matter the domain of symbols in relation to their objects (*Collected Papers*, I, 296, 297). Cf. Sidney Hook, *The Metaphysics of Pragmatism*, chap. iii; Charles W. Morris, "The Relation of Formal to Instrumental Logic," *Essays in Philosophy*, ed. Smith and Wright. Peirce writes that

A sign, which is "essentially triadic," is defined "as anything which is so determined by something else, called the Object, and so determines an effect upon a person, which effect I call its Interpretant, that the latter is thereby mediately determined by the former." Peirce adds the following significant sentence: "My insertion of 'upon a person' is a sop to Cerberus, because I despair of making my own broader conception understood."¹ This "broader conception" is connected with his metaphysical extension and orientation of the symbolic process. Peirce believed that the Interpretant (ordinarily this would be called the "meaning") becomes "in turn a sign, and so on *ad infinitum*."² Instead of the sign being for a person, "the word or sign which man uses *is* the man himself"; "that every thought is an external sign, proves that man is an external sign."³ Thus man's whole nature is symbolic. Nor can the limitation be made to man. Interpreted in terms of this metaphysics of symbolism, "Mind is a sign developing according to the laws of inference."⁴

after reading Whately's logic at an early age, he could never study anything "except as a study of Semeiotic" (*The Meaning of Meaning*, Ogden and Richards, p. 125).

¹ *The Meaning of Meaning*, Ogden and Richards, pp. 442, 443. If a sign partakes of the character of the object it is an "icon"; if it is in real relation to the object, as a footprint, it is an "index." A "symbol" does not have these characteristics, but is a sign which is "by more or less approximate certainty . . . interpreted as denoting the object, in consequence of a habit" ("Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmatism," *Monist*, XVI [1906], 495). For a detailed consideration of Peirce's view of the sign see Vols. I and II of the *Collected Papers*. It may be noted that Hegel's distinction between the symbol and the sign is the reverse of Peirce's distinction between the symbol and the icon (Wallace, *The Philosophy of Mind*, pp. 219, 220).

² "Sign," in Baldwin, *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*.

³ "Some Consequences of Four Incapacities," *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, II, 156.

⁴ *Ibid.* Note how easily Royce makes idealistic use of this position: "The world as 'the process of the Spirit' " is held to contain "its own interpretation and its own interpreter" (art. "Mind," in Hastings, *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*).

Although Peirce regards mind as inseparable from the symbolic process, he does not limit this process to its human appearances nor equate mind and the process. The symbolic process is a cosmic characteristic, rather than simply a way in which human selves utilize given events as signs of a wider environment. All of which means that the setting of Peirce's thought is at this point idealistic.¹ In so far as this is true, Peirce's functionalism is not complete in either of the two main senses of the word: he can write that cosmically "the organism is only an instrument of thought,"² and hold that mind and thought are not exhausted by the operation of signs but remain as intrinsic and non-functional characters of the universe. This last point warrants further elaboration.

As a defender of Platonic realism, Peirce held that nature is being progressively controlled by "laws" which confer upon existences "the power of working out results in this world, . . . that is to say, organic existence, or, in one word, life."³ These laws are "the eternal forms," "a world of potential being" gradually becoming uncovered and revealed.⁴ In accordance with Platonic tradition, Peirce called such laws by the terms "thought," "idea," "mind." The laws work by final rather than by efficient causation. It follows that the mental is the sphere of final causation, and human minds with their distinctive trait of living concern for the future are instances of this wider

¹ A comparison might be made to the position of Ernst Cassirer in his *Philosophie der symbolischen Formen*. The point of view is that of a dynamically conceived objective idealism in which *Geist* reveals itself through the creation of the symbols found in language, art, mythology, religion, and science. As requiring both an intellectual or a spiritual act and a sensible vehicle, the symbol becomes the key to the world-process. The task of philosophy is to give "a kind of grammar of the symbolic process as such."

² *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, II, 157.

³ *Collected Papers*, I, 96.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 350, 351.

cosmic process.¹ In spite of such statements that "every thought is a sign,"² Peirce does not even equate the finite mind with the operation of signs; he constantly talks of given phenomena as "present to the mind,"³ and describes the sign as "a vehicle conveying into the mind something from without."⁴

The pragmatic movement has not continued to develop in the Platonic and Kantian direction marked by Peirce's idealism and logical realism, partly, it is to be supposed, because of its growing contact with the biological and the psychological sciences. The movement has, however, taken even more seriously than Peirce himself his suggestions as to the relation of thought and behavior, and as to the significance of the concept of symbol or sign for a theory of mind. It has yet fully to appropriate the richness of Peirce's analysis of the symbol, and the implications of his position for logic and the philosophy of mathematics.

70. RELATION AND FUNCTION IN JAMES'S VIEWS OF MIND AND KNOWLEDGE

James developed slowly in the direction of the position which states mentality in symbolic terms. In the *Principles of Psychology* James's position is that of a dualistic realism which regards "mind knowing and things known" as two interacting and irreducible factors: "Some sort of *signal* must be given by the thing to the mind's brain, or the knowing will not occur."⁵ In knowing, "the thing remains the same whether known or not."⁶ In spite of having for the criterion of mind "the pursuance of future ends and the choice of means for their attainment,"⁷ there are

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 110, 117, 124, 127, 128, 336-37.

² *Ibid.*, p. 284.

³ *I.*, 218.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 141.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 219.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 171; cf. pp. 196, 293.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 8. Original in italics.

places in the *Psychology* where James practically identifies mental states, thought, and states of consciousness with the mere fact of experience or givenness. The stream of experience is regarded as a stream of thought; sensations are called thoughts and are regarded as intrinsically cognitive.¹ The bare suggestion that except for sensations "the stuff of which all our other thoughts is composed is symbolic"² is not followed by any treatment of the nature of the symbol. There is as yet no functional distinction of the concept from the percept, of reflective from immediate experience.

The situation had changed entirely by the time of the publication of the paper on "Does 'Consciousness' Exist?"³ Here James denies what he had previously affirmed, namely that there is any conscious stuff opposed in character to the world of natural existents, insisting instead that "*thoughts in the concrete are made of the same stuff as things are.*"⁴ In the implied treatment of thought and mind, James really proposes two answers, not contradictory to be sure, but confused and intertwined because of James's failure to make the proper distinctions. There is first the clear indication of the type of relational theory found in the

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 186.

² *Ibid.*, p. 471. Contrast the following statement with James's later views: Introspection "means, of course, the looking into our own minds and reporting what we there discover. *Everyone agrees that we there discover states of consciousness*" (*ibid.*, p. 185). In using "feeling" or "thought" to cover "every form of consciousness indiscriminately," he realizes the difficulty and admits that "we thus seem about to be forced back on some *pair* of terms like Hume's 'impression and idea,' or Hamilton's 'presentation and representation,' or the ordinary 'feeling and thought,' if we wish to cover the whole ground" (*ibid.*, p. 186)—but a functional interpretation of this duality is not given.

³ Printed in the 1904 *Journal of Philosophy*, and reprinted in *Essays in Radical Empiricism*. It should be noted, however, that even in 1884 James had defined the conceptual sign as the substitution of one precept for another, and had spoken of symbolic thought as not requiring any mind stuff that resembles the object thought about (*The Meaning of Truth*, pp. 39, 30).

⁴ *Essays in Radical Empiricism*, p. 37.

new realists, the insistence that the same bit of existence can now figure in a mental context, and now in a physical context, and now in both at once.¹ The analogy which James gives is the point of intersection of two lines. Similarly, a perceived room has connections with the series of events called "physical" at the same time that it is a member of the series of events which constitute a mind. On such a Machian basis, two or more minds may include and know the same thing.² It is in terms of this analogy that James writes that "a 'mind' or 'personal consciousness' is the name for a series of experiences run together by certain definite transitions, and an objective reality is a series of similar experiences knit by different transitions."³ The relational type of theory is primarily used by James to account for mind at the perceptual level.

At times the relational theory is applied by James to situations where it is obviously inadequate, as in the case of the relation of fire to the perceived room, where he says of the room: "In the real world, fire will consume it. In your mind, you can let fire play over it without effect."⁴ Here it is plain that the perceived fire and the imaginatively conceived fire are not just the same content in two contexts, but rather that the conceived fire is one portion of experience acting as a symbolic substitute for other portions of the world. When James himself contrasts fires which warm and burn with those which do not, and says "I account for all such facts by calling this whole [latter] train of experiences unreal, a mental train,"⁵ he has made mentality an intrinsic characteristic of some events, and in effect confessed the inadequacy of a purely relational theory.

James himself tends to shift from a relational to a func-

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 12, 14, 123-24.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 80.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 123-36.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 32, 33. "Mental fire is what won't burn real sticks . . ." (p. 33).

tional theory of mind, particularly when he passes from the perceptual to the conceptual level of experience. On this type of explanation James no longer regards thought and experience as equivalent terms, but as concept thought is now separated from percept by the function it performs, the rôle which it assumes. A concept is interpreted as a percept that has become a substitute for other percepts to which it leads and which thereby it means.¹ The domain of concepts can rise to higher and higher levels of abstraction, and it is in the noting of the relations between these concepts that the formal studies of logic and mathematics arise.² The final significance of concepts lies in their relation to perceptual existence, in the biological function they perform by admitting of mental experimentation in advance of overt action, and in rendering possible the analysis, recognition, and manipulation of the given world.³ "Whenever," James writes, "we intellectualize a relatively pure experience, we ought to do so for the sake of redescending to the purer or more concrete level again."⁴ Since the very meaning of a concept can be stated only in terms of the percepts it stands for, and the consequences for action which it suggests,⁵ truth and knowledge are to be experientially described in terms of the relation of concepts to the percepts (given events) to which they lead when acted upon.⁶

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 61-66, 201. On p. 137 James notes that the opposition of thought and things is one of function as well as relation. Chap. iv, v, and vi of *Some Problems of Philosophy* are an important source for James's theory of the concept. "The intellectual life of man consists almost wholly in his substitution of a conceptual order for the perceptual order in which his experience originally comes" (*ibid.*, p. 51).

² *Some Problems of Philosophy*, pp. 51, 52, 67-69.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 57, 63, 65.

⁴ *Essays in Radical Empiricism*, p. 97.

⁵ *Some Problems of Philosophy*, p. 60.

⁶ *Essays in Radical Empiricism*, pp. 52-61; *The Meaning of Truth*, pp. 132,

The difficulties and ambiguities in James are certainly in part due to his attempt to regard mind and knowledge as characters of both the immediate and the conceptual levels of experience, and perhaps in part to his inclination toward panpsychism. While moving in the direction of an identification of mind with the symbolic portion of experience, James does not specifically make this identification or attain a clear-cut view of the symbolic process; while expressing an attitude and approach essentially instrumentalistic, James supplies no detailed account of the relation of mental processes to the demands of action. A functionalist in both senses, James is not a thoroughgoing functionalist in either. It is not just to make too much of an isolated statement, but any position that allows even a momentary identification of thinking with the stream of breathing¹ cannot be said to have attained a satisfactory orientation to the nature of the mental.

71. DEWEY'S DOCTRINE OF EXPERIENCE AS ADJECTIVAL

The definition of mind in terms of the symbolic functioning of events is given a decisive formulation by John Dewey. That which Dewey has called the critical task of contemporary thought—"the need of thoroughgoing revision of ideas of mind and thought and their connection with natural things that were formed before the rise of experimental inquiry"²—is the distinguishing task of his own life's work. The resulting reinterpretation is an explicit functionalism in the two main senses of this word, stressing, on the one hand, that "thinking is instrumental to the control of the environment,"³ and, on the other, that

¹ *Essays in Radical Empiricism*, p. 37.

² *The Quest for Certainty*, p. 168.

³ *Essays in Experimental Logic*, p. 30.

thought and mind are functional characters of a complex interaction of natural events. Through Dewey the concepts and attitudes of the biological, psychological, and social sciences have received a philosophical formulation whose ultimate significance bids fair to loom as large as the imprint of the mathematical and physical sciences upon earlier philosophical thought. This reformulation has been made through an investigation of the processes of experimental inquiry found in science, the belief being that theories of thought and mind should be interpreted in terms of their admittedly most adequate manifestations.

The concept which has framed much of Dewey's discussion is the concept of experience. The reasons for the use of this concept are largely historical, and it cannot be said that no confusion has resulted. The issue centers around the question as to whether "experience" denotes subject matter or method. Two recent statements are typical of many others: "Experience denotes whatever is experienced, whatever is undergone and tried, and also processes of experiencing";¹ "Experience for philosophy is method, not distinctive subject-matter."² Or, to take earlier statements: Experience is "the entire organic agent-patient in all its interaction with the environment, natural and social";³ "I do not mean by 'immediate experience' any aboriginal stuff out of which things are evolved, but I use the term to indicate the necessity of employing in philosophy the direct descriptive method that has now made its way in all the natural sciences."⁴ In this later connection Dewey notes that "the significance of experience was not that sun and moon, stick and stone, are creatures of the senses, but that men would not put their trust any longer

¹ *Experience and Nature* (1st ed.), p. 8.

² *Ibid.*, p. 10.

³ *Creative Intelligence*, p. 36.

⁴ *The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy*, p. 240.

in things which are said, however authoritatively, to exist, unless these things are capable of entering into specifiable connections with the organism and the organism with them."¹

It does not seem to be unfair to Dewey's thought to state the matter in this way: Experience as subject matter always indicates an appearing character within an event field organized around and partly constituted by an organism, the appearing components of this field being "there" for the organic center of the field although not necessarily known to be there; experience as method requires that knowledge be concerned with and respectful to that which appears. On this interpretation there is no temptation to make experience a stuff, to allow an adjective to masquerade as a noun: "When 'an experience' or 'some sort of experience' is referred to, 'some thing' or 'some sort of thing' is always meant."² Nor is experience a mental appearance of a different order of reality. Rather is it a relation of naturally conditioned events to an organism within a complex organized whole of natural objects. The "seen," for instance, "involves a relation to organic activity, not to a knower, or mind."³ The view is not subjective in any derogatory sense of the term. To say to a person that he is confined to his own experience is no more damning than to tell a traveler that he can never visit the places to which he does not travel. Even if what is given is in part determined qualitatively and existentially by the organism, given events may still be characters in and of nature quite as well as the waves which the swimmer makes are waves in the sea in which he swims. As adjective, "experienced" points out that something has appeared, has been con-

¹ *Essays in Experimental Logic*, p. 62.

² *Influence of Darwin*, p. 228.

³ *Essays in Experimental Logic*, p. 256 n.

fronted, has come into a unique relation with an organic center.¹

On such a view no supplementary doctrine to the effect that an experienced content is an object of some mind or act of awareness is required.^b For Dewey:

The discrimination of something experienced from modes of experiencing is . . . the work of reflection. . . . An act of experiencing is one object, among others, which may be discriminated out of the original experience. When so discriminated, it has exactly the same existential status as any other discriminated object; seeing and thing seen stand on the same level of existentiality. But primary existence is innocent of the discrimination of the *what* experienced and the *how*, or mode, of experiencing. We are not in it aware of the seeing, nor yet of objects *as* something seen. Any experience in all of its non-reflective phases is innocent of any discrimination of subject and object. It involves within itself what may be reflectively discriminated into objects located outside the organism and objects referred to the organism.²

What is given is thus part of nature: part of an existing object, or part of an organism. The focal organism too may be given, that is, what is given may be part of the organism. In this respect the organism is like any other natural object—a point important in understanding the constant reference to the organism in Dewey's instrumentalism.

¹ "A presentation marks the existence of a thing in relation to an organism; the table before me is in view. If I close my eyes, it disappears from view:—a particular relationship ceases, namely, that to a certain part of my organism." It is an "organic relationship that conditions an appearance" ("An Empirical Account of Appearance," *Journal of Philosophy*, XXIV [1927], 451).

^b It is at this point that the present analysis diverges from the doctrine of mind as act. The act involved in the *ings* of experience is not an act of awareness or consciousness of a different order than that of the *eds*, but rather organic action and the direction of certain experienced contents. Awareness is not something in addition to givenness, but is merely an alternative expression for the same relational situation, describing it from the subject rather than the object pole. Since mind is not regarded as a unique existence, it becomes possible to conceive it in functional terms.

² *Essays in Experimental Logic*, pp. 136, 137 n. Cf. E. B. McGilvary "Experience and Its Inner Duplicity," *Journal of Philosophy*, VI (1909), 225–32.

As it stands this account of experience is inadequate both to the problems involved and to Dewey's full thought. It needs consideration in terms of wider ontological issues such as the nature of event fields and objects; it has been presented in abstraction from a theory of the self; the conditions under which an event or complex of events appears has not been adequately specified; the relation of action to appearance and to consciousness and thought has not been adequately stressed. Such matters will be more fully discussed at the proper place. However, the present account may serve to illustrate what is meant by the statement that experience is a natural event occurring under specific conditions. It may show that Dewey's thought is set in a realistic context, that the experienced world is cradled in the bosom of a wider world, the given world being part and parcel of the wider world not given. With a realization that Dewey's use of "experience" simply serves to demarcate a region of relationships among certain emergent natural events, attention can be turned to his analysis of reality at that level.

72. BEHAVIOR, CONSCIOUSNESS, AND MIND

For Dewey the organism is a going concern in a world which is a going concern. It is through the activity of an organism that the complex relational structure of events called "experience" arises. Through the activity of the organism changes arise in the surrounding world and new features of the world arise which would not have appeared in the absence of the organism. "The organism is a part of the natural world; its interactions with it are genuine additive phenomena."¹ It is on this background that Dewey's philosophy rests.

When the ongoing activity of the organism is blocked,

¹ *The Quest for Certainty*, p. 234.

there arises a situation with the character which Dewey calls "doubtful" or "tensional." It is in such situations that mind and consciousness make their appearance, serving the purpose of resolving this ambiguity so that the situation can be controlled in the service of the frustrated organic demands or interests. It should be noted that this view does not make thought instrumental to sheer activity but to specific interests. Nor does it specify the limits of such interests—they may range from the need of food to a solution of the problem of mind. The insistence is simply that thought is inseparably linked with the demands of interested behavior, and is instrumental to the satisfaction of such demands.¹

In the problematic situation "there is always something unquestioned . . . at any stage of its process."² The existence of a world can never be seriously doubted; "the facts *qua* presentations or existences are sure; *qua* meanings (position and relationship in an experience yet to be secured) they are doubtful."³ In the problematic situation certain existential qualities of the given are discriminated for the specific purpose in hand,⁴ and these "takens" are the basis upon which the thought process proceeds, the clues which suggest that which is yet to come and the way in which behavior is to move. The term "consciousness"

¹ These words of Dewey are found in Montague's *The Ways of Knowing*, p. 135 n.: "I have never taught that all needs are practical, but simply that no need could be satisfied without action. Our needs originate out of needs that at first were practical, but the development of intelligence transforms them so that there are now aesthetic, scientific, and moral needs. I have never said that thought exists for the sake of action. On the contrary, it exists for the sake of specific consequences, immediate values, etc. What I have insisted on is quite a different point, namely that action is involved in thinking and existential knowing, as part of the function of reaching immediate non-practical consequences."

² *Essays in Experimental Logic*, p. 137.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 139.

⁴ *The Quest for Certainty*, p. 178.

designates such "dubious, suspected objects—things hinted at, guessed at."¹ The actions and consequences as suggested are ideas: "To be 'in the mind' means to be in a situation in which the function of intending is directly concerned."² Mentality is a functional character. Thought is mental "not because of a peculiar stuff which enters into it or of peculiar non-natural activities which constitute it, but because of what physical acts and appliances *do*."³ For instance, "fire, running, getting burned, are not mental; they are physical. But in their status of being suggested they may be called mental when we recognize this distinctive status."⁴ Even "images are not made of psychical stuff; they are qualities of *partial* organic behaviors, which are their 'stuff.'"⁵

In this way mentality comes to mean a functional status which an event may take on at a complex level of the interaction of events—the function of indicating other events. It is such functioning that furnishes the criterion of the mental and the conscious. Mind, then, is "the presence and operation of meanings, ideas";⁶ the "state of things in which qualitatively different feelings are not just had but are significant of objective differences."⁷ In terms of behavior mind may be defined as "the ability to anticipate future consequences and to respond to them as stimuli to present behavior."⁸

The distinction between mind and consciousness is best stated in Dewey's terms: "Mind denotes the whole system of meanings as they are embodied in the workings of or-

¹ *Essays in Experimental Logic*, p. 225.

² *Influence of Darwin*, p. 104.

⁵ *Experience and Nature*, p. 291.

³ *Essays in Experimental Logic*, p. 14.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 290.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 50, 51.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 258.

⁸ *Creative Intelligence*, pp. 39, 40. Cf. in this volume Bode's essay, "Consciousness and Psychology."

ganic life; consciousness in a being with language denotes awareness or perception of meanings; it is the perception of actual events, whether past, contemporary or future, *in* their meanings, the having of actual ideas. The greater part of mind is only implicit in any conscious act or state; the field of mind—of operative meanings—is enormously wider than that of consciousness. Mind is contextual and persistent; consciousness is focal and transitive. Mind is, so to speak, structural, substantial; a constant background and foreground; perceptive consciousness is a process, a series of heres and nows.”¹ As a “connected whole” characterized by order, organization, and coherence, mind “extends beyond a particular process of consciousness and conditions it.”² Consciousness is simply “that phase of a system of meanings which at a given time is undergoing re-direction, transitive transformation”; it is not “a power which modifies events” but “the meaning of events in course of remaking.”³

In such a theory “action is at the heart of ideas.”⁴ And this in two senses: ideas arise in the process of action and function instrumentally in liberating action; ideas are a particular kind of “action” or functioning of events—events in a relation of meaning or intending. Ideas are doubly functional: functional in purpose and functional in nature.

73. DEWEY: MIND AS THE FUNCTIONING OF SYMBOLS

It is not unfair to epitomize Dewey’s position in the statement that mind denotes the symbolic functioning of events. Only when events function symbolically do they

¹ *Experience and Nature*, p. 303.

² *Ibid.*, p. 307.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 308.

⁴ *The Quest for Certainty*, p. 167.

have the characteristic of mentality.¹ Dewey himself frequently speaks the language of symbolism. States of consciousness, he writes, are "symbols."² The previously quoted statement that "the organism is a part of the natural world; its interactions with it are genuine additive phenomena," continues as follows: "when, with the development of symbols, also a natural occurrence, these interactions are directed towards anticipated consequences, they gain the quality of intelligence, and knowledge accrues."³ Ideas are described as "the promise of things hoped for, the symbol of things not seen."⁴

According to Dewey, the symbol is one particular natural object which "refers to something else of the same order of existence as itself."⁵ "The suggesting thing has to be there or given; something has to be there to do the suggesting. The suggested thing is obviously not 'there' in the same way as that which suggests; if it were, it would not have to be suggested."⁶ The value of such a symbolic event "resides in its representative character: in its suggestive and directive force for operations that when performed lead us to non-symbolic objects. . . ."⁷ Symbolic

¹ This does not deny the plurality of kinds of events—emotions are not chemical compounds. To call colors, images, and emotions "psychical" may be a proper way of marking certain differences, but it does not negate the possibility that such contents are part of the system of events which constitutes a physical object.

² "The Realism of Pragmatism," *Journal of Philosophy*, II (1905), 325. In the same volume, in an article on "The Nature of Consciousness," F. J. E. Woodbridge defended the view that consciousness can be stated in terms of representative objects, without introducing any further factor of "awareness."

³ *The Quest for Certainty*, p. 234.

⁴ *Experience and Nature*, p. 350.

⁵ "Realism without Monism or Dualism," *Journal of Philosophy*, XIX (1922), 357.

⁶ *Essays in Experimental Logic*, p. 47.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 226. In the case where a footprint suggests a man to Robinson Crusoe, the footprint is symbolic of the man, and here "the man suggested is on

events may be said to have the character of transcendence, provided it is realized that such transcendence "has nothing to do with transcending mental states to arrive at an external object. *It is behaving to the given situation as involving something not given.*"¹

The question as to whether events as suggested imply a realm of contents intrinsically mental has already been discussed in the preceding chapter. That such events may be designated as "psychical," provided that no ontological dualism is implied, has been admitted. Dewey's own view is in harmony with the previous suggestion that given events are physical in the sense of being characters of physical objects. The statement that images "are qualities of *partial* organic behaviors" has already been noted. In a similar vein, in referring to the surrogates or ideas involved in thinking of friend or enemy, Dewey writes as follows: "The ideas are qualities of events in all the parts of organic structure which have ever been implicated in actual situations of concern with extra-organic friends or enemies:—presumably in proprio-receptors and organ-receptors with *all* their connected glandular and muscular mechanisms."² The full explication of such statements is not given by Dewey, but in terms of the preceding contention that a thing is a substantive analyzable into a system of events, Dewey's position must be that surrogate objects, often called images, are component aspects of the behaving organism when the response is implicit, nascent, and tenta-

the same coercive level as the suggestive footprint." But "a gesture, a sound, may be used as a *substitute* for the thing inferred. It exists independently of the footprint and may therefore be thought about and ideally experimented with irrespective of the footprint. It at once preserves the meaning-force of the situation and detaches it from the immediacy of the situation. It is *a* meaning, an idea" (p. 432). This difference between the footprint and the idea of "man" suggests a hierarchy of symbolic levels.

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 425.

² *Experience and Nature*, p. 292.

tive. This does not mean that the image simply is a movement, but rather that the object called the "organism" is a system of events which includes under certain conditions those events which appear when one thinks of friend or enemy. Such surrogate events are not strictly present-as-absent, since as present they are not absent. What is implied is that such events help constitute the symbolic relation; "present-as-absent" refers to the whole functional process and not to abstracted components of the process.¹

On such a view meaning is relational, "the relation being the function or office of serving as a sign of something else."² Dewey introduces an important distinction between referential and immanent meaning. In referential meaning one thing signifies another—smoke means fire; in immanent meaning "events are . . . clothed with meaning on their own behalf; thus something is directly taken to be 'smoke' . . . ; the character of being smoke belongs to the event as it is observed."³ Immanent meanings are collapsed referential meanings. They arise "in consequence of the repeated successful outcome of referential or evidential meanings";⁴ "Events acquire meaning by having their potential consequences identified with them as their properties (as in the case of practically anything designated by a common noun)."⁵ Hence what is perceived are objects, events with meaning, the event having gained an immanent meaning in virtue of its previous connections with other events. It is in this way that objects are perceived: what is existentially given is a fragment out of

¹ This is not, of course, the complete story. Such an account would involve a physiological psychology.

² "Meaning and Existence," *Journal of Philosophy*, XXV (1928), 352.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 349. In both cases signification, not significance or value, is referred to.

⁴ *Ibid.*, cf. p. 351.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 348.

an organized structure, the fragment meaning the structure and being clothed with its potential consequences and connections.¹

Two additional points may be mentioned. Dewey's instrumentalistic background requires that the meaning function be seen in its behavior setting. It is under the demands of behavior that events assume the symbolic or meaningful rôle. Meanings are suggested ways out of a difficulty—"the promise of things hoped for, the symbol of things not seen." Even the more formal and definitive meanings are "rules for using and interpreting things,"² and conceptions are "definitions of consequences of operations."³ Second, it is in the phenomena of meaning that Dewey finds the explanation of that which has variously been referred to by such terms as "subsistence," "form,"

¹ Thus an instrumentalist would explain what Laird refers to as a "sign-fact." The account may also be compared with the frequent idealistic insistence that there are no brute givens, no meaningless events. G. P. Adams, for instance, uses meaning "to denote an aspect of any given content which is other than its immediacy and the presence of which stamps the given and the immediate as belonging to some wider and non-given context" ("Immediacy and Meaning," *Philosophical Review*, XXXVII [1928], 119). He then denies that any content "can be given without any trace of some . . . meaning" (*ibid.*, p. 120), the view which he regards as the fallacy of detached and self-contained immediacy. In part Adams seems only to mean that "to be aware of, to be conscious of, to be acquainted with, to discriminate and to attend to the given involves the apprehension of that which is not given" (p. 123), and interpreted in cognitional terms Dewey would not object. But if events can be given without being cognitionally given, as Dewey's view supposes, Adams' insistence that every event has meaning would involve one of two fallacies: it would either confuse the fact that a given content has a place in a wider context with the awareness or knowledge of that fact, or it would forget that immanent meaning is a concretion of referential meaning. To attribute meaning to every given, Dewey might say, is to ignore, in idealistic fashion, "the temporally intermediate and instrumental place of reflection" (*Essays in Experimental Logic*, p. 22). The idealist is of course right in insisting upon the fact that the given does have, for the most part, referential or immanent meaning, the real question being whether such meaning is native and intrinsic or acquired and functional.

² *Experience and Nature*, p. 188.

³ *The Quest for Certainty*, p. 141.

"possibility," and "essence."¹ In Dewey's system no non-existential realm of pure possibility and essentiality hovers over the ongoing system of events which constitute nature.

74. GENERAL ASPECTS OF THE KNOWLEDGE PROCESS

On this interpretation of mind, what meaning do the concepts of truth and knowledge receive? The present section will discuss the more general aspects of the knowledge process; the following section will deal specifically with the nature of truth.

Dewey's view, based on an analysis of experimental procedure, "is one that installs doing as the heart of knowing."² Knowing is an activity instrumental to the satisfaction of organic needs and interests. In virtue of the effects of objects upon the organism and the activity of the organism itself, experience arises, events appear. The stimulus itself is not given: the "qualities which are observed are those attendant upon response to stimuli. . . ."³ These given events are regarded as dependent upon the organism for their existence as well as for their appearance. This is not to say that the events are not characters of external objects—it has been argued in the preceding chapter that the characters which objects take on in the presence of other objects are "really" their characters, and a relation to an organism is no different in this respect than a relation to other objects. The position, then, is an objective relativism. In Dewey's words, "the qualities never were 'in' the organism; they always were qualities of interactions in which both extra-organic things and organisms partake." The qualities "are as much qualities of the

¹ *Essays in Experimental Logic*, pp. 49, 432.

² *The Quest for Certainty*, p. 36.

³ *Experience and Nature*, p. 336. Such qualities may, of course, be aspects of the stimulus-object.

things engaged as of the organism.”¹ The position is a generative rather than a selective theory of the given. What is given is partly constituted by the active organism, the givenness involving “a relation to organic activity, not to a knower or mind.”²

Given events do not for Dewey, in contrast to James, constitute knowledge.³ Dewey unqualifiedly rejects immediate (non-mediated) knowledge; he states that he has not “a chemical trace of interest” in epistemological monism.⁴ Knowledge always requires existential givenness⁴ but it also requires symbolic reference, and so organic action. It is in this sense that Dewey may write: “The gist of my theory about the object of knowledge is that it is mediate in one *respect* and immediate in *another*.”⁵

Given, then, a problematic situation and appearing events, the reflective process aims to resolve the problematic character of the situation so that the blocked or-

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 259.

² *Essays in Experimental Logic*, p. 256 n. Lovejoy's questioning of this last phrase depends upon the implicit view that any account of awareness must make it possible for it to have a causal influence (*The Revolt against Dualism*, pp. 104, 184-86). While his criticisms are valid against a view which admits an existential and mental act of awareness, they do not apply to a doctrine which denies the existence of any such act. On Dewey's position there is no way in which mind can be cause of the appearance of given events or of the existence of such events, since mind is itself a functioning of such events, and presupposes them. This may be contrasted to Peirce's view that a sign is “for a mind.”

³ Dewey's frequent use of “perception” to designate given events is confusing, since if perception means more than existential givenness, and among psychologists it frequently does mean more, perception is cognitional. This ambiguous word is a philosophical pitfall.

⁴ “Duality and Dualism,” *Journal of Philosophy*, XIV (1917), 491. Cf. *Influence of Darwin*, p. 80; *Experience and Nature*, p. 322.

⁵ “The analysis points to the fact that knowledge requires as its precondition an appearing object which results from an integrated interaction of all factors, the organism included, and that the completed object of knowledge is precisely such an interrelated and self-manifesting whole as includes an appearance” (“An Empirical Account of Appearance,” *Journal of Philosophy*, XXIV [1927], p. 463).

⁶ “Realism without Monism or Dualism,” *op. cit.*, p. 356.

ganic demands (the interests) obtain an open road. Hence Dewey's thesis that all judgments are judgments of practice, judgments as to what is to be done. On the one hand, reflection "must discover, it must find out, it must detect; it must inventory what is there"; on the other hand, it must suggest a way out.¹ Thus arises the isolation of data as cues for inference, and the appearance of meanings as suggested plans of action. If all statements imply "indirectly if not directly, something to be done, future possibilities to be realized in action,"² the judgment involves "a statement of what the given facts of the situation are, taken as indications of the course to pursue and of the means to be employed in its pursuit."³

With the objective of knowing conceived as the resolution of a problematic situation, what is the object of knowledge—that is, what is known?⁴ It is here that realists have frequently taken issue with Dewey. A typical statement by Dewey is the following: "The realities which we *know*, which we are sure of, are precisely those realities that have taken place in and through the procedures of knowing."⁵ More strongly stated: "The object of knowledge is a constructed, existentially produced, object."⁶ What precisely is meant by such statements?

As *The Quest for Certainty* makes abundantly clear, Dewey is opposing the view that the knower is merely a glassy eye angelically beholding a ready-made world. In place of this, he insists that knowledge plays its part in a

¹ *Essays in Experimental Logic*, p. 23.

² *Ibid.*, p. 357.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 345.

⁴ Dewey often seems to confuse the two issues by using "object" to cover both the objective of the knowledge process and the object known.

⁵ "Does Reality Possess Practical Character?" *Essays in Honor of William James*, p. 63.

⁶ *The Quest for Certainty*, p. 211.

life-process, and that both the data given and the object finally known are determined by the interaction of the inquiring subject with objects. As Dewey points out, this doctrine has a sting only if it is denied that "the aim of knowing be precisely to make *certain* differences in an environment,"¹ for if this doctrine is denied, then the differences in reality made by the organism are fatal to the purity of knowledge. If, however, knowing requires action, then what is known is a change in reality produced by acting upon an idea, the reality which appears as a result of knowing being no less dependent upon the organism than the reality prior to, and in the early stages of, the reflective process.

Several misinterpretations must be noted. Idealists are likely to take Dewey's statements as implying that the objects which mind knows are objects which mind generates; realists may interpret the position as some form of subjectivism. Neither interpretation is justified. The object is not produced by a mind, but is in part dependent upon organic action; the object is not simply a state of the subject since the changes produced in and by the organism are, on this view, actual characters in nature, as "objective" as "subjective."

Dewey himself offers a qualification not sufficiently noted. The view that "knowledge *is* reality making a particular and specified sort of change in itself"² is denied to mean that knowledge "makes a difference in the object *to be* known, thus defeating its own purpose."³ Or again: "Knowing fails in its business if it makes a change in its *own* object—that is a mistake; but its own object is none the less a prior existence changed in a certain way."⁴ In other words, the task of knowing is to effect certain

¹ "Does Reality Possess Practical Character?" *op. cit.*, p. 67.

² *Ibid.*, p. 59.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 58.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 70.

changes in reality, and thus the object of knowledge, "as an object of knowledge . . . depends upon a specific kind of practice for its existence," but as an existent this object, while partly dependent upon the organism, is a part of nature as genuinely as any other part.

The point may be illustrated by reference to a discussion provoked by Dewey's interpretation of Heisenberg's principle of indeterminacy.¹ Dewey uses this principle to show that "what is known is seen to be a product in which the act of observation plays a necessary rôle. Knowing is seen to be a participant in what is finally known."² "The principle of indeterminacy thus presents itself as the final step in the dislodgment of the old spectator theory of knowledge. It marks the acknowledgment, within scientific procedure itself, of the fact that knowing is one kind of interaction which goes on within the world. Knowing marks the conversion of undirected changes into changes directed toward an intended conclusion."³ To this argument Lovejoy replies that "it is not 'knowing' that, for the physicist, affects the momentum or the position of the electron, or even the precise determinability of these; it is the action of a certain physical process or instrument upon a certain physical entity."⁴ If I can be said truly to 'know' this physical object of reference, or any fact concerning it, I know it as it would have been if my cognitive act had not occurred."⁵

This reply is partly justified and partly beside the point. Dewey admitted in his discussion that "it is not the 'mental' phase of observation which makes the difference."⁶ Lovejoy has not seen the argument in the light of the fore-

¹ A discussion of the principle is found in Eddington's *The Nature of the Physical World*, pp. 220 ff. Heisenberg's paper is in the *Zeitschrift für Physik*, 1927.

² *The Quest for Certainty*, p. 204.

⁴ *The Revolt against Dualism*, p. 292.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 204, 205.

⁵ *Ibid.* ⁶ *The Quest for Certainty*, p. 202.

going qualification that it is not the known object which is changed by knowing but that the known object is a change in antecedent reality (which Dewey does not deny) produced by the activity of the organism in knowing. The final object which appears is not changed by the fact that it is known (this is the truth of Lovejoy's statement); the point is that what does appear and is known would not have appeared without the organic activity involved in the knowing process. Lovejoy's discussion, accordingly, does not disprove Dewey's fundamental contention that it is not a prior reality which is known but a reality into which organic action has causally entered.

Interpreted in the terms of objective relativism, Dewey's view is realistic, its uniqueness lying in the stress upon the fact that new events, owing to the interaction of organism and things, appear in the knowledge process; in the claim that the objective of knowledge is to produce by action a redirection of natural processes; and in the view that the object of knowledge is found among such redirected processes.

75. TRUTH, ACTION, AND VERIFICATION

The fact that Dewey's theory is functional in the two senses previously distinguished gives to his theory of truth a dual emphasis. It is this duality which accounts for an apparent ambiguity in the doctrine of truth. Since the reflective process is regarded as instrumental to the resolution of a problematic situation, it is natural to hold that those ideas which perform this resolution are true; since the reflective process is stated in terms of symbolic events which refer to and intend other events, it is equally natural to hold that the occurrence of the intended event constitutes the truth of the reflective process. Dewey's view accordingly contains both the notion of "successful work-

ing" and the notion of "verified prediction." Before attempting to see how these two strains are related in the analysis, the two emphases may first be distinguished.

The emphasis upon successful working appears in such statements as the following: "The test of validity of [an] idea is its functional or instrumental use in effecting the transition from a relatively conflicting experience to a relatively integrated one."¹ In *The Influence of Darwin* (p. 143) truth is identified with "the effective working of an idea"; on page 130 it is stated that "truth is the adequate fulfilment of the function of intelligence," this function being presumably to find a way out of the problematic situation. In discussing the case of a man lost in the woods, it is held that the idea is right that gets the lost man home, if "it has, *through action*, worked out the state of things which it contemplated or intended." To this Dewey adds: "Just how does such agreement differ from success?"² It is on such grounds that he finds "a somewhat startling similarity between the notions of 'success' and 'agreement.'"³ The most striking passage concerning this side of the theory of truth is found in *Reconstruction in Philosophy* (p. 156): "If ideas, meanings, conceptions, notions, theories, systems are instrumental to an active reorganization of the given environment, to a removal of some specific trouble and perplexity, then the test of their validity and value lies in accomplishing this work. If they succeed in their office, they are reliable, sound, valid, good, true. . . . That which guides us truly is true—demonstrated capacity for such guidance is precisely what is meant by truth. . . . The hypothesis that works is the *true* one." In all such statements it is implied that the test of an idea is to be found in the "exercise of the function of direction

¹ *Essays in Experimental Logic*, p. 170.

² *Ibid.*, p. 240.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 238.

or control to which the idea makes pretension or claim.”¹ Such a view seems the valid conclusion of an instrumental theory of thought.²

Nevertheless, Dewey does not anywhere simply identify useful and true ideas. It is the emphasis upon the specific intent of an idea which prohibits such an identification. It is held that personal satisfaction is relevant to truth only when such satisfaction is part of the intent of the idea.³ Stress is frequently laid upon the fact that satisfactory working depends upon the entire situation.⁴ It is stated that “it is the failure to grasp the coupling of truth or meaning with a *specific* promise, undertaking, or intention expressed by a thing which underlies, so far as I can see, the criticisms passed upon the experimental or pragmatic view of the truth.”⁵

The insistence upon specific intent introduces the element of “verified prediction” into the account. Thus the present-as-absent event must become present “if the meaning or intention of its companion or yoke-fellow is to be fulfilled through the operation it sets up.”⁶ Similarly, “fi-

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 172.

² Mead's theory of truth might seem to remain at this level. “The test of truth which I have presented is the ongoing of conduct, which has been stopped by a conflict of meanings—and in meanings I refer to responses or conduct which the characters of things lead up to” (“A Pragmatic Theory of Truth,” *Studies in the Nature of Truth*, “University of California Publications in Philosophy,” XI, 73). Truth is not the gratification which follows the solution, but “is synonymous with the solution of the problem” (*ibid.*). In regarding truth as determined by the ongoing of conduct, the element of verified prediction seems to be neglected. Mead does write that “all experimental findings are lodged in perceptual presents and they are the final touchstones of all theories” (*ibid.*, p. 80), so that both strains enter the account, but they are not adequately brought together. As the theory stands, the relation between action and perception, and the relation of truth to each, remain without adequate treatment.

³ *Essays in Experimental Logic*, p. 322 n.

⁴ *The Influence of Darwin*, pp. 155, 166.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 95 n.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 90. Original in italics.

nal certitude can never be reached except experimentally—except by performing the operations indicated and discovering whether or no the intended meaning is fulfilled *in propria persona*.¹ Truths are identified with “specific verifications”;² verification refers to the process, truth to the “product, as process telescoped and condensed.”³ The term “prediction” is specifically used in reference to the reflective process.⁴ In the case of knowledge of a star “the visible light is a necessary part of the evidence on the basis of which we infer the existence, place, and structure of the astronomical star, *and some other perception* is the verifying check on the value of the inference.”⁵ With truth conceived as a verified prediction,⁴ error would consist in the appearance of something other than that intended or claimed in the prediction.

That Dewey means to unite the two emphases upon successful working and verified prediction is sufficiently clear. Such a reconciliation is implied in the definition of truth as “processes of change so directed that they achieve an intended consummation.”⁶ It is certainly present in the statement that “any idea or proposition is relevant to its *own* problematic situation in which it arises and which it

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 103 n.

² *Ibid.*, p. 109.

⁴ *Essays in Experimental Logic*, p. 15.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 140.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 260. Italics mine.

^d When a verification process begins, there are implicit behavior processes involved in the expected appearance of what has been claimed. With the appearance of the predicted referent, these implicit processes are at the same time released, and here is the truth of Mr. Mead's contention that truth always involves the ongoing of conduct. It should not be concluded, however, that the process of verification is completely statable in terms of conduct, or that any release of blocked behavior by an idea verifies the truth of that idea.

For the relation of truth concerned as verified prediction to conduct and to verification, see my series of articles: “The Prediction Theory of Truth,” *Monist*, Vol. XXXVIII (1928); “Neo-Pragmatism and the Ways of Knowing,” *ibid.*; “Truth, Action, and Verification,” *ibid.*, Vol. XLII (1932).

⁶ *Experience and Nature*, p. 161.

intends to resolve. As far as it does resolve it, it is validated or is 'true.'"¹ Indeed, if the intent of the idea is to succeed in resolving the ambiguity of a situation in the service of organic needs and interests, then such success would be precisely the verification of the idea in question.

If it be granted that only that which is intended by an idea is relevant to the truth of the idea, the sole question at issue is whether every idea is a plan of action and every judgment a judgment of what is to be done. If this is not so, then of course successful working is not relevant to the truth of an idea when such success is not intended by the idea. To Dewey's question whether all statements of fact do not imply, "indirectly if not directly, something to be done, future possibilities to be realized in action," an affirmative reply might add that even if every judgment is instrumental to the resolution of behavior problems, and so *implicitly* a judgment of practice, only that which is *explicitly* intended by the judgment is relevant to its truth or falsity.² Such a reply would not be in opposition to Dewey's view. He admits that "the endeavor to control inference as to consequences (so as to reduce their likelihood of error) leads to propositions where the knowledge-object of the perceived thing is not something to be done, but the cause which produced it."³ In this event, scientific propositions are "not, as such, about things to do, but about things which have been done, have happened—'facts.' But they have reference, nevertheless, to infer-

¹ "In Reply to Some Criticisms," *Journal of Philosophy*, XXVII (1930), 274, 275.

² It must be admitted that even the explicit judgment is often wider than a bare examination of the verbal proposition would reveal, but in spite of this qualification it does not seem that every judgment is explicitly a judgment of practice. R. B. Perry stressed this point ("A Review of Pragmatism as a Theory of Knowledge," *Journal of Philosophy*, IV [1907], 368, 369).

³ *Essays in Experimental Logic*, p. 400.

ences regarding consequences to be effected. They are the means of securing data which will prevent errors which would otherwise occur," it being admitted that scientists need not be conscious of this further reference.¹ Couple this admission with the recognition that reflection "must inventory what is there" in the situation in order to suggest a way out,² and it becomes possible to maintain that while a judgment occurs within a problematic situation and is instrumental to find a way out, a specific judgment may claim to describe or to predict events rather than to claim explicitly to guide behavior—and in this case, not being intended, success in behavior is irrelevant to the truth or falsity of this judgment. Instrumental guidance then becomes a judgment *about* ideas rather than the specific intent *of* every idea. An instrumentalist may accept the Baconian distinction between experiments of light and experiments of fruit, in the sense that not all predictions claim fruitful results. The instrumentalist will add, however, that all predictions appear within a tensional behavior situation to which they are implicitly instrumental even when not explicitly so.³

76. KNOWLEDGE AS INVOLVING RELATIONAL STRUCTURE

A return can now be made to the question previously raised: What precisely is known? In the light of the discussion of truth it cannot merely be answered, "the change

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 401.

² *Ibid.*, p. 23.

³ In accepting this distinction between "implicit" and "explicit," and the interpretation of explicit intention, Dewey adds this important comment: "When I writing afresh I fancy I should try to show that purely instrumental ideas are outside the province of truth and falsity—that is, as tools they are good or bad rather than true or false. And the point about judgments of practice could be better stated to the effect that the *structure* of all judgments is, with various degrees of indirectness, derived from that of intentional judgments of practice. Probably the statement about ideas as plans of action (ultimately derived from Royce) would have to be developed through reference to different kinds of action—including symbolic action—and qualified by limitation to ideas of a definite"

in reality produced by acting upon the idea," for simply as an existent, however produced, such change is neither true nor false. If it is only the appearance of what is intended that is relevant to the truth or falsity of the idea, then what is known is that some prior appearance is related through intent to a wider context into which action has entered. Knowledge, accordingly, is irreducibly relational. Even to know a certain appearance as water requires the fulfilment of a prediction as to a wider relational context of the appearance. What is known is that a certain appearance, indicated by the subject of the judgment, is related to other events in the way predicted by the judgment. Even to say "I now experience red" means that what is now given has the characters of that sort of event referred to by the symbol "red." In judgments of perception the claim and its verification are compresent, but the symbolic or meaning factor must be there if the situation can be dignified by the claim to knowledge. Although such judgments need further consideration as limiting cases, they need not be interpreted as exceptions to the view that knowledge is always the verification of the ascription of a presented content to a wider context. Nor can there be any reasonable doubt but that the mediation involved in knowledge is intimately connected with the problems of behavior, and takes place only through action.

Dewey would add two propositions to this account: (1) that all judgments are instrumental to the furthering of organic demands by effecting intended changes in reality through action upon the idea; (2) that pre-judgmental

cognitive purport. About other 'ideas' the only claim would be that *genetically* they follow the pattern of plan-of-action ideas." In this statement the first sentence removes all ambiguity from Dewey's account of truth by giving a clear distinction between the factors of success in behavior and the verification of a prediction. The final sentence is not incompatible with the position that those ideas which have no explicit cognitive import nevertheless play an adjustmental rôle in the behavior process.

appearances as well as those appearances which terminate the reflective process are dependent upon the interaction of the organism and objects.

The first proposition has in part already received discussion. Whether or not all reflective processes arise in behavior difficulties need not be decided in the present connection. In intricate cases experimental verification seems difficult or impossible. That the view is highly probable seems incontestable; that it is a fruitful directive hypothesis is certain. In any case, as has been pointed out, it need not be held that all judgments are explicitly and in intent judgments of practice, whatever be their relation to the behavior process. The claim that every idea is a plan of action or a component member of such a plan would then be a (highly probable) proposition *about* ideas and not a claim made *by* or *in* every idea.

The nature of this distinction may be illustrated by reference to Dewey's discussion of knowledge of the past. Holding that "verification of thought about the past must be present or future,"¹ knowledge of the past becomes "knowledge . . . of the present and future as implicating a certain past."² Dewey concludes: "Once recognize that thoughts about the past hang upon present observable events and are verified by future predicted or anticipated events which are capable of entering into direct presentation, and the machinery of transcendence and of epistemological dualism (or monism) is in so far eliminated."³ This concluding clause is not without ambiguity: it might seem to deny any reference to the past.⁴ But if transcendence

¹ "Realism without Monism or Dualism," *op. cit.*, p. 310.

² *Ibid.*, p. 309.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 316.

⁴ Dewey notes: "There *is* an ambiguity in the word transcendence. The sense which is denied is that of Lovejoy, which has had a pretty constant epistemological use: starting with a purely mental state as psychic and then conferring upon it a capacity to refer to something non-psychical."

be, in terms Dewey uses elsewhere, "behaving to the given situation as involving something not given," there can be no ground for eliminating such transcendence. At this point the importance of the distinction noted above becomes clear. "It is conceivable," Dewey writes, "that specific reference to the past is, after all, only part of the procedure of making judgment about the present as adequate as possible."¹ This is Dewey's own position: "The past occurrence is *not* the meaning of the proposition. It is rather so much stuff upon the basis of which to predicate something regarding the better course of action to follow, the latter being the object meant."² In reply to this article Lovejoy holds that Dewey confuses object and objective—the object referred to being the past event, whatever be the objective which led to the making of the judgment. The foregoing analysis confirms this position. Grant the distinction in question and there is no need of denying that judgments may refer to the past without explicit reference to a course of conduct to be pursued. It is of course possible, as Dewey holds, that judgments about the past are made only in situations demanding a direction of future action, but this further possibility does not negate the fact that the explicit reference in such judgments is to the past.³

¹ "Realism without Monism or Dualism," *op. cit.*, p. 312.

² *Ibid.*

³ Dewey notes: "I never meant to question that some judgments make explicit reference to the past, nor that in some judgments this is the only *explicit* reference. My problem was rather the meaning of such judgments for logical theory." Dewey's answer to this problem, noted above, is confirmed by Mr. Mead's similar analysis of judgments about the past in the first lecture of the 1930 Paul Carus Foundation Lectures. Holding that "the estimate and import of all histories lies in the interpretation and control of the present," Mr. Mead maintains that "we test our conjectures about the past by the conditioning directions of the present and the later happenings in the future, which must be of a certain sort if the past we have conceived was there." On this view the concept of an absolute past which is not relative to the present problem "plays no part in our judgments of the correctness of the past"; new problems in new presents demand new pasts. The assumption of a past not so related to the present must

In judgments about the past, no direct intuition of the past event or existent is possible, since the event cannot appear *in propria persona*. That certain other observers claim, or claimed, to have had judgments verified, that we have found A repeatedly to lead to B and so have reason to believe that B in the present signifies that A did happen, that objects have a temporal span which links present and vanished characters, and that we ourselves can make records of present events to be used as checks on our future memory claims—these considerations remove reflection on the past out of the domain of fancy; they do not remove it out of the domain of probability. And probability is a concept worthy of the deepest respect.¹

be based on metaphysical reasons, since it is not an assumption necessarily implied in the making of historical judgments. To the present writer, Mr. Mead's statement as embodied in the preceding sentence is correct, but while Mr. Mead contents himself with exploring the methodology of such judgments, those instrumentalists of realistic persuasion will want to hold (metaphysically) that just as existence is not exhausted by given existence, so the "present present" is not the only present which has been, and that these presents-which-were-but-are-no-more supplied the conditions out of which the present existents emerged. Thoughts about such past existents are in the present, but not these existents themselves. The whole problem of the past is a thorny one, but the foregoing distinction between "implicit" and "explicit" makes it possible to hold (if, indeed, not necessary to hold) a more realistic conception of the past than Mead and Dewey sometimes seem to hold, while nevertheless admitting their contention that implicitly all such judgments are instrumental to the control of the present.

¹ It may be noted that in certain important respects historical judgments do not differ from judgments concerning present existences. In both cases a given content is used as a basis to predict the conditions, attendants, and consequences of the content itself. Both judgments are of the form, "If A can be regarded as so and so, then, B, C, and D can be expected to turn up under search." To affirm A because B, C, and D are found is regarded in logic as a fallacy, but if B, C, and D are *specified as sufficient criteria*, then, for the purpose in hand, the verification is as complete in one case as in the other. All judgments concerning objects, whether present or past, have a hypothetical character unless they are given an a priori or definitive status (cf. C. I. Lewis, *Mind and the World-Order*). In this respect a judgment concerning objects which no longer exist is capable of the same sort of verification as one concerning a present object. The only relevant difference is that in the first case the specific condition that the past

The second of the propositions referred to above arises out of Dewey's conviction that what appears is a genuine additive event emergent in the interaction of organism and things. The resulting view is a generative rather than a selective theory of the given. "Sense organs, neurones, and neuron connections are certainly involved in the occurrence of a sense quality."¹ Nevertheless, qualities have an existential status; they are "as much qualities of the things engaged as of the organism."² This restoration of "immediate qualities to their rightful position as qualities of inclusive situations"³ Dewey regards as "the only complete and unadulterated realism."⁴

There is no place in this account for the view of the new realists that what appears qualitatively is merely selected by the behavior of the organism. From first to last the world that appears is a world into which action has causally entered. Two consequences result. Since sense-data differ from individual to individual, and from time to time in the same individual, an objectivity or community of knowledge would be impossible if the bare appearance of an event were to be conceived as a knowledge revelation of its generating conditions. If, on the other hand, knowledge always involves a relational structure, the qualitative differences in what appears to various individuals would not negate the possibility of common knowledge. It

object or the past character of a present object be directly confronted cannot be fulfilled. The confidence in judgments concerning the past is therefore somewhat less than that in judgments concerning present existents, but not of a different order. In both cases of judgment, the confidence rests in the last analysis on the observed fact that B involves A as a condition of its occurrence. The more often A is found when B suggested its presence, the greater the confidence in the right to infer the past happening of A when B alone is given.

¹ *Essays in Experimental Logic*, p. 407.

² *Experience and Nature*, p. 259.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 265.

⁴ *The Quest for Certainty*, p. 240.

is noteworthy that the greatest objectivity and community of knowledge is found precisely in those fields where emphasis upon relational structure is the greatest.¹ The second consequence is that prior existence—existence prior to and causally independent of action—cannot appear or be known.² What already exists can never appear since what appears is always an emergent character produced by the interaction of prior existences. It results that the largest part of nature cannot appear or be known, indeed *nothing existing at the moment of action can ever be given*. A great range of nature is not only unknown but is literally unknowable. This does not mean that objects existing at the moment of action cannot through action take on new aspects which are given. In this sense, the prior existence is given. The point is rather that the given and known world is the world into which action has entered.

It is primarily the claim that what does appear is an event in nature existentially given—the element of objective relativism—which distinguishes this view from a critical realism which grants to the object only those characters which it has independently of any interaction with an organism. On both analyses that which appears owes its appearance, and in part its existence, to an organism, and both views regard such appearances as the vehicles of knowledge. The advantage which the objective relativist

¹ This view is stressed in Lewis, *op. cit.*, and in Cassirer, *Substance and Function*. Lewis' volume is an important contribution to the pragmatic movement.

² Such prior existence is of course presupposed in the very statement of a generative theory. Dewey writes: "I, too, conceive that things had in direct experience exist prior to being known"—the object of knowledge being "a deliberately effected re-arrangement or re-distribution, by means of overt operations, of such antecedent existences" ("In Reply to Some Criticisms," *Journal of Philosophy*, XXVII [1930], 273). To say that such existences cannot be known is only to distinguish verified claims from probable claims. Of course, if propositions in the higher ranges of probability are included in knowledge, prior existences might be said to be known.

may claim is that the recognition of existential givenness of nature allows, in many cases, the idea to be directly confronted by that which it intends, thereby giving a test to such knowledge-claims. Nevertheless, too much cannot be claimed for this advantage, since even here claims concerning a large part of nature cannot be directly verified or refuted. And in regard to the basic contention that there are realities prior to and independent of that which appears, both forms of realism must make their pious bow to the category of probability, though the critical realists confuse the issue by calling this bow "knowledge."

Dewey's form of objective relativism shares with new realism the doctrine that nature is existentially given. It differs from new realism in admitting the mediation through symbols necessary to make the existence of error intelligible.¹ The fundamental difference, however, lies in the acceptance in the one case and the denial in the second case of a generative theory of the given. Those who hesitate to accept the second implication of Dewey's position, while agreeing with his instrumentalism and theory of mind, would have to uphold some form of a selective theory.² Such a view is of course possible, and its development would be of interest. The central problem such thinkers would have to meet would be the overwhelming evidence that in many cases the organism helps to produce rather than select what is given. In the event that a combination of the generative and selective views was attempted (based, say, on the difference between quality and structure), the problem of drawing the line between selected and generated appearances would become the cru-

¹ For Dewey's summary of the advantages of the denial of epistemological monism, see the *Essays*, pp. 407 ff.

² Such a combination of pragmatism and new realism is suggested and partially developed in E. B. McGilvary's "Realism and the Physical World," *Journal of Philosophy*, IV (1907), 683-92.

cial issue. In neither case, however, is a change in the theory of mind demanded; the problem is rather one of the nature of objects and of the limits of experience and knowledge.

77. MIND AS SOCIAL

There is one aspect of Dewey's treatment of mind that must receive specific mention, and that is the conception that mind is intrinsically social. Although pragmatism has always emphasized the relation of mind to action, and has always been behavioristic in the larger non-Watsonian sense of stressing the central importance of behavior for philosophy (its radical empiricism prevents it from adopting the oversimplified metaphysics of Hobbes, Watson, and Weiss), Dewey has consistently opposed the tendency to find the seat of mind in the individual brain or nervous system, and has stressed a position that might be called "social behaviorism."¹ Admitting that mind is the symbolic functioning of experience, Dewey has increasingly come to regard this functioning as of social origin. While believing that "the identification of knowing and thinking with speech is wholly in the right direction,"² and while not doubting "that vocalization, including overt laryngeal changes, furnishes the mechanism of the greater part (possibly the whole) of thought-behavior,"³ Dewey regards the Watsonian type of behaviorism which neglects the social situation, and which makes language a bare succession of movements in the vocal cords or movements substituted for these movements, as giving a grossly oversimplified "subcutaneous" theory of the mental processes.⁴ For Dewey the heart of language is not the expression of

¹ *Experience and Nature*, pp. 290-95.

² "Knowledge and Speech Reaction," *Journal of Philosophy*, XIX (1922), 561.

³ *Ibid.*, XI (1914), 510.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 509-11.

antecedent thought, or the bare fact of vocal-cord movements, but "the establishment of coöperation in an activity in which there are partners, and in which the activity of each is modified and regulated by partnership."¹ While animals respond to stimuli of the substitutive sort, as when the hen moves away at the farmer's motion of throwing food, a child learns to react to sounds and actions "as signs of an ulterior event so that his response is to their meaning. He treats them as means to consequences. The hen's activity is ego-centric; that of the human being is participative. The latter puts himself at the standpoint of a situation in which two parties share. This is the essential peculiarity of language, or signs."² On this theory, animals, not having language, are not regarded as having minds.³ Mind is an emergent character at the level of social or co-operative behavior.⁴ The factor of meaning or mentality which language makes possible is then extended to other events, so that the ultimate origin of mentality is social.⁵ Finally: "Thinking as implicit speech . . . represents the social situation carried over into the habits of the organism. One talks to himself as a way of anticipating objective consequences (that is, consequences into which the environment enters) before they happen."⁶ Dewey occasionally speaks of the "body-mind"⁷ in emphasizing the relation of mentality to behavior, but such remarks should not be allowed to obscure his general doctrine that mind is the

¹ *Experience and Nature*, p. 179.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 177, 178.

³ *Experience and Nature*, pp. 185, 282.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 170, 258. "Meanings do not come into being without language, and language implies two selves involved in a conjoint or shared undertaking" (*ibid.*, p. 299; cf. pp. 185, 187).

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 174.

⁶ Ratner, *The Philosophy of John Dewey*, p. 103.

⁷ *Experience and Nature*, p. 277.

symbolic functioning of portions of experience, and that the ultimate source of all symbols, and so of mind, is the language process.

78. MEAD'S ANALYSIS OF THE SYMBOL AND THE SELF

Dewey has always thought in terms of the category of the social, but his identification of the symbol with the language symbol represents, in part at least, the influence of Mr. George H. Mead.¹

In all important respects Mr. Mead's general position is the same as Mr. Dewey's. There is the same emphasis upon the instrumental functioning of thought in the service of conduct, knowledge arising within the given world there is there before, and presupposed by, the knowledge process; the same belief that "emergent life changes the character of the world," given characters being the characters which objects wear in the presence of organisms;² the same conviction that mind is the symbolic functioning of events, "an evolution in nature in which culminates the sociality which is the principle and the form of emergence";³ the same earnest concern for the direction and enrichment of human life through the refinement and expansion of the process of intelligence.³ Within this common framework (which he himself helped to create) Mr. Mead

¹ Dewey writes: "I should be glad to have the statement of my indebtedness to Mead made even stronger. It stems in part from Peirce and Royce, but only after and through Mead." Concerning this influence, Dewey notes elsewhere, "I dislike to think what my own thinking might have been were it not for the seminal ideas which I derived from him" ("George Herbert Mead," *Journal of Philosophy*, XXXVIII [1931], 311).

² "The Genesis of the Self and Social Control," *International Journal of Ethics*, XXXV (1925), 254, 257.

³ From the manuscript of the Paul Carus Foundation Lectures, delivered in 1930 under the title "The Philosophy of the Present."

³ See his "Scientific Method and the Moral Sciences," *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. XXXIII (1923).

worked with rare constancy upon the intimate details of the correlative rise of the mind and the self.¹ For his later thought, the "taking of the rôle of the other," which is central in his account of the symbol, is envisaged as the high form of the social character of the emergent world-process, the character revealed by the "capacity of being several things at once."

For Mead, mind is not a substance and is not located in the brain; rather, it is the functioning of significant symbols. Such symbols arise, he holds, only in a social process. The private life of mind is an internalization of the objective speech process. There is no signification without reference to both the self and others.² Animals lower than man are regarded as having gestures that are significant to others but not to themselves (p. 160). The self and the significant symbol arise together in those situations where one participant can assume the rôle of the other, stimulate himself as the other would stimulate him, and respond to this stimulation in the light of the potential responses of the other. Thus "it is through the ability to be the other at the same time that he is himself that the symbol becomes significant" (p. 161). Speech makes this possible, for in talking to others one stimulates one's self at the same time in a way similar to the stimulation received when others are talking. In general terms, "the significant symbol is then the gesture, the sign, the word which is addressed to the self when it is addressed to another individual, and is addressed to another, in form to all other individuals, when

¹ A just account of his thought on these matters is not possible here. The fragmentary reference to Mr. Mead's cosmology may be expanded by reference to his *The Philosophy of the Present*. For the account of the symbol in social terms, attention may be called to a volume of Mr. Mead's writings which will appear under the title, *Mind, Self, and Society*.

² "A Behavioristic Account of the Significant Symbol," *Journal of Philosophy*, XIX (1922), 162. The four page references in the paragraph are to this article.

it is addressed to the self" (p. 162).¹ In the employment of significant symbols the user is anticipating a social situation, that is, anticipating the effects upon others of the symbols used, and controlling himself in the light of these effects. This situation may be further internalized, so that one becomes the other to one's self. Thinking, as opposed to overt talking, becomes the conversation of the self with the "generalized other" (p. 162). In moral conflicts in particular it is not unusual to be aware of an inner conversation, one member of which is the voice of the desires and urges of the individual, while the other member is the voice of the generalized other, the social phases of the self, the social attitudes reflected in the voice of conscience. Whenever a person acts in the light of what "people" will say, the situation which Mead so acutely describes is unmistakable. On this doctrine, "it is only in the organized conduct of men that the bare relatedness of events and things can pass over into meaning, that meaning can invest events and things."²

The functional theory of mind as developed by Dewey and Mead involves the position that symbols are social in nature, that language is the matrix of mind and meaning. Since the vocal gesture is given pre-eminence in the account, the Mead-Dewey theory of the symbol is a social-vocal theory. The questions raised by this theory must await a later discussion of the symbol and the self. At that time a wider use of the concept of the symbol will be advocated, a use which admits the overwhelming importance of the social and vocal phases of the symbolic process while allowing the extension of the term "mind" to certain ani-

¹ Cf. "The Objective Reality of Perspectives," *Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy*, pp. 79, 80.

² "A Pragmatic Theory of Truth," *Studies in the Nature of Truth*, "University of California Publications in Philosophy," XI, 80.

mals and to situations that are not essentially social. For the present it is only necessary to emphasize that no other doctrine of the symbol or theory of the self has done such justice to the neglected social phases of mind or has gathered such a rich harvest to support the identification of mind and the symbolic process.

79. DEWEY'S METAPHYSICAL BACKGROUND: EMERGENT REALISM

A final glance may be given at the background upon which Dewey has developed his symbolic version of a functional theory of mind. The supporting world-view is an emergent metaphysics, mind being conceived as one level of the interaction of natural events. Within the world-process whatever differences between natural events exist are frankly admitted—only it is recognized that these events appear within a process: "Nature has both an irreducible brute unique 'itselfness' in everything which exists and also a connection of each thing (which is just what *it* is) with other things such that without them it 'can neither be nor be conceived.' " Nature has "heres, nows, perspectives—as many as there are existences."¹

Experienced events are among such natural events. They constitute one level of natural processes—events emergent upon the presence of organisms, genuine additive phenomena in the world-process, presupposing a simpler level of interacting organisms and things. Such interactions "eventuate in objects preceived to be colored and sonorous"; even tertiary qualities "are as much products of the doings of nature as are color, sound, pressure, perceived size and distance."² As natural happenings, given events are not instances of consciousness or knowledge.

¹ "Half-hearted Naturalism," *Journal of Philosophy*, XXIV (1927), 63.

² *The Quest for Certainty*, p. 239.

Under certain conditions such events assume a symbolic status—and mind has emerged. The mental emerges from the domain of organic life (which Dewey calls the level of the psychophysical) as this in turn emerges from the physical,¹ these three terms denoting “levels of increasing complexity and intimacy among natural events.”² Envisaged in this way, the world is not solely “an interplay of masses in motion, without sound, color, or any quality of enjoyment and use.”³ for “when life and mind are recognized to be characters of the highly complex and extensive interaction of events, it is possible to give natural existential status to qualities,”⁴ to give them even a causal status as events releasing action.⁵

Given events have been called “appearances,” but this does not imply that they are “mere” appearances contrasted to a noumenal realm of the “real”: “‘Seeming’ does not signify that something seems to exist, but that a certain object seems to be pointed to: ‘Seeming’ denotes an essayed, but temporarily blocked, inference.”⁶ Appearances are not intrinsically representative of their causes or of other events. They may be taken as clues to, indications of, other events, and truth and knowledge enter when the events intended are found to occur. Applied to scientific thought, the implication is that experienced events are not to be conceived as the subjective appearance of scientific objects. For Dewey the problem of “reconciling” experience and scientific objects is a factitious prob-

¹ *Experience and Nature*, p. 271; cf. p. 290.

² *Ibid.*, p. 261. G. T. W. Patrick has considered the relation of mind to the doctrine of emergent evolution in his book, *What Is the Mind?*

³ *The Quest for Certainty*, p. 104.

⁴ *Experience and Nature*, p. 265.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 268.

⁶ “An Empirical Account of Appearance,” *Journal of Philosophy*, XXIV (1927), 462.

lem since the scientific object is not a duplicate real object, but the designation of an abstracted relational structure. "The 'real' or 'true' objects of science are those which best fulfil the demands of secure and fertile inference."¹ The relation of experience to scientific objects is not a meta-physical relation of appearance to reality.

On Dewey's realistic world-view, the given is regarded as the foreground of a wider process of nature. If knowledge is concerned with the foreground, what can plausibly be said of the background? Dewey writes: "My 'meta-physical principle' is that the related foreground may be taken as a method for determining the traits of the background."² The foreground, as one aspect of reality, can be taken as a sample for descriptive generalization (to use Whitehead's phrase), a sample for a plausible reading of "the more ultimate traits of the world." So taken, "time itself, or genuine change in a specified direction, is itself one of the ultimate traits of the world irrespective of date."³ Likewise, "the evolution of life and mind indicates the nature of the changes of physico-chemical things and therefore something about those things." This evolution "makes impossible a purely mechanistic metaphysics," but "it does not signify that the world 'as a whole' is vital or sentient or intelligent."⁴

80. A COMPARISON OF FUNCTIONALISM AND THE FIVE ALTERNATIVE THEORIES OF MIND

Dewey has stated in striking terms the outcome of the development in the notion of mind traced in the theories which have passed across the preceding pages as across

¹ *Essays in Experimental Logic*, p. 437.

² "Half-hearted Naturalism," *op. cit.*, p. 60 n.

³ "The Subject-Matter of Metaphysical Inquiry," *Journal of Philosophy*, XII (1915), 345.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 344.

preceding centuries, and has stressed the significance of this outcome:

· If such changes do not constitute, in the depth and scope of their significance, a reversal comparable to a Copernican revolution, I am at a loss to know where such a change can be found or what it would be like. The old center was mind knowing by means of an equipment of powers complete within itself, and merely exercised upon an antecedent external material equally complete in itself. The new center is indefinite interactions taking place within a course of nature which is not fixed and complete, but which is capable of direction to new and different results through the mediation of intentional operations. . . . Mind is no longer a spectator beholding the world from without and finding its highest satisfaction in the joy of self-sufficing contemplation. The mind is within the world as part of the latter's own on-going process. It is marked off as mind by the fact that wherever it is found, changes take place in a *directed* way, so that a movement in a definite one-way sense—from the doubtful and confused to the clear, resolved and settled—takes place. From knowing as an outside beholding to knowing as an active participant in the drama of an on-going world is the historical transition whose record we have been following.¹

The resulting functional account of mind as illustrated in the views of Mead and Dewey diverges from each of the five other theories which have been considered, and yet preserves in a remarkable way the dominant theme of each of them. On the formulation of mind in terms of the symbol, mind is not a substance or a substantive, not a universal realizing itself through differences, not a collection of psychic units, not a searchlight of awareness, and not simply a relation of neutral contents to a responding organism. Nevertheless, on this approach mind has a degree of unity and substantiality, since a particular nexus of symbolic activity has some degree of independence and some persistence through time; mentality is recognized to be a systematic process, but one which draws its lifeblood from the dynamics of action and not from a bloodless universal; an object of consciousness is admitted to be an ob-

¹ *The Quest for Certainty*, pp. 290, 291.

ject of response, even though not an object which in some virginal way owes nothing to the response while entering into its presence; mind is admitted to be a matter of relation, provided that the relation is regarded as one of function rather than of simple grouping; although mind is not regarded as a collection of psychic events, it is agreed that mind involves certain characters of physical events which may, if desired, be called "psychical" in order to distinguish them from other characters of physical objects; while the act of awareness is denied, a place is found for the doctrine of intentionalism when interpreted literally in terms of a symbolically mediated intention of an active self; even though not simply identifiable with the organism or nervous system, mind on the symbolic theory is so intimately related to action that the self literally becomes the "minded organism."

Because of its synthetic character, such a theory is able to take into itself the positive insights of the rival theories without being forced into the predicaments met in those theories when individually taken as adequate. Within its spacious framework it may claim to do justice to error, to truth, to memory, to imagination, and to the highest complexities of the thought processes represented in the formal structures of the mathematician. In addition to its philosophical implications, the symbolic theory of mind has obvious and intimate bearings upon the problems and materials of the psychologist, the sociologist, the biologist, and the psychopathologist. When set in a realistic world-view, this theory is able to include the cosmic sweep of the worship of the Russellian free man, without the paralyzing impotence which comes from breaking the connection of mind with action and through action with the wider processes of nature—processes which, to some unknown degree, are amenable to human purpose. It gives signifi-

cance, in Mr. Mead's words, to the substitution of "the goal of a society aware of its own values and minded intelligently to pursue them, for the city not built with hands eternal in the heavens," whether that heaven be the *civitas dei* or the subsistential domain of the Platonist or the aloof and virginal physical world of certain realists.

But to sail these uncharted seas which rise beyond the present horizon demands a ship of deeper keel than this more cautious vessel which has carried us to older and less unfamiliar ports.

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